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General introduction 
Alongside the free movement of goods, persons and services, 
the free movement of capital within the Community is one 
of the basic freedoms laid down by the Treaty establishing 
the EEC. 
However, lifting the restnct10ns in this field was over a 
long period considered a secondary objective of European 
integration. Indeed, there was relatively little capital mobility 
between the various Member States at the start of the 1980s 
compared to the considerable progress which had been made 
on intra-Community trade and the spectacular development 
of international financial relations through the Euromarkets. 
In just a few years, the target of fully liberalizing capital 
movements has become a key element in the drive for econ-
omic and monetary union in the Community. At the Com-
mission's proposal, the Council is currently examining a set 
of texts aimed at completing the process of liberalizing 
capital movements in the Community. 
The purpose of this publication is to set out the main stages 
in the thinking which has led the Commission to present its 
proposals, and to describe both the reasons behind the 
proposals and their scope. 
This general introduction aims to put the new impetus to 
the liberalization of capital movements within the Com-
munity into perspective. It will show why, after the strides 
made in the early 1960s, the process remained blocked for 
so long. It will explain the reasons behind the new initiatives 
taken by the Community in recent years. Finally, it will 
indicate what full liberalization of capital movements is 
mainly about, and how the Commission plans to achieve 
this goal. 
I - The new impetus to liberalization of capital 
movements 
I. Liberalization of capital, a process held up 
for years 
Reference is habitually made to the relative caution of the 
EEC Treaty's provisions dealing with capital. Obstacles to 
the movement of capital are to be abolished 'progressively' 
and only 'to the extent necessary to ensure the proper func-
tioning of the common market'. Unlike the provisions on 
the customs union, those on capital do not lay down a 
timetable specifying the successive stages for dismantling 
restrictions: they leave it to the Council to implement liberal-
ization by issuing directives adopted on the basis of pro-
posals from the Commission. This is still the only course 
open today. 
Up to the end of 1986, the main achievements in liberalizing 
intra-Community capital movements dated back to the early 
1960s. By virtue of two directives adopted in 1960 and 1962, 1 
capital transactions most directly linked to the exercise of 
the other basic freedoms established by the Treaty (direct 
investments, commercial credits and guarantees, personal 
capital movements) were unconditionally liberalized, as were 
transactions of a more strictly financial nature (acquisition 
of foreign securities quoted on a stock exchange). 
Following the adoption of these instruments. attention fo-
cused on the harmonization or approximation of the na-
tional rules and regulations governing financial activities; 
the matter was discussed in particular by a group of experts 
appointed by the Commission and chaired by Mr Segre. 2 
On that basis, it was possible to adopt a number of directives 
concerning the activities of financial intermediaries and 
stock exchanges. However, further attempts to continue 
the step-by-step liberalization of capital movements were 
blocked. In 1964, the Commission had presented to the 
Council a new proposal for a directive along those lines. 
The proposal aimed to abolish, subject to certain ceilings, 
restrictions on the issue and placing on the national market 
of the securities of companies from other Member States. 
This proposal was not taken up. In the 1970s, some of the 
ground gained in the previous decade was actually lost, since 
several Member States made extensive use of the safeguard 
clauses provided in the Treaty to introduce and maintain 
restrictions on capital transactions which, in principle, had 
been liberalized. 
Thus, at the start of 1983, of the 10 Member States only 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Belgium and Luxembourg (the latter two countries operating 
a two-tier foreign exchange market) had abolished exchange 
controls on all capital transactions. The Netherlands com-
plied with its Community obligations and adopted a liberal 
attitude towards transactions not subject to the liberalization 
requirement. In contrast, France, Italy, Ireland, Denmark 
and Greece remained short of their Community obligations 
and applied exceptional arrangements in respect of capital 
transactions which had, in principle, been liberalized. 
This reverse was probably due to the instability of inter-
national monetary relations, the worsening economic en-
vironment following the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange-rate system, and the energy crisis. Another reason, 
I First Directive for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, OJ 
43, 12.7.1960. p. 921 /60, and Directive 63/21 /EEC, OJ 9, 22.1.1963, p. 
62/63. 
This group's report was published by the Commission in November 1%(, 
under the title 'The development of a European capital market'. 
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however, was the difficulty, in the absence of sufficiently 
close coordination of economic policies within the Com-
munity, of reconciling the four goals of free trade, exchange-
rate stability, freedom for capital movements, and monetary 
policy autonomy. 
Th us, France and Italy, faced with conflicts between internal 
and external objectives, opted for membership of the EMS 
exchange-rate mechanism, but chose to recover some room 
for manoeuvre by partially ridding themselves of the disci-
pline which was considered the least essential to the proper 
functioning of the common market, i.e. the free movement 
of capital. 
In contrast, the United Kingdom, which fully liberalized 
capital movements at the end of 1979, chose not to accept 
exchange-rate discipline as it was anxious to preserve its 
monetary autonomy. 
Finally, Germany, the country which managed best to rec-
oncile the free movement of capital, membership of the EMS 
exchange-rate mechanism and the pursuit of a relatively 
independent monetary policy, was only able to do so by 
virtue of the international status of its currency and the 
pivotal role which the latter played within the EMS. 
2. The revival of the liberalization process 
The Communication on financial integration presented by 
the Commission to the Council in 1983 (COM(83) 207 final) 
reopened Community discussion on the liberalization of 
capital movements. It described the deadlock mentioned 
above, assessed possibilities for progress and identified prac-
tical initiatives capable of reviving the interrupted process 
of financial integration. 
One year later, the Commission introduced a system of 
tighter management of exceptional arrangements applied to 
capital movements. By substantially revising its decisions 
authorizing a number of Member States to maintain restric-
tions on capital transactions liberalized under Community 
Jaw, it strictly limited their scope and period of validity. The 
decision in favour of Denmark was therefore repealed, and 
the decisions concerning France, Italy and Ireland had their 
scope reduced to the strict minimum and their period of 
validity limited to two or three years. The same approach 
was followed in 1985 when, at the end of the transitional 
period laid down in the Act of Accession, Greece was auth-
orized to maintain certain restrictions on capital movements. 
The new Community initiatives on the liberalization of capi-
tal movements were not only the expression of a political 
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will, but were also dictated by international financial devel-
opments, by the increased convergence-in particular within 
the EMS-of the key economic aggregates, and by the new 
awareness on the part of national authorities of the relative 
ineffectiveness of exchange restrictions and the limitations 
of an autonomous economic policy in an increasingly inte-
grated area such as the Community. 
The early 1980s were marked by a speeding-up of the global-
ization of financial markets and by the spectacular develop-
ment of financial innovations to meet the needs of businesses 
faced with increased instability of interest and exchange 
rates in the world economy. In this context, several Member 
States considered it necessary to open up and modernize 
their financial structures in order to keep up with these 
developments, and believed that the European dimension 
was vital to national financial institutions as a means of 
achieving the necessary competitiveness. 
Moreover, with trade between the Member States' econ-
omies increasingly integrated, exchange-rate discipline acted 
as a constraint on the conduct of domestic economic policies, 
even if restrictions were imposed on capital movements. The 
practical working of the EMS gradually led the participating 
Member States to acknowledge that exchange-rate stability 
must be based on cooperation and convergence of economic 
policies, and not on control of capital movements. 
3. The requirements of completing the large 
internal market 
Adopted in February 1986, the Single European Act, amend-
ing the Treaties establishing the European Communities (OJ 
L 169, 29.6.1987), set a target date of31 December 1992 for 
the Community to create an area without internal frontiers 
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital would be guaranteed. 
The Single Act, which gave formal recognition to the objec-
tives of the Commission's White Paper on the internal mar-
ket (COM(85) 310 final) in this field, therefore added a new 
dimension to the aim of complete liberalization of capital 
movements. This is now seen as necessary for the proper 
functioning of the common market, and must be considered 
part and parcel of the drive for economic and monetary 
union. Not only does it mean that those restrictions on 
capital movements still in force must be lifted, without 
undermining exchange-rate stability, but also that, in paral-
lel, all forms of discrimination affecting the free movement of 
financial services within the Community must be abolished, 
without damaging the protection afforded to savers, fair 
competition or the stability of financial systems. 
4. The Commission's programme and im-
plementation of its initial phase 
In May 1986 the Commission decided to make complete 
liberalization of capital movements one of the Community's 
top priorities, and it presented a programme in the form of 
a Communication to the Council, 1 followed by an initial 
proposal for a Directive (COM(86) 326 final). 
The Commission's programme laid down two phases for 
completing the liberalization of capital movements. The aim 
in the first phase was to achieve effective liberalization 
throughout the Community of the capital transactions most 
directly necessary for the proper functioning of the common 
market and for the linkage of financial markets. 
In practice, this meant first and foremost continuing the 
gradual dismantling of the derogations from Community 
obligations then in force. Consequently, the decision auth-
orizing France to take protective measures was repealed in 
June 1986, and that applicable to Italy was first limited in 
scope and then repealed in July 1987.2 
The next step was to produce a directive extending Com-
munity liberalization requirements to include all transactions 
involving the acquisition and issue of shares or bonds, 
whether or not dealt in on a stock exchange. The new 
directive3 was adopted by the Council in November 1986, 
only five months after the Commission's proposal had been 
presented, thereby setting an example for cooperation be-
tween Community institutions. 
The second phase laid down by the Commission is aimed at 
achieving complete liberalization of all capital movements, 
including all short-term or long-term banking and financial 
transactions, even those of a purely monetary or quasi-
monetary nature not linked to commercial transactions. 
Implementation of this final phase has major implications 
and therefore merited detailed forward analysis. Apart from 
the regular exchanges of views between the Commission and 
the trade organizations concerned, this analysis has been 
organized at two levels: 
(i) within Community institutions, i.e. the Commission staff 
in liaison with specialized committees (the Monetary 
1 See Part One of this publication. 
2 At present, four out of the 12 Member States are authorized to maintain 
restrictions on capital movements liberalized under Community law: 
Greece and Ireland, by virtue of authorizations (safeguard clauses) 
granted by the Commission; Spain and Portugal, by virtue of transitional 
arrangements based on the Act of Accession. 
3 Directive 86/566/EEC, OJ L 332, 26.11.1986. 
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Committee and the Committee of Governors of the 
Central Banks);4 
(ii) within a group of independent consultants drawn from 
the academic world and charged by the Commission 
~ith r~porting on the various implications of complete 
hbcrahzat1on of capital movements for the various 
Member States and the EMS.5 
The main conclusions from the analyses made arc sum-
marized below. 
II - Implications of complete liberalization of 
capital movements 
I. Quite generally, complete liberalization of capital move-
~ents is necessary for the proper functioning of the large 
internal market and represents an important step towards 
monetary unification in the Community. 
The opening up of national financial markets produced by 
liberalization will make the process of channelling savings 
into investment more efficient and generally less costly to 
business, if only because of the economies of scale associated 
with a large integrated market. Savers will be offered a 
means of managing their investments more efliciently and 
will have a choice of better profitability/risk mixes. The 
enlargement and proliferation of secondary markets will 
enable claims to be mobilized on better terms. Borrowers 
will have access to more diverse, cheaper and better-suited 
financing methods. 
2. However, complete liberalization of capital movements 
inevitably carries risks and will not bring financial inte-
gration all by itself: 
(i) It necessitates modernization and adaptation of na-
tional financing systems, including methods of manag-
ing the public debt, the cost of which will be easier to 
sec. 
(ii) It will occur in a changing international environment, 
therefore imposing increasing constraints on the con-
duct of monetary policies, with risks for exchange-rate 
stability; the imperatives of the internal market and the 
EMS demand that the objectives of liberalization and 
stabilization of exchange-rate relationships be pursued 
jointly; in order to achieve this, it is therefore vital that 
4 See Part One of this publication. 
5 See Part Two of this publication 
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convergence and monetary cooperation are stepped up 
and EMS mechanisms strengthened; if temporary diffi-
culties should arise. recourse must be had to safeguard 
arrangements rather than to relaxing exchange-rate 
discipline. 
(iii) It has major implications for taxation (distortions and 
discrimination under internal rules and regulations, 
greater risk of evasion) which must be dealt with prag-
matically. 
(iv) It is only one component in the creation of a European 
financial area: it must therefore fit in with other 
measures to harmonize national rules and regulations 
to enable freedom of establishment and freedom to 
supply financial services to be exercised in full, whilst 
guaranteeing security for savers and healthy compe-
tition for intermediaries. 
Without parallel efforts in these fields, three types of negative 
reaction would ensue: 
(i) a loss of ground on what has already been achieved, 
owing to systematic application of safeguard clauses: 
(ii) the maintenance of protectionist measures in the area 
of financial services. based on considerations of national 
interest or on attempts to protect national savings; 
(iii) major distortions in capital flows rather than the im-
proved allocation of resources aimed at, and an artificial 
shift in financial activities. 
3. As the degree of financial development is not the same 
in all Member States. the Community should be given appro-
priate means and procedures to ensure that complete liberal-
ization of capital movements does not aggravate regional 
and structural imbalances within the Community. 
This should be achieved primarily through specific measures 
to strengthen economic and social cohesion within the Com-
munity, and notably through financial engineering, i.e. by 
linking budgetary measures to the provision of loan finance 
and by developing national financial structures by means of 
integrated programmes. 
Special transitional arrangements should also be introduced 
to help the new Member States. or those with a less de-
veloped financial system, to adapt to the requirements of 
financial integration in the Community. 
Finally, by adjusting the purpose and resources of the Com-
munity instruments for medium-term balance-of-payments 
support, it should be made possible, where necessary. to back 
up the efforts to liberalize capital movements undertaken by 
Member States suffering from a vulnerable external position. 
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4. Any integration process automaticaliy strengthens the 
Community's identity vis-a-vis the outside world. Three prin-
ciples must be adopted here: 
(i) For reasons of economic efficiency, the Community 
must opt for a high degree of openness to the outside 
world; it must therefore achieve maximum liberalization 
of capital movements between itself and third countries. 
(ii) With capital movements completely liberalized, the 
Community's identity in relation to third countries must 
be based on closer monetary cooperation-in particular 
through a coordinated exchange-rate policy against 
non-Community currencies-and work towards greater 
alignment of national rules and regulations; the ex-
change-rate arrangements and policies of the Com-
munity and its Member States vis-a-vis third countries 
must be managed applying Community procedures that 
become increasingly strict as progress is made towards 
economic and monetary union. 
(iii) During the transitional phase, the Community must still 
be free to take concerted action to regulate destabilizing 
capital movements to or from third countries, so as to 
be able temporarily to strengthen the Community's 
exchange-rate policy and cohesion within the EMS. 
III - The Commission's proposals for the final 
phase of liberalization of capital move-
ments 
The lessons drawn by the Community institutions from 
the January 1987 realignment have confirmed the need to 
establish a link between further liberalization of capital 
movements and strengthening EMS mechanisms. The agree-
ments on the EMS reached in Basle and Nyborg in Sep-
tember 1987 opened the way for the implementation of the 
final phase of liberalization. 
To this end. the Commission presented a Communication 
and three proposals 1 to the Council in November 1987. 
The Communication introduces the Commission's proposals 
a_nd draws attention to a number of complementary ques-
tions: harmonization of supervisory and prudential rules, 
taxation aspects, and the link with participation of the 
Community currencies in the EMS exchange-rate mechan-
ism. The Commission considers that solutions to these ques-
tions must not be regarded as preconditions for implement-
ing the programme for the liberalization of capital move-
1 See Part Three of this publication. 
ments. But they constitute important elements in the creation 
of a truly integrated financial market, the implications of 
which need to be fully appreciated. 
In its proposals, the Commission aims to: 
(i) extend liberalization to all capital movements; a specific 
safeguard clause is included to enable controls to be 
reintroduced for short periods on short-term capital 
movements in cases where a Member State's monetary 
or exchange-rate policy is seriously disrupted; Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece are granted longer time-
tables for implementation of the new liberalization obli-
gations; 
(ii) amend an existing directive on regulating international 
capital flows in order to introduce the principle of 
extensive liberalization of capital movements to and 
from third countries, whilst providing for the possibility 
of concerted use of a range of instruments for regulating 
General introduction 
short-term capital flows in the event of an external 
monetary shock; 
(iii) establish an instrument to provide medium-term finan-
cial support for Member States' balances of payments 
by combining existing mechanisms (the medium-term 
financial assistance and Community loan mechanisms); 
this instrument could be used not only to assist a Mem-
ber State experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties 
but also, in an appropriate form, to back up an effort 
to liberalize capital movements. 
The Commission's proposals and the complementary ques-
tions raised are currently being discussed within the Com-
munity institutions. Formal opinions are expected from the 
specialized committees, the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee. The Commission hopes 
that its proposals, amended if necessary in the light of the 
opinions expressed, will be adopted by the Council before 
the end of this year. 
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Part One - The approach proposed by the Commission 
The three documents presented in this first part are from 
the Commission. They describe the general background to 
its efforts to achieve complete freedom of movement for 
capital in the Community in the near future. 
In its Communication to the Council of May 1986, the 
Commission recalls the reasons why the process ofliberaliza-
tion should be completed; it puts forward a programme for 
achieving this objective and identifies the main conditions 
for and implications of its implementation. 
The Commission staff paper prepared in December 1986 
for the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Gover-
nors of the Central Banks examines this last point in greater 
detail. Its aim is to initiate analysis of the consequences of 
complete liberalization of capital movements and of how to 
take due account of them in working for genuine financial 
integration. The focus is on the additional constraints im-
posed on Member States' monetary policies and the need 
for increased cooperation in this field; the impact on the 
organization and functioning of national financial systems 
and the aims to be pursued in harmonizing national rules 
and regulations; the situation of the Member States which 
have made less progress on the road towards financial inte-
gration; relations between the European financial area and 
the rest of the world. 
In a memorandum sent to the President of the Council 
on the occasion of the informal meeting of Ministers for 
Economic and Financial Affairs held at Knokke in April 
1987, the President of the Commission draws provisional 
conclusions from this analysis and describes the basic ap-
proach adopted by the Commission at that stage for imple-
menting the final phase of the programme announced. 
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Programme for the liberalization of capital movements in the Community 
Communication from the Commission to the Council - May 19861 
Introduction 
The communication on financial integration which the Com-
mission presented to the Council in April 19832 gave new 
impetus to Community discussions on the liberalization of 
capital movements. Today there are two essential reasons for 
placing this question among the Community's top priorities. 
First, the Luxembourg Act makes new demands on the 
process of financial integration which has already begun. 
The Act clearly affirms the need for the large internal market 
to assume its full financial dimension, since the objective of 
free movement by 1992 also applies to capital and financial 
services. 
Already, a considerable effort is in progress to remove the 
technical, administrative and legal obstacles to trade: the 
effort covers the harmonization of standards, the opening-
up of public procurement contracts, the ending of excessive 
controls at frontiers and the approximation of indirect tax-
ation. It would be difficult to imagine that it should not 
extend to exchanges of capital. 
The result will be the closer coordination of economic and 
monetary policies, which is important for the Community's 
integration. This will have to be accompanied by appropriate 
measures to bring levels of development as close together as 
possible and to reduce the structural differences between the 
Member States. Article 130(b) of the Single Act provides 
I COM(86) 292 final. 
COM(83) 207 final. 
that the implementation of common policies and of the 
internal market shall take into account the objectives of 
cohesion. The proposals set out in this communication, while 
ultimately beneficial for all, may create difficulties for some 
Member States. In such cases, it may be necessary to take 
additional measures, outside the scope of this communi-
cation, in order to help those Member States to participate 
fully in the creation of a genuine common market in financial 
services with full freedom of capital movement. 
Second, there is a close link between the development of 
the EMS and the free movement of capital: this link was 
established by the Commission in its communication to the 
Council of November 1984 on developing the European 
Monetary System. 3 The EMS experience has played a decis-
ive role in the evolving attitude of the Member States. The 
opinion which has prevailed is that the stability of exchange 
rate relationships must reflect and be nurtured by a genuine 
convergence of monetary policies and economic perform-
ances. 
The purpose of this communication is: 
(i) to trace the logic behind the Commission's proposed 
approach and the major phases in that approach, so as 
to arrive at as liberal as possible a Community system 
of capital movements; 
(ii) to set out the resultant implications for the effective 
integration of the financial markets and for the coordi-
nation of the monetary and financial policies of the 
Member States. 
J COM(84) 678 final. 
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The proposed approach for the liberalization of 
capital movements 
1. The logic behind the liberalization of capital 
movements 
1.1. Analysis and experience show that there are three de-
grees in the progressive liberalization of capital movements 
which. in simple terms, correspond to three categories of 
operations: 
(i) capital operations - such as commercial credits, direct 
investments or various personal capital movements -
which are directly linked to the effective exercise of the 
other fundamental freedoms of the common market 
(the freedom of trade in goods and services, the free 
movement of persons, the freedom of establishment); 
(ii) operations in financial market securities (bonds, shares 
and other securities of a participating nature), the liber-
alization of which determines the existence of a single 
European financial market; liberalization in this area 
has to cover the operations carried out by investors as 
well as those carried out by issuers; 
(iii) operations involving financial credits and operations 
relating to money market instruments, the liberalization 
of which is necessary for the establishment of a unified 
financial system in the Community. 
1.2. As each threshold is crossed. growing constraints are 
imposed on the Member States in the conduct of their 
monetary policy. 
The first group of operations requires merely that the inevi-
table consequences, in terms of balance of payments, be 
drawn from a system of freedom of establishment and the 
free movement of goods, services and persons. The liberal-
ization of operations in securities also opens the possibility 
of choosing between the financial markets of the Member 
States and therefore places them in direct competition. The 
extension of liberalization to monetary transactions imposes 
not only a greater constraint in terms of the balance of 
payments, it also affects the organization and functioning 
of national banking and financial systems and the methods 
of controlling the external indebtedness of financial insti-
tutions and the external circulation of the national currency. 
1.3. In the face of these constraints, the Member States are 
not in identical positions. Three factors determine their room 
for manoeuvre in settling potential conflicts between the 
internal and external objectives of their monetary policy: 
16 
(i) their level of development and the structural character-
istics of their balance of payments, which determine the 
speed and ease with which the requisite adjustments 
can be made; 
(ii) the international status of their currency (its importance 
as a vehicle of trade and a reserve instrument) and of 
their exchange regulations (whether or not they partici-
pate in the EMS exchange rate mechanism); 
(iii) the level of development of their domestic financial 
system (size, liquidity, diversification of techniques, 
methods of regulation). 
2. The main phases in the liberalization of capi-
tal movements 
In this context, two phases could be involved in the process 
of continuing to liberalize capital movements. 
2.1. In the first phase, the objective would be to achieve the 
unconditional and effective liberalization throughout the 
Community of the capital operations most directly necessary 
for the proper functioning of the common market and for 
the linkage of national markets in financial securities. 
Two types of measure are required for the attainment of 
this objective: 
2.1.1. The ending of exceptional arrangements 
(a) Certain of these exceptional arrangements derive from 
the application of the safeguard clause provided for in Ar-
ticle 108(3) of the EEC Treaty and is within the Com-
mission's field of competence. The Decisions relating to 
France, Ireland and Italy were revised, and made stricter, 
in December 1984. A target date was fixed for the expiry of 
the Decisions (the end of 1986 for France, the end of 1987 
for Ireland and Italy). Similarly, in November 1985 Greece 
was authorized to maintain certain restrictions on capital 
movements normally liberalized under Community law, but 
only for a period of three years. 
Also, the revised Decisions referred to the need for restric-
tions to be gradually relaxed before the expiry date, in line 
with the results achieved in the recovery of the balance of 
payments. This partial progress is to be consolidated at 
regular intervals by the modification of the original authori-
zations. 
(b) Other exceptional arrangements were introduced on a 
temporary basis by the Treaty of Accession of Spain (until 
the end of 1990) and Portugal (until the end of 1992). Here 
too, and chiefly in order to avoid the difficulty of bringing 
all the authorized restrictions to an end at once, on the expiry 
date, the Commission will ensure that every opportunity for 
partial liberalization is taken. 
2.1.2. An extension of Community obligations as regards 
liberalization 
As a result of the discussions held on this question in 
the Monetary Committee, two main guidelines have been 
identified. 
First, the legislative progress in view, which will not assume 
its full significance unless it is applied by all the Member 
States, must not make it more difficult to dismantle the 
existing exceptional arrangements. It is logical for these 
exceptional arrangements to apply, initially, to the new 
liberalization obligations, in so far as they relate to the same 
type of operations or present an equivalent risk to the 
balance of payments. (For example, could a Member State 
be compelled to liberalize transactions in securities not dealt 
in on a stock exchange if restrictions on operations in listed 
securities were still authorized?). 
Secondly, the extension of Community obligations must 
mean that all the capital operations involved in the free 
movement of goods, services and persons or which are the 
very basis of a financial market can be reclassified within 
the rules of unconditional liberalization. On the basis of 
these criteria, the Commission is preparing a proposal for a 
Directive, which it intends to present shortly to the Council, 
and which would make the following additions to the Com-
munity's liberalization rules of 1960-62: 
(i) The obligation of unconditional liberalization applying 
to the operations in Lists A and B of the present 
Directives would be extended to: 
(a) long-term commercial credits; 
(b) the acquisition of financial market securities, 
whether or not they are dealt in on a stock exchange; 
(c) the admission of securities to the capital market 
(introduction on a stock exchange, issue or placing). 
On this point, the Commission had first envisaged 
that, in the initial stage, the liberalization obligation 
would be restricted to the admission of certain cate-
gories of securities only: shares, units of undertak-
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ings for collective investment subject to Community 
coordination rules, and bonds issued by Community 
institutions. But it felt that liberalization which im-
mediately covered the admission of all bonds (except 
the public securities referred to in Article 68(3) of 
the Treaty) would be closer to the objective of 
achieving the close linkage of national financial mar-
kets, and would avoid giving preferential treatment 
to certain categories of issuers, as recommended by 
the Monetary Committee. 
(ii) It would also be proposed that, for all liberalized capital 
movements (Lists A and B), uniform conditions would 
be laid down for the functioning of any dual exchange 
market which might exist, by aligning these conditions 
on the most binding provisions of Article 1 (List A 
operations) of the present Directive. As a result, Lists 
A and B of this Directive could be merged. I 
2.2. In a second phase, the realization of a large internal 
market, in full possession of its financial dimension, means 
that a decisive step must be taken towards the total freedom 
of capital movements. 
2.2. I. In the White Paper 'Completing the internal market', 
the Commission stressed the need to achieve the liberaliza-
tion of financial services in the Community by 1992 at the 
latest. The attainment of this objective, and more generally 
the logic of a European financial system without internal 
frontiers, inevitably leads to the ending of all restrictions 
on capital movements. The free movement of capital will 
therefore have to extend to operations which, under Com-
munity law, would still remain excluded, i.e. financial loans 
in both domestic and foreign currencies, money market 
operations, deposits and balances on current account. Such 
liberalization is necessary if the financial intermediaries are 
I Lists A and B cover direct investments, personal capital movements, 
short and medium-term credits related to commercial transactions or to 
provision of services in which a resident is participating, transfers in 
performance of insurance contracts, and the acquisition of securities 
dealt in on a stock exchange. Liberalization of these operations is uncon-
ditional and may be suspended only by the implementation of the 
safeguard clauses provided for in Articles 73, I 08 and I 09 of the Treaty. 
The capital movements contained in List C (in particular the issue of 
securities, the acquisition of securities not dealt in on a stock exchange 
and financial credits) are subject only to conditional liberalization, in 
that a Member State may maintain or reintroduce restrictions on these 
operations provided that they were operative on the date of entry into 
force of the Directive or on the date of accession, when such free 
movement of capital might form an obstacle to the achievement of the 
economic policy objectives of that Member State. 
For the other operations --- chiefly short-term capital movements (secu-
rities dealt in on the money market, the opening and placing of funds 
on current or deposit accounts, etc.) -- the Member States can choose 
whether or not to impose restrictions. 
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to compete fully on the European market and derive full 
advantage from the freedom to provide services which they 
will he offered. Complete exchange liberalization will make 
it possible to do away with control procedures for the 
purposes of verification which have to be maintained, even 
on liberalized operations, so long as restrictions continue to 
exist. 
2.2.2. The question which arises is whether all the Member 
States are capable of moving towards this objective of the 
complete freedom of capital movements at the same speed. 
This question is especially relevant since, as indicated above, 
a link has been established between the liberalization of 
capital movements and the development of the EMS in 
which not all the Member States fully participate. Moreover, 
the Luxembourg Act provides for the possibility of special 
arrangements for the most vulnerable Member States in the 
realization of a large internal market. 
In any event, any differentiation to be made between the 
Member States in the liberalization process should not be 
introduced below a uniform level of Community obligations 
as previously defined (point 2.1. above). Also, through its 
instruments for supporting balances of payments, the Com-
munity must be able to offer Member States which are 
faced with special constraints the means of overcoming these 
difficulties so as to enable them to take part in the full 
process of the liberalization of capital. 
2.2.3. Consequently, the approach required for completing 
the process of liberalization without doubt differs from the 
one followed up to this stage and based on the progressive 
transfer of certain categories of operations to a system of 
unconditional liberation (save where recourse is had to the 
safeguard clauses of Articles I 08, I 09 or 73 of the Treaty): 
(i) For operations involving financial loans and credits, 
monetary operations or deposits, the liberalization rules 
should be more flexible and better suited to their nature. 
One possibility would be to provide, for this category 
of transactions, a specific safeguard clause which is less 
binding than the one in Article I 08 of the Treaty. 1 A 
safeguard clause of this kind, incorporated in the basic 
Directive, could be activated by the Commission, after 
I Article I 08 applies to situations in which a Member State is in difficulties 
or seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of pay-
ments. Under this Article, the Commission may grant protective measures 
only on completion of a prior procedure consisting of: (i) examination 
by the Commission of the position of the Member State and the sending 
of a recommcn<latiun; (ii) the adoption of a position by the Council on 
the possible granting of mutual assistance. The scope of the protective 
measures is not confined solely to capital movements, but may concern 
any other Community obligation. 
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consulting the Monetary Committee, if the correspond-
ing movements of capital lead to disturbances in the 
conduct of the monetary policy of a Member State and 
are liable to harm the stability of exchange rates in the 
Community. The derogations authorized would be the 
subject of a periodic examination within the Monetary 
Committee. 
Consequently, the instruments provided for by the 1972 
Directive on regulating international capital flows and 
neutralizing their undesirable effects on domestic 
liquidity could be put into operation between the Mem-
ber States only pursuant to this safeguard clause. 
(ii) This important step towards the full liberalization of 
capital movements should logically be accompanied by: 
(a) ending the possibility of resorting to a dual market, 
save by invoking a safeguard clause; 
(b) a tighter formulation of the obligations applying to 
unconditionally liberalized operations: such obli-
gations would have to cover not only the lifting of 
exchange restrictions and measures having equiva-
lent effect which do not directly derive from the 
exchange control regulations, but also all other types 
of discrimination, taken for reasons of domestic 
control (in particular tax treatment or placement 
rules imposed on institutional investors). 
(iii) In the light of experience and of the development of 
financial techniques, the revision of the rules governing 
the liberalization of capital movements should be seized 
as an occasion for clarifying and bringing up to date 
certain definitions and provisions which are over 25 
years old. This would mean taking account of the new 
techniques which have emerged, for example, in the 
field of transactions in securities or with regard to 
lending instruments or clarifying the content of certain 
headings, e.g. those relating to blocked funds or to 
transfers of assets by migrants. 
On the basis of these guidelines, the Commission intends to 
prepare a new Directive which could be presented to the 
Council in the first half of 1987. 
The other implications of financial integration 
A high degree of liberalization of capital movements is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the Community's 
genuine financial integration. It is therefore important for 
liberalization to be paralleled by provisions designed to 
ensure the cohesion and identity of this financial area. Also, 
a truly integrated financial market is bound to have conse-
quences for the conduct by the Member States of their 
monetary policies. 
The Commission intends to embark immediately on a for-
ward-looking analysis of these questions. Only the broad 
lines of this analysis are presented here. 
1. The cohesion of the European financial area 
1.1. The objective goes beyond the establishment of a finan-
cial free trade area in Europe; it is the establishment of a 
Community-wide integrated financial system. The intensifi-
cation of intra-Community financial relations, favoured by 
the lifting of restrictions, will naturally derive support from 
the progress already made and to be continued in commer-
cial integration and the convergence of economic and monet-
ary policies. It will have to be accompanied by parallel 
progress towards the creation of a common market in finan-
cial services. The objective is to establish fair conditions of 
competition which will favour the development of a diversi-
fied range of high quality financial instruments and to enable 
users to exercise their activities throughout the territory of 
the Community without having to fragment their financial 
relationships. 
1.2. The integration of the European financial area must 
therefore be preceded by some standardization in the Com-
munity of the laws or administrative provisions governing 
access to financial activities and the exercise thereof. 
The main guidelines adopted in this area were described in 
the White Paper 'Completing the internal market' .1 The 
Luxembourg Act offers additional legal means of advancing 
along this road. 
Harmonization must as a priority concentrate on the estab-
lishment of a minimal basis of common rules for the protec-
tion of the users of financial services and the supervision, 
by the country of origin, of the suppliers of these services. 
This harmonized system of prudential rules would guarantee 
the quality of the financial services offered in the Com-
munity. 
It would also be necessary to establish rules for the mutual 
recognition of financial techniques rather than to carry out 
1 COM(85) 310 final of 14 June 1985. 
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standardization of an administrative nature. which would 
damage this sector's innovative capacity. 
Lastly, the liberalization of financial services within the 
Community implies the establishment of common rules ap-
plying to third country suppliers. 
Also, as the Monetary Committee has noted, the develop-
ment of the use of the ECU as a vehicle for trade could play 
a useful role in unifying this market. 
The forward-looking analysis which the Commission intends 
to make would inter alia have as its object to identify the 
obstacles to the creation of a homogeneous network of 
financial services, and in particular the structural difficulties 
characteristic of certain countries; it would define its links 
with the liberalization of capital movements and evaluate its 
economic significance. 
1.3. Apart from its function of mobilizing and allocating 
savings in the Community, an integrated financial system 
must permit the establishment of an effective network of 
payments between the residents of the various Member 
States for the performance of all current transactions. 
The complete liberalization of capital movements will do 
away with the indirect barriers which may result from na-
tional provisions relating to exchange control (e.g. rules 
governing forward cover for import and export operations), 
the organization of the foreign exchange market (e.g. the 
use of multiple exchange rates) or rules on methods of 
payment (restrictions on the free choice of method of settle-
ment). 
In the communication of November 1984 on developing 
the EMS, the Commission indicated a need for enhanced 
surveillance, by the Community, of the external payments 
systems of the Member States. The achievement of an inte-
grated market by 1992 reinforces this need so long as the 
process of liberalizing capital movements has not reached 
completion. This would mean, for example, defining at Com-
munity level, in a legal form to be agreed, certain rules of 
conduct with the aim of prohibiting certain practices of 
a restrictive nature, unless a derogation were granted by 
common accord. 
2. The conduct of monetary policies 
2.1. Substantial progress towards the full convertibility of 
the European currencies, while respecting the exchange rate 
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disciplines of the EMS, will inevitably create new conditions 
for the management of the system. 
At the present time, there are two classes of participant in 
the EMS exchange rate mechanism. Five Member States 
operate a liberal system, or one which at least complies with 
existing Community obligations in respect of movements of 
capital. In this first group of countries one currency performs 
a guiding role on the monetary policy of the other Member 
States, which are smaller in economic dimension and, for 
the most part, are extremely open to the outside world. 
By contrast, the other three participating Member States 
maintain a relatively strict system of exchange controls and 
one of them benefits from a wider margin of fluctuation for 
its currency. In this mixed situation, the system has been 
managed satisfactorily in terms of the objectives pursued of 
stability and convergence, and the progress made in these 
areas opens the way to the greater liberalization of financial 
flows. 
A system broadened to include other part1c1pants and in 
which the principle of the free movement of capital would 
become the rule would inevitably be far more sensitive, 
from the point of view of the variability of interest and/or 
exchange rates, to cyclical lags and to the expectations of 
economic groups. It would therefore require a substantial 
reinforcement of convergence but also of the effective coor-
dination of the monetary policies of the Member States. In 
its turn, this closer coordination will increase the dynamism 
of economic policies and increase confidence and investment 
throughout the Community. 
2.2. The pace at which coordination can be reinforced and 
the procedures for achieving it will have to be determined 
in the light of experience and it would be largely artificial 
to wish to specify all the details in advance. Especially since 
the chief requirement, as the Commission stressed in its 
communication to the Council of November 1984, would be 
to make full use of the coordination system which exists, by 
a more explicit affirmation of the objectives pursued and a 
stricter application of existing procedures. In other words, 
coordination should be brought in at a fairly early stage in 
the definition of the monetary policies of the Member States, 
in order to prevent divergences rather than to aim for a 
correction, however rapid, of the imbalances. 
As for the management of monetary policy instruments, 
account will have to be taken of the fact that a higher degree 
of liberalization of capital will make management by interest 
rates and the removal of barriers between domestic sources 
of financing inevitable in the long run, and this will lead to 
greater uniformity within the Community of the techniques 
of monetary control. 
20 
2.3. The reinforcement of coordination will raise similar 
questions with regard to the Community's external monetary 
relations. 
In the first place, closer coordination of the monetary poli-
cies of the Member States will contribute, at international 
level. to the stabilization of exchange rates between the 
major currencies. 
Also, Article 70 of the Treaty gives the Community the legal 
means for the progressive coordination of the exchange 
policies of Member States in respect of the movement of 
capital between those States and third countries. Clearly 
there can be no question of establishing a Community system 
of exchange control between it and other countries. The 
principle, adopted by the Monetary Committee, must remain 
that of liberalization erga omnes. However, it would be 
::1ppropriate to update in good time the 1972 Directive on 
regulating international capital flows, notably in order to 
limit the use of the instruments provided for therein solely 
to relations with third countries and to coordinate their 
implementation. 
Timetable for the Commission's forthcoming 
initiatives 
(i) In view of the easing of exchange controls which has 
taken place in France and Italy, the Commission will 
without delay repeal the Decision taken pursuant to 
Article 108(3) of the Treaty relating to France - this 
Decision being no longer applicable - and will revise 
the Decision relating to Italy, so as to reduce its scope 
solely to the protective measures which remain in force; 
the period for which the Decision is valid will not be 
changed. 
(ii) Taking account of the discussions which will have taken 
place within the specialized committees, the Com-
mission will present, early in the summer of 1986, a 
proposal for a Directive extending Community obli-
gations as regards unconditional liberalization to long-
term commercial credits, transactions in securities not 
dealt in on a stock exchange and operations for the 
admission of securities to the capital markets, and intro-
ducing uniform conditions for the functioning of a dual 
market. 
(iii) In close collaboration with the Committee of Governors 
and the Monetary Committee, the Commission will 
initiate a forward study on the implications of financial 
integration for monetary cooperation and on the liber-
alization of financial services, and more generally on 
the inter-relationships necessary between the different 
aspects of the internal market (including the approxi-
mation of tax systems). The results of this study will as 
soon as possible be the subject of a communication to 
the Council. 
(iv) On the basis of this study and the guidelines which 
will be adopted by the Council and the specialized 
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committees consulted for this purpose, the Commission 
will prepare a new proposal for a Directive establishing 
the principle of extending the liberalization obligation 
to all movements of capital. The text of this proposal 
could be presented to the Council in the first half of 
1987. 
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Introduction 
In its programme for the full liberalization of capital move-
ments in the Community, which has been endorsed by the 
Council, the Commission stated that: 
(i) the logic of financial integration inevitably leads to the 
ending of all restrictions on capital movements and to 
the lifting of all types of discriminatory treatment; 
(ii) with this in view it would initiate, in collaboration 
with the Monetary Committee and the Committee of 
Governors, a forward study on the implications of 
liberalization for the conduct of monetary policies, for 
developing the internal market in the field of financial 
services, for the machinery for financing economies, for 
Community cohesion and, lastly, for monetary and 
financial relations with third countries. 
The legislative progress required to complete the liberaliza-
tion of capital movements in the Community comprises two 
phases. I The first phase is to complete the liberalization, 
under Community law, of the capital operations most di-
rectly necessary for the proper functioning of the common 
market and for the linkage of financial markets within the 
1 See Communication from the Commission to the Council of 23 May 
1986- Doc. COM(86) 292 final. 
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Community. The Council adopted the relevant Directive on 
17 November and it will be applied in February 1987. 
The second phase will extend the liberalization obligations 
to financial loans and to operations of a monetary or quasi-
monetary nature (operations relating to short-term securi-
ties, current or deposit accounts). 1 but will also end the 
possibility of resorting to a dual exchange market as well as 
the maintenance, in the domestic regulations of the Member 
States, of discriminatory forms of treatment relating to capi-
tal operations and based on the nationality or on the place 
of residence of the parties or on the place where the capital 
is invested. 2 
The purpose of this paper is to present a preliminary analysis 
and assessment of the economic implications of attaining 
the final stage of the liberalization of capital movements and 
the conditions in which this can be done, in order to aid the 
Committees' deliberations. 
2 Article 67(1) of the Treaty states: During the transitional period and to 
the extent necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the common 
market, Member States shall progressively abolish between themselves 
all restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to persons resident 
in Member States and any discrimination based on the nationality or on 
the place of residence of the parties or on the place where such capital is 
invested. 
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The full liberalization of capital movements and 
the conduct of monetary policies 
1. The full liberalization of capital movements 
involves risks and places constraints on na-
tional monetary policies 
1.1. In comparison with a situation in which only medium 
and long-term capital movements are liberalized, the lifting 
of all restrictions on short-term capital flows will mean that 
the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies is more 
exposed to the effects of differences which may occur bet-
ween domestic monetary and financial situations and the 
international monetary environment at the time, whether or 
not the country concerned participates in the EMS exchange 
rate mechanism. The greater mobility of capital could lead 
to more sensitive interest and exchange rates. 
At present the amount of liquidity available on the Euromar-
kets and the sophistication in managing the treasuries of 
multinational companies can generate short-term financial 
flows which are already capable of disturbing foreign ex-
change markets and domestic money markets. To this will 
be added the effect of a broad measure of substitutability 
between the liquid assets of the residents of all the Member 
States. 
The liberalization of operations of a monetary character 
will facilitate speculative transfers of funds which will obey 
without constraints the exchange rate expectations of econ-
omic agents, and the liberalization of financial Joans in 
national currency will make it easier for non-residents to 
speculate against that currency. 
1.2. The full and effective liberalization of short-term capital 
movements will therefore mean, in particular within the 
EMS, a relative loss of national autonomy as far as monetary 
policy is concerned. 
Since the substitutability between domestic and external 
financing will become almost perfect, lasting recourse to 
direct instruments of monetary control, or even the use of 
monetary targets limited to the ·resident' money supply will 
become less relevant. Monetary regulation will have to be 
based chiefly on indirect management techniques through 
the manipulation of short-term interest rates and 'open-
market' operations. A movement in this direction is already 
underway. Full liberalization of capital movements will ren-
der it irreversible. 
Because of this substitutability and the impossibility of isola-
ting Euromarket interest rates from those prevailing on 
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the domestic money market, the monetary authorities will 
hardly be able any longer to use the short-term rates to 
pursue. as a priority, autonomous domestic objectives con-
cerning the volume of financing in the economy and the 
conditions governing it. 
Policies to sterilize the monetary effect of foreign exchange 
intervention will also lose their efficiency in temporarily 
reducing possible conflicts between internal and external 
objectives of monetary policy. Indeed, in the complete ab-
sence of exchange controls, compensating movements of 
capital will more easily be able to cancel out the effects of 
sterilization. 
Although to a lesser extent, these constraints will also affect 
the member countries with flexible exchange rates in so far 
as they apply some kind of exchange rate target. 
The general lifting of exchange controls in the Community 
will also have its effect on the conduct of monetary policy in 
the member countries which have already liberalized capital 
movements in full. It will be more difficult for them to limit 
the effects of capital inflows on internal liquidity in that 
their residents will have free access to foreign currency 
financing which until then had not been readily available. 
2. To a great extent these constraints are al-
ready having an effect 
2.1. Experience has shown that the control of capital move-
ments does not give countries with open economies more 
than a relative and, in any case, only temporary monetary 
autonomy in relation to their main partners. In a situation of 
external imbalance and in the absence of a credible domestic 
adjustment policy, exchange rate expectations will deterio-
rate and undesirable autonomous capital movements can 
occur, despite the application of exchange controls.' In this 
situation, a country can prolong the period for the requisite 
domestic monetary adjustments only at the price of an 
organized external indebtedness which in the Jong run merely 
1 It has been shown that the variability of capital movements is virtually 
as high in the countries with exchange controls as in the countries which 
do not maintain restrictions. This can be explained by the fact that 
exchange control regulations do not generally apply to non-residents' 
operations and they arc not very effective in the face of powerful specula-
tive behaviour such as taking advantage of 'leads and lags·. 
accentuates the external constraint. The full liberalization 
of capital movements would indeed make the need for these 
adjustments more immediate, but this would act to streng-
then and maintain convergence within the Community. 
2.2. Most Member States have already attained a high level 
of liberalization of capital movements. So experience already 
exists in this area and the assimilation of the chief constraints 
resulting from the mobility of capital has largely begun. 
Banking disintennediation, the 'globalization' of financial 
markets and international financial innovation have strongly 
stimulated the adaptation at national level of monetary 
and financial structures and regulatory methods ( on the 
monetary side, more recourse to indirect monetary policy 
instruments and predominance of market mechanisms and 
on the financial side, decompartmentalization and opening 
up of financial markets). Several Member States are concer-
ned, even among those which have not yet entirely liberalized 
capital movements (Spain, Italy, France, Denmark and the 
Netherlands). 
3. Liberalizing capital movements in full while 
respecting the disciplines of the EMS implies 
that economic policy coordination and mon-
etary and financial cooperation will be re-
inforced and renewed 
3.1. The objective of the full liberalization of capital move-
ments clearly raises the question of its compatibility with 
the objective of exchange rate stability within the EMS. 
By putting the EMS into practice. the Community has clearly 
opted for exchange rate management determined chiefly by 
striving for the convergence of nominal trends at the lowest 
inflation rate possible and conforming. in the medium term. 
to developments in the economic fundamentals of the par-
ticipating countries. 
Experience has shown that frequent exchange rate variations 
destabilize expectations and are liable to give rise to perverse 
dynamic processes ( overshooting of exchange rates. impor-
ted inflation, undesirable movements of capital) without 
having predictable, significant and lasting effects on the 
trade balance (substantial lags in the beneficial effects expec-
ted and short-term predominance of J-curve phenomena). 
In contrast, the acceptance of EMS obligations. apart from 
its beneficial effects on convergence. also produces a power-
ful signalling effect. The economic agents are generally con-
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vinced that the participants in the mechanism are prepared 
to accept the constraints of a strong exchange rate policy 
and, as uncertainty surrounds the dates of realignments. 
exchange rate expectations are usually stabilized for long 
periods within the EMS. Added to this. in so far as they 
limit potential speculation by residents. exchange controls 
may appear to add to the ability to resist of the central 
banks. 
For several years, convergence towards monetary stability 
has been growing more apparent within the EMS (greater 
downward convergence of inflation rates, wage costs and 
interest rates). There is also appreciable convergence to-
wards a sustainable configuration of the external balances 
of the various countries participating in the mechanism. Of 
course much progress remains to be accomplished, especially 
in the area of public finance. but one may consider that 
the present situation allows, under certain conditions, the 
continued movement along the path towards full capital 
liberalization. During the last few years, certain Member 
States have been able to organize or assure a large measure 
of capital liberalization while respecting the disciplines of 
the EMS and the mechanism has stood up well to the savage 
turn-round of the dollar which started in 1985. If in the 
future the nominal divergences within the EMS are reduced 
further and stay limited. and if, in addition, concertation 
and coordination procedures associated with the mechanism 
assure in a lasting way the stability of economic agents· 
exchange rate expectations. then the increased mobility of 
capital will not be destabilizing in character, but will serve 
to compensate the unavoidable asymmetries on current ac-
counts by permitting sound financing for member countries 
having to undertake a more sustained investment effort. 
3.2. However, the full liberalization of capital movements 
may in the short term make the cost of exchange rate 
discipline higher in terms of the level of money market 
interest rates, the volume of interventions on the foreign 
exchange market, and the organized external indebtedness 
required to withstand inopportune short-term outflows of 
capital. 
So. without increased economic convergence. closer m0net-
ary cooperation and the better coordination of budgetary 
policies, there are grounds for fearing that the greater weight 
of external constraint will produce either a lasting deflation-
ary bias in the European economy or a looser operation of 
the EMS. The EMS might be seen as no more than a method 
of avoiding the overshooting of exchange rates, and as a 
result a widening of the margins of fluctuation and more 
frequent realignments could be envisaged. Such a situation 
would take the Community further away from its final 
objective, economic and monetary union. 
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At present it is one central bank, whose credibility is based 
on its institutional autonomy and on the proven stability of 
its currency, which establishes the common reference for the 
conduct of monetary policies in the Community and the 
definition of the parity grid within the exchange rate system, 
and which effectively takes on the essential responsibility of 
managing relations between the system and major third 
currencies. This situation has its merits and the procedures of 
the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors 
make it possible to increasingly clarify and share in the 
choices of this central bank. Nevertheless, the full liberaliza-
tion of capital movements, by reducing even further the 
residual autonomous room for manoeuvre of the other na-
tional monetary authorities, will create a situation in which 
the basic monetary choices, domestic as well as external, will 
have to be as collective as possible. With this in mind it will 
be appropriate to put in place a set of 'rules of the game' in 
order to strengthen the efficiency of coordination pro-
cedures. In this context the concept of Community money 
supply could start to take on some reality and it will be 
necessary to study the implications for the rules governing 
intra-marginal interventions ~ which in principle would 
have to be more symmetrical and non-sterilized ~ and 
for extending the international role of all the Community 
currencies, including the ECU. 
3.3. In parallel with the adjustment of the objectives for the 
safeguard clauses and for the Community instruments of 
medium-term financial support proposed in the Section 'The 
full liberalization of capital movements and taking account 
of the diversity in the situations of the Member States' 
below, it would also be important to reinforce the machinery 
for monetary solidarity between the Member States partic-
ipating in the EMS so that they could if necessary cope 
with more substantial intervention and external financing 
requirements. As yet, the short-term monetary support 
mechanism (STMS) has hardly been used. Yet it can be 
activated independently of needs to intervene at the margins 
and therefore not necessarily to consolidate a very short-
term financing operation. Perhaps its use should be made 
dependent solely upon the application of the procedures for 
coordinating monetary policies managed by the Committee 
of Governors of the Central Banks. The Monetary Commit-
tee would be kept informed of this. 
The full liberalization of capital movements and 
the development of the internal market in the field 
of financial services 
1. The requirements of financial integration 
Looking ahead to the financial integration of the Com-
munity, the full liberalization of capital movements is a 
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necessary condition for the realization of an economic area 
in which there is complete freedom to establish financial 
institutions, freedom for these institutions to supply financial 
services and an integrated securities market manifested es-
pecially in close operation between stock exchanges. 
In these areas, the regulations necessary at Community level 
to a large extent already exist and any gaps should be filled 
by execution of the programme contained in the White Paper 
'Completing the internal market'. 1 Also, the level of capital 
liberalization already reached is favourable to the free pro-
vision of a wide range of services and the integration of the 
financial markets. 
However. in several Member States, the national rules still 
contain a body of discriminatory practices and administrat-
ive or regulatory obstacles which impede or disrupt the free 
movement of capital and the free provision of financial 
services. With a view to financial integration, it is important 
to organize the removal of such discrimination and obstacles 
so that the present segmentation of the European financial 
markets does not survive the full liberalization of capital. 
2. Approaches to the more systematic im-
plementation of the principle of the free pro-
vision of financial services 
2.1. The financial services sector is of major economic im-
portance today, and it is appropriate to create at Community 
level the necessary conditions in which it can benefit from 
the economies of scale associated with the integrated market. 
The important point is to find the right mix between the 
pre-eminence of common rules (principle of harmonization) 
and that of national rules (principle of mutual recognition). 
In accordance with the approach outlined by the Com-
mission in the White Paper and since adopted by the Council, 
priority should be given to harmonizing the supervisory rules 
governing the provision of financial services, in preference to 
a standardization of the service offered. This supervision 
should be carried out by the country of origin. 
Already a common approach to banking supervision at 
Community level is in operation adoption of the First Direc-
tive on banking coordination and the Directive on consoli-
dated banking control, proposals relating to mortgage cre-
dit, to harmonizing the concept of own funds and solvency 
ratios, to the surveillance of large risks, to the liquidation 
I COM(85) 310 final of 14 June 1985. 
of credit establishments and to deposit insurance, or to 
harmonizing the annual and consolidated accounts of banks 
and the periodic information which they must provide for 
the supervisory authorities. The Commission considers that 
the measures which have been taken or which are now 
planned - notably in the White Paper - to implement the 
principle of 'home country' control with a view to freedom 
of establishment and freedom to provide services are suf-
ficient to guarantee an adequate level of protection to savers 
in all the Member States, to preserve satisfactory conditions 
for competition between suppliers of financial services and 
to assure the stability of the financial systems (in particular 
by the application of solvency and liquidity ratios). Conse-
quently, achieving the free provision of financial services will 
not in principle require entirely new work on coordination. 
2.2. With regard to the securities markets, the Commission 
considers that it is necessary to improve their transparency 
and to reduce the costs and delays involved in transactions 
between residents of different Member States. For these 
reasons, it attaches great importance to the following work: 
(i) realization of the IDIS project (lnterbourse Data Infor-
mation System) of the Committee of Stock Exchanges 
in the European Community, intended to create a real 
time information exchange system between Community 
stock exchanges which should eventually lead to the 
establishment of a genuine European securities market; 
(ii) improving the settlement of cross-frontier transactions 
in securities by means of agreements between the central 
securities depositaries in the Member States; 
(iii) adoption of the amended proposal for a Council Direc-
tive on the prospectus to be published when public 
offers are made for securities; this would facilitate simul-
taneous issue on several markets as a result of the 
prospectus published in the country of origin being 
recognized by the authorities of other Member States. 
3. The elimination of discriminatory treatment 
and other obstacles affecting the free move-
ment of capital and of financial services ap-
pears necessary 
3.1. In the national regulations of the Member States, it is 
possible to identify several types of discrimination or indirect 
obstacles to capital movements and to the provision of 
financial services. 
Part One - Th~ approach proposed by the Commission 
3.1.1. Taxation: 
in several member countries national securities receive privi-
leged treatment with regard to personal taxation or indirect 
taxes imposed on securities transactions. 1 
3.1.2. Placement rules imposed on institutional investors: 
several member countries restrict the volume of acquisitions 
of foreign securities. 
3.1.3. Concerning the freedom to provide financial services: 
(i) several member countries prohibit or limit the partici-
pation of non-resident financial institutions in issuing 
operations on the national market or in national cur-
rency; 
(ii) several member countries prohibit or make difficult the 
access by foreigners to the occupation of broker or 
exchange broker; also foreign brokers or financial insti-
tutions often cannot canvass national investors or are 
obliged to go through an approved intermediary to 
effect transactions; 
(iii) lastly, in several member countries, the guarantees given 
by foreign banks are not recognized by the public auth-
orities, national export guarantee systems do not extend 
to the financing granted by foreign banks, etc. 
3.2. The ending of discriminatory treatment relating to the 
movement of capital is in fact formally written into Article 
67( I) of the Treaty but the Commission has up to now 
accepted that the scope of Community obligations in respect 
of capital movements was limited to that laid down in the 
provisions of Directives adopted pursuant to Article 69 of 
the Treaty,2 i.e. to the ending of restrictions on the con-
clusion and performance of liberalized capital operations 
1 Irrespective of these problems of discrimination. the taxation of financial 
transactions is far from being harmonized within the Community: this 
introduces distortions and increases the risks of tax avoidance under a 
system of fully liberalized capital movements. 
Article 69 provides for the adoption of directives for progressively putting 
into effect Article 67. 
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and to related transfers. 1 The discriminatory treatment (es-
sentially by taxation) of a liberalized capital operation is not 
explicitly covered by the directives in force. 
However, in a recent judgment2 the Court of Justice seems 
to favour a wider interpretation on this point, namely that 
all the provisions of Article 67(1) should apply to capital 
operations liberalized by the directives adopted putting it 
into effect. Consequently, the question of discriminatory 
treatment should be clarified during the second phase of the 
programme for the liberalization of capital movements. 
3.3. It should be said that the principle of dismantling 
discriminatory treatment and other obstacles affecting the 
free provision of financial services is already established in 
Community law by the direct applicability of Article 59 of 
the Treaty which refers to the general abolition of restric-
tions on freedom to provide services within the Community. 
From the end of the transitional period, the coordinating 
directives adopted in this area cannot, therefore, have as 
their object the granting of a right which is already estab-
lished, but solely the fa1:ilitating of the exercise of this right. 
The adoption of these directives cannot thus be considered 
by the Member States as a precondition for the removal 
from their domestic regulations of provisions which may 
impede the freedom to provide services. 
These questions, as well as the scope of the notion of public 
interest sometimes advanced to justify the maintenance of 
discriminatory regimes, should be clarified following a judg-
ment in principle which the Court will shortly hand down 
on the subject of the supply of non-life insurance services. 
But, irrespective of any legal argument, it is clear that the 
maintenance of segmentation with regard to the provision 
of financial services would make the realization of the Com-
munity's financial integration illusory. 
Lastly, with regard to the dangers of tax evasion which may 
arise pending harmonization of the taxation of financial 
transactions, it should be recalled that Article 5 of the 
present Directive on capital movements permits the Member 
1 Such liberalization is clearly intended to end all restrictions on capital 
movements, whether or not the restrictions derive strictly speaking from 
the exchange control regulations. Thus, any law, regulation or adminis-
trative provision which has as its direct objective the influencing of 
liberalized capital movements is incompatible with the provisions of the 
directives (measure having equivalent effect to an exchange restriction). 
Further, Article 68(2) of the Treaty requires Member States to apply to 
movements of capital so liberalized the domestic rules governing the 
capital market and the credit system, in a non-discriminatory manner 
(for example this covers the conditions for operating a calendar of issues). 
See Judgment of 24 June 1986 in Case 157 /85 Brugnoni-Ru/finengo. 
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States to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements 
of their laws and regulations. However, cooperation between 
Member States, especially concerning their control pro-
cedures, could prove necessary in this area. 
The full liberalization of capital movements and 
financing channels in the Community 
1. The impact of liberalization on financial 
intermediation 
1.1. At the Community level, there is a probably unnecessary 
diversion of savings towards the intermediation channels of 
non-Community currencies. Two main reasons can be put 
forward for this situation: 
(i) an area for the international circulation of Community 
currencies which does not measure up to European 
commercial integration (restrictions on capital move-
ments are generally accompanied by restrictions on 
current payments procedures) nor to the Community's 
economic importance internationally; 
(ii) national finance markets which are segmented and 
poorly linked with one another at European level 
(flawed adjustment of supply of capital to demand). 
Experience shows that the freedom of capital movements 
in a country encourages the invoicing and financing of 
international transactions and the financial placements of 
non-residents in that country's currency. It can therefore be 
expected that the currencies of the member countries -
particularly of those which occupy an important position in 
world trade - will naturally see their international role 
develop, as and when the restrictions on the free movement 
of these currencies are removed. 
In this context, greater use of the ECU could make a useful 
contribution to the integration of the European financial 
market: 
(i) the development of the ECU as a currency for invoicing 
international transactions, particularly transactions 
within the Community, would contribute to the more 
equal sharing of the exchange risk between importers 
and exporters and to greater transparency in the con-
ditions of competition; 
(ii) similarly, the development of the ECU as a currency for 
denominating issues on the Community's stock markets 
would facilitate simultaneous access of issuers to several 
European financial centres and would favour the ere-
ation within the Euromarkets of a large homogeneous 
compartment offering a relatively small exchange risk 
for European operators. 
1 .2. The full liberalization of capital movements ac-
companied by an absence of barriers to the free provision 
of financial services will expose all the national finance 
systems to a very competitive international environment to 
which they will have to adapt. The experience of several 
countries and recent developments on international finance 
markets suggest, in fact, that the opening up of national 
financial systems to other countries often goes together 
with mergers and the establishment of 'universal' financial 
institutions. But this type of development is not incompatible 
with the viability, nationally, of financial institutions which 
are smaller in size and which can handle the 'distribution' 
of sophisticated financial products devised by the financial 
institutions operating internationally, and which can adapt 
to local needs - notably those of SM Es - the new financial 
services which are developing. 1 
Mon: generally, though it is no doubt true that the full 
liberalization of capital movements requires that market 
mechanisms predominate in the methods of regulating na-
tional financial systems, this does not necessarily imply a 
standardization of financial structures in the short term. In 
the longer term, one may suppose that competition will 
promote homogeneity of the structures but it is difficult to 
establish a priori which form will predominate. 
Keener international competition will stimulate innovation, 
produce large productivity gains and encourage national 
financial institutions to extend their activities into other 
member countries (e.g. in sectors as imponant as the finan-
cing of large-scale projects of Community interest, mortgage 
credit or consumer credit). If certain member countries, 
whose financial systems have long been protected from inter-
national competition, were to be authorized to liberalize 
their exchange controls more gradually than other countries, 
they would nevertheless have to make a rapid choice either 
to develop a competitive financial system themselves, or to 
accept in their country the predominance of the financial 
institutions of the partner countries. 
The size of the predictable effects of full capital liberalization 
on certain national financial structures and on the conditions 
of international competition underlines the need, for the 
1 See the conclusions of the recent work of the OECD Committee on 
Financial Markets. 
Part One - The approach proposed by the Commission 
central banks, for a change in legislation on prudential 
control and for closer cooperation in this field. Certain 
provisions of the White Paper concern this objective. 
2. The impact of liberalization on the non-
financial sector 
In general, the removal of barriers between national financial 
markets resulting from the liberalization of capital move-
ments would make the process of allocating savings to in-
vestments more efficient and generally less costly for econ-
omic agents, if only because of the economies of scale associ-
ated with a large integrated market. 
Savers would be enabled to manage their liquid assets more 
rationally, but would also be offered a wider range of finan-
cial assets permitting more diversified placements and better 
risk-return combinations. The enlargement and increased 
number of secondary markets would create better conditions 
for mobilizing claims. Borrowers could have access to more 
diversified financing methods, less costly and better suited 
to their needs. In particular, access to international financing 
in Community currencies would be easier, even for oper-
ations involving smaller amounts than those normally dealt 
in on the Euromarkets, and this could be particularly useful 
for SMEs. 
However, the ex1stmg channels for financing the private 
sector would not necessarily be upset. Already, the large 
international enterprises have access to the international 
markets, and these will remain the 'wholesale' financial 
markets. For these enterprises, the liberalization of capital 
movements should above all result in a greater preference 
for financing operations, in Community currencies. As for 
the financing of SM Es, even if it is diversified among several 
Community currencies, in most cases it will probably go on 
being provided by the local bank network in so far as it will 
be able to give SMEs access to modern and competitive 
financing techniques. 
In several member countries the public sector now benefits 
from preferential financing channels (direct tapping of 
savings, system of Treasury correspondents, obligations on 
banks and institutional investors to place money in public 
securities). Even if these preferential financing channels are 
retained once the liberalization of capital movements is 
complete, the Member States will no longer have direct 
means of tapping residents' savings and will have to accept 
financial conditions as regards cost and financing the public 
debt which are competitive with those of the private sector. 
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3. The impact of liberalization on the con-
ditions for settling intra-Community trans-
actions 
The full liberalization of capital movements, and more par-
ticularly the liberalization of lending operations and finan-
cial deposits, would considerably facilitate the settlement of 
all intra-Community transactions (current and capital). All 
controls on cross-frontier movements of funds (basic travel 
allowances, restrictions on the transfer of banknotes, etc.) 
would have to be ended and all rules governing payments 
for international operations (choice of invoicing currencies, 
the requirement that the proceeds of exports or incomes 
originating abroad must be repatriated etc.) would be un-
necessary. Also, the settlement of all cross-frontier supplies 
of financial services would be easier and the costs incurred 
in such operations reduced. 
Against this background, it will moreover be appropriate to 
promote, within the Community, an 'interchangeability' as 
wide as possible among the new methods of payment which 
will become current as a result of technological develop-
ments. This approach would serve not only financial inte-
gration but also the objective of the people's Europe. In 
this area, the Commission is preparing a specific measure 
concerning systems of payments cards. 
The full liberalization of capital movements and 
taking account of the diversity in the situations 
of Member States 
1. The question of coherence and Community 
cohesion 
It is probable that when the final phase in the liberalization 
of capital movements within the Community comes into 
operation, the Member States will not be able to attain the 
objective of full liberalization at the same pace and in the 
same circumstances. 
Nor can it be ruled out that in future, after the full liberaliza-
tion of capital movements, some Member States have to 
cope with disturbances of their balance of payments equilib-
rium, in the functioning of their financial markets or of the 
conduct of their monetary or exchange rate policies. 
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It is therefore important to ensure that appropriate Com-
munity procedures exist which will enable Member States 
in difficulties to withdraw temporarily from some of their 
obligations or which will guarantee if necessary that Com-
munity solidarity is appropriately expressed. This approach 
conforms to the provisions of the Single Act on economic 
and social cohesion within the Community. Moreover it is 
the only way to avoid an accumulation of preconditions for 
a full liberalization of capital movements. 
2. The management of the exceptional arrange-
ments for newly acceding Member States 
The 1985 Act of Accession provides a transitional period 
for Spain and Portugal enabling them to defer the liberaliza-
tion of certain capital movements liberalized under Com-
munity law until 1990 and 1992 respectively. It is appropriate 
for these two Member States to be able to defer, for similar 
periods and for the same economic reasons, the implemen-
tation of new liberalization obligations in this area. But, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act of Accession, if 
circumstances permit, the Member States concerned will 
liberalize capital movements in full before the end of the 
transitional period. For the conditions in which such ad-
vance liberalization could be implemented, the Commission, 
in agreement with the Member State concerned, could con-
sult the Monetary Committee and if necessary submit any 
appropriate proposal to the Council. 1 
3. The application of the Treaty's safeguard 
clauses 
3.1. The procedures of Articles I 08 and 109 are permanent 
provisions of the Treaty which permit any Member State in 
difficulties or seriously threatened with difficulties as regards 
its balance of payments to adopt, under Community control, 
the necessary safeguard measures. In practice these measures 
comprise severe restrictions on outflows of capital. 
Three Member States (Greece, Ireland and Italy) are now 
authorized, under Article I 08(3), to maintain restrictions on 
normally liberalized capital operations. These exceptional 
arrangements are from now on strictly limited in scope and 
destined to disappear in the relatively near future (the end 
of 1987 for Ireland and Italy, the end of 1988 for Greece). 
1 See Articles 65, 66, 224 and 225 of the Act of Accession of Spain and 
Portugal. 
3.2. The provisions of Article 73 of the Treaty also form a 
body of Community procedures enabling a Member State 
to adopt or maintain protective measures in the field of 
capital movements. The Article 73 procedures are simpler 
than those required to activate Article I 08. However, the 
scope of this clause is strictly defined since Article 73 cannot 
be invoked unless: 
(i) disturbances occur in the functioning of the capital 
market in a Member State; 
(ii) these disturbances are clearly the result of movements 
of capital; 
(iii) there is no threat, however, to the balance of pay-
ments. 1 
In practice, Article 73 therefore authorizes the adoption, 
under Community control, of protective measures, chiefly 
when inopportune inflows of capital (acquisitions of dom-
estic securities by non-residents) or an excessive drain on a 
country's savings (issues on the domestic market by non-
residents) endanger the balanced functioning of the capital 
market of a Member State. 
No Member State is now authorized to maintain restrictions 
on capital movements pursuant to Article 73.2 
3.3. The safeguard clauses of Articles 108, I 09 and 73 are 
permanent provisions of the Treaty and can obviously be 
invoked by any Member State when circumstances justify 
this. But these clauses cannot be used as a way of postponing 
indefinitely the effort of economic convergence and struc-
tural adjustment necessary if all the Member States are to 
participate fully in the process of the Community's financial 
integration. The Commission for its part is determined to 
ensure a strict management of exceptional arrangements. 
4. The establishment of a safeguard procedure 
specifically for situations leading to disturb-
ances in the monetary or exchange rate policy 
of a Member State 
4.1. The strengthening of the convergence of monetary and 
financial policies and the deepening of monetary cooperation 
1 If there was a threat to the balance of payments, the provisions of Articles 
108 and 109 would apply and not those of Article 73. 
From l 979 to l 983 Denmark was permitted to maintain restrictions on 
non-residents' acquisitions of Government securities denominated in 
Danish kroner, in accordance with the provisions of Article 73. 
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described above will have to be brought into operation 
according to a certain timetable, and the dates may on 
occasions not be met. 
Therefore, if need be, and temporarily, a Member State 
should be allowed to take measures permitting the regulation 
of short-term monetary and financial flows, from or to 
other countries, if they were such as to seriously disturb 
the conduct of the Member State's monetary policy or the 
stability of its exchange rate. 
To this end a specific safeguard clause could be incorporated 
into the directive liberalizing financial loans and operations 
of a monetary nature. The capital movements concerned 
would undoubtedly have to be identified with precision in 
order to prevent the Article 108 and 109 procedures from 
being circumvented. The capital operations referred to in 
this specific clause should form a coherent whole so that their 
possible control can be applied with a degree of temporary 
effectiveness. They could cover: 
(i) credits and financial loans granted by non-residents, in 
national or foreign currency, and by residents in na-
tional currency; 
(ii) operations in short-term secunt1es (normally handled 
on the money market) by non-residents on domestic 
markets and residents on foreign markets; 
(iii) placing of funds on non-residents' current or deposit 
accounts in national currency and on those of residents 
in foreign currencies; 
(iv) forward foreign exchange operations whether or not 
related to the cover of operations involving the import 
or export of goods and services. 3 
The implementation of such rules would be authorized for 
short periods only and in a situation in which the economic 
fundamentals of the Member State concerned did not di-
verge significantly from those of the other Community 
countries. If such a situation existed, the Member State 
concerned would have to adopt an economic recovery pro-
gramme, request the adjustment of the exchange rate and 
possibly have recourse to the procedures of Articles I 08 and 
109. 
J These operations arc not at present included in the lists for the liberaliza-
tion of capital movements. The Commission has nevertheless on several 
occasions indicated that the rules relating to operations for the forward 
cover of imports or exports formed part of a ·grey area· which should 
be placed under Community surveillance, so long as capital movements 
remain subject to restrictions. 
33 
Creation of a European financial area 
4.2. With regard to procedure, the mechanism of this safe-
guard clause could be modelled on the clause contained in 
Article 73 of the Treaty. However, its implementation should 
be considered as an integral part of the procedures for 
coordinating the monetary and exchange rate policies of the 
Member States. Therefore, not only the Monetary Commit-
tee but also the Committee of Governors ought to be associ-
ated in the activation of this safeguard clause. Thus the 
Commission, after consulting the Committees, may auth-
orize the Member State in difficulties to take protective 
measures, the conditions and details of which it would deter-
mine. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, could 
revoke or amend this authorization. On grounds of urgency, 
the Member State may take the measures on its own initiat-
ive, after informing the Commission and the Member States. 
In this event, the Commission would have to decide, after 
consulting the Committees, whether these measures should 
be maintained, amended or dismantled. 
5. A more appropriate implementation of the 
Community instruments of financial support 
The full liberalization of capital movements, while respecting 
the disciplines of the EMS, is a difficult challenge for Mem-
ber States in a precarious balance of payments situation or 
whose financial structures are ill-adapted. In accordance 
with the guidelines of the Single Act, the Community should 
strengthen its cohesion by implementing common policies 
and policies of the internal market, through the financial 
instruments which it possesses. 
With this view, the Community, through its structural instru-
ments and integrated schemes, notably under the IMPs, 
could support moves to adapt the financial structures (infra-
structure projects, telecommunications etc.) of the Member 
States engaged in the process of the full liberalization of 
capital movements. 
Above all it would be necessary to broaden the objective of 
the Community instruments providing medium-term bal-
ance of payments financial support, so that they were not 
only instruments of stabilization but also instruments back-
ing and supporting the full liberalization of capital move-
ments. It would thus be conceivable for the Community 
loans mechanism to take the form of a medium-term credit 
line opened for a specific period, for a Member State which, 
although in a precarious balance of payments situation, 
intended to embark on the process off ully liberalizing capital 
movements or to maintain a system of full liberalization. 
The conditionality attaching to this way of activating the 
mechanism would thus concern specifically the commitment 
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to ensure the free movement of capital. However, this condi-
tionality should also be directed at the general macro-
economic framework making such capital mobility possible. 
The full liberalization of capital movements and 
financial services and relations vis-a-vis third 
countries 
1. The liberalization of capital movements 
should extend to third countries but a system 
of safeguards should remain possible 
I. I. The Community must affirm its identity as a coherent 
economic area. wide open to the outside world. It must 
therefore endeavour to attain the highest possible degree of 
liberalization of movements of capital to and from third 
countries. 
In these circumstances, the chief instrument for regulating 
capital flows out of or into third currencies or countries 
would be the Community's exchange rate policy combined 
with a coherent interest rate policy. The provisions of Article 
I 07 of the Treaty should thus result, in particular for Mem-
ber States participating in the EMS exchange rate mechan-
ism, in the establishment of a genuine common exchange 
rate policy (including an intervention policy) vis-a-vis the 
major third currencies. This approach has since 1978 been 
written into the Brussels Resolution and the Bremen Annex 
and progress has already been made. It will probably be 
necessary to go farther along this road in parallel with the 
abovementioned closer coordination of monetary policies. 
1.2. Although it is true that in restricting or liberalizing 
capital movements, the Member States, for practical reasons 
and in order to respect their international commitments 
(OECD) do not discriminate between Community and non-
Community residents, it is no less true that the principle of 
liberalization erga omnes, adopted by the Commission and 
the Monetary Committee, is not written into Community 
law. Admittedly, Article 70( I) of the Treaty, which forms 
the legal basis for the coordination of the policies of Member 
States in respect of the movement of capital between those 
States and third countries, clearly states that the Community 
shall endeavour to attain in this area the highest possible 
degree of liberalization. However, for it to be really binding 
this principle should be incorporated into a Community 
Directive. 
1.3. To date, only one Directive has been adopted on the 
basis of Article 70( I ). 1 The principle behind this Directive, 
adopted in 1972 with a view to economic and monetary 
union, is that it is in the interests of the Community for 
Member States to be able, in case of need, to decide to adopt 
concerted monetary protection vis-a-vis third countries. 
However, this Directive does not establish the procedures 
for organizing this protection where necessary, but confines 
itself to defining a set of exchange control or monetary 
policy instruments which the authorities of the Member 
States should have available in order to regulate undesirable 
international financial flows. In addition, these instruments 
chiefly relate to inflows of capital and make no distinction 
between operations involving Community residents or cur-
rencies and operations involving third-country residents or 
currencies. 
The full liberalization of capital movements is bound to have 
an effect on this machinery for 'monetary' protection vis-a-
vis third countries. It will be necessary to consider whether 
to amend this directive, in particular: 
(i) so that the range of instruments which it mentions 
relates to both inflows and outflows of capital and 
applies, at least, to the same operations as those referred 
to in the clause for 'monetary' protection to be incor-
porated in the new rules for the liberalization of capital 
movements; 
(ii) so that implementation of this directive forms part of 
the procedure for the close coordination of monetary 
and exchange rate policies within the EMS; 
(iii) so that the procedures for activating these instruments 
are defined and so that the Council can decide, in case 
of need, on their implementation by the EMS countries 
- or by all the Member States with a view to ensuring 
the cohesion of the EMS or in providing temporary 
assistance for the Community's exchange rate policy in 
the face of possibly destabilizing short-term inter-
national financial flows. 2 
Apart from the hypothesis of coordinated action described 
above, a Member State would always be able to impose 
unilateral limits on capital movements from or to third 
countries only. 
1 See Directive 72/156/EEC of 21 March 1972 011 regulating international 
capital flows and neutralizing their undesirable effects on domestic 
liquidity. 
2 The protective measures taken under this Directive would be compatible 
with the provisions of the OECD Code of liberalization of capital 
movements. Article I O of the Code in fact provides that the Community 
may adopt internally a more liberal system than that which it grants to 
the other OECD countries. 
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2. The benefit of the integrated financial market 
sh_ould be extended to non-Community sup-
pliers of financial services in conditions 
which preserve the cohesion and interests of 
the Community 
2.1. The Community's integrated financial market will be 
characterized : 
(i) by the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services within the Community; 
(ii) by coordinated rules relating to the access to or exercise 
of the profession of financial intermediaries, which are 
intended to ensure that all users of financial services 
enjoy the same protection; 
(iii) by coordinated systems of surveillance and control, 
designed to ensure the stability of the financial system. 
This market should on the whole remain wide open to 
suppliers of financial services originating in third countries, 
if only to assure and strengthen the Community's role as an 
international financial centre. 3 Foreign competition, often 
crucial in this area, should thus be able to operate on equal 
terms within the different member countries. However, this 
implies a greater effort towards the coordination, if not the 
standardization, of the national systems which apply to 
suppliers of services of non-Community origin. For, if differ-
ent external systems were retained, the result would in fact 
be that, without concertation at Community level, the most 
accommodating Member State's system would become the 
rule, and this would be used to justify the re-emergence of 
barriers within the Community. 
2.2. In parallel with the process of completing the internal 
market the Member States should therefore examine the 
possibility of establishing common external systems relating 
to the various financial services sectors. 
Companies based in a third country do not benefit from the 
full right to provide financial services, whether they arc 
carried out directly (without an establishment in the Com-
munity) or through their European branches. To the extent 
that a Member State gives them this right, the system from 
3 This justifies the choice of the broad liberalization of capital movements 
vis-ii-vis the third countries mentioned above. However. it could prove 
ne~essary to make the complete liberalization of certain capital oper-
ations originating from third countries dependent upon the prudential 
rules of those countries first being harmonized with those of the Com-
munity. The operations referred to arc, in particular, the admission of 
foreign securities or units of foreign Ucits to Community markets and 
the insurance or guarantee contracts concluded by Community residents 
with foreign companies. 
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which they benefit cannot be more favourable than that 
under which Community companies operate in the frame-
work of the coordination directives concerning the access to 
the different financial service activities. Where it proved 
useful for these common systems, which may in the future 
govern the activity of these companies in the Community, 
to be granted solely on a basis of reciprocity (e.g., within 
the framework of GATT negotiations), or to differ from the 
corresponding intra-Community systems, the Community 
could envisage negotiating agreements with third States. 
These accords should also aim at strengthening cooperation 
between supervisory authorities of third countries and those 
of the Community. The Community has the legal capacity 
to conclude such international agreements and even enjoys 
exclusive competence in this matter according to the Court 
of Justice. 1 
1 See Judgment 22/70 of 21 March 1971 (AETR). In this case the Court 
states that 'whenever, in order to implement a common policy laid 
down in the Treaty, the Community has taken measures establishing in 
whatever form, common rules, the Member States are no longer entitled, 
whether acting individually or collectively, to contract with third States 
obligations which affect these rules'. 
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The question of conditions on the act1v1t1es of European 
subsidiaries of foreign financial companies arises in different 
terms. Any company established within the Community and 
set up in line with the conditions provided for in Article 58 
of the Treaty2 has in effect the right to the free provision of 
services throughout the Community. If it were to appear 
useful to make the right to establish subsidiaries dependent 
on reciprocal conditions, it would be necessary to agree on 
the arrangements for effective coordination of investment 
conditions in the Community for non-Community financial 
companies. 
i.e. in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their 
registered office, central administration or principal place of business 
within the Community. 
Note from the President of the Commission to the President of the Council 
Informal meeting of the Ministers for Economy and Finance at Knokke - April 1987 
In May 1986 the Commission presented the Council with a 
programme for the full liberalization of capital movements. 
Since then a first stage in applying this programme has 
been accomplished. Certain safeguard regimes have been 
withdrawn or made more restrictive (France, Italy). A direc-
tive liberalizing the last operations necessary for the genuine 
inter-linkage of the financial markets has been adopted and 
entered into force on 28 February 1987. 
The Commission has undertaken to promote a study of 
the various implications of the full liberalization of capital 
movements before proposing the corresponding directive to 
the Council. This study is under way, notably within the 
Committee of Governors and the Monetary Committee. The 
Commission's provisional conclusion is that liberalization 
could be accomplished, at least in a majority of Member 
States, even before the deadline of 31 December 1992 set by 
the Single Act for completing the internal market. The 
purpose of this paper is to identify the conditions for the 
venture to succeed. 
1. The liberalization of capital movements in 
the Community concerns all the Member 
States and is part of a general process 
1.1. The objectives which underlie the liberalization pro-
gramme concern all the Member States. The realization of 
an internal market having its full financial dimension is 
now an objective which the Community has set itself. The 
liberalization of capital movements will help improve the 
allocation of savings resources and can be expected to pro-
duce additional growth in the Community, from which all 
the member countries will benefit. In short, it aims to re-
inforce and consolidate the convergence of economic poli-
cies, which, though remarkable, could still now be seen to 
be reversible. 
The interdependence of the economies means that no Mem-
ber State can remain indifferent to the process which is 
taking shape. The countries primarily involved are undoubt-
edly those participating in the EMS exchange rate mechan-
ism which consider that they still have a significant margin 
of autonomy in the conduct of their monetary policies. But 
the liberal countries will have to reckon with the opportunity 
given to their residents of access to currencies which have 
so far been unavailable. The countries which still have strict 
exchange controls will have to define, in terms of a timetable, 
their relative priorities with regard to the liberalization of 
their exchange rules and their participation in the EMS. 
1.2. It will be necessary to carry through a development 
which is already well under way. Exchange controls have on 
the whole become appreciably more liberal in the last two 
years. The decisions taken by Spain, notwithstanding the 
provisions of the Treaty of Accession. are very encouraging. 
The distance which still remains to be covered should not 
be overestimated: the operations in question are financial 
loans in domestic currency. transactions in money market 
securities and the opening of accounts in foreign currencies. 
Financial innovation is known to be blurring the traditional 
distinction between the short-term and long-term sections 
of the financial markets. For some countries the issue of the 
repeal of the safeguard clauses from which they benefit -
and which is already written into the timetable - comes on 
top of the implications of the second stage of liberalization 
and obstructs their calm consideration of it. 
2. The completion of the liberalization of capi-
tal movements will open a new phase in the 
development of the EMS and monetary co-
operation 
2.1. The first period of the EMS has been one of painful 
and successful convergence towards a model of monetary 
stability consistently provided by Germany. One of its in-
struments has been exchange rate discipline. relaxed from 
time to time by moderate realignments and somewhat facili-
tated by the existence of exchange controls. 
This first phase is corning to an end and the realignment of 
12 January 1987 probably marks its completion. The new 
level of exchange liberalization reached in the Community, 
together with the increasingly general use of indirect 
methods of monetary control, have made the foreign ex-
changes more volatile and more sensitive to the relative 
financial data, in particular interest rate differentials. Con-
vergence is becoming more demanding; since it must now 
aim to ensure the coherent management of public finances 
and the pursuit of monetary stability; it is also becoming 
less straightforward since the exemplary behaviour of the 
principal partner is becoming more general. It follows that 
when there are strains within the EMS. the methods of 
adjustment arc proving less simple and that it will no longer 
be possible to evade the difficult question of sharing the 
burden of adjustment. 
2.2. The EMS is going to have to face a challenge when 
capital movements are liberalized of the same nature as the 
one it would have faced as a result of sterling's accession: 
how to manage the triangle of incompatibilities which results 
from the coexistence of exchange rate stability and the 
free movement of capital, with the relative autonomy of 
monetary policies of certain member countries. 
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There arc two rival schools of thought as to how to resolve 
this ovcrdetermination in the long term. Either reliance 
is placed on common adherence to the same objective of 
monetary stability and on the formation of a ·stable block' 
within the EMS to generate a process of spontaneous coordi-
nation of monetary policies (subject to a degree of Oexibility 
in the management of the system to react to unexpected 
shocks): or the choice of a more institutional solution is 
recommended. with a collectivization of the fundamental 
monetary choices in the Community (preferably ac-
companied hy more scope for resorting to the mechanisms 
of financial solidarity in order to defend the stability of 
exchange rates in the event of transitory strains). 
Whatever the respective merits of these two approaches. the 
issue at stake in the new phase of the EMS is more immedi-
ate. It is to define a method of managing a transitional stage 
characterized by the greater freedom of capital movements, 
the juxtaposition of convergent and coherent monetary poli-
cies whose credibility is however still widely dissimilar. and 
strict application of the EMS. It would be unrealistic to 
think that realignments will not be necessary from time to 
time. But the completion of the internal market implies, and 
this is how it differs from a free trade area. a rational 
stability of exchange rates - and for all the Member States. 
The cost and the constraints of this transitional period -
notably in terms of growth rates, of volatility and level of 
interest rates, and of volume and financing of interventions 
- arc liable to prove excessive for some Member States if 
behaviour in terms of adjustment, coordination and EMS 
solidarity is not cooperative. In particular there must be 
agreement: in seeking at Community level a rate of economic 
growth which makes the best use of the growth potential 
while respecting the priority of monetary stability; in attain-
ing the highest degree of liberalization of capital movements, 
while revising a rigorous system of safeguard clauses; in 
reinforcing and widening the purposes of the Community's 
monetary and financial instruments. 
It will he essential to strengthen the methods of coordinating 
monetary policies. For example, coordination must cover the 
definition of an objective of monetary stability acceptable to 
all; the use of the existing elements of flexibility in the EMS 
designed to frustrate speculation: the management of interest 
rate levels and differentials which is consistent with the 
defence of the EMS parity grid and the desired exchange 
rate relationships with third currencies. 
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3. The full liberalization of capital movements 
will reveal the variety of obstacles which will 
also have to be removed in order to attain a 
high degree of financial integration 
3.1. The liberalization of capital movements is clearly a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for financial inte-
gration. -Financial integration presupposes: the effective free-
dom to provide financial services. for which the movement of 
capital is often only the support: no discriminatory treatment 
connected with the location of placements: conditions of 
competition between suppliers of services unbiased by non-
economic considerations (tax evasion). This means that fi-
nancial integration will not necessarily keep pace with the 
liberalizatio; of capital movements, even if liberalization 
only fully makes sense in the perspective of financial inte-
gration. 
3.2. Although it is in principle directly applicable, the exer-
cise of the freedom to provide financial services presupposes 
a degree of harmonization in national legislation in the fields 
of banking. insurance and the organization of financial 
markets. It is sufficient to recall here the approach of the 
White Paper, adopted by the European Council in 1985. 
The White Paper forgoes - in the interests of realism 
- the harmonization of financial products, and instead 
advocates seeking a sufficient degree of harmonization -
sometimes a little awkwardly termed 'minimal' - of the 
supervisory rules, so that, in accordance with the principle 
of mutual recognition. the country in which the service 
is supplied must be satisfied with the supervision of the 
authorities in the supplier's country of origin. The harmon-
ization sought does not at all mean alignment on the most 
Oexible supervisory rules. What is desired is, on the contrary. 
to use the most relevant rules notably in the face of renewed 
banking risks. A recent judgment by the Court of Justice 
recognized that the wish to protect savings and the users of 
financial services may result in the freedom to provide ser-
vices being legitimately subordinated to authorization pro-
cedures where harmonization is insufficient. 
It remains that. in the field of banking at least, the Com-
mission considers that the directives which have already 
been adopted. those which it has presented to the Council 
and those which it has announced, form a body of texts 
sufficient to ensure the effective freedom to provide services. 
3.3. The Commission intends to propose a redrafting of the 
scope of liberalization obligations in relation to financial 
operations; in addition to the foreign exchange authoriza-
tion, liberalization should cover everything which could im-
pede the conclusion and execution or transactions. In a 
recent judgment, the Court of Justice even seemed, in the 
name of the principle of the freedom of capital movements. 
to condemn certain forms of administrative and possibly 
tax treatment which discriminated between national and 
Community placements. 
3.4. The dangers should not be underestimated of placements 
and financial activities being moved to other locations as a 
result of differences in the tax system of the Member States, 
although these differences affect just as much the location 
of the production of goods and services. They could exacer-
bate the effects of the normal diversification of portfolios 
and even in some cases take the form of 'inverse transfers·, 
hardly consistent with the optimum allocation of financial 
resources. These problems can be solved by harmonizing tax 
systems. In the meantime, the Member States are authorized 
under Community law 'to take all requisite measures to 
prevent infringements of their laws and regulations· but 
provided that these controls do not render illusory the right 
to engage in liberalized capital movements. 
4. The liberalization of capital movements must 
not run counter to the cohesion of the Com-
munity 
This gives rise to three essential questions: 
4.1. Because Member States do not start from the same 
situations, is there a need for supporting and transitional 
measures? 
In the majority of the Member States the liberalization of 
capital movements will be complete before the 1992 deadline. 
Does it have to be complete by the same date in the new 
Member States? This is not definite. especially if it is remem-
bered that for them the implications are particularly signifi-
cant. In particular they will have to modernize their financial 
systems - this could be helped by the Community's struc-
tural instruments - rearrange their systems of financing the 
public sector, reconsider the return on and the taxation of 
savings, etc. 
The Commission has already announced its plan to broaden 
the scope of the instruments providing medium-term balance 
of payments assistance. In the past they have always been 
activated to assist member countries which. at a time of 
balance of payments crisis, have introduced or tightened 
exchange controls. Their use could be envisaged to support 
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a State which, although its external situation was precarious, 
undertook to proceed along the path of liberalization. An 
appropriate form of conditionality would have to be worked 
out. 
4.2. Because of the greater fluidity of the monetary environ-
ment of each of the Member States, should the system of 
safeguard clauses be amended'? 
Discussions in the committees have shown the advantage 
there would be in a Member State being able temporarily 
to prevent short-term capital movements from entering or 
leaving the country in a situation in which they seriously 
disrupted the regulation of bank liquidity, but without there 
being any significant divergence in economic fundamentals. 
It has been argued that this need could be met by the 
safeguard clause of Article 73 of the Treaty. authorized by 
the Commission. after consulting the Monetary Committee. 
But this clause does not really meet the same need, because 
it refers to disturbances in the functioning of the capital 
markets. A broad interpretation could give grounds for the 
accusation that a procedure was being circumvented. The 
Commission would therefore prefer to incorporate a specific 
safeguard clause. relating to monetary operations, in the 
future Directive. 
4.3. In a financial market that is becoming glohal. is the 
financial identity of the Community an illusion'1 
There is broad agreement on the idea of liberalization erga 
omnes. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to update the 1972 
Directive on regulating international capital flows since it 
will no longer be possible to activate the instruments of 
control to which it refers within the Community except by 
virtue of a safeguard clause, whereas today their use is 
discretionary. When updating the Directive, the Commission 
would aiso suggest examining the advisability of providing 
for the possible concerted application of this Directive in 
the event of exceptionally large capital movements to or 
from third countries: this would moreover be in line with 
the explanatory memorandum to the Directive, which was 
drafted before the EMS existed. 
The financial identity of the Community will be based on 
the juxtaposition of the liberalization of capital movements 
and the free provision of services, the exercise of which is 
suhjcct to legislative harmonization which will apply only 
to the States of the Community. Third countries will have 
to negotiate with the Community a regime for supplying 
financial services. for which it will be able to determine the 
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conditions of reciprocity and the degree of liberality. The 
Commission considers however that the lack of coordination 
demonstrated in Member States' negotiations on the estab-
lishment of the branches of foreign financial institutions 
may lead to unbalanced concessions to the advantage of 
third countries. 
Conclusion 
1. Notwithstanding the additional comments which may be 
made by the Ministers, the Monetary Committee and the 
Committee of Governors envisage finalizing their reports 
for the informal economic and financial Council meeting of 
September. Between now and then the Commission envis-
ages, independently from work on strengthening the EMS, 
continuing its examination of the following points in particu-
lar: advisability of subdividing the second phase, rec-
ommended by certain Member States for reasons of tax-
ation; exact scope of the liberalization obligations; safeguard 
clauses; modifications to financial instruments. After the 
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economic and financial Council meeting of September the 
Commission intends to present the Council with the corre-
sponding proposed Directives or Decisions, having made a 
progress report to Parliament at its request. 
2. At this stage of the discussions the Commission is in a 
position to make three observations: 
(i) The implications of full liberalization are multiple and 
major; but none of them represents an insurmountable 
obstacle; 
(ii) full liberalization now corresponds to an obligation of 
the Treaty. It means carrying through an irreversible 
process, even if its pace differs from one member coun-
try to another. It will be a challenge to the stability of 
the EMS, but also an opportunity to strengthen it; 
(iii) lastly, and perhaps most importantly, there is no pre-
condition for the liberalization of capital movements. 
On the other hand, it will have a powerful stimulatory 
effect on the adoption of the accompanying measures 
necessary for it to lead to the completion of the internal 
financial market. 
Part Two - Reports prepared by a group of independent 
experts consulted by the Commission 
To help with the thinking on the implications of complete 
liberalization of capital movements, the Commission con-
sidered that a detailed analysis was needed and decided to 
seek the opinions of several independent experts. 
In general terms, each consultant was asked to analyse the 
economic, financial and monetary implications of a complete 
lifting of restrictions on capital movements, as set out in the 
Commission's Communication to the Council of May 1986. 1 
Within this overall analysis, each expert was expected to 
deal with one specific aspect.2 
The contribution by Professor de Boissieu therefore attempts 
to outline the consequences of complete liberalization of 
capital movements for the European Monetary System. 
Each of the other contributions focuses on the particular 
case of one Member State or of a group of Member States: 
I See Part One of this publication. 
The contributions were prepared in English. 
(i) Italy (Professor Basevi); 
(ii) France (Professor Wyplosz); 
(iii) Spain (Mr Cuervo-Arango Martinez'); 
(iv) the small open economies -Belgium, Denmark and the 
Netherlands (Mr Steinherr and Mr De Schrevel); 
(v) the Member States less advanced in the integration 
process because of their more recent accession: Greece, 
Spain and Portugal (Professor Braga de Macedo'); 
(vi) the United Kingdom (Professor Artis). 
The contributions reproduced in this part are preceded by 
an introductory note setting out the main issues investigated 
in the analyses and presenting the Commission's point of 
view. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of 
the Commission's departments alone and do not necessarily 
reflect the positions of the experts consulted. 
3 These consultants, having been contacted by the Commission at a later 
date, had only a relatively short time to complete their studies. 
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Summary and comments by Commission departments 
For the purposes of this summary, the main points of the 
consultants' analyses have been grouped around four prin-
cipal subjects: 
(i) the impact of the liberalization of capital movements 
on resource allocation; 
(ii) the consequences for the determination and evolution 
of exchange rates; 
(iii) the effect on monetary and budgetary policies; 
(iv) the envisaged solutions to the problems. 
On each of these subjects, the viewpoint of Commission 
departments is also presented. 
This arrangement, adopted for the sake of clarity, should 
not conceal the fact that these problems are heavily interde-
pendent, as is clearly brought out by the experts' analyses. 
For example, the distinction made between the impact of 
the liberalization of capital movements on resource allo-
cation and its consequences for exchange rates is, in certain 
respects, arbitrary. As Basevi in particular stresses, exchange 
rates may overreact by reference to changes in the economic 
fundamentals and this may have a substantial effect on 
resource allocation. 
More generally, examination of the interdependence of the 
problems inevitably leads to the fundamental question of 
the incompatibility between fixed exchange rates, free move-
ment of goods, services and capital and the independence of 
economic and monetary policies. In other words, it poses 
the problem of the degree of coordination necessary to 
ensure both the freedom of financial and monetary relations 
and the stability of exchange rates, both of which are indis-
pensable for the realization of an internal market in line 
with the objective which the Community has set itself for 
1992. 
From the Commission's point of view, the solutions to this 
problem must take account of the fact that, by reference to 
traditional theoretical analyses, the Community finds itself 
in a transitional phase with regard to the liberalization of 
capital movements, the coordination and convergence of 
economic policies and the system of exchange rate relation-
ships, added to which situations differ from one Member 
State to another. 
1. The effects of liberalization on resource allo-
cation, saving, investment and employment 
Summary 
1.1. On the basis of a two-country model, Steinherr provides 
the theoretical demonstration that free capital movements 
encourage the optimum allocation of resources at world 
level and that they are therefore globally welfare improving. 
Assuming that the productivity of capital is higher in country 
A than in country B, liberalization will be reOected in an 
export of capital from B to A. The two countries will gain, 
but the benefits will not be the same for all sections of the 
community. In country B, the outOow of capital will reduce 
the productivity of labour; wage and salary earners will 
therefore suffer a loss of income, but this will be more than 
offset by the rise in the revenue of capital holders deriving 
from the investment made in country A. Conversely, in 
country A wage and salary income will rise and the revenue 
of the capital holders will fall. In other words. in country B, 
GNP will increase more in absolute value than GDP will 
fall in absolute value: 
> 
while in country A the two aggregates will increase but the 
increase in GDP will be larger than the increase in GNP: 
6 + PIB > 6 + PNB 
This process assumes that country B's wage earners are 
prepared to accept a reduction in their real remuneration; 
if this is not the case. because of imperfections on the labour 
market, the export of capital will cause a reduction of 
employment in that country. Global income will not increase 
so much, and it may even decrease. Artis observes that hy 
reducing capital productivity, the imperfections of the la hour 
market may be the root cause of outOows of capital. but 
that this should lead the authorities to correct these imper-
fections, and not to prevent outOows of capital. Steinherr 
recalls that the situation of the Belgian franc was critical 
until 1982. the date when a radical reform of the wage 
indexation system was adopted. Basevi. referring to the 
Italian experience, is far more sceptical as to whether it is 
possible (or even advisable) to correct the imperfections of 
the labour market in the short term, and even in the medium 
term. In these circumstances, the theory of the 'second best' 
justifies measures, such as the dual exchange market. which. 
without preventing capital movements, 'throw sand' in the 
works. Cuervo-AranRo feels that adjustments in the labour 
market are necessary to enable Spain to achieve real inte-
gration (abolition of tariff barriers) in satisfactory con-
ditions. Nevertheless, he sees no major problems in direct 
and portfolio investment being liberalized during this tran-
sitional period. which will have to enable the sustainable 
exch,rnge rate for the peseta's entry into the EMS to be 
established. De Macedo emphasizes the need for the newly-
integrating countries first to liberalize the markets in goods, 
if the ·welfare effect' of the integration of the financial 
markets is to be maximized. 
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1.2. Another advantage or liberalization is that it offers the 
possibility of being better able to satisfy savers' and inves-
tors' preferences, which differ according to country, with 
respect to the degree of liquidity of placements and the time 
horizon; whence a globally positive effect on the level of 
saving and investment ( Steinherr ). 
1.3. According to Steinherr. in the present European situ-
ation. liberalization will be renected above all in increased 
competition between financial intermediaries and therefore 
in a reduction of their profit margins. to the benefit of savers 
and borrowers. Empirical estimates suggest that the interest 
elasticity of investment is stronger than the interest elasticity 
of savings; the reduction of intermediation margins could 
therefore be renected in a transfer from banks to savers 
rather than in an increase of investment. 1 However, de 
Boissieu quotes other studies which show that the global 
saving of households is chieny a function of income but that 
interest rates play an important role in the distribution of 
households' saving between financial assets and real assets. 
Consequently, the increase in the yield would give rise to an 
increase in financial saving. 
1.4. According to the consultants. competition will have a 
positive effect on the quality, the diversification and the 
prices of financial services. Cuervo-Arango stresses the im-
portance of the contribution made by foreign banks' subsidi-
aries to the modernization of financial structures in Spain. 
Wrplos::. considers that the possibility of failure for some 
intermediaries is a price worth paying for the advantages of 
liberalization. De Boissieu, Artis and Basevi mention the 
possibility that liberalization may increase the concentration 
of operations on certain financial centres (notably London) 
but do not consider that this should give rise to serious 
concern. 
1.5. Exchange controls are imposed in some countries 111 
order to contain the cost of the public debt. Wvplos::. ob-
serves that the reduction in the cost of the debt obtained in 
this way represents a tax on savers. By doing away with this 
disguised taxation. liberalization implies the use of other, 
more explicit forms of tax. Wyplos::. considers this process 
to be positive from the point of view of tax transparency. 
Liberalization will give rise to a redistribution of income as 
a result of this new distribution of the effective tax burden. 
1 Otherwise the increase in investment will give rise to a deterioration in 
the current account balance. because or an excess or investment over 
domestic saving. 
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1.6. Another redistributive effect may result from the abol-
ition of privileged financial channels and administered rates 
( Wyplos::., de Boissieu); liberalization implies that interest 
rates. rather than a compartmentalization of the market, 
should be used for monetary and financial management. 
De Boissieu mentions the possibility that some Member 
States will seek to maintain a selective interest rate policy 
by protecting certain sectors from outside innuence, through 
forms of ·re-regulation'. Wyplos::. observes that after liberal-
ization. the only way of favouring certain categories will be 
to grant them loans at reduced rates of interest charged to 
the budget. The advantage of this system is transparency, 
since in the end the subsidy is always paid by someone 
(under the system of administered rates by savers or by 
categories of borrowers who are obliged to obtain finance 
at a higher market rate). 
According to de Macedo, the abolition of privileged finan-
cing channels and the increase in interest rates which may 
result could lead to a riskier selection of investments, and 
consequently a greater risk for the whole financial system. 
1.7. For Steinherr and Wyplos::., differences in regulatory 
conditions. e.g. with regard to compulsory reserves and 
taxation. could continue to restrict competition despite liber-
alization. 
Steinherr stresses the advisability of adopting systems which 
eliminate both double taxation and tax evasion. According 
to him, the solution would be a uniform tax at source for 
the Community. It would be even better to set the uniform 
rate at zero, so that capital income would be tax-exempt. 
However, he adds that the harmonization of regulations 
(even tax rules) will emerge as a by-product of liberalization, 
and should not be a precondition for it. Basevi cautions 
against the danger that liberalization may lead to unre-
strained deregulation. 
Comments 
1.1. Commission departments consider that evaluation of 
the effect of the full liberalization of capital movements 
on resource allocation must take account of the degree of 
financial openness already achieved. In almost all the Mem-
ber States, both incoming and outgoing direct investment is 
already almost entirely liberalized. With the exception of a 
few of the small, newly acceding countries, it seems difficult 
to maintain that direct investment in the member countries 
provides widely differing rates of return. 
It is true that interest rates are another factor in determining 
where direct investment is made. If a country seeks to keep 
its real interest rates at a low level to stimulate domestic 
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investment, but leaves residents free to make direct invest-
ment abroad, it is probable that they will borrow on the 
domestic market to invest abroad (and so, even recently, in 
several Member States residents were obliged to finance 
direct investment abroad in foreign currencies). However, 
in most of the countries real interest rates have become 
much the same in the 1980s. In these circumstances, France 
in 1986 and Italy in 1987 were able, with no major problems, 
to lift the restrictions on portfolio investment, so that these 
operations are now unrestricted in the large majority of 
Member States. 
On this point it is interesting to refer to the distinction 
made by de Macedo between capital movements based on 
differences in endowments and capital movements based 
on arbitrage opportunities which enforce capital market 
efficiency. The former type of movement tends to enforce 
the equality of returns on real (direct) investments; the latter 
type tends to enforce the equality of returns on portfolio 
investments. This equalization has already taken place in 
most of the Member States so that full liberalization, while 
further promoting optimum resource allocation, will not 
cause massive shifts. Greece and Portugal, where these con-
ditions do not yet fully obtain, have justly been granted a 
longer period, under the terms of a safeguard clause and of 
the Act of Accession, within which to liberalize direct and 
portfolio investment. Since Spain is closer to the other mem-
ber countries in terms of economic and financial homogen-
eity, the exceptions which apply are narrower and the Span-
ish authorities have already been able to abolish some of 
the restrictions authorized by the Act of Accession. 
1.2. In addition, the possibility exists of improving struc-
tures and making them more similar. Much progress has 
been made in several countries in recent years with regard 
to labour market flexibility. In this area, as in others, the 
liberalization of capital movements is likely to accelerate 
structural changes, for example by making the consolidation 
of public finances and better management of the public debt 
even more essential. 
1.3. The liberalization of capital movements must also be 
seen in the context of the completion of the internal market, 
of which it forms an essential component. The lifting of 
exchange controls will, for example, make it possible to 
abolish a good many formalities which today impede every-
day trade. It will also unlock the full potential of action 
taken to facilitate the freedom to provide financial services. 
1.4. Liberalization will entail a modernization of financial 
structures. Modernization will probably stem from increased 
competition between national intermediaries, following the 
deregulation resulting from the liberalization of capital 
movements, as much as from competition between domestic 
and international intermediaries. 
When assessing the reduction in intermediation margins 
entailed by liberalization, it is necessary to take account of 
the different factors in each country, which may influence 
their size. The constraints on bank assets differ according 
to country. The consultants mention some of them but it 
must not be forgotten that debtor rates may include a risk 
premium which may vary from country to country and that 
some services are provided free of charge by the banks which 
recover their cost on creditor or debtor rates. The size 
of intermediation margins and therefore the possibility of 
reducing them must be assessed with some caution. It is, 
however. certain that in the medium term liberalization will 
give rise to the harmonization, in itself desirable, of the 
modus operandi of monetary policies, so that competition 
between intermediaries is not distorted by the use of different 
supervisory instruments, and to bank management which is 
increasingly inspired by criteria of efficiency. 
2. The impact of liberalization on exchange 
rates 
Summary 
2.1. All the consultants stress that in the absence of correc-
tive measures (examined in point 4) the full liberalization of 
short-term capital and financial credits may have a destabi-
lizing effect on exchange rates and the EMS. This judgment 
is based on experience of crisis periods during which the 
market expects an early realignment. Observation shows 
that during such periods, the differential between Eurofranc 
and Eurolira interest rates and interest rates on the domestic 
market or the gap between the Belgian franc official and free 
markets may become very large. This implies that exchange 
controls have been effective during crisis periods and that 
without controls the countries concerned would have had 
difficulty in complying with the EMS exchange rate disci-
pline. Of course, the exchange rate can always be defended 
by raising short-term interest rates: but in crisis periods the 
rise could reach untenable proportions. Wyp/os: observes, 
for example, that if the market expects a I O % depreciation 
one week ahead. the interest rate increase required to counter 
speculation in the currency concerned would have to be of 
the order of 520 percentage points. 
2.2. Outside crisis periods, the impact of liberalization on 
exchange rates will chiefly depend on the degree of substitut-
ability between financial assets. De Boissieu makes an initial 
distinction between capital mobility which is essentially a 
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legal concept and the substitutability between financial 
assets, which depends on the wealth and behaviour of oper-
ators and in particular on their attitude to risk. In theory. 
perfect substitutability between financial assets denominated 
in different currencies deprives monetary policy of all auton-
omy while imperfect substitutability leaves the authorities 
some margin or autonomy. However. when the markets 
expect a realignment. the holding of weak currencies be-
comes more risky (i.e. the degree of substitutability between 
\veak currencies and strong currencies diminishes). If the 
authorities of weak currency countries wish to avoid or defer 
the realignment they will be obliged to raise domestic interest 
rates which will then incorporate a risk premium. In this 
case a lower degree of substitutability reflects a loss of 
monetary autonomy since the external constraint becomes 
more severe. 
Dc Boissicu points out that if liberalization causes speculat-
ive movements which give rise to more frequent realign-
ments. this would mean a lower degree of substitutability 
between European currencies; in this case, it would therefore 
be movements of capital which determine the degree of 
substitutability, and not the reverse. ~ 
2.3. De Boissicu observes that the impact on exchange rates 
will differ according to whether liberalization leads to a 
concentration of portfolios in one currency or on the con-
trary to a process or diversification between the different 
currencies. The former will generally have a destabilizing 
and the latter a stabilizing effect. Admittedly. distinctions 
must be made according to cases. since a shift into the 
German mark may be considered as diversification (out of 
the domestic currency) or concentration (in the German 
mark). 
In principle, liberalization will be aga omncs so that diversi-
fication and concentration will also concern third currencies. 
2.4. According to Srcinhar and Bascri, liberalization could 
cause effects of over-adjustment of exchange rates in relation 
to third currencies. This process between currencies belong-
ing to the EMS could, however. occur onlv as a result of 
the system being abandoned or if realign"ments were no 
longer to respect the principle of purchasing power parity. 
Comments 
2.1. In crisis periods, the wide variations observed on the 
Eurocurrency markets are also the result of the thinness of 
these markets. and can give no precise indications as to the 
scale of the rise in domestic rates should capital movements 
be liberalized. The figures given as an example by Wrplos::: 
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assume that operators have very precise expectations as 
to the date and scale of realignments. Uncertainties make 
speculators far more cautious and reduce the scale of the 
interest rate increase required to defend the exchange rate. 
2.2. Furthermore. it is difficult to extrapolate from past 
experience. since convergence is now far greater; it must be 
considered as an established achievement and a starting 
point for more ambitious objectives. When inflation rate 
differentials are of the order of 2 or 3 %, operators can no 
longer expect substantial realignments. In addition. recent 
experience shows that certain economic policy measures 
(including a significant but moderate change in interest rates) 
may curb speculative attacks through their announcement 
effect. This effect. more than the monetary measures them-
selves, discontinued after a few months, halted speculation 
against the lira at the beginning of I 986. Admittedly. for 
the countries which are more divergent. liberalization and 
acceptance of EMS obligations can only be gradual, as de 
Macedo and Cue1To-Arango stress. 
2.3. 'Diversification' and 'concentration' have implications 
not only for how the EMS but also for how the international 
monetary system as a whole functions. It can be assumed 
that liberalization, by increasing the credibility of economic 
policy, will make the currencies concerned more attractive. 
The result will be a diversification, from which all the Euro-
pean currencies will benefit, in the portfolio of international 
investors, including third-country residents, and this will 
strengthen the cohesion of the EMS. The fact that the greater 
presence of the European currencies would have a direct 
positive effect on the stability of the international monetary 
system considered as a whole may be disputed, but greater 
stability will be possible because Europe's negotiating ca-
pacity will be strengthened. 
3. The impact of liberalization on interest rates 
and on monetary and budgetary policy 
Summary 
3.1. All the experts observe that according to the Mundell-
Fleming mo<lt:l, in a system of fixed exch,(nge rates. monet-
ary policy has very little independence (de Maccdo's analysis 
is less definite on this point). Consequently. for the count.ries 
concerned. participation in the EMS exchange rate agree-
ments involves a restriction on the management of their 
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monetary policy, which varies in severity according to the 
country's economic power and size. 
All the experts consider experience of the EMS to be positive, 
and stress the need to preserve its achievements. However, 
opinions are somewhat divided on the degree of monetary 
policy independence allowed by the EMS and on the advis-
ability of retaining or even enlarging it by means of adjust-
ments to the system. 
3.2. Wyplosz maintains that the existence of a margin of 
fluctuation and the possibility of realignments have not 
deprived the EMS of its fundamental character of a fixed 
exchange rate system. In accordance with the Mundell-
Fleming model, the member countries have lost the possi-
bility of conducting an independent interest rate policy, 
because the interest rate completely incorporates the ex-
pected rate of fluctuation within the band and the eventual 
rate of change at the time of realignment. However, cle 
Boissieu considers that in normal times. the coexistence of 
the EMS and of the liberalization of capital movements 
should mean a tendency for nominal interest rates to equal-
ize. Artis considers it possible that a change in interest rates 
in the leading country might not require so much of a 
parallel change in the interest rates of the other countries 
but be accepted in a change in the exchange rate, if this is 
permitted by the band width and the position of the currency 
within the band. Consequently, increasing the band width 
is likely to increase monetary autonomy. According to 
Basevi, the dual exchange market would enable the country 
which adopted it to maintain its monetary independence 
(better control of its money supply) even if it belonged to 
the EMS because capital movements would pass through 
the free market and would have no effect on domestic 
liquidity. Steinherr refers to empirical results which are said 
to confirm that membership of the EMS involves an almost 
total loss of monetary policy autonomy in the smaller 
countries. 
3.3. According to Wyplos:::, the sole monetary independence 
allowed to EMS participants is to be able to maintain a 
long-run inflation rate which differs from that of the partner 
countries. The liberalization of short-term capital move-
ments is liable to do away with this last area of limited but 
important independence in so far as it makes it possible to 
avoid the social costs of a policy aimed at the rapid reduction 
of inflation differentials. Wyplosz considers that there are 
still major structural differences in the member countries 
which make periodic realignments inevitable; these realign-
ments trigger speculative attacks which are liable to make 
the system unworkable, if short-term movements are unre-
stricted. Although ineffective in the medium term. exchange 
controls on capital movements play an important role in the 
short term and their existence has contributed to the stability 
of the EMS. In this light. it seems difficult. for Cucrro-
Arango. to abolish exchange controls on short-term oper-
ations. According to de A1acedo. in the new member 
countries, liberalization should initially be confined solely 
to long-term inflows of capital. 
3.4. The coordination of policies is a way of both coping 
with the dangers of liberalization and of compensating for 
the loss of monetary autonomy resulting from liberalization. 
However. the consultants are sceptical as to whether pro-
gress can be made along this road in the current situation. De 
Boissieu mentions the obstacles represented by differences in 
structure (which imply a different reaction to external 
shocks) and by the differences in the models used to interpret 
the functioning of national and international economics; the 
dominant position occupied by Germany in the EMS is also 
an obstacle to coordination. in so far as the other States arc 
not prepared to accept this position. 
According to Wyplos::: it could be argued that the countries 
belonging to the EMS implicitly agree to align themselves 
on Germany's monetary policy and 'buy' the credibility 
of the Bundesbank. It remains to be proved whether this 
approach is always the best solution since in some circum-
stances the EMS countries might wish the Bundesbank to 
change its policy. Artis observes that there is no certainty 
that one of the factors which in the recent past has favoured 
convergence, namely the priority given to fighting inllation, 
will persist in the future. 
The sterilization policy which aims to offset the impact of 
capital movements on domestic liquidity is an important 
element of coordination. This policy could be negotiated in 
advance. Artis quotes empirical studies on Germany which 
show that the effectiveness of sterilized interventions is lim-
ited, and observes that in theory the liberalization of capital 
movements is likely to reduce such effectiveness. However. 
as can also be seen from other studies quoted by de Macedo, 
the results of empirical work vary according to country and 
period so that it is difficult to draw any definite conclusions. 
De Boissicu states that in order to make progress towards 
liberalization. it would be necessary to move from the pre-
sent level of coordination, based on an agreement concerning 
certain fundamental economic policy objectives, to a higher 
level covering certain instruments of economic policy, e.g. 
interest rates. However. de Boissieu goes on to discuss the 
theory of the 'second best'. to show that the total indepen-
dence of economic policies may be preferable to partial 
coordination. For example. if there is no coordination of 
budgetary and pay policy, it would not he appropriate to 
coordinate monetary policies by setting a common money 
supply target. On this subject Wyplos::: observes that 
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irrespective of the intentions of each country's monetary 
authorities, European money supply growth will always 
he the weighted average of money growth in all member 
countries. 
:u. With regard to the impact which liberalization may 
have on the choice of intermediate targets, de Boissieu ob-
serves that the removal of foreign exchange restrictions will 
extend the empirical variability of the external counterpart 
of the money stock and therefore of the money stock it-
self. This, together with the increase in domestic currency 
held abroad, will reinforce the instability of the relations 
between the money stock and the real variables. The author-
ities could abandon monetary targeting or adopt a more 
nexible attitude both to the targets set and to their attain-
ment. 
Another solution might be to replace the money supply by 
different targets; however. interest rates do not seem an 
appropriate choice since they are increasingly determined by 
external rates. A nominal exchange rate target is already 
implicit in membership of the EMS. As for real exchange 
rates, they are much less controllable than nominal exchange 
rates. However, greater capital mobility could be a justifi-
cation for reactivating, in some member countries, credit 
aggregates (notably domestic credit expansion) as a target. 
3.6. Liberalization will also imply that the methods of mon-
etary control are brought closer together. Artis observes 
that liberalization is likely to limit, or even to nullify, the 
effectiveness of direct controls; in the United Kingdom, after 
the liberalization of capital movements, the 'corset' was 
found to be biting less and less, which is why it was abolished. 
The ineffectiveness of direct controls under a liberalized 
system is due to the development of off-shore markets which 
are not subject to such controls. 
3.7. According to the Mundell-Fleming model, under a fixed 
exchange rate system the liberalization of capital movements 
is likely to increase the effectiveness of budgetary policy. 
In this situation an expansionary budgetary policy is not 
hampered by 'crowding-out' effects since capital inflows 
limit the rise in interest rates. However, the increase in 
budgetary policy room for manoeuvre after liberalization 
must not be exaggerated. Steinherr recalls that the function-
ing of the model is subject to restrictive conditions (fixed 
prices, absence of expectations) which reduce its practical 
validity. Wyplos:: observes that if an expansionary budgetary 
policy leads to a loss of credibility as to whether the exchange 
rate can be maintained, capital outflows follow, not inflows. 
De Boissieu adds that, at the present time, Member States 
are keen to follow a policy consolidating public finances in 
the medium term and this reduces the possibility of adjusting 
budgetary policies to the economic situation. Finally, the 
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room for manoeuvre will subsequently be reduced for the 
Member States which, following liberalization, may have to 
bear a higher debt-servicing charge. 
Comments 
3.1. A distinction should probably be made between the 
'absolute' independence and the 'relative' independence of 
monetary policy. Absolute independence means that the 
authorities seek the domestic market's permanent isolation 
from the international market so that all national saving is 
kept within the country. This problem has already been dealt 
with in the chapter concerning resource allocation. None of 
the consultants advocates the continuation of this type of 
monetary independence and the application of the exchange 
controls which are its consequence. Opinions are, however, 
more divided concerning the second type of independence 
which aims to preserve a certain degree of autonomy in 
relation to the international economic situation and the 
possibility of choosing a different trade-off between real 
growth and inflation. Commission departments agree that 
convergence should not be interpreted too rigidly; for exam-
ple, growth rates will not necessarily have to be the same 
for all countries and for all periods of time; it will be possible 
for current account deficits to be offset by surpluses in the 
following years. On the other hand, it is important to avoid 
divergences in the stance of economic and monetary policies. 
3.2. The consultants are somewhat sceptical as to whether 
progress can be made towards coordination. However, the 
theory of the 'second best' referred to in this connection by 
de Boissieu seems valid only if it is assumed that monetary 
policy coordination would be based on the setting of a 
uniform money supply growth target for all the countries. 
But closer coordination of monetary policies with the aim of 
establishing ex ante, at Community level, monetary targets 
tailored to each country, seems perfectly credible. 
In this respect, in a situation in which there is complete 
freedom of capital movement between the participants in 
the EMS, a policy of non-sterilization of interventions on 
the foreign exchange markets assumes particular importance 
in enabling an element of automatic stabilization to be 
introduced into the system. Otherwise, in the weak currency 
countries, money market operations aimed at reconstituting 
liquidity destroyed externally will fuel additional outflows 
of capital and will therefore cause fresh losses of foreign 
exchange reserves. Conversely, attempts by the central banks 
of the strong currency countries to sterilize the effect on 
their domestic liquidity of inflows of capital by keeping 
unchanged the interest rate differentials with other countries, 
will encourage new inflows of capital. 
3.3 Commission departments share the opinion of the ex-
perts that the full liberalization of capital movements will 
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encourage the adoption of indirect methods of monetary 
control and will make direct controls ineffective. The ques-
tion of the impact of liberalization on the use of intermediate 
objectives will deserve more detailed study, especially since 
the choice and quantification of these objectives will have 
an important role to play in the coordination of monetary 
policies. The problem will have to be studied as part of the 
review of intermediate objectives which is already under way 
in most of the member countries, since the significance of 
the objectives used until now has been profoundly affected 
by financial innovation. Nevertheless, the most urgent need 
is to coordinate variations in interest rates, as de Boissieu 
stresses. 
3.4. As the experts stress, the effectiveness of independent 
budgetary policies, in a situation in which capital moves 
freely, should not be overestimated. The limits to these 
policies are already apparent, when inflows of capital are 
unrestricted in most of the Member States: theoretically this 
should nevertheless limit the crowding-out effects connected 
with e~pansionary budgetary action. However, exchange 
rate stability, rendered more necessary and more difficult by 
the full liberalization of capital movements, requires far 
more attention to be paid to the compatibility of monetary 
policy and budgetary policy, whether within each Member 
State in the mix of their economic policy measures or at the 
level of Community coordination. 
4. Solutions and palliatives 
Summary 
The solutions and palliatives proposed by the consultants 
may be divided into two categories, depending on whether 
they involve a reintroduction, in principle temporary, of 
restrictions on capital movements or whether they are based 
on changes to the EMS. 
4.1. De Boissieu makes a distinction between the measures 
which reintroduce real exchange controls (non-price mech-
anisms) and those which confine themselves to throwing 
sand in the wheels, such as a 'Tobin tax', an 'interest equali-
zation tax' (IET) or the two-tier exchange market. In theory, 
the second type of measure is preferable, but in some circum-
stances quantitative controls could usefully be imposed, for 
example in crisis periods (prohibition on banks lending in 
national currency to non-residents). Furthermore, the disad-
vantage of the Tobin tax' is that it hits financial operations 
as well as commercial operations. 
The practice of the dual or two-tier exchange market cap-
tures the attention of several consultants. Steinherr is of the 
opinion that the advantages of the two-tier market are that 
it functions automatically, has low administrative costs, 
presents no obstacles to commercial flows and ensures that 
the weight of adjustment is distributed between a variation 
in interest rates and a variation in exchange rates. Basevi 
goes even further. In his opinion, the establishment and the 
maintenance of a dual exchange market is essential not 
only to respond to speculative attacks but also to avoid 
overadjustments of exchange rates, to give monetary policy 
room for manoeuvre and to avoid the misallocation of 
resources. Basevi states that the dual market is equivalent 
to a continually adjusting tax on capital movements; because 
it is regressive, this tax has a deterrent effect especially on 
short-term movements; furthermore, when the differential 
between financial and commercial rates becomes wide, long-
term investors defer their purchases and wait for better 
times, and this produces a stabilizing effect. For de Macedo, 
recourse to the dual exchange market would make it easier 
for the newly-integrating Member States to participate in 
the EMS exchange rate mechanism. However. in the case of 
Spain, Cuervo-Arango considers it preferahle for restrictions 
to be maintained solely on short-term capital movements. 
4.2. In order to counter tensions in the EMS, de Boissieu 
proposes that the system be strengthened by a more intense 
utilization of available instruments: the full use of the fluctu-
ation margin, wider recourse to monetary support instru-
ments and more symmetrical interventions by central banks 
on the foreign exchange markets. 
Artis proposes increasing the band width and reducing the 
allowable amount of realignment, at the same time keeping 
the new central rates within the existing bands. The EMS 
would thus resemble a 'crawling peg' system and speculative 
pressures would find themselves much reduced by this. 
According to de Macedo, a wider fluctuation band could 
enable the currencies of the new Member States to enter the 
EMS more rapidly. Cuervo-Arango considers that it would 
be better for the peseta to enter the exchange rate mechanism 
later, with the normal fluctuation band, than to enter it 
sooner with a wider one. 
4.3. Wyplos:: proposes a more radical solution, the creation 
of an economic and monetary union; it is true that differ-
ences in structure make periodic exchange rate changes 
essential, but these changes could be replaced by taxes or 
subsidies. 
Comments 
4.1. The suggestions that temporary exchange control meas-
ures could be reintroduced fit in with the Commission pro-
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gramme. In principle. these measures could also consist in 
the (temporary) use or the dual market. though its effective-
ness must not he overvalued. The experiences or France and 
Italy which made use or the dual market in the 1970s brought 
out the difficulties of controlling the nature or operations 
and or preventing arhitraging hetween the two markets. The 
case or the Belgian dual market is more controversial. No 
douht in periods or tension its existence has sometimes 
prevented large losses or reserves and/or a considerable 
increase in domestic rates. However. since the authorities 
cannot ignore the differential between the two markets. the 
increase in the margin or monetary policy independence is 
modest and temporary. If. apart from normal times, the 
differentials between the two markets are to remain small. 
the policies of the countries concerned must be coordinated. 
The usefulness of the dual market would therefore simply 
he to permit the authorities to gain time in crisis periods. 
The deterrent effect or the dual market would correspond 
to the tax represented by the differential between the free 
and the official market. However. exporters of capital will 
not pay this tax on the amount of exported funds until the 
moment they repatriate their assets and only if their own 
currency's exchange rate has in the meantime been revalued 
on the non-official market. The tax effect induced by the 
dual market can be exerted on the yield of assets placed 
abroad, provided that the corresponding income, as a cur-
rent operation. is obliged to pass through the official market 
whereas the principal is transferred through the free market. 
However, the deterrent effect of this tax presupposes a wide 
differential between the two markets: a I O % differential 
between the two exchange rates reduces by only half a point 
the yield on a placement made abroad at the nominal rate 
or 5 'Yi,. 
The application of a 'pure' dual market system - i.e. where 
there is a perfect dichotomy between current and capital 
operations - in theory means that a surplus or deficit 
balance on capital operations (outside the official sector) is 
not possible. Yet, in a situation in which capital moves 
freely, it is normal, and desirable for optimum resource 
allocation, that each of the countries can adopt, according 
to their structural characteristics, net positions as exporters 
or importers of capital. 
In practice. the maintenance of a dual exchange market must 
be accompanied, according to circumstances, by changes in 
the dividing line between the two markets. The danger is 
that this nuctuating dividing line may not be defined objec-
tively but only in such a way that the official market is made 
to handle all the (current or capital) flows necessary for its 
equilibrium at the desired official exchange rate. Such a 
practice introduces an arbitrary dimension which is not 
really compatible with the integration desired. The adminis-
trative complexity for the Community of a situation in which 
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each Member State followed a different practice for its dual 
market can also be imagined. 
In this connection. the administrative cost of operating a 
dual market should not be underestimated; the necessary 
controls bearing mainly on operations eligible for the official 
market. i.e. on current transactions. 
4.2. The Commission believes that capital movements can-
not be fully liberalized at the cost of relaxing EMS exchange 
rate discipline. This approach would conOict with the wider 
objecti\·e of establishing an integrated financial market in 
the Community. It would be counterproductive by giving 
negative signals on the credibility of the Member States· 
monetary policies and their coordination. In addition. the 
degree of convergence already achieved on inOation has 
significantly increased the relative width of the fluctuation 
band agreed when the EMS was established. To make it 
even wider would necessarily be perceived as a weakening 
or exchange rate discipline. 
Conclusions 
I. The consultants' contributions show that the liberaliza-
tion of capital movements will not produce all its beneficial 
effects unless certain conditions are satisfied and certain 
precautions taken. 
Two aspects are emphasized: 
1.1. A better allocation of resources is not possible unless 
the markets are nexible: in particular: 
(i) the national financial system must adapt and modernize 
itself. compartmentalization must be ended, monetary 
regulation and the cost of the public debt will be deter-
mined by the action of interest rates according to mar-
ket rules: the result will be some redistribution of in-
come. and. sometimes. tighter management of the pub-
lic debt: 
(ii) the rigidities of labour markets must be eliminated. and 
commercial free trade must be fully realized. 
1.2. Tighter coordination of economic policies. and particu-
larly of monetary policy will be necessary to counter poten-
tial increased tensions within the EMS which will result from 
the full liberalization of capital movements. The consultants' 
scepticism as to the possibilities of increasing coordination 
leads them to envisage chiefly an alternative between: 
(i) a new (more flexible) operation of exchange rates in the 
EMS; 
(ii) (temporary) restrictions on capital movements. 
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2. Commission departments broadly agree with this analysis 
but they have major differences in relation to the scale of 
the problems and the solutions proposed. 
2.1. First of all, the progress already made in liberalizing 
capital movements and modernizing financial markets must 
not be underestimated. The degree of openness achieved 
within the Community is already high, particularly with 
respect to the free choice of productive locations (freedom 
of establishment and of direct investment) and with respect 
to portfolio investment. After decades during which rigid 
administrative rules were imposed on monetary and financial 
flows, several countries have greatly developed (sometimes 
created ex nova) large and efficient money and financial 
markets. This has been particularly noticeable in France and 
Italy, but the first concrete steps have also been taken in 
Spain, Greece and Portugal. 
2.2. For the Commission, the solutions which consist in 
seeking a trade-off between liberalization and relaxing the 
exchange rate discipline are not acceptable. The completion 
of the large internal market, a stepping-stone towards econ-
omic and monetary union. requires assured exchange rate 
stability. extending to all the Community currencies. 
The consultants' scepticism as to whether coordination can 
be increased is partly based on differences in economic 
structures. These differences represent an obstacle to the 
immediate achievement of a completely fixed exchange rate 
system, rather than to the liberalization of capital move-
ments. It is also based on the conviction that policy coordi-
nation should immediately mean a uniform inflation rate in 
the Community. Commission departments are of the opinion 
that it is necessary to proceed boldly but gradually towards 
coordination as regards both procedures (decision-making 
process) and achievements, while maintaining the fight 
against inflation as a priority. On this point, the degree of 
convergence already achieved must not be underestimated, 
largely thanks to the disciplinary effect resulting from mem-
bership of the EMS. The liberalization of capital movements 
is likely to increase this effect. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of the 
financial liberalization process, which is gradually im-
plemented by EC countries, on the overall stability of the 
EMS, the conduct and the effectiveness of monetary policy 
and interest rate determination. 
The programme of financial and monetary liberalization 
within the EC will increase potential capital mobility in 
European countries. Its impact on the actual capital mobility 
will depend on private agents' behaviour, namely on the 
substitutability of financial assets. Mobility and substituta-
bility are of course related, but at the basis they concern 
separate aspects: 
(I) The mobility of capital mainly results from the legal 
framework. The barriers to mobility can be manifold: ex-
change controls, taxation of capital movements, 1 selective 
use of the reserve ratios imposed on the banking sector, etc. 
A higher capital mobility requires the phasing-out of the 
explicit and the shadow barriers to capital inflows and out-
flows. Analytically, it means an increase of the sensitivity or 
capital flows to price differentials (interest rate differential. 
tax differential, etc.), for a given level of risk premiums. In 
terms of the uncovered interest rate parity, perfect capital 
mobility is consistent with positive risk premiums. 
(2) The substitutability between financial assets depends on 
individual situations and behaviour (tastes and endow-
ments), and on the attitude towards risk. At the empirical 
level, it is often assessed by the matrix of crossed price 
elasticities. In the uncovered interest rate parity, perfect 
substitutability is obtained if risk premiums are equal to 
zero. A more general condition of perfect asset substituta-
bility would be that the risk premium is exogenously given 
(with a value equal to zero as a special case), i.e. it does not 
vary with relative stocks of domestic and foreign financial 
assets, hence with international capital movements. The risk 
can derive from many sourcesexchange risk, political risk, 
etc. Let us take an example to underline the importance of 
the distinction between mobility and substitutability. If the 
financial liberalization generates destabilizing capital move-
ments and an increase in the frequency and/or the amplitude 
of parity realignments, it will, compared to the present 
situation, extend the exchange risk and risk premiums. 
In this case, the substitutability between financial assets 
denominated in different currencies will, ceteris parihus, de-
crease notwithstanding the gradual phasing-out of the legal 
1 Like a "Tobin· tax or an interest equaliLation tax. These tools will be 
analysed later. 
restrictions to capital mobility. The level of risk premiums 
in the interest rate parity equation is mainly influenced 
by expectations of exchange rate movements. It is also 
determined by other economic and political arguments, 
among which the credibility of monetary authorities plays a 
key role. A more complete and formal analysis would have 
to illustrate a two-way causation: if capital movements con-
dition the substitutability between financial assets, as illus-
trated above, they reveal portfolio behaviours which are 
themselves determined by asset complementarity or substitu-
tability relations. 
The three-step programme of financial liberalization in 
Europe will certainly extend capital mobility. Its influence 
on substitutability and the structure of European portfolios 
has to be documented more precisely. 
Three topics will be tackled successively: 
(i) is the EMS an asset or a hindrance for financial liberal-
ization?; 
(ii) the consequences of financial and monetary liberaliza-
tion for the dynamic stability of the EMS; 
(iii) the consequences of financial liberalization for monet-
ary policy, the monetary-fiscal mix and interest rates. 
The nature of the EMS and the financial liberal-
ization process 
1. Preliminary remarks 
The interpretation of a monetary union like the EMS, with 
'fixed but adjustable exchange rates', may vary depending 
whether the emphasis bears on the fixity of exchange rates, 
or the possibility of adjusting them. The optimum frequency 
of parity realignments in the EMS is a crucial and delicate 
question. In recent models (e.g., F. Giavazzi and M. Pagano, 
1985), it is mainly determined by two elements: (i) the degree 
of divergence in domestic money growth rates and in the 
rate of inflation, and (ii) the cost of realignment. We will 
have to study if it is necessary to add to these variables the 
degree of financial integration as a separate argument. The 
EMS corresponds to an intermediate case between the polar 
situations highlighted in the literature (pure fixity - pure 
flexibility). 
Financial liberalization in Europe has been accelerated by 
the financial innovation process. In many cases, financial 
innovation is a way to circumvent existing and costly regu-
lations, and the ·regulatory dialectic' (E. Kane) between 
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regulation and innovation applies also to the regulatory 
apparatus used to limit capital mobility (exchange controls, 
etc.). Deregulation or interest rates, of financial services and 
capital movements reduces the gap between the legal system 
and the facts, recognizing the international dimension of the 
financial innovation process and the decreasing effectiveness 
of exchange controls. 
The sequence of events in the liberalization process is not 
neutral, and it is logically based on the delimitation between 
non-monetary financial instruments and money flows, the 
latter being liberalized at the end since they are supposed to 
have a more direct impact on monetary policy and sover-
eignty than the former. It is well known that, due to financial 
innovation, the frontier between money and the other finan-
cial instruments has become more conventional and tenuous 
than ever. Then, the justification and implementation of this 
gradual programme are rather delicate. 
Financial liberalization takes place in the context of rising 
capital markets and disintermediation. Therefore, the em-
phasis is put on negotiable financial instruments more than 
on the part of savings collected by the financial intermedi-
aries. To assess the impact of deregulation in the long run 
and not only in the short run, it is necessary to raise this 
question does this process correspond to an irreversible 
trend, or must we expect a cyclical evolution? The answer, 
to be documented later, depends very much on the conse-
quences of financial liberalization for member countries and 
of the possibility to resort to some kind of regulation. None 
the less, we have to keep in mind that financial innovation 
and the growth of capital markets seem to have a large 
cyclical component. For instance, in France, a further devel-
opment of the bond market is jeopardized by interest rate 
expectations, and if nominal interest rates increase, there 
will be important shifts in portfolios, a significant portion 
of private savings being 'reintermediated'. 
2. The EMS and financial integration 
2.1. The EMS, an asset for financial integration 
The EMS has been instrumental in the financial integration 
process in two aspects: 
(i) The theory or optimum currency areas shows that the 
fixity of exchange rates is a crucial clement for financial 
integration. In the seminal contribution of R. Mundell 
(1961), the mobility of the factors of production (labour 
and capital) is the criterion used to define the optimum 
currency area. According to the theory referred to, 
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greater capital mobility within EC countries increases, 
ceteris paribus, the 'optimality' of the European monet-
ary zone. 
(ii) The exchange rate constraints of the EMS and the 
leadership exercised by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many have induced a significant convergence in econ-
omic performances of EC countries (especially, a con-
vergence in nominal terms: growth of the money stock, 
disinflation, etc.). Greater convergence is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient, condition to further progress in 
financial integration, since it will in principle reduce the 
scope for potentially destabilizing capital movements. 
2.2. The consistency puzzle 
Is it possible to reconcile fixed exchange rates with perfect 
capital mobility? The Bretton Woods regime had been con-
fronted with this canonical question, and greater capital 
mobility in the I 960s was one of the reasons for its failure. 
To simplify, let us assume for the moment that coordination 
of economic policies (not only monetary policies) is a pre-
requisite for convergence. Under fixed exchanges rates, four 
regimes are conceivable: 
Perfect 
capital 
mobility 
Yes 
No 
Coordination 
Yes No 
B 
C 
Until now, the EMS has functioned with imperfect capital 
mobility (exchange control regimes in France, Italy, etc.) 
and limited coordination. This combination, which corre-
sponds to the no-no case, can be dynamically stable. In this 
case, restrictions to capital movements are the price to pay 
for (relatively) fixed exchange rates, without much coordi-
nation. 
The yes-yes case seems also to be dynamically stable, at a 
level of global economic activity different from the no-no 
solution. Economic policy coordination would be the means 
to contain destabilizing capital flows, thus to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate regime with high capital mobility. 
The situations represented by Band C raise some consistency 
issues. The experience of EC countries shows that the incen-
tives to coordinate national economic policies are reduced 
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under imperfect capital mobility. The C situation does not 
correspond to the historical experience of the EMS, and its 
probability of occurrence is low. 
On the other hand, the probability of a B regime is high if 
there is no significant improvement in the coordination 
process. B solutions have a great chance to be dynamically 
unstable and thus transitory, since perfect capital mobility, 
without enough coordination will increase the frequency and 
the size of parity realignments within the EMS - even if 
domestic interest rates share a part of the adjustment burden 
- and then transform the initial fixed exchange rate regime 
into a de facto floating rate regime. 
What kind of coordination is required to reconcile capital 
mobility and fixed exchange rates? To simplify, we can 
distinguish three meanings for coordination, ranked in an 
increasing order of implication: 
(i) the circulation of information among partners, concern-
ing policy objectives and instruments; 
(ii) basic agreement on policy objectives; 
(iii) agreement on policy objectives. and integration of some 
policy instruments. 
Coordination interpreted as a process of circulation of infor-
mation has not been sufficient to ensure stability of the EMS 
under imperfect capital mobility. The success of the EMS 
since 1982 has been due to the passage to step (ii), and the 
growing consensus in favour of disinflation starting from a 
8-solution. The dynamic stability will require the implemen-
tation of (iii), since the coordination of policy tools would 
be necessary to monitor capital flows between EC countries 
(e.g. the coordinated use of domestic interest rates by the 
monetary authorities is required). A cost-benefit analysis of 
financial liberalization must take into account the political 
and economic consequences of the internalization of external 
effects due to the partial integration of policy tools. 
2.3. The scope for coordination and the danger of non-
cooperation 
Is partial coordination efficient? The second-best argument 
shows that, in many cases, partial coordination - for exam-
ple, limited to monetary policy - is not welfare-improving 
compared to the non-cooperative solution. Since the growth 
of the money stock is influenced not only by monetary 
policy, but also by fiscal policy, incomes policy, etc .. it is 
difficult to justify and implement piecemeal coordination. 
Is global coordination plausible? Certainly not, in the near 
future, if we take into account the conflict of interest between 
Germany and France on many issues (the role of the ECU, 
the transition to the 'institutional phase' of European monet-
ary integration, etc.). Several models show that. with dissym-
metries between partners, some countries may be induced 
to be 'free riders' and not to cooperate because they are in 
a better position in the non-cooperative equilibrium than in 
the cooperative equilibrium. Among the relevant dissym-
metries, we may notice (see P. Artus, 1987) the following 
arguments: 
(i) some shocks may be country-specific. and thus encour-
age other countries not to share the burden of the 
adjustment; 
(ii) the differences in the objective-functions of rational 
policy-makers (e.g. Germany is much more inflation-
averse than its EC partners); 
(iii) the differences in the models used for the different 
countries (differences in the relevant parameters, etc.). 
Germane to this argument. the possibility that member 
countries don't use the same model of world interdepen-
dence (this corresponds to the 'positive economics' ar-
gument); 
(iv) the domination effect of one country over the others 
(e.g. Germany fixing the level of interest rates for the 
European zone). 
Financial liberalization will have some impact on some of 
these factors. For instance, it can accelerate the convergence 
of some relevant parameters (interest-elasticity of the de-
mand for money, etc.) to common values and then reduce 
the dissymmetries referred to in (iii). But on the other hand, 
financial liberalization may reinforce certain dissymmetrics 
(e.g. the role of London as a financial centre). I think 
that some arguments which explain the reluctance of some 
countries to cooperate will continue to be effective under 
perfect capital mobility. The viability of the EMS without 
exchange controls will be greater the sooner, and the deeper 
dissymmetries, and therefore incentives not to cooperate for 
some countries, may be reduced. 
The European consensus on policy objectives has increased 
over the last five years (see, for example, convergent values 
for the weight of the argument 'disinflation' in the ohjective-
function of the policy-makers). Therefore. one source of 
dissymmetry has been reduced. It is not sure that this trend 
will continue to work. Growing divergences in certain real 
indicators (see later) may induce some countries to modify 
the relative weights of unemployment and inflation in the 
government objective-function, compared to the present 
situation. If this evolution, which would not be a conse-
quence of financial liberalization, took place, it would 
generate other incentives in favour of the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. 
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3. Convergence and coordination in the EMS 
3.1. The notion of convergence revisited 
The convergence refer to several r,henomena. We introduce 
three meanings: 
(a) Convergence in economic r,erformances, esr,ecially the 
performances which have a direct influence on exchange rate 
stability. According to the recent !MF study (see H. Lingerer 
et al .. 1986 ), economic convergence would in the first place 
imply a narrowing of international differences in the devel-
opment of those economic variables that have a direct impact 
on exchange rate stability. This is the EMS concept of 
economic convergence. Very often, the analysis refers to the 
ultimate goals of economic policy. A relevant distinction has 
been r,resented (see the 1986-87 economic report of the 
European Commission) between nominal convergence (re-
duction, among the EC and the EMS countries, in the 
standard deviation of inflation rates, interest rates, rates of 
growth of the money stock, rates of growth of nominal 
wages, etc.) and real convergence (reduction in the standard 
deviation of GNP per capita, the rate of unemployment, 
etc.). Empirical studies show that, since the early 1970s, 
nominal convergence has developed dramatically in the EC 
and the EMS, especially concerning domestic monetary poli-
cies and inflation rates. At the same time, convergence of 
some nominal variables (the fiscal stance, the current ac-
count. etc.) and real convergence have stopped or even 
diminished. 
The evolution of real convergence is due to many factors, 
among which the entrance of southern countries with low 
per capita GNP and high unemployment has played an 
important role. 
(b) Convergence in economic structures, particularly indus-
trial structures. As the structure of input-output tables dif-
fers from one member country to another, the sensitivity of 
the domestic productive sector to a given variation in the 
real exchange rate varies significantly. This will remain valid 
even with a perfect convergence in economic performances 
(e.g. with perfect nominal convergence). Among the other 
structural aspects, the degree of flexibility on the labour 
market is crucial. The persistence of the present disparity, 
or on the contrary more convergence, will condition the 
dynamics of the EMS under perfect capital mobility. 
(c) Convergence in the modus opaandi of economic policy. 
By modus operandi, we mean the instruments used and their 
combination. and the regulatory framework. In a monetary 
union with perfect capital mobility, all the factors which 
influence the level and volatility of after-tax returns on 
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financial assets. or the cost of resource mobilization by the 
banking sector have to be taken into consideration. Three 
issues are particularly important: 
(i) the convergence in the explicit tax system applied to 
the financial sector (for instance, the application of the 
VAT to financial institutions, the tax rules concerning 
deposit and lending rates, etc.); 
(ii) the convergence in the implicit ( or shadow) tax system 
associated with banking regulations. Permanent dis-
crepancies in the regulatory cost due to the reserve 
requirement ratio or prudential control imposed on 
banks will induce distortions in the mobilization of 
savings and in capital movements, notwithstanding the 
progress of convergence in economic performances; 
(iii) the convergence in the instruments of monetary policy. 
Until now. the EC and the EMS have functioned with 
great disparity in domestic monetary policies. 
Some countries have implemented transitory or permanent 
direct control procedures, especially credit ceilings (France, 
Italy, Portugal, Greece, etc.). In some cases, credit ceilings 
have been progressively phased out (France as of January 
1987, Italy in 1983), but, due to the limits of indirect control 
procedures, the temptation is great to return to direct con-
trols (Italy, the Netherlands). It is well known that direct 
controls like credit ceilings are generally a substitute for 
interest rate variations (they are a means of 'economizing' 
interest rate increases when the control of the growth of the 
money stock must be tight). Therefore, in countries with 
indirect control procedures, the domestic sources of interest 
rate volatility play a limited role. 
In other countries, the monitoring of money growth is based 
on indirect controls, through interest rate variations (Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, France since I 987, etc.). For 
these countries, the domestic sources of interest rate varia-
bility add to the external ones. 
Under perfect capital mobility, the EC would not remain a 
patchwork of direct and indirect operating rules, since the 
removal of direct control procedures is the logical conse-
quence of the phasing-out of exchange controls (credit ceil-
ings are ineffective in a completely liberalized system). How-
ever, there are several types of indirect control procedures. 
For instance, the modus operandi of French monetary policy 
since January I 987 is not the same as the operating rule 
implemented in Germany. Due to persistent divergences in 
monetary operating rules, differences in interest rate vola-
tility in member countries for domestic reasons could induce 
potentially destablizing capital flows. From this point of 
view, divergences in the modus operandi of monetary policy 
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could have the same effect as the time desynchronization of 
domestic monetary policies using the same type of operating 
rules. 
3.2. The relevance of convergence for market operators 
It is well known that convergence and coordination are not 
always positively correlated. On the one hand, convergence 
in economic performances can be obtained without much 
coordination. For instance, the present convergence con-
cerning the disinflation process is more the consequence of 
the external constraint bearing on each country ( one aspect 
of the external constraint for EC countries being the role of 
Germany and the disinflation pattern chosen by this coun-
try), than the result of a real coordination process between 
member countries. On the other hand, coordination may 
sometimes accentuate the divergence in economic perform-
ances (e.g. this is the case when cooperation leads to the 
implementation of the 'locomotive' model, with an active 
de-coupling of national economic policies). 
Are market operators more influenced by convergence m 
economic performances or by the very process of coordi-
nation? Their expectations and their behaviour are generally 
conditioned by both aspects. The announcement of coordi-
nation - even before its actual implementation - can 
have a positive influence on expectations and may deter 
speculative capital movements (see for example the an-
nouncement effect generated by the Plaza agreement of 
September 1985). Notwithstanding this psychological im-
pact, capital movements will remain determined under per-
fect financial liberalization by persistent divergences in econ-
omic performances, namely after-tax interest rate differen-
tials adjusted for expectations of exchange rate variations. 
It is likely that market operators have been, and will remain, 
victims of an illusion, in considering other differentials than 
the relevant ones. For instance, they look at the CPI when 
the GDP deflator would be relevant (and vice versa), or they 
look at prices instead of unit labour costs. The choice of the 
relevant signals may be indifferent for capital movements, 
but not always (e.g. the direction of the differential between 
Germany and France is totally different if we examine the 
CPI index or the evolution of unit labour costs. 1 We must 
follow market operators in their illusion, since capital in-
flows and outflows are explained by the differentials and 
the disparities actually looked at by market operators, not 
always hy the differentials which would be relevant from a 
theoretical point of view. 
1 For example, this statement is valid for 1986. 
The consequences of financial liberalization for 
the dynamic stability of the EMS 
Generally speaking, financial liberalization induces simul-
taneous effects on the allocation of resources, the conditions 
of stabilization and the distribution of resources. It increases 
the efficiency in resource allocation (e.g. in the saving-invest-
ment adjustment process), but it may have an ambiguous 
influence regarding stabilization issues. Here, we will focus 
on a particular dimension of stability, namely the dynamic 
stability of a monetary regime (the EMS), which is related 
to, but must not be confused with, the empirical stability or 
instability of economic variables (exchange rates, nominal 
or real, the rate of inflation, etc.). 
1. The impact of liberalization on portfolio be-
haviour 
The main issue is the following: will financial liberalization 
induce more concentration (e.g. in DM). or more diversifi-
cation of European portfolios? The answer may have a clear 
impact on the intertemporal stability of the EMS. 
To be sure, the economies of scale argument, which leads to 
greater concentration in portfolios, especially in transaction 
cash-balances, will be reinforced by the deepening of finan-
cial integration. On the other hand, other forces may induce 
more diversification or more concentration depending on 
the empirical evolution. According to basic portfolio theory, 
a diversified portfolio is efficient for risk-averse agents when 
returns on investment in various currencies are imperfectly 
correlated. Concentration is rational in the case of perfect 
correlation of returns. Since the calculation of returns must 
integrate exchange rate variations and risk. the frequency 
and size of parity realignments in the EMS condition the 
degree of diversification of European portfolios. Should 
financial liberalization significantly increase the frequency 
and/or size of realignments, it would lead. ceteris parihus, 
to greater diversification of financial assets. Even in the 
present circumstances where inflation differential has de-
creased, but there still remain persistent disparities between 
EC countries concerning the functioning of the labour mar-
ket and the formation of wage costs (see C. Goodhart, 1986), 
the inability of operators to forecast accurately the date 
and the extent of realignments may explain differences in 
the ex post returns on financial assets with the same m:iturity 
denominated in different currencies. 
Since the early 1970s. some diversification in international 
portfolios has taken place, with the limited but progressive 
transition towards a multi-currency reserve system (or a 
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'polycentric' world). The erratic nuctuations of the dollar. 
the success of the ECU (especially in its private use), the 
importance of Germany and Japan - all these factors 
explain the transition mentioned. The restrictions on foreign 
exchange have created gaps between the optimum portfolio 
(according to the mean-variance analysis) and the actual 
portfolio. and the removal of exchange controls is welfare-
improving in reducing these gaps. Whether the optimum 
portfolio for an EC resident will be more concentrated after 
liberalization than before will depend on the impact of 
financial integration on the correlation between tax returns 
and exchange rate adjusted returns, as mentioned before. 
The 'polycentric' model at the world level may be an unstable 
form, if conceived as a perfectly symmetrical monetary oli-
gopoly (see Ch. de Boissieu, 1986). The same kind of prop-
osition holds for the EMS, which has little chance to corre-
spond to a monetary oligopoly on a permanent basis. At 
each point of time, the operators have a weak or a strong 
(e.g. a lexicographic order) preference for some currencies, 
perhaps only one, and spontaneous forces lead to portfolio 
concentration and some kind of a monetary monopoly (see 
the domination of the OM in the EMS). This statement is 
consistent with the observation that individual preferences 
may change over time. 
A detailed analysis would necessitate a split between private 
portfolios and central banks' portfolios. Empirical studies 
show that the trend towards diversification of official re-
serves has been limited, less developed that one could think 
on an a priori basis, when distribution effects (i.e. effects 
due to the evolution in the distribution of reserves between 
countries) are eliminated (see A. Horii, 1986). 
The approach in terms of 'characteristics' is a useful general-
ization of portfolio theory. It adds to price arguments other 
relevant considerations which concern the 'quality' of the 
currencies and are not always renected by their returns. In 
the case of the EMS. the domination of the OM has no limit 
during periods of speculation, but the monetary role of the 
German currency is diminished by structural factors: for 
many reasons, German monetary authorities have been re-
luctant to speed up the financial innovation process in their 
country, and permanent concentration of European port-
folios in OM held in Germany is doubtful should the 'menu' 
of assets proposed by German banks and markets remain 
the same. Due to the liberalization of financial services, this 
scencirio will not take place since the propagation of financial 
innovation will be accelerated, notwithstanding the attitude 
of German monetary authorities. 
All this means that the impact of financial deregulation on 
portfolio diversification will be determined not only by the 
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correlation of returns. but also by the 'correlation of services' 
and the speed of propagation, between EC countries, of 
financial product and process innovation. 
2. A crucial element: the comparison between 
the speed of financial liberalization and the 
speed of convergence 
Here. convergence essentially refers to less disparity in 
macroeconomic performances, but we know that diver-
gences in the modus operandi of economic policy (especially, 
monetary policy) must also be considered. 
If the speed of the financial liberalization process (V L) is 
significantly greater than the speed of convergence in macro-
performances (V ), the EMS will be potentially destabilized 
by the removal cif exchange controls. Since capital mobility 
will reinforce the fact that financial markets adjust much 
quicker than goods markets, the risk of 'overshooting' in 
the exchange rate variations will be enhanced by persistent 
divergences. The January 1987 realignment is a good illus-
tration of the potential danger: with the US dollar falling 
rapidly, shifts in portfolios lead to concentration in strong 
currencies (especially, the OM), since diversification is de-
terred by structural differences concerning economic per-
formances (see in particular France and Germany). Impor-
tant shifts in portfolios increase the frequency of realignment 
and, thereby, if the actual frequency is well above the 'opti-
mal' frequency. 1 jeopardize the internal and the external (i.e. 
for the rest of the world) credibility of the EMS. On the 
other hand, if VP is significantly greater than V L• financial 
liberalization is not in itself a potential source of instability. 
No doubt V L and V are not independent variables. The 
extent of financial liberalization has some impact on the 
speed of convergence, but the direction of innuence is an 
open question. Financial liberalization, as a new and signifi-
cant constraint, may strengthen the present configuration 
where the country with the lowest rate of inflation sets the 
standards for the other EMS member countries. Let us 
consider, for instance, nominal interest rates. According to 
the loanable funds model, arbitrage from countries with 
low interest rates to high rate areas must, ceteris paribus, 
implement the 'law of one price' for financial assets. 
Rut speculative capital movements take place the other way, 
from weak currencies bearing high interest rates to strong 
currencies with lower interest rates (especially when a parity 
1 We have already referred to the optimization model built by F. Giavazzi 
and M. Pagano ( 1985). 
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realignment is expected in the short run). In the short term, 
financial liberalization may extend, rather than diminish, 
the gap in nominal interest rates. 
Two questions seem crucial: 
(i) What is the level of divergence in macroeconomic per-
formances consistent with a smooth functioning of the 
EMS under perfect capital mobility? To study 'toler-
able' divergences, it would be necessary to think in 
terms of thresholds and turning points in expectations. 
Depending on the environment (evolution of the dollar, 
sensitivity of exchange rate expectations to the 'news'), 
a disparity - for instance, a significant inflation differ-
ential - can be compatible or incompatible with perfect 
capital mobility; 
(ii) Facing the instability due to permanent divergences, 
what actions may some countries be tempted to im-
plement? There, it may be relevant to use the 'exit, voice 
and loyalty' approach. 
3. An exit, v01ce and loyalty approach to the 
EMS 
The exit/voice model refers to the behaviour of individual 
units (agents, etc.) having growing dissatisfaction with the 
rules and the functioning of an organization (here, the EMS). 
Financial deregulation in EC countries may lead members 
to resort to one of the following attitudes. 
3.1. Loyalty 
Here, EMS member countries respect the rules of the system. 
In case of speculative capital movements, five instruments 
are available which represent the loyalty solution: 
(i) the complete use of fluctuation margins around the 
parities. Until now, central banks have been reluctant 
to act as if the band of fluctuation would be much less 
than the one introduced in 1979, since expectations 
are destabilizing actual parities as soon as the 'pivot' 
exchange rate is reached. The last realignment is an 
exception to this rule, with the Bank of France using 
the whole band to force the intervention from the Bun-
desbank. 
(ii) the extensive manipulation of interest rates, as a substi-
tute for parity realignment. With foreign exchange re-
strictions, central banks have an option they directly 
intervene on domestic capital markets (through open-
market operations, etc.), or they intervene indirectly on 
the Euromarket of their currency (large borrowing by 
commercial banks at the request of the Central Bank 
can make the speculation very costly this situation cor-
responds to the French experience in March 1983). 
Financial liberalization will rule out all significant dis-
crepancies between domestic rates and the correspond-
ing Euro-rates. Central banks may continue and extend 
their open-market operations on domestic ma~kets, but 
they will face conflicts between EMS exchange rate 
commitments and domestic monetary considerations. 
In many cases, the temptation has been great in the past, 
and perhaps will be greater in the future, to 'decouple' 
domestic interest rates from international influences, 
and by this means, to avoid upward fluctuations in 
domestic lending rates in periods of speculative attack 
against the currency. The possibility of an effective 
'decoupling' are, by definition, reduced by financial 
deregulation. But some EC member countries, in order 
to cope with the European financial liberalization, may 
be inclined to implement a selective interest rate policy 
at home, insulating some privileged sectors from exter-
nal influences. As a selective interest rate policy postu-
lates a high degree of capital markets segmentation, it 
appears that we cannot exclude, in some countries, 
more domestic segmentation and regulation to offset, 
at least partially, the effect of the international financial 
deregulation. 
The use of interest rates to delay or avoid parity realign-
ment means that risk premiums included in nominal 
interest rates on weak currencies would increase. and 
therefore the degree of substitutability between financial 
assets denominated in weak currencies and those de-
nominated in strong currencies would, ceteri.1· parihus, 
be reduced. 
(iii) the extensive use of financing facilities organized by the 
rules of the EMS (very short-term financing, etc.). 
(iv) interventions by central banks on the foreign exchange 
market, to keep exchange rates within the bands. The 
actual efficacy of these interventions is still an open 
question. The January 1987 experience confirms that 
we meet, at the level of the EMS, the problem of the 
(N - I) extensively studied at world level: is it justified 
to share the burden of the adjustment and of the inter-
vention between surplus and deficit countries? If so, 
how to share the burden? The discussion is topical in 
the EMS, due to the reluctance of the Bundesbank 
to intervene in a period of domestic monetary target 
'overshooting'. 
(v) parity realignments are an illustration of the loyalty 
solution, if their empirical frequency is below a certain 
threshold (i.e., the level above which the global credi-
bility of the EMS is jeopardized). According to the well-
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known model of J. Melitz and P. Michel (1986), two 
conditions arc required for dynamic stability with parity 
realignments: (a) the high-intlation country (for the 
two-country case). having lost reserves before the re-
alignment. must build up its reserves immediately after 
the realignment. and (b) the high-intlation country 
authorities must. compared to the low-intlation coun-
try, be more concerned with their reserve targets rather 
than the output targets. As far as the first condition is 
concerned. it is interesting to contrast the April 1986 
and January 1987 realignments. In the latter case, con-
trary to the former, the stability condition is not satis-
fied. since reserves lost by the Bank of France before 
the modification of parities have been recovered only 
partially and after an unusual delay. 
3.2. Voice 
The 'voice· solution refers to the different types of 'reregu-
lation· which are compatible with the basic rules of the EMS. 
They will he implemented by member countries if it appears 
that. in face of persistent divergences, individual costs of 
financial libt'ralization significantly outweigh the actual and 
t'Xpt'cted bt'nefits. 
(a) The degree of reversibility of financial liberalization 
\\le haYe already argued that financial deregulation is more 
a ·cycle' than a trend. Some experts. looking at the experi-
t'nce of the UK and Japan, claim that. due to the conjunction 
of se\t'ral ratchet effects. there is here an inherent irreversi-
bility. But the problem is different for the UK and Japan 
on tht' one hand. and countries belonging to the exchange 
rate mechanism (ERivt) of the EMS on the other hand. 
Japan and the UK are not constrained by fixed exchange 
rates. and they illustrate the complementarity between finan-
cial deregulation and floating rates. On the other hand. it is 
likely that countries of the ERM. at some point, will have 
It) trade oil between the fixity of exchange rates and financial 
liberalization. and also. as we have argued, between domestic 
and international financial liberalization. Even a crude cost-
benefit analysis will lead member countries to stay in the 
ERM. and to implement some kind of reregulation. 
(h) The non-price mechanism 
Capital cllntrols are included in the non-price mechanisms, 
even if they can be in certain circumstances interpreted as a 
tax on holding of foreign securities. or as transaction costs 
added tt, the price of currencies subject to such controls. 
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The EC Commission has agreed to permit recourse to the 
safeguard clause defined by Articles I 08 and I 09 of the 
Treaty. The clause is meant to be temporary and limited to 
special circumstances, even if, in practice, it has become 
'permanent' in some Member States (France, Italy, Ireland 
for example). According to the dominant interpretation, 
·special circumstances' refer to (i) the case of an exchange 
rate or balance of payments crisis or (ii) the case of a large 
instability in the domestic financial sector. A third case 
is currently under discussion in relation with the future 
liberalization of short-term capital movements, namely the 
case of a money supply 'shock' created by large capital 
inflows and by the ineffectiveness of sterilization policy. This 
third case can be considered as a subset of (i) where large 
capital intlows may induce an exchange rate crisis or (ii) 
where they may generate financial instability. Facing persist-
ent divergences (in economic performances, in labour market 
flexibility, etc.), the reintroduction of some capital restric-
tions will be perhaps the price to pay for keeping the ex-
change rate mechanism of the EMS. If this is the case. the 
Commission must keep normalizing the use of the safeguard 
clause. 
The adoption of the new safeguard clause concerning short-
term capital movements may have positive effects in limiting 
the scope of the reregulation process: some countries con-
fronted with shocks and external disequilibrium will im-
plement this clause (and stay in the exchange rate mechanism 
of the EMS), without discarding the other elements of the 
financial liberalization process. 
The distinction between temporary and permanent capital 
controls is crucial, but difficult to implement practically. 
These controls can limit speculation only if at the time of 
their implementation they are considered as permanent. 
Otherwise, if market operators consider them ex ante as 
transitory, capital restrictions will have a pure calendar 
effect, delaying but not eliminating speculation. Until now, 
the financial obstacles to capital mobility have been an-
nounced ex ante as transitory measures, but in fact have 
been rather permanent. Perhaps the best solution is obtained 
when capital controls are judged permanent by the operators 
on an ex ante basis and thereby influence their expectations, 
but de facto remain effective during a short period. But the 
first part of the condition is dearly incompatible with the 
Treaty and the very idea of a common market in financial 
services, since permanent controls are ruled out, even if they 
are 'notional' (ex ante) and not actual. To limit calendar 
effects. it would be required not to specify, ex ante, the time 
horizon of the reregulation of capital movements, and this 
seems inconsistent with the new legal framework. 
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(c) Price mechanisms 
Facing dynamic instability due to perfect capital mobility, 
some Member States may be induced to have recourse to 
the 'Italian solution', i.e., to widen the fluctuation margin 
around the parity. If generalized, this alternative would 
transform the EMS into a target zone area, a system which, 
according to J. Frankel (l 987), 'might encompass the worst 
of both worlds - the instability of flexible rates and the 
unsustainability of fixed rates'. Introducing more flexibility 
of exchange rates within the EMS can be considered only 
as a substitute for policy coordination, and would, over a 
certain threshold of fluctuation margin, jeopardize the very 
essence and functioning of the EMS. 
Price mechanisms to limit capital mobility are numerous: 
(i) a Tobin tax (see J. Tobin, 1978), to increase the cost of 
all foreign exchange operations (in the various pro-
posals, the tax is uniform and low); 
(ii) an interest equalization tax, which can be used either 
to deter capital inflows or capital outflows. The JET is 
a special case of a Tobin tax, since it concerns only 
financial operations; 
(iii) the two-tier exchange market. the purpose of which is 
to insulate commercial transactions from speculative 
movements and to reduce the dominance of capital 
account transactions over domestic real activity and 
inflation. 
The efficacy of these different devices depends on the price 
elasticity of capital movements. In many cases, expectations 
concerning the social and political situation in member 
countries tend to reduce relevant price elasticities in a period 
of crisis. Nevertheless, the actual working of the price mech-
anisms mentioned above means some form of financial pro-
tectionism, and it can be used by some countries as a justifi-
cation for commercial protectionism. The experience of dual 
rates in France and in Belgium suggests that in calm periods, 
the premium on the financial rate is low, perhaps nil (see 
the present situation in Belgium), and in a period of crisis, 
the premium may rise up to a point where the efficacy of 
the whole system diminishes rapidly with the development 
of 'disguised' operations (which tend to blur out the delimi-
tation between the two compartments of the foreign ex-
change market). 
As financial liberalization is supposed to take place erga 
omnes, will financial reregulation do the same? Due to the 
new regulatory framework in the EC there will be the 
temptation to discriminate by the use of dual rates or of a 
Tobin tax. But, practically, it will be very difficult for mem-
ber countries to combine functional compartmentalization 
(between markets, types of operation, etc.) and geographic 
discrimination. 
(d) The cost-benefit analysis of the various mechanisms 
Insulating domestic interest rates from international rates 
allows retention of some fiscal autonomy and not complete 
subordination of domestic monetary policy to exchange rate 
targets. It is well known that capital controls and taxation 
also generate costs, due to the distortions in resource allo-
cation and the loss of welfare associated with the implemen-
tation of second-best or third-best solutions. From a welfare 
economics viewpoint, the problem is to compare second-
best solutions and to discard mechanisms which are very 
inefficient. 
The split between occasional and permanent measures, with 
the two possible interpretations already mentioned (the ex 
ante and the ex post), has to be complemented with another 
criterion, namely the distinction between global and specific 
measures. Some capital restrictions seem to be inconsistent 
with the development of trade and the increasing openness 
of countries. For instance, some constraints imposed on 
importers and/or exporters (authorized delays for the re-
patriation of receipts, rules concerning hedging operations, 
etc.) are deary costly and inconsistent with an efficient 
allocation of resources. On the other hand, some constraints 
on 'pure' financial operations (i.e., transactions not related 
at all to trade) may be more acceptable. Undoubtedly, in 
the French experience of capital controls, the impossibility 
for residents of lending French francs to non-residents has 
been less distorting than the regulation concerning the re-
patriation of funds for traders. 
Combining the two criteria (the time horizon and the field 
of application), we get four cases: 
Mea~urcs 
Global 
Specific (concerning ·pure' 
financial operations) 
Permanent 
2 
3 4 
Compared to other mechanisms, a Tobin tax is more third-
best than second-best, since it globally concerns all trans-
actions (including commercial transactions). The compari-
son between the interest equalization tax and the two-tier 
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exchange market is delicate. Both measures generate tax 
evasion and strategic behaviour by private agents, and they 
postulate a certain degree of market segmentation. For some 
member countries, the use of dual rates may constitute the 
second-best mechanism in order to cope with speculative 
capital movements. It has to be considered as an illustration 
of case 3. We saw that the legal definition (but de facto, not 
the application) of the safeguard clause of the Treaty ex-
cludes situations like 2 and 4. 
(e) The threat of reregulation 
Will the threat of reregulation, through capital controls or 
other restrictions, be sufficient to deter speculative behav-
iour and to warrant the dynamic stability of the EMS under 
perfect capital mobility? Certainly not, and this question 
leads to a few remarks: 
(i) The threat has to be known by market operators. This 
question relates to the efficiency of the information 
process. 
(ii) What is the credibility of the threat and how to increase 
it, if necessary? The recent literature on reputation and 
credibility in a game-theoretic setting is relevant here. 
(iii) What will be the impact of the threat? The uncertainty 
of operators about the date and the form of future 
controls reduces the degree of substitutability between 
financial assets in different countries. The impact of the 
threat on speculation is more ambiguous. In some cases, 
the threat of foreign exchange reregulation may deter 
speculation. In other cases, especially if the action of the 
monetary authorities is rationally expected by private 
agents, the threat may generate strategic behaviour. 
Studying the discontinuous credit ceilings regime that 
we had in France in the 1960s, I have shown that firms 
were able to anticipate the reintroduction of credit 
ceilings rather accurately. On several occasions they 
raised their demand for credit during the periods with-
out the ceilings, to circumvent them more easily later. 
The same effect may apply to foreign exchange restric-
tions: if they are expected, private agents will take 
protective measures. The effectiveness of reregulation 
will be low, perhaps nil, due to private strategic behav-
iour. To maintain some efficacy for the reregulation 
process, monetary authorities would have to adopt a 
strategic behaviour themselves, i.e. to create uncertainty 
about the form and the timing of their intervention. 
3.3. The exit solution 
At a certain point in time, some countries confronted with 
persistent divergences in economic structures (e.g., the flexi-
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bility on the labour market) and/or performances, may have 
to choose between fixed rates and financial liberalization. 
The exit solution consists in leaving the exchange rate mech-
anism while keeping financial openness and deregulation. It 
leads to the present situation of the UK, but this country 
corresponds to the no-entry case. I claim that if there is an 
option between the ERM and financial liberalization, it will 
be preferable for most of the countries and for the system 
itself to accept second-best solutions, i.e. some type of finan-
cial reregulation (specific capital controls, dual rates etc.) 
rather than to take the risk of widespread floating rates. 
Some countries may be tempted to use the threat of exit 
from the ERM to get larger financial assistance or to catalyse 
policy coordination. The debate in France just before the 
March 1983 realignment was very much in this line. But the 
threat of exit is an ambiguous tool: if it is used too often or 
under inopportune circumstances, its effectiveness will be 
low, and the 'player' misusing it will lose reputation and 
credibility. 
3.4. The ECU and the dynamic stability of the EMS 
Is the development of the ECU a means to reconcile capital 
mobility and fixed exchange rates? This question leads to 
two observations: 
(i) The promotion of the ECU will perhaps speed up the 
convergence of Member States concerning economic 
structures, performances, etc. But this has not been 
rigorously demonstrated. Looking backward over the 
last five years, we see that progress in convergence has 
been due to many other factors than the dramatic 
development of the private use of the ECU. 
(ii) Further developments of the European currency, its 
transformation as a 'complete' money (which would 
require, inter alia, a complete articulation between the 
private market for ECU and its official role, and the 
possibility to use the ECU as a general means of pay-
ment), would imply a degree of policy coordination 
between EC members such that the question of consist-
ency between financial liberalization and fixed exchange 
rates would be automatically solved. The chronological 
and logical order does not go from a complete European 
currency to an extended policy coordination. Economic 
coordination, which is necessary to limit the dynamic 
instability of the EMS under perfect capital mobility, 
is a prerequisite for the transition to the second 'phase' 
of European monetary integration and to a complete 
European currency, not a consequence of it. 
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Consequences of financial liberalization for mon-
etary policy, the monetary-fiscal mix and the 
determination of interest rates 
1. Consequences for the autonomy and the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy 
The impact of exchange controls on the autonomy of monet-
ary policy is a controversial issue. However, many empirical 
studies show that in countries having used exchange controls 
extensively (France, Italy, etc.), the variability of real ex-
change rates and official reserves has not been significantly 
reduced. The segmentation between the domestic money 
market and the Euromarket for the same currency authorizes 
large gaps between interest rates on the two markets, not-
withstanding loopholes in exchange controls and the willing-
ness of private agents to circumvent regulations. In France 
and in Italy, the differential between domestic and Euro-
rates has been sometimes very large (e.g., the French example 
just before the March 1983 realignment). But even if, in 
statics, foreign exchange restrictions give some degree of 
freedom to interest rate policy, domestic interest rates in 
Italy, France, etc., have been highly correlated with inter-
national rates. 
1.1. The efficacy of sterilization policies 
The EC countries now lifting exchange controls are going 
to face a paradoxical situation: 
(i) On the one hand, the development of capital markets, 
the growth of public debt and technical improvements 
in the compulsory reserves mechanism give extended 
levers to monetary authorities: with deep and resilient 
financial markets, the tools of open-market inter-
ventions are more diverse, and their volume and price-
effects more effective. For example, in France - but 
the example is more general - open-market policy has 
been until now limited, due to the thinness of financial 
capital markets (France, like many EC countries, was 
until recently an 'overdraft economy', i.e. an economy 
where financial intermediation is predominant and capi-
tal markets have a residual role) and the prevalence of 
direct monetary control through credit ceilings. The 
scope for open-market interventions is widely enlarged 
with the new financial instruments, the development of 
securitization and the outstanding volume of Treasury 
bills and bonds; 
(ii) On the other hand, the efficacy of open-market policy 
concerning sterilization of capital inflows or outflows 
will be reduced significantly, to zero if financial liberal-
ization induces perfect asset substitutability. For in-
stance, sterilization of capital outflows means purchases 
of negotiable paper ( outright purchases or repurchase 
agreements, etc.) by the central bank, in order to pro-
vide liquidity to the money market. This intervention 
will induce a drop in domestic interest rates, this under 
perfect asset substitution, new capital outflows and, 
under fixed exchange rates, additional losses in official 
reserves. Sterilization of capital inflows or outflows 
generate here dynamic instability. 
The divorce between the improvement in the open-market 
techniques and the decreasing efficacy of open-market inter-
ventions due to the removal of exchange controls can be 
reduced only in the situation, not to be excluded on an a 
priori basis, where perfect capital mobility goes with imper-
fect asset substitutability. 
1.2. Monetary targeting without exchange controls 
The lifting of exchange controls will accentuate the current 
crisis in monetary targeting, mainly initiated by financial 
innovations and the deregulation process. Due to their open-
ness and the limited efficacy of sterilization policies, small 
open countries have been reluctant to announce monetary 
targets (e.g., Belgium, Scandinavian countries etc.). In other 
EMS countries, frequent 'overshooting' of monetary targets 
reduces the credibility of the procedure and the positive 
announcement effects which might be attached to it. 
The removal of foreign exchange restrictions will extend the 
empirical variability of the external counterpart of the 
money stock and therefore of the money stock itself in the 
context of ineffective sterilization policies. 
Generally speaking, two criteria have been referred to for 
the selection of the intermediate target of monetary policy: 
(i) the (indirect) controllability of the intermediate target, 
which relates to the links between the instruments (com-
pulsory reserves, open-market, etc.) and the intermedi-
ate target; 
(ii) the predictability, which is conditioned by the degree 
of stability of the links between the intermediate target 
and the ultimate goals. 
The choice of intermediate target results from a trade-off 
between controllability and predictability; the first criterion 
leads to variables close to the instruments, whereas the 
second criterion promotes variables close to the ultimate 
goals. 
The phasing-out of exchange control measures will, in the 
same time, diminish the controllability and the predictability 
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of monetary aggregates (Ml, M2, M3, Mn, the monetary 
base and the concepts derived from it). First, national monet-
ary authorities will face statistical difficulties relating to the 
measure of the money stock: as the proportion of domestic 
currency held abroad by residents and non-residents will be 
higher and more volatile, and as foreign banks abroad will 
not be obliged to report to national monetary authorities, 
the calculation of domestic currency held by residents will be 
much more complicated. Secondly, larger shifts in portfolios 
may reinforce the instability of the relationships between 
money stocks and nominal GDP. 
Confronted with this new situation, monetary authorities 
face several alternatives: 
(i) The abandonment of monetary targeting. This solution 
corresponds to the extrapolation of the present trend 
and a geographic extension of what is occurring in 
Canada, in the UK, etc. The end of monetary targeting 
would oblige the monetary authorities to implement 
new communication channels with the private sector, 
and to find new vehicles for the propagation of an-
nouncement effects. It must be added that the abolition 
of monetary targeting in countries belonging to the 
ERM has to be a coordinated decision: if a country 
took this decision alone, it could induce speculative 
capital flows against its currency. 
(ii) The prolongation and the accentuation of the 'soft' 
targeting of monetary aggregates, which is now prevail-
ing in many EC countries. 'Soft', since 'overshooting' 
is easily explained (by financial innovations, the deregu-
lation of interest rates, the removal of exchange con-
trols, etc.) and more generally accepted than 10 years 
ago. The drop in the velocity of money, which is mainly 
a cyclical evolution caused by disinflation, explains the 
change in the attitude of several European central 
banks. Monetary authorities prefer to keep some 'fixed 
points', even if they overshoot announced targets (the 
loss of credibility and reputation would be greater in 
the case of abolition than it is with 'overshooting'). It 
is very likely that the need for 'fixed points' would be 
reinforced, rather than diminished, by the lifting of 
exchange controls. 
(iii) A change in the announced targets. Leaving monetary 
aggregates, monetary authorities may choose one of the 
following targets: 
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(a) Interest rates. Under perfect capital mobility, dom-
estic interest rates do not satisfy the controllability 
criterion, since they are, in a small - or medium 
- open economy, mainly determined by external 
rates. And a lack of controllability generally under-
mines the credibility of monetary policy. Thus, there 
is no justification to shift from monetary aggregates 
to interest rates (nominal or real) in a financially 
liberalized environment. 
(b) Nominal exchange rates. By definition of the EMS, 
nominal exchange rates are already announced tar-
gets or constraints for member countries of the 
ERM. We have argued that the removal of exchange 
controls in the case of persistent divergences will 
induce higher instability, thereby lower controlla-
bility, for nominal exchange rates. As for real ex-
change rates, contrary to what some advocates of 
'target zones' claim, they are much less controllable 
than nominal exchange rates. 
(c) Credit aggregates, like domestic credit expansion 
(DCE, defined here as the sum of the domestic 
counterparts of the money stock). The (indirect) 
controllability of DCE is not influenced by the abol-
ition of exchange controls. The new possibility for 
residents to borrow and lend on international mar-
kets without limits will undoubtedly diminish the 
predictability or the links between DCE and the 
ultimate targets (real growth, inflation, etc.), since 
in a fixed exchange rates regime, foreign lending 
and borrowing influence the external counterpart of 
the money stock, not the growth of DCE. Credit 
aggregates are not immune from 'Goodhart's law', 1 
but the analysis and the experience show that they 
are more sheltered from financial innovation and 
deregulation than monetary aggregates. I think that 
greater capital mobility is a justification for reacti-
vating, in some EC member countries, credit aggre-
gates. 
1.3. Some supplementary remarks on the operating rules 
of monetary policy 
The removal of exchange controls and the transition in many 
EC countries to indirect instruments of monetary policy are 
clearly associated changes. The abolition of quantitative 
constraints (mainly credit ceilings) will leave market forces, 
i.e. interest rate variations, to influence the behaviour of 
banks and non-banks. In some circumstances, it is likely 
that economic and social constraints will limit the upward 
flexibility of nominal and/or real interest rates and will 
necessitate, instead of interest rate adjustment, a temporary 
reactivation of credit ceilings. The recent experience in Italy 
and the Netherlands confirms that we cannot extrapolate 
the present transition to market-orientated instruments of 
1 According to Goodhart's law, statistical regularities tend to loosen, 
sometimes to vanish, as soon as they are used for policy purposes. 
Good hart's law is an application of the well-known Lucas critique. 
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monetary policy. Even in the case of reactivation of inter-
mediate solutions (like 'soft' credit ceilings based on the use 
of compulsory reserves bearing on credit expansion, etc.), it 
would be necessary at the same time to reactivate some form 
of foreign exchange restrictions. Situations where domestic 
interest rates consistent with exchange rate expectations do 
not correspond to the level required by the internal targets 
of monetary policy will induce some EC countries, histori-
cally well acquainted with credit ceilings, to resort to them 
temporarily (at least, on an ex-ante basis). 
2. Consequences for the monetary-fiscal mix 
One important lesson drawn from the Mundell-Fleming 
model is that the respective effectiveness of monetary policy 
and fiscal policy is conditioned both by the exchange rate 
regime and the degree of capital mobility. With fixed ex-
change rates and perfect capital mobility, monetary policy 
is ineffective whilst fiscal policy has a great impact on dom-
estic real activity. The gist of the argument lies in the fact 
that fiscal expansion without monetary accommodation in-
duces a rise in domestic interest rates, then capital inflows 
up to the point where domestic rates return to the level of 
international rates and 'crowding-out' effects disappear. In 
the present situation, EC central banks are firmly resisting 
the monetization of public deficits. For an individual mem-
ber country, the temptation could be great to reduce unem-
ployment through an expansionary fiscal policy which, in 
the case of no-monetization, would generate capital inflows 
and very limited crowding-out effects. But here we face 
another dimension of the coordination puzzle: like competi-
tive devaluations, 'competitive' expansionary fiscal policies 
have a very high social cost. Through the coordination 
process, we must design institutional mechanisms which 
would limit the incentive for fiscal authorities to be 'free 
riders'. 
The Mundell-Fleming conclusions give a partial picture of 
the situation, since in practice many factors may put ob-
stacles in the way of the equilibrating mechanisms which are 
supposed to take place. For instance, it would be necessary 
to introduce announcements effects and the credibility issue. 
If a country initiated a reflating fiscal policy, whereas most 
OECD countries have been trying to reduce the ratio of 
government deficit over the GDP, it would create perverse 
announcements effects and capital outflows, instead of capi-
tal inflows. Here again comes the question of international 
budgetary and fiscal coordination, but in a perspective dif-
ferent from the one suggested by the Mundell-Fleming ap-
proach. 
The enlarged assignment of monetary policy to external 
equilibrium and the present rigidities of fiscal policy in most 
EC countries may lead policy-makers to have more extensive 
recourse to a countercyclical use of structural policies, such 
as incomes policy (in its traditional forms or in its more 
recent versions) or employment policy (measures intended 
to increase labour flexibility, etc.). But the extended revival 
of domestic structural policies, to offset at least partially 
the impact of financial liberalization, would be perhaps 
detrimental to economic performances, since structural 
measures are quite inadequate when we are facing short-run 
internal or external shocks. 
3. The consequences of financial liberalization 
for interest rates 
3.1. The influence on the level of interest rates 
A direct consequence of the abolition of exchange controls 
is to narrow the gap between domestic and European interest 
rates to negligible values, often to zero, due to unlimited 
possibilities for arbitrage. For countries which have liberal-
ized for several years, the differential between domestic and 
Euro-rates, for a given maturity, is rarely over 15 basis 
points. Generally, there is no gap, or it is under I O basis 
points. Risk premiums on the Euro-dollar or the Euro-
deutschmark are most of the time close to zero for all 
maturities. If they persist with perfect capital mobility, gaps 
between domestic and Euro-rates may be explained by politi-
cal considerations (and the risk premium associated), by 
minimum reserves and deposit insurance schemes applied to 
domestic deposits, etc. 
The recent French experience could be relevant. Just before 
the last parity realignment, the risk premium on the Euro-
franc interest rates reached 500 basis points (the rates on 7 
January were 14 % for the one-week Euro-rate and 9 % for 
the corresponding domestic rate). In February 1987, we still 
have a risk premium close to 25 basis points (37,5 basis 
points for the six-month maturity). Persistent differentials 
between domestic rates and Euro-rates in the case of France, 
Italy, etc. give an indication not only of the assessment 
of political risk by international markets, but also of the 
remaining obstacles to capital mobility and international 
arbitrage. To be sure, the causation between Euro-rates and 
domestic rates is complex. But even for currencies with a 
rather limited Euromarket (e.g., the examples of the Euro-
franc and the Euro-lira markets, which are not 'deep and 
resilient'), the dominant causation goes from the inter-
national to the domestic rates, and this asymmetry in the 
adjustment process will be reinforced by the abolition of 
exchange restrictions. 
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The decompartmentalization of domestic capital markets 
means a globalization of the adjustment process between 
saving and investment. Financial deregulation will generate 
a more efficient allocation of capital in European countries. 
It is likely that a portion of loanable funds invested abroad, 
particularly in the United States and Switzerland, will be 
kept within EC countries after the lifting of exchange con-
trols. It is quite impossible to derive a general proposition 
concerning the impact of financial globalization on the aver-
age level of interest rates in member countries of the ERM. 
We present here only a piecemeal analysis. Let us assume 
that real interest rates are determined by the forces of 'thrift 
and productivity'. The removal of exchange controls may 
influence the two components: 
(i) Due to the announcement effects created by the finan-
cial deregulation process, firms could be more optimis-
tic and there would be an upward shift in the investment 
curve which would, ceteris paribus, raise the equilibrium 
level of real interest rates. 
(ii) The effect of financial deregulation on private saving is 
more ambiguous. On the one hand, deregulation might 
increase the volume of domestic saving, through repatri-
ation of funds kept abroad. On the other hand, the 
current experience with financial innovations and liber-
alization suggests that they are more influential on 
the distribution of private saving (between real estate, 
financial assets, cash-balances, etc.), than on the pro-
pensity to save which is mainly conditioned by the 
cyclical evolution of real incomes. 
If we turn now to individual countries, the phasing-out of 
foreign exchange restrictions has no clear-cut effect on the 
level of nominal and real interest rates. For some member 
countries, exchange controls, like credit ceilings, have been 
a means of 'economizing' on the level and volatility of 
interest rates, since administrative constraints have been 
used as a substitute for upward movements in domestic rates 
to limit capital outflows. For these countries, the lifting 
of exchange controls may, during a transition period and 
especially for weak-currency countries, raise actual interest 
rates up to their equilibrium values (corresponding to 
'shadow' interest rates). Empirically, as some countries are 
at the same time leaving exchange controls and credit ceil-
ings, and as both measures may have the same direction of 
influence on interest rates, it will be difficult to separate the 
two effects. The experience of financial liberalization in 
Denrr.ark suggests a different sequence of events: in this 
country, the credibility of policy-makers has been increased 
by financial deregulation, and domestic rates, instead of 
rising, dropped after the abolition of exchange restrictions. 
The respective weights of the opposite arguments just men-
tioned are conditioned by the time horizon of the analysis: 
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the steady-state influence of financial liberalization on nomi-
nal and real rates is clearly distinct from its transitory 
consequences. 
3.2. The influence on the volatility of interest rates 
For EC countries just starting financial liberalization, two 
sources of additional interest rate volatility will be added: 
the internal volatility due to the passage from direct to 
indirect methods of monetary policy, and the external vola-
tility introduced by greater capital mobility. Generally 
speaking, it would be helpful to separate interest rate flexi-
bility (i.e., potential variability) from interest rate volatility 
(i.e., actual variability). The two measures will coincide in 
the pessimistic scenario where perfect capital mobility leads 
to destabilizing capital movements and incessant adjust-
ments of interest rates, substituting for parity realignments 
(and sometimes associated with them). 
For EC countries having already liberalized, 'feedback' ef-
fects are to be expected. The international propagation of 
interest rate volatility will also concern the leading country 
of the EMS, even if the dominant causation within the 
monetary zone goes from German interest rates to other 
member countries' rates. 
The increased volatility of interest rates could have some 
effect on their level. Extension of the interest rate risk may 
be hedged through several devices, one of them being the 
introduction of high risk premiums into nominal rates. 
Should this be the case, financial liberalization could create 
some downward rigidity in the level of nominal interest 
rates, with high interest rate risk premiums. 
3.3. The influence on the yield curve 
Perfect capital mobility and the liberalization of financial 
services (securities, mutual funds, deposits with banks and 
non-bank financial intermediaries, etc.) will open infinite 
room for arbitrage operations. It is likely that these oper-
ations will continue to be determined by after-tax return 
differentials adjusted for expectations of exchange rate vari-
ations, and that they will become more and more sensitive 
to the services offered (we have already argued that the 
analysis in terms of 'characteristics' is a helpful generaliza-
tion of the conventional portfolio theory, when it is necessary 
to take into account the 'quality' of monetary and financial 
assets). The direct consideration of services (liquidity, ac-
ceptability, etc.) is required if return differentials are biased 
estimates of service differentials (this may be one aspect of 
market inefficiency). 
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Generalized arbitrage has two effects on the yield curve: 
(i) At the domestic and at the international level, interest 
rate expectations will determine the term structure of 
interest rates. Any activist policy, as for instance a 
'twist' operation, would be totally ineffective except if 
it succeeded in influencing private agents' expectations 
through announcement effects. After financial deregu-
lation, the reputation and credibility of monetary 
authorities will become the privileged content of the 
analysis of the yield curve. 
(ii) As the arbitrage process will concern every portion 
of the yield curve, the international propagation of 
movements between medium- and long-term interest 
rates will be direct. Up to now, due to exchange con-
trols, and the obstacles to the internationalization of 
financial instruments and services, short-term interest 
rates have been the main channel for the propagation 
of influences between national yield curves. Even if 
causation continues to run from short- to long-term 
interest rates, financial integration means also inte-
gration of the entire yield curve, with infinite possibility 
for intertemporal and geographic arbitrage. 
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Introduction 
The group of experts was asked to explore two main points: 
(i) the gains, in terms of production and employment, that 
could result from the liberalization of capital move-
ments, because of increased competition and more ef-
ficient mobilization of savings towards investment; 
(ii) the costs and problems, during the period of transition, 
for the conduct of monetary policy and for keeping 
balance of payments equilibrium, as well as the long-
term implications for exchange rate stability within the 
Community. 
In addition the group of experts was also asked to explore 
a wider range of problems, i.e.: 
(a) the transitional costs possibly connected with the issue 
of private versus public sector financing, and with the 
issue of coordination of monetary policies; 
(b) the permanent reduction of monetary autonomy that 
would result from capital liberalization; 
(c) the implications of capital liberalization in terms of the 
possibility that some member countries may lose from 
that process. 
Finally, during the initial meetings, the group was also 
reminded that, in the view of the Commission, liberalization 
should be erga omnes. 
The reason for listing here the terms of reference for our 
group is less to organize the following analysis around these 
themes than to bring to light the stand taken by the Com-
mission. The Commission seems to be of the opinion that, 
aside from problems of transitional adaptation, the process 
of liberalization of capital movements should improve the 
economic situation of the Community at least in the long 
run. Although this position is widely shared by economists, 
it seems worthwhile to analyse it briefly, in order not to 
transform into an uncritical assumption what might instead 
be an analytical conclusion. 
I. A preliminary issue 
It seems, therefore, necessary to raise from the beginning a 
preliminary question: does capital liberalization necessarily 
imply a more efficient allocation of resources, even in the 
long run? The answer to this question is generally taken for 
granted in the affirmative sense. And yet it is more than 30 
years since the so-called theory of second-best has been 
developed and applied with particular emphasis in the field 
of international economic policy. 1 The central message of 
that theory is that the elimination of a sectoral distortion, 
such as an obstacle to international capital mobility, does 
not necessarily improve the efficiency of the system, when 
other distortions remain in it. On the contrary, when these 
cannot be eliminated, it is possible that the introduction 
of countervailing distortions might improve the economic 
situation, relative to the one that would otherwise obtain 
with the original distortions but without the additional ones. 
The fact that large sections of the economies of industrialized 
countries do not work according to efficient rules of resource 
allocation - and this is so particularly for the labour mar-
ket, where wages are not flexible enough to be able to clear 
instantaneously the market - is a sufficient reason to take 
either one of two positions: 
(a) aim at eliminating all inefficiencies, and in particular 
make the labour and products markets as efficient as the 
textbook auction markets; 
(b) recognize that, for reasons that are both economic and 
social, the first position is not viable, and then accept 
that compensatory interferences with the free working 
of the market must be allowed. 
In my view, these considerations suggest that a framework 
for controlling capital movements among the countries that 
are members of the European Community may be needed 
even in the long run, at least until either: 
(a) the economic structures of all the members of the Com-
munity are perfectly homogeneous; 
(b) a system of economic or political compensations is cre-
ated within the Community in favour of the countries or 
sectors that would be damaged by full liberalization of 
capital movements. 
With respect to relations with countries outside the Com-
munity, as both these conditions seem unlikely or undesir-
able, it appears even more desirable to keep ready at hand 
a system of controls of capital movements also for the long 
run. In other words it follows that liberalization of capital 
movements erga omnes is theoretically not justified, even 
though technically it might be difficult to envisage liberaliza-
tion or controls designed to discriminate geographically 
between members and non-members of the Community. 
I See Meade ( 1955). 
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2. A strategic approach to capital liberalization 
2.1. As I find it theoretically justifiable to keep a framework 
for controlling capital movements, and possibly (i.e., if it 
were feasible) also for discriminating with respect to 
countries or currencies outside those of the Community, it 
is worthwhile to ask why the authorities of the Community 
and of most member countries have definitely chosen to 
move ahead towards liberalization of capital movements, 
full and crga omnes. 
The analysis of this question i.e., of the motivations 
behind this new wave of liberalization - is not meant to 
satisfy a sterile curiosity, but to give political, and not simply 
economic advice on the more appropriate ways to implement 
the proposed liberalization of capital movements. 
A preliminary question is whether the authorities of member 
countries - here those of Italy in particular - have indeed 
changed their position with respect to capital liberalization. 
It is important to know this in order to understand the 
meaning and extent of their commitment to the new enterpr-
ise, and to design ways that facilitate its success. 
Not too long ago the Governor of the Bank of Italy declared I 
that: 
· ... the road towards international opening cannot suffer 
obstacles on the front of the exchange of goods and services; 
a system of stable exchange rates, even though adjustable, 
is the complement of it. In foreign relations these are irre-
nounceable priorities; in order to respect them it may be 
necessary to use mechanisms that break the velocity of 
capital movements, particularly those at short term that are 
more exposed to the inducements of changing expectations. 
( ... ) Between countries belonging to areas more closely inte-
grated, from the economic point of view it is conceivable 
and desirable to tend more decisively to full financial, in 
addition to commercial, integration. This is the case for the 
European Community, which enshrines such an objective in 
its founding Treaty. ( ... ) The economic and institutional 
logic that governs the behaviour of the individual countries 
would be transferred to the Community level. That logic 
implies: the further reinforcement of the European Monet-
ary System and of the procedures of coordination of macro-
economic policies; the full acceptance of the mobility of 
labour as a factor of production in parallel with that of the 
capital factor; the transfer at the Community level of those 
instruments of control of capital mobility that would still be 
necessary.' 
1 At the Annual Congress of the Forex Club, Milan. 26 October 1985. 
(The translation and omissions arc mine.) 
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More recently and not too differently, the Minister of the 
Italian Treasury has asked for Community initiatives that 
may tend to: 
'(a) strengthen the coordination of economic policies be-
tween Member States ( ... ); (b) develop the financial and 
procedural instruments - and, if needed, to create new ones 
- in order to promptly meet with situations of tension in 
the exchange markets and the balance of payments, as well 
as with difficulties in monetary management, both deriving 
from destabilizing capital movements, thereby preserving 
the cohesion in the (European) exchange system'.2 
Given such recent statements, similar in content and reiter-
ated at the interval of about a year, it is natural to wonder 
about the depth and extent of the Italian monetary authori-
ties' new commitment to liberalization of capital movements. 
It does not seem that this commitment could be explained 
as a reflection of the widely diffused wave of deregulation 
of money and financial markets. A more convincing in-
terpretation of their present stand appears to be a further 
example of a strategy that the Italian monetary authorities 
have followed on previous occasions internally, and that 
they may now be playing externally, together with the auth-
orities of the European Community. 
Internally, since the time of the letters of intent to the 
International Monetary Fund, and thereafter with the so-
called divorce between the Bank of Italy and the Treasury 
- whereby the former is no longer compelled to take up 
unsold Treasury bills at the monthly auctions (an obligation 
that used to create monetary base beyond the Bank's direct 
control)- and, again, with the abandonment of quantitative 
controls on credit ceilings, the strategy of the Italian monet-
ary authorities appears to have been partly determined by 
the desire to tie their own hands. In fact these were all 
instances in which the authorities limited the number of 
instruments at their disposal to those more directly involved 
in a restrictive definition of their policy objectives, and did 
so with the aim of underlying the terms, but also the limits, 
of their responsibility in preserving monetary stability. The 
authorities were thus throwing on other Government auth-
orities, on Parliament, and on the social partners, the re-
sponsibilities that belong to them in the field of public 
expenditure and its financing, of the distribution of income 
and its growth. In so doing, the monetary authorities were 
breaking away from a tradition, according to which, al-
though well aware of the proper institutional aims of its 
Quoted from the newspaper La Repuhh/ica, 18 November 1986. (The 
translation and omissions are mine.) 
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policy, the Bank of Italy had for years been compelled 
to take care of various and often mutually inconsistent 
objectives, and thereby to suffer the damaging consequences 
of being unable to control a sufficient number of instru-
ments. 
At the external level, the strategy may partly disguise the 
attempt to force the hand of other partners in the Com-
munity, by eliminating the remnants of financial dirigisme 
that have for a long time characterized Italian economic 
policy in the international field - as well as the French one, 
for which a similar interpretation may be suggested. In fact, 
these remnants have in the past easily lent to the more liberal 
partners of Italy (specifically Germany) an argument with 
which to oppose Italian (and French) requests for a higher 
degree of cooperation and mutual surveillance in monetary 
policy, on the grounds that such cooperation would first 
require from Italy (and France) a more liberal attitude in this 
field, and a convergence to the lower European standards of 
inflation and of growth of public debt. 
Still at the external level, another element for explaining the 
new stand taken by the Italian monetary authorities is to 
consider it in the light of a policy to build up their inter-
national credibility. In fact, a more stringent set of rules 
in the EMS, accompanied by full, even though possibly 
premature, elimination of capital controls, could be a way 
to impress on other countries' authorities and, more impor-
tantly, on the markets, the seriousness of their new commit-
ment to monetary responsibility. This may indeed be a 
rational strategy to follow for an authority which, in the 
past - even though as a result of faulty behaviour of other 
policy makers within the country - has had to disinvest in 
monetary credibility. In other words, the acquisition of 
credibility involved in becoming members of a demanding 
and exclusive club may reinforce the policy leverage of 
monetary authorities at both the national and international 
level.' 
If the strategic interpretation of the Italian monetary auth-
orities' new policy stand, as suggested above, is at all valid, 
and if this interpretation is also applicable to the authorities 
of the European Community, which appear to invest much 
of their stock in this venture, then an important consequence 
follows at both the Italian and the European Community 
levels. This consequence results from the fact that such a 
strategy contains an element of hazard, and therefore re-
quires a fall-back solution, a safety net, in case it were not 
to achieve its objectives, i.e., in case it failed, internally, to 
1 For a theoretical analysis of this argument, see Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1987). 
change the behaviour of the other Italian authorities and 
pressure groups, and, externally, failed to impress other 
member countries so as to induce them to submit their 
national economic policies to a higher degree of Community 
coordination. 
In other words, the Italian economic and socio-political 
fabric may be unable to move further towards harmoniza-
tion with the European standards of inflation, public deficit, 
etc. Similarly, even after the full liberalization of capital 
movements is accomplished, the authorities of other Euro-
pean countries may not bow to the need for coordinating 
more strictly their policies with those of their partners. If 
this were the case, then new exchange crises would explode 
in the EMS, putting at strain the results reached until now, 
and possibly also the new ones that are being pursued in the 
field of capital liberalization.2 The credibility of both the 
Italian and Community authorities would not be enhanced 
by such unfortunate but not wholly unlikely events. This is 
why, in my view, a safety net must be supplied by the 
Italian monetary authorities during the process of capital 
liberalization. This net should be deployed in agreement 
with the European authorities and jointly with other member 
countries. It should however be designed independently, in 
case the necessary consensus could not be rallied behind a 
common European approach in this direction. 
2.2. The interpretation given above suggests an additional 
justification for the liberalization policy pursued by the 
authorities of the European Community. In fact this in-
terpretation indicates that a rationale for their policy may 
be found in the same 'second-best theory' argument that 
was used above to criticize their stand in favour of complete 
capital liberalization. In the past, and particularly in the 
1960s and early 1970s, the authorities of the European 
Community pushed ahead with ambitious projects - par-
ticularly in the monetary area with the Werner plan, but also 
in more politically sensitive areas, such as those implying a 
higher degree of budget autonomy for the Commission -
in order to force the hand of Member States and induce 
'quantum' jumps towards European economic and political 
unification. Without discussing here the political merit of 
such a strategy, it is to be noted that, if successfully pursued 
in the monetary field and, more specifically, with respect to 
capital liberalization, this strategy may do away with the 
criticism expressed above. According to that criticism, mov-
ing towards full efficiency in one field - such as capital 
markets - may take us further away from economy-wide 
efficiency, because of persistent structural distortions in 
The strained monetary relations between France and Germany before 
the parity realignment at the beginning of 1987 are a timely example of 
such a possibility. 
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other fields and particularly in the labour markets, where 
the degree of nexibility varies internationally and is in any 
case far from matching the flexibility and efficiency of finan-
cial markets. The counter-argument suggested here - which 
was the argument behind the so-called 'monetarist' as op-
posed to 'economist' position in the debate of whether and 
at what speed to move towards European monetary unifi-
cation at the time of the Werner plan -- is that forcing the 
hand of national policy-makers by imposing on them a 
strait-jacket in the monetary field, may put pressure on their 
policy in other fields, and thus induce them, for example, 
to eliminate the inefficiencies in the labour and products 
markets. 1 A possible answer to this application of the coun-
ter-argument is that the aim of reducing the labour markets 
to perfectly efficient conditions is socially costly and politi-
cally difficult to accept, because homogenization of the 
European economies may be inconsistent with full mobility 
of factors of production within the Community. In this 
respect, the long historical experience of European countries 
such as Italy, where regional differences have probably been 
enhanced by monetary unification and full labour mobility 
at the national level, should be kept in mind. 
2.J. In any case, whether applied to the Italian or to the 
Community authorities, the interpretation of the present 
liberalization policy in terms of strategy vis-<i-l'is their own 
political partners internally or their European partners exter-
nally, is instrumental for deriving four conclusions: 
(a) if successful. the strategy might invalidate the criticism 
addressed above to the policy of capital liberalization 
and based on second-best theory: 
( h) if the strategy is unsuccessful. the cost of failure is a 
damaging loss in credibility: therefore. a safetv net must 
be provided to insure against the risk of such ; loss· 
~ . 
(c) this safety net must be deployed in parallel with the 
process towards capital liberalization. in order to avoid 
the loss of credibility that would result from the hurried 
provision of it. L)f of other restricti\'e arrangements. at a 
later stage and pwbably at a time of crisis: 
(d) for the same reason, the safetv net must take the form 
of a mechanism that comes i~tL) play in an automatic 
way if needed, so that the autlwrities, national and 
international, would not appear to break any part of their 
commitment to capital lihcralization when the situation 
would require falling back on the safety nl'l. 
1 St•t· llust'VI ( I 9H7l. and Hase\ i. I klh,,1H> and I knic·nli, ( I •lH7) for a mnrc 
l'Xll'll<kd anal)·,1, ,,(' tills t'<llllll<'l ,.tl p.11111<'111 
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3. Liberalization of capital movements and 
microeconomic efficiency in the long run 
have dealt with the implications for macroeconomic ef-
ficiency that derive from the highly nexible working of 
international financial markets. It is now time to discuss the 
implications from the microeconomic point of view. 
There is no question that, in itself, the move to liberalization 
of international capital transactions is an improvement in 
the microsectoral allocation of resources. This should benefit 
savers as they would be able to invest their funds in forms 
that they consider preferable in terms of their portfolio 
diversification by borrowers and currencies. Similar con-
siderations apply to borrowers of funds. 
However, two issues arise that must be set on the other 
side of the balance sheet in a cost-benefit analysis of these 
implications. 
3.1. The first issue concerns the sectoral losses in employ-
ment of labour, capital, and other factors of production, that 
some countries and their financial centres might experience, 
following the concentration of the industries that provide 
these services in a fewer number of financial centres. While 
this issue concerns more the effects of financial deregulation 
- effects that fall outside the terms of reference submitted 
to our group of experts - I think that, as generally happens 
in the case of industrial and sectoral reallocations brought 
about by a more efficient organization of an industry (par-
ticularly when it is subject to economies of scale), the gains 
to the consumers will more than compensate the losses to 
the producers that are pushed out of the market. This 
process will surely imply international redistribution of in-
come among the producers of these services, and possibly 
require temporary assistance and compensations. However, 
it does not seem to pose a problem needing different treat-
ment to similar problems often encountered in international 
specialization of production. The important point is that 
assistance, if necessary, should be temporary and not such 
as to interfere with the efficient long-term reallocation of 
productive resources. From the Italian point of view. in 
particular. the comparative advantage should not be tilted 
in a direction where the country has no chance of attracting 
major international money or financial centres. On the con-
trary, the occasion should be taken to introduce elements 
of wider competition in the banking and other connected 
services, too long characterized in Italy by their inadequate 
diversification and inefficient provision to the consumers. 
But here again, the matter trespasses into the area of the 
incoming freedom of bank establishment within the EC -
an area that goes beyond the specific terms of reference of 
this rcpllrt. 
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3.2. This first issue is strictly connected with a second one. As 
emphasized at more length below, liberalization of capital 
movements should not be pursued as a step in a deregulatory 
process that, wishing to eliminate all interferences with the 
free working of markets, also does away with the set of rules 
that are required to make markets work in an orderly way. 
This is particularly important in the case of international 
money and financial markets, where elements of risk are 
unavoidable, as they cannot all be internalized by the market 
in appropriate forms of insurance. Although regulating the 
behaviour of agents in these markets is in their own individ-
ual interest, it cannot be left to them, as it has the nature of 
a public good, that no individual agent has an effective 
interest to provide in competition with other individual 
agents. Thus such a need has long been recognized as one 
of the main duties of monetary authorities. The fact that it 
is more difficult to enforce such duties internationally, and 
that the short-sighted interest of some countries might tend 
to reduce the international level of controls to the minimum 
provided by the least responsible country, is only a reappear-
ance at the macroeconomic level of the problem already met 
at the microeconomic level. Thus countries at the macro-
level, as individual agents at the micro-level, may be tempted 
to play the deregulatory game up to a dangerous level of 
risk. The European Community, and its members, should 
therefore mistrust the gains from attracting these risky types 
of venture, and follow a conservative approach in a field in 
which - particularly at times of uncertainty and recurrent 
shocks as the ones that characterize international markets 
at present - the dangers of sudden breakdowns in the 
fabric of international monetary, financial and commercial 
relations are not to be dismissed too lightly. 
4. Liberalization of capital movements and 
control of macroeconomic policy 
4.1. Section 2 has already presented the main economic 
argument for a critical approach to liberalization of capital 
movements by the EC countries: this argument is essentially 
based on the theory of second-best. 
Recent versions of this argument often refer to James To-
bin's suggestion of the need 'to throw some sand' in the 
wheels of the international monetary system by taxing inter-
national capital movements. 
'Any appraisal of the efficiency of our financial system 
must reach an equivocal and uncertain verdict. ( ... ) Here, as 
elsewhere, many regulations have been counterproductive. 
But the process of deregulation should be viewed neither as 
a routine application of free market philosophy nor as a 
treaty among connicting sectoral interests. Rather, it should 
be guided by sober pragmatic consideration of what we can 
reasonably expect the financial system to achieve and at 
what social cost. ( ... ) I fear that, as Keynes saw even in his 
day, the advantages of the liquidity and negotiability of 
financial instruments come at the cost of facilitating nth-
degree speculation which is short-sighted and inefficient.· 1 
Already Keynes before Tobin, and, more recently, Modigli-
ani and many other economists, 2 have argued against full 
liberalization of capital movements. However, it is not en-
ough to invoke an ipse dixit argument in favour of an 
unpopular position: it could in fact be counter-argued that 
the situation has much changed since the times of Keynes, 
and even since the more recent times of the authors referred 
to above. International money and financial markets have 
been profoundly changed by contractual innovations and 
the diffusion of electronic communications. Moreover. trade 
in financial services has reached an unprecedented large 
share of, and intimate compenetration with, trade in prod-
ucts, while trade in financial assets (capital movements) 
dominates by far the foreign exchange markets. Thus the 
reasoning of these eminent authors might have become 
wholly obsolete. 
The point, however, is that these authors were indeed refer-
ring to modern developments as potentially dangerous in 
the presence of full liberalization of international capital 
movements. In fact, among the recent positions in favour 
of throwing sand in the wheels of international financial 
transactions, the best known is probably the one based 
on Dornbusch's formalization (Dornbusch. 1976) of the 
phenomenon of overshooting exchange rates, which is typi-
cally a consequence of modern development of financial 
markets. In a world of efficient money and financial markets. 
and of relatively rigid labour and products markets. exogen-
ous and unexpected shocks generate temporary over-reac-
tion of real exchange rates or interest rates. These overshoot-
ing phenomena are costly for the economy, as they produce 
temporary but substantial divergences of production and 
employment from their new equilibrium level. These tempor-
ary divergences may also induce lasting and costly distor-
tions in the productive structure of a country. Because of 
these distortions, free trade and perfect capital mobility lead 
to second-best solutions. as already emphasized above. Thus. 
taxes on trade or taxes on capital movements. or both. may 
generate superior levels of welfare. As taxes on trade are. 
for economic and political reasons, to be excluded from the 
set of usable instruments (at least within the European 
1 Tobin (1984). pp. 14-15. 
See Keynes ( 1936). Modigliani ( 1972). and. among others. Bergsten 
(1984). Buiter and Miller (1982). Cooper (1973). Dornbusch (1986). 
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Community), the argument turns in favour of taxing capital 
movements, or of some equivalent means for slowing down 
capital mobility. As it will be discussed presently, the particu-
lar means proposed in this report is a double foreign ex-
change market. 
From this point of view, it is not surprising that the wide 
fluctu<llions of real interest and exchange rates that have 
characterized the 1970s and 1980s have revived protectionist 
forces in international trade. Thus, in order to keep trade 
free from new taxes and subsidies, it may be necessary to 
regulate capital movements. Such controls are fully consist-
ent with free choice in the allocation of financial portfolios. 
Indeed, they may favour a sounder liberalization of capital 
movements, particularly for those countries. such as Italy 
and France, that for long have been deprived of such free-
dom; at the same time, these controls avoid the need to 
make use of trade interferences as means to offset temporary 
changes in the real exchange rate, and, therefore, in the 
international competitiveness of a country. 
4.2. The case for regulating capital movements is based not 
only on the second-best theory coupled with the modern 
theory of exchange rate determination. It is also based on 
the argument - due to Mundell ( 1963) - that in a world 
of perfect capital mobility, fiscal and monetary policies 
alternatively lose their effectiveness as means to control 
aggregate demand, under flexible and under fixed exchange 
rates respectively. This is a well-known argument, at least 
with reference to monetary policy and fixed exchange rates, 
as it implies the inability to keep control of the supply of 
base money (or of the level of interest rates) when the central 
bank is compelled to undo through its open market window 
what it is trying to do, in defence of the exchange rate, 
through its foreign exchange window. 
What is perhaps less frequently considered is the fact that 
the other side of Mundell's argument -- i.e., the side that 
implies the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy under floating 
exchange rates and perfect capital mobility - when coupled 
with the side related to monetary policy, suggests a double 
exchange market system as a way to escape the dilemma 
of the alternative ineffectiveness of the two policies. The 
effectiveness of both policies (monetary and fiscal) is re-
stored by adopting, through a double exchange market, a 
system which partakes of both fixed and flexible exchange 
rates regimes. In fact, the adoption of a double exchange 
market, by breaking the link between capital movements 
and commercial transactions, prevents the former from 
backfiring, through the latter, upon the objective of controll-
ing monetary aggregates, because the Central Bank is now 
compelled to defend the commercial exchange rate only, and 
not a unified (commercial and financial) rate. Similarly, a 
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fiscal policy oriented. for example, to expand demand and 
employment. is no longer made ineffective by the higher 
interest rates it induces. Without a double exchange market, 
these attract capital, appreciate the exchange rate and thus 
reduce net demand from abroad by an amount just equal 
to the expansion of demand originally induced by fiscal 
policy. With a double exchange market, the commercial rate 
does not react to the higher interest rates induced by the 
expansionary fiscal policy: the capital movements that 
would be induced by those higher rates find an automatic 
brake in the appreciation of the financial exchange rate. 
Therefore, although with reference now to macroeconomic 
policy effectiveness, rather than to microeconomic efficiency 
in the allocation of resources, it is arguable again that 
full deregulation and perfect mobility of capital are not 
conducive to a 'first-best' situation. Moreover, the double 
exchange market is thereby indicated as the natural arrange-
ment to deal with both aspects of the problem. 
Before further elaborating on this proposal - i.e., on the 
adoption of a double exchange market by Italy, and possibly 
by a larger set of European countries - it is useful to dwell 
on the persistent need for exchange rate realignments in the 
EMS. The issue boils down to the question of how close the 
EMS comes to an optimum currency area. 
I have elsewhere (Basevi and Giavazzi, 1987) analysed a 
number of situations in which, among three ideal countries 
(dubbed the USA, Germany and Italy), cooperative, unco-
operative, or partly (as limited to Germany and Italy) coop-
erative strategies lead to different welfare rankings of monet-
ary arrangements between the European countries. 
Some conclusions emerge from that study, that may be 
useful to report here: 
'The process of economic integration among European 
countries today has two principal objectives: the abolition 
of barriers to capital movements within Europe and the 
gradual transformation of the European Monetary System 
from a system of adjustable parities into a system of irrevo-
cably fixed exchange rates. 
The two objectives are not independent: the experience of 
the EMS shows in fact that in a system characterized by 
periodical realignments, the anticipation of a realignment 
gives rise to speculative attacks against the reserves of the 
central banks. These have two ways to defend their own 
reserves: to accept a high volatility of the interest rates or 
to impose controls on capital movements. Until now the 
choice has always been tilted in favour of capital controls. 
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The experience of the EMS suggests therefore that the abol-
ition of the barriers to capital movements cannot be ac-
complished independently of the transformation of the EMS 
into a system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates. 
The important question therefore is: how much does it 
cost to renounce the realignment of exchange rates as an 
instrument of economic policy? In a world in which vari-
ations of exchange rates have real effects, a realignment can 
take place for two reasons. 
First, even though the European countries were perfectly 
identical (in their economic structure) and hit by common 
external shocks, a realignment of the intra-European ex-
change rates can simply be the result of non-cooperative 
management of monetary policies (by the member 
countries). Notice that the degree of cooperation requested 
is not limited to the cooperation of decisions with respect 
to exchange rates, but must also extend to the decisions with 
respect to the monetary policy of each country belonging to 
the system. 
Second, if the macroeconomic structures of the various 
European countries are not identical, or in presence of 
regional (European) shocks, realignments of intra-European 
exchange rates become part of a cooperative reply to exogen-
ous shocks. 
In itself, the fact that realignments could simply result from 
non-cooperation (at the European level) would render a 
system of fixed parities particularly attractive; fixed ex-
change rates in fact enforce the cooperative solution. From 
this point of view, far from being a cost, the abandonment 
of the use of exchange rate changes as an instrument of 
economic policy would only present advantages; it avoids 
the losses that derive from non-cooperative behaviour and 
allows the integration of financial markets. 
However, in the real world, the presence of structural differ-
ences among European countries and of regional shocks 
imply that the decision to keep exchange rates fixed implies 
a choice. Fixed exchange rates allow financial integration, 
but do not allow the use of realignments as an instrument 
for redistributing the effects of regional shocks, or also of 
common shocks in the case of structural differences (among 
the European countries). In the present reality, therefore, 
the thesis in favour of adjustable parities is grounded simply 
on the fact that, in presence of asymmetrical shocks or of 
structural differences, Europe does not yet constitute an 
optimal currency area. What is new, relative to the tra-
ditional debate on optimal currency areas, is the trade-
off between cooperative realignments and liberalization of 
capital movements( ... ).' 
Indeed, some authors 1 go as far as to suggest that the success 
of the EMS so far has been due in large part to the existence 
of exchange controls, particularly in France and Italy. 
In any case, according to this argument, the structural pecu-
liarities of a country - Italy in our case - are a definite 
obstacle to liberalization of its capital movements. Notice 
that the structural differences that are relevant are not only 
the labour market rigidities, which may be higher in Italy 
than in the other European countries, but also some differ-
ences that directly impinge on the mobility of capital. 
Two of them are of particular importance in the Italian case. 
The first is the fact that, because of the long history of 
capital controls in Italy, of its relatively less-developed finan-
cial markets, and of the large accumulation of public debt, 
there could be in this country a large backlog of potential 
desire for currency and country diversification of financial 
portfolios, that seems dangerous to release suddenly. This 
argument is not new, it has probably been overplayed, and 
in any case its importance is likely to have diminished in the 
recent period, with the diffusion of investment funds and 
the gradual liberalization already accomplished through 
them. In any case, it would be illogical to argue that capital 
liberalization cannot take place because it has not been 
allowed in the past. The system must be changed at some 
point in time, if and when the change is deemed desirable. 
Thus these are really arguments for gradualism and auto-
matic safety valves. As such they will be considered again 
in Section 5. 
Second, the economic structure of Italy is different with 
respect to the other major European countries for the large 
share of its public debt indexed to short-term interest rates, 
even though formally issued with a long-term maturity. In 
this situation, when, with perfect capital mobility and in the 
absence of realignments of exchange rates, the burden of 
regulating exchange relations within the EMS falls on inter-
est rates, the control of fiscal policy would be endangered. 
Indeed, as the Italian public debt is such a large share of 
GDP, its service has already made it difficult, in recent years, 
to effectively use fiscal policy for stabilizing the economy. 
In any case, full coordination of economic policies and 
convergence of the economic structures of the European 
countries are unlikely to be achieved in the reasonably near 
future; hence the need to deploy a safety net for the liberal-
ization of capital movements. Without such a net, we risk 
1 Sec, in particular. Mclilz and Michel (1986), Rogoff (1985). Wyplosz 
( 1986). 
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losing much of what has already been accomplished in the 
monetary field in Europe, and damaging the credibility of 
the national and Community authorities that have embarked 
on such an enterprise. 
4.3. The position that has been taken here, therefore, is not 
one a priori opposed to liberalization of capital movements. 
It is a position from which, given the present economic and 
institutional structures of Italy and the European countries, 
liberalization by itself is seen as not necessarily improving 
the efficiency of their economies, and yet involving the 
authorities in a risky predicament, from which they would 
lose much if they had to withdraw. Hence the proposal of a 
safety net, to be explored in more detail in this section. First, 
however, I would emphasize that liberalization must not be 
confused with deregulation. This distinction is important for 
two reasons, one related to the same philosophy that has 
inspired the supporters of deregulation in recent years, the 
other being more specific to Italy. 
As to the first reason, let us remind ourselves that, as stated 
40 years ago by one of the most eminent representatives of 
the school of thought to which those in favour of deregu-
lation generally belong: 
'( ... ) Government must provide a monetary framework for 
a competitive order, since the competitive order cannot 
provide one for itself. ( ... ) This monetary framework should 
operate under the "rule of law" rather than discretionary 
authority of administrators.' 1 
Thus, deregulation is accepted. within the liberal approach 
to monetary institutions. if aimed at the elimination of 
discretionary interventions by the monetary authorities, but 
rejected if interpreted as the elimination of all rules of the 
game. 
The second reason derives directly from this first one, and 
is of particular importance in the case of Italy. In fact, in this 
country, even aside from the requirements of the European 
Community. a process of revision of the intricate set of laws 
and regulations that control capital movements has been 
under way for a few years. The fundamental principle on 
which the framework for revising the law prepared by Parlia-
ment and to be defined by Government is inspired has, 
with much publicity, been expressed as the opposite of the 
principle governing Italian intervention in these matters until 
now, i.e., the principle that all that is not explicitly allowed 
is ipso facto prohibited in the field of international capital 
movements. This principle would be reversed into the prin-
ciple that all is allowed that is not explicitly forbidden. 
I Friedman ( 1948), p. 370. 
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Now, beyond the apparently impressive reversal of principle, 
it is clear that the two statements can be made equivalent if 
a basic premise is not changed, according to which authori-
ties in this field keep discretionary control of what is either 
allowed (under the old principle) or prohibited (under the 
new principle). Thus the real issue is to limit as much as 
possible the discretionary power of authorities in this field, 
rather than to deregulate sic et simpliciter. From this point 
of view - as I have already argued elsewhere (Basevi and 
Cavazzuti, 1985) - the framework of law prepared for the 
Government by Parliament2 seems unsatisfactory. 
The proposal to provide a safety net resembles only super-
ficially the suggestion expressed in most documents submit-
ted by the Commission to this group of experts, according 
to which there is a case for considering new safety clauses 
as the most appropriate way of dealing with difficulties in 
the process of capital liberalization. The proposal must 
also be distinguished from the idea emphasized in some 
documents of the Bank of Italy, according to which it is 
useful to distinguish, at least for the case of that country, 
between temporary and permanent controls of capital move-
ments. 3 In fact, the proposal to provide a safety net, and 
more specifically one in the form of a double exchange 
market, implies: 
(i) that it should be kept in place before its need actually 
arises; 
(ii) that, therefore, it should not be considered as either 
temporary or permanent; its existence only should be 
permanent, while its use and effectiveness would be 
temporary. as it is only in case of crises that the potential 
of the safety net will come to work. 
Here the metaphor of the safety net is indeed so close to 
reality that it may be worthwhile to emphasize it. In a circus 
the net is put under the swinging acrobats for safety and in 
the hope of never having to use it. Clearly, in order to be 
useful, the net must be in place before the acrobats start 
swinging over the admiring eyes of the public. Clearly, also, 
its eventual use becomes effective and temporary in the 
unfortunate case of an acrobat missing his grip. Pushing the 
metaphor somewhat further, we may also have observed 
that the public of a circus - at least the true lovers of such 
shows - are not in the least less pleased and impressed by 
the ability of the acrobats when there is a net under them, 
and that the freedom and elegance of the acrobats are not 
impeded by the presence of the net. 
Such was the situation at the time when this report was prepared. Since 
then. the Italian Government has regulated the matter by a decree 
(September 1987). which will soon be followed by a comprehensive 
revision of the whole law (March 1988). 
See, for example. Micossi and Rossi ( 1986). 
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5. The double exchange market 
5.1. It is time to conclude this report by extending the 
analysis to the advantages and disadvantages of the proposal 
to install a double exchange market, as a safety net ac-
companying the liberalization of capital movements in a 
country such as Italy. The general justifications for such a 
proposal have already been presented in the preceding sec-
tions. What is needed here is consideration of some specific 
aspects of the proposal. 
These will be organized in terms of objections to it on the 
one hand, and its main advantages on the other hand. As 
for the more technical aspects of the system, I refer to the 
extensive literature on the theoretical and empirical aspects 
of double exchange markets, 1 as well as to my own work 
(Basevi, 1985). 
In any case, before considering the pros and cons of such 
an arrangement, let me restate that a double exchange mar-
ket does not limit the freedom of capital movements; quite 
the contrary - it is a means to make such freedom possible, 
while avoiding its negative consequences on the allocation 
of real resources and allowing the effective use of monetary 
and fiscal policies. 
5.2. Objections 
(a) Some authors criticize the double exchange market by 
arguing that the system becomes ineffective in the long run, 
as loopholes are found through which arbitrage between 
the two markets makes their separation useless. While the 
existence of loopholes cannot be denied, their significance 
should not be misunderstood. In particular, a double ex-
change market of the type used or envisaged in industrialized 
countries, is not such as to imply a permanent tax on capital 
outflows in the form of a discount of the financial, relative 
to the commercial, exchange rate. 
First, although the way the market is sometimes organized 
is such as to bias it towards depreciation of the financial 
rate relative to the commercial one, the system in principle 
could be perfectly symmetrical, and it could therefore open 
a wedge either in the form of a tax or of a subsidy on capital 
outflows. This, by the way, indicates that the market can 
also be a substitute for the possible introduction of new 
safety clauses, alluded to in the documents of the Com-
mission, as a means to keep capital out of strong currency 
markets. 
1 See the many references in Frenkel and Razin (1986), and in Gros (1986). 
Second, the wedge opens only in case of crises. In normal 
times the spread between the two rates can be insignificant, 
and it may be managed through exchange intervention by 
the monetary authorities in both markets. The fact that the 
wedge is insignificant means that the tax (subsidy) is not a 
permanent one, and that the system may be sustained even in 
the long run. Thus, the recent criticisms raised by Dornbusch 
(1986) are correct if they are addressed, as they are, to the 
way double exchange markets have been used in developing 
countries to keep, for long periods of time, misaligned ex-
change rates and disequilibriated balance of payments situ-
ations, thus feeding rather than choking speculative attacks 
and fostering the final breakdown of the systems. Similarly 
the criticism by Frenkel and Razin (1986), according to 
which 'intertemporal considerations cast serious doubts on 
the long-run viability of such exchange-rate regimes' 2 is 
correct but beyond the point, as the authors themselves 
recognize, by adding that 'even though dual exchange rate 
regimes may not be viable in the long run, they can be 
sustained in the short run' - which is indeed all that is 
required. 
(b) Still on the issue of loopholes, it is sometimes difficult 
to distinguish current account from capital account trans-
actions, so that the possibility of arbitrage through over- or 
under-invoicing, leads and lags, and other operations related 
to current account transactions is undeniable. However, the 
argument is in practice overstated, as experience shows again 
and again that in case of crises substantial differences arise 
between the commercial and the financial rates. Arbitrage 
cannot be so successful or else such wide wedges would not 
be observable. 
(c) The question of loopholes and the need to separate 
the two markets effectively raises the issue of bureaucratic 
machinery and its costs. The issue, however, must be looked 
upon from a relative point of view; relative, on the one hand, 
to the existing degree of administrative and discretionary 
controls in a country such as Italy, and, on the other hand, 
to the anarchic deregulation already criticized above. How-
ever, it must be allowed that the actual implementation of 
a double exchange market requires the formal maintenance 
of an apparatus of controls. This disadvantage is, in my 
view, balanced by the fact that the system allows an effective 
liberalization of capital movements, as they would be com-
pletely free within the financial market. 
(d) A double exchange market is sometimes criticized for 
giving clear signs to potential speculators on the way the 
commercial rate is bound to be changed when a revision 
Frenkel and Razin ( l 986). p. 33. 
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of panties comes. These signs would feed destabilizing 
speculation, safely encouraged by the one-sided nature of 
the market, that bounds the possible losses in case the 
expected depreciation docs not materialize. 
However, this argument is valid for a type of double ex-
change market where the separation works only in one 
direction (as, for example, in the case of Belgium-Luxem-
bourg, where purchases of foreign exchange for capital 
transactions must take place in the financial market, while 
sales have the option of going into either market). The 
double exchange market proposed here should work both 
ways; this symmetry, by the way, is required if the system 
were to be adopted not only by a single country, such as 
Italy, but by at least two countries in the EMS. Moreover, 
in so far as signals would still come from the financial rate 
to indicate that the commercial rate is misaligned, the double 
exchange market would lend credibility to the central bank, 
because this could less easily keep a misaligned commercial 
rate for long periods of time. Thus, by adopting such a 
system, a central bank would commit itself more credibly to 
policies that are consistent with a fixed parity. 
5.3. Advantages 
(a) The main advantage of a double exchange market is that 
it provides an automatic control mechanism that reproduces 
equivalently that of a continuously adjusted tax or subsidy 
on capital movements. The system would thus work without 
imposing on the authorities the impossible task of having to 
change and adapt such wedges to continuously changing 
economic situations. From a more technical point of view, 
this aspect is explored at length by various authors. 1 
(b) As just stated, a double exchange market is equivalent 
to a continuously adjusting tax (subsidy) on capital move-
ments. While a system of taxation of capital movements is 
preferable to a double exchange market if the purpose is to 
keep a permanent wedge between domestic and foreign real 
interest rates. a double exchange market system is more 
efficient than the alternative when there is a need to fine-
tune an instrument so as to avoid temporary jumps in the 
real exchange rate. Moreover, the nature of the market itself, 
by implying a tax (subsidy) on capital movements, rather 
than on their returns. discriminates automatically against 
short-term and speculative movements of capital, i.e., those 
that aim at reaping fast and repeated gains from moving in 
and out of a currency. Long-term investments are minimally 
impeded by a double exchange market; on the contrary, the 
1 See Buiter and Miller (1982). Liviatan ( 1980), Basevi ( 1985). 
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complete liberalization of capital movements that the system 
allows is an incentive to avoid speculative motivations be-
hind long-term investments. For them, the avoidance of 
bureaucratic controls sets a premium over the attraction of 
speculating on the best moment at which to make the pur-
chase or sale of currency in the financial market. For exam-
ple, if, because of a crisis, the financial rate were to depreciate 
substantially relative to the commercial rate, the longer-term 
investors in need of foreign currency had better wait for 
quieter periods, while the burden of taking risky chances is 
left to speculative short-term capital. Thus, demand for 
foreign currency withdraws from the financial market when 
the domestic currency is under attack, with stabilizing conse-
quences. 
(c) As hinted above, the perfect freedom of action that 
the double exchange market allows to capital transactions, 
provided they are conducted through the financial market, 
is another main advantage of the system. From this point 
of view, early adoption of the system is the best way of 
accompanying a gradual and eventually full liberalization of 
capital movements for a country like Italy, and possibly for 
other major countries in the EMS. 
(d) Last but not least, the system has the valuable advantage 
of diverting from the authorities the mark of unsuccessful 
policy that is attached by national and international opinion 
to the reintroduction of capital controls in a hurried way 
and at times of crisis. If a double exchange market system 
is set up in advance and smoothly steered through in the 
initial period, with interventions aimed at keeping the two 
rates rather close to each other, and used only to reduce the 
pressure on exchange rates in both directions (as is the case 
in the unbiased version proposed here), then no risk of 
defaulting on promises authoritatively made, and no conse-
quent loss of credibility, are involved, neither at the national 
nor at the Community levels. This, from an institutional 
and wider political point of view, appears to be the main 
advantage of the system proposed here, in the interest of 
both the Italian and the Community monetary authorities. 
6. A comment and an afterthought 
6.1. The comment 
The comment is addressed to Wyplosz's contribution to this 
group. In his paper he states the proposition that, out of the 
three conditions: 
(i) a fixed exchange rate system (such as the EMS); 
(ii) full capital mobility, i.e., no capital controls; 
(iii) long-run monetary independence, 
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just two are compatible. Then, by leaving aside the abandon-
ment of the EMS (i.e., the abandonment of (i)), two possi-
bilities are left : 
(a) EMS with full capital mobility, but without long-run 
monetary independence; 
(b) EMS with long-run monetary independence, but with 
capital controls. 
Wyplosz analyses both possibilities, and does not come out 
in clear favour of one or the other. The proposal presented 
in my paper falls under possibility (b ). 
The set of choices, however, is larger than that proposed 
by Wyplosz. This is clearly understandable as soon as we 
distinguish between currencies and countries; as soon as 
we recognize that, whereas capital mobility and monetary 
independence (conditions (ii) and (iii)) may apply to either 
countries or currencies, fixed exchange rates (condition (i)) 
necessarily apply to currencies only. Clearly the two-dimen-
sional structure of the domain of application of conditions 
(ii) and (iii) multiplies the number of possibilities. 
6.2. The afterthought 
The afterthought results from the comment above. The 
additional possibilities that may be interesting to explore are 
those in which: 
(a) the domain of application of monetary independence is 
kept with respect to control of money supply expressed 
in domestic currency, but lost with respect to additional 
supply of money within the country when the supply 
takes the form of foreign currency or ECU; 
(b) full capital mobility is preserved with respect to capital 
transactions that residents make in money and financial 
instruments denominated in foreign currency or ECU 
without moving in or out of domestic currency; it is 
not preserved with respect to capital transactions that 
residents make by moving in and out of domestic as 
opposed to foreign currency denominated instruments. 
In other words, a double exchange market (or other equiva-
lent forms of capital control) could be introduced as a means 
to preserve monetary independence with respect to control 
of the supply of domestic money. At the same time, however, 
full freedom would be left to residents to make capital 
movements in assets denominated in foreign currencies or 
ECU. 
This is the 'parallel' currency approach, that has taken 
various forms in the past, 1 and which is here reconsidered 
together with a double exchange market applied to trans-
actions in and out of domestic currency. The double ex-
change market component would allow a less traumatic 
introduction of the parallel currency (or currencies) within 
a country, as it would essentially provide the Central Bank 
with an automatic mechanism to protect the gradual re-
duction of the field of application of its independent national 
monetary policy. 
It goes without saying that this scheme, as the parallel 
currency approach in general, implies: 
(i) liberalization extended to monetary and not just finan-
cial instruments, and 
(ii) giving up the Central Bank's monopoly of foreign ex-
change. This is a step that does not yet appear in sight 
in Italy. 
The recently revised Italian law on foreign exchange trans-
actions will have to be modified again to incorporate these 
revolutionary principles, if Italy really agrees to move into 
the second phase of liberalization that the European Com-
munity has set for 1992. 
1 See, in particular, The Economist ( l 975), Optica (l 976), Optica (l 977). 
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Part Two - Reports of independent experts consulted by the Commission 
Introduction 
The EC plan to foster further integration of capital markets 
is certain to create new opportunities for the Member States 
but also further constraints on their ability to shape domestic 
economic policies. 
This report covers a wide range of issues of relevance to the 
proposal, bringing to bear recent developments in economic 
analysis while not attempting to present a model or even a 
coherent framework. The main proposition is presented in 
Section 3, and asserts that one cannot maintain simul-
taneously the EMS, long-term monetary independence 
through differences in steady-state inflation rates, and full 
freedom of capital movements. The implications of this 
proposition are very serious. The objective of full liberaliza-
tion represents a high risk for the EMS. The risk should not 
be dismissed lightly. A certain number of solutions exist. 
One possibility is to set up some 'safeguard clauses', the 
codeword for temporary capital controls, but of course this 
goes some way towards undermining the very objective 
which it is meant to support. Alternatively, the EMS needs 
to be adapted. Section 4 considers three other possibilities. 
One possibility is to adopt a softer version of the EMS with 
more frequent realignments and larger margins of fluctu-
ations. Two other possibilities represent a strengthening of 
the EMS, the first one by increasing the pooling of national 
reserves, the second one by going the full way to a monetary 
union. 
Section I considers distribution issues as well as the tempor-
ary costs of a full liberalization of capital movements and 
the steps to be taken to achieve full financial integration. 
Section 2 prepares the more substantial arguments sum-
marized above as it considers the constraints imposed by the 
EMS. Overall, the EMS is seen as a most useful arrangement 
which should not be endangered by unwarranted expec-
tations about the benefits of financial integration. 
1. Distribution effects 
I.I. Borrowers versus lenders 
In order for financial markets to be fully integrated arbitrag-
ing possibilities must be complete, i.e., not restricted by 
considerations other than profit making. It must be noted 
at the outset that this need not lead to perfect asset substitu-
tability across currencies of denomination. Indeed, exchange 
risk will normally imply some degree of imperfect substituta-
bility, no matter whether currencies are floating or part of 
a fixed but adjustable regime like the EMS. The important 
implication though is that portfolios will be optimally diver-
sified so that all non-diversifiable risks (including exchange 
risks) will be optimally spread within the total market, 
fundamentally achieving the best possible allocation of re-
sources. This will be the case, of course, only if each domestic 
market is free of distortions, an important provision to be 
discussed at a later stage. 
Full integration does not actually require that all existing 
restrictions be lifted; it is enough that one side of the market 
(demand or supply) be free to operate. For example, it is 
not necessary that borrowers be allowed to operate in all 
markets. One could imagine the extreme case where bor-
rowers may only borrow on their own domestic markets. 
Yet if lenders are free to buy liabilities no matter where they 
are issued and in any currency, the desired integration of all 
financial markets will be achieved. For example, French 
firms could be forbidden from floating stocks and bonds 
abroad. But if foreign financial intermediaries are allowed 
to freely subscribe to issues on French markets, and if 
French financial institutions may buy securities issued 
abroad, French markets would effectively be fully integrated. 
The previous argument does not say that capital movements 
can be restricted to operate in one direction only. Quite to 
the contrary, as the example shows, integration requires 
two-way freedom of movement. It only says that when 
institutional reasons (for example tax-related issues) require 
some form of restriction (maybe because some degree of 
harmonization is required across countries and may be hard 
to achieve soon enough), full integration still remains poss-
ible, and should not be postponed because of false pretexts. 
Quite clearly, if the objective is full integration, no restriction 
is better than some restriction. But full integration is possible 
with some restrictions, provided that they are carefully ana-
lysed. 
Obviously, there are transaction costs involved, and as the 
previous example amply suggests, it may matter for cost 
effectiveness how the liberalization process is enacted. But 
the previous example shows how intermediaries would enter 
the picture and how competition among them would drive 
costs down to the point where it would hardly matter which 
side of the market has been freed. 
There is still a question of incidence: in the previous example, 
one would expect that the costs would be borne by the 
lenders as they gather information and/or pay fees to the 
intermediaries. This might then suggest that, according to 
how integration is achieved, different groups may end up 
bearing the costs of trans-border operations. As a conse-
quence, one might obtain the following implications: if it is 
th.:: lender who bears the cost, the process of liberalization 
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will tend to reduce cctcris parihus the now of savings; if it 
is the horrower who hears the cost. aggregate investment 
will he hurt. 1 Yet. as always when we deal with incidence 
issues, the ahove presumption need not hold under any 
condition and market pressures may well shift the burden 
from one side of the market to the other. In addition. one 
would expect intermediaries to play on both sides of the 
market and even cut out the incidence. 
Finally. the main point of this section is that freedom of 
transactions may be restricted to a limited segment of the 
financial markets: as long as the national markets themselves 
are fully integrated (for example between the short and long 
maturities. as has been recently achieved in France). opening 
up one segment (e.g. the long maturities) is sufficient to 
achieve full integration. But. as noted by the Commission ·s 
staff. it is true that such a limited liberalization will affect the 
performance of the financial intermediaries as an industry. 
1.2. Foreign versus national interests 
Opposition to free trade in assets sometimes stems from 
fears that domestic savings will be diverted to finance pro-
ductive and employment-creating investments abroad. Such 
fears are founded only if it is net outOows which result. For 
that to happen. it must be the case that returns on foreign 
investments exceed domestic returns. But in that case. the 
country suffering from net outnows should benefit as a 
whole since it will acquire assets of higher value: financial 
integration is Pareto-improving. 
There is no denial that foreign investment may have domestic 
distributional effects. particularly affecting employment 
while benefiting asset holders. But what must be recognized 
is the reason why returns on investment are lower at home 
than abroad: in principle. this is because the domestic capi-
tal-labour ratio is higher or because subsidies have pushed 
down the required rate of return on investment. In the first 
case. in most European countries and my best guess is in 
the case of France. the presumption is that high capital-
labour ratios arise from various rigidities and inefficiencies 
in the labour market which result in excessive labour costs. 
In that case. the 'first-best' solution is to address the origin 
of the distortion. not one of its symptoms. so that imposing 
further distortions to the capital market can only be assumed 
to be welfare-reducing, that is unless a specific case can be 
made that such restrictions are of a second-best nature. 
In the second case. that of subsidies or other regulatory 
1 Bc>th imestment and saving !lows arc normally expected to grow as a 
consequence of the intcgrntiL>n process. What is discussed here is which 
side of the market would hcnelit most. 
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restrictions. the same rule applies, namely that interventions 
in the capital market ought to be explicitly related to existing 
distortions. 
Another frequent argument against free movement of capi-
tal. and one that enjoys considerable support in France from 
government to government, concerns foreign ownership of 
domestic corporations. One first embodiment of this argu-
ment is that strategic military considerations make it necess-
ary to control the production. and sometimes the confiden-
tiality, of specific goods. This may be a valid argument, 
although one suspects that it concerns only a very narrowly 
limited list of instances and actually is being vastly over-
blown. The second embodiment of the argument concerns 
the need to protect infant industries in growing markets. 
Here again. this is a valid argument in theory but an often 
grossly overused one.2 A last variation is that foreigners are 
being attracted by returns on investment which exceed the 
foreign level and ought to benefit domestic savers. This can 
happen when the domestic capital-labour ratio is lower at 
home than abroad: in that case foreign investment should 
be welcome as it compensates for a lack of accumulated 
savings which results in lower real wages. Note that this 
latter case cannot occur simultaneously with the case, dis-
cussed above. of capital outnows creating jobs abroad: 
returns at home must be either lower or higher than abroad, 
not both at the same time unless domestic capital markets 
are highly inefficient. 
Finally it is worth noting that returns at home may differ 
from returns abroad for yet another reason: when there 
exists a monopoly power of either lenders or borrowers. 
This is a good argument in favour of liberalization of capital 
movements since a most likely effect of these movements is 
to reduce such distortions. 
1.3. Public versus private sectors 
In France. it has been argued for a long time that real 
interest rates ought to be kept low so as to reduce the burden 
of servicing the public debt. This in turn has often been used 
as an argument in favour of capital movement restrictions. 
As of I January 1987. the Banque de France is changing its 
operational procedures and a large number of measures 
aimed at deregulating domestic financial markets have been 
taken or are being currently prepared. The end result should 
be a situation where the Treasury does not enjoy any more 
the advantage that it used to organize for itself. Therefore, 
the following might be a moot issue, at least as far as France 
is concerned. yet a few remarks may be warranted. 
For a discussion of many of these issues. sec Jacquemin and Geroski 
(1985). 
Part Two - Reports of independent experts consulted by the Commission 
What is true under these circumstances is that bond holders 
pay an implicit tax which substitutes for higher taxes which 
would have to be otherwise raised in order to service the 
public debt. The real issue, therefore, is one of the domestic 
tax structure and the associated income transfers, and there 
may be valid reasons for choosing such a pattern of taxation. 
However this cannot be construed as a case against capital 
movements as any structure of taxation may be achieved 
through explicit taxes-cum-subsidies: doing so implicitly 
through capital movement restrictions is an inefficient, and 
presumably costly, way of achieving otherwise valid objec-
tives. There remains the facts that, if and when trade in 
assets liberalization forces the Treasury to resort to other 
sources of financing to service its debt, it ought to recognize 
the associated income transfers: for example, if it simply 
raises income taxes to match the increased burden of the 
debt, it may hurt households at the lower part of the income 
scale, who do not save and will not benefit from higher 
returns on bonds, yet pay taxes, and will pay more of them. 
1.4. Domestic financial agents 
In general, the presumption is that opening up to trade 
should be welfare-improving, at least in the long run. This 
will be true unless there is an identifiable market failure, so 
that one should indeed try to seek whether such failures 
currently exist. Two such potential failures or market imper-
fections are examined. 
Many European countries, including France, have deemed 
it necessary to set up often complex systems of reduced 
interest rates (taux d'interet bonifies) designed to subsidize 
corporations and households. What is the implication of 
such schemes for the liberalization programme? As long as 
such discounts are directly recuperated by financial inter-
mediaries from the Government, one would not expect liber-
alization to create major problems. The issue is different 
though when the implied transfers are only indirectly com-
pensated. This is the case in France where a large number 
of pricing decisions by banks are regulated by the monetary 
authorities: charges for overdrafts, yields on popular savings 
schemes, rates on borrowings by households, etc. Clearly 
these rates are set in order to allow 'normal' operating 
profits for the financial intermediaries, particularly keeping 
in mind that they are 'asked' to grant concessionary loans 
to a large number of privileged customers chosen by the 
authorities. The French authorities have stated their inten-
tion of dismantling at least a large portion of this web of 
indirect transfers, and have already started to do so. But 
even the most enthusiastic believer knows that this process 
is not likely to evolve easily to a situation where all subsidies 
will be eliminated: after all, there may exist valid reasons 
for subsidizing certain categories of economic agents. Inas-
much as the liberalization programme implies free interest 
rates, it follows that the current transfer system is in jeop-
ardy. This is not an argument against liberalization, how-
ever, since the existing systems of 'implicit' transfers can 
easily be replaced by explicit subsidies or by tax concessions 
aimed directly at the desired beneficiaries. In fact, such a 
change would be beneficial from an economic point of view, 
first, as it would make the costs of the transfers visible and 
therefore easier to evaluate and, second, as it would eliminate 
a factor of reduced competition among financial intermedi-
aries.1 
Another concern with the effect of the liberalization pro-
gramme is that (foreign) powerful intermediaries may use 
the enhanced market system to build up dominant positions. 
It would indeed be ironic should a liberalization programme 
result in less competition! While such a scenario cannot be 
ruled out on a priori grounds, and is beyond this report, it 
seems safe to believe that the risks are quite limited. Mon-
opolies typically emerge when there exist increasing returns 
to scale and/or barriers to entry are easy to erect and to 
protect. There do exist increasing returns to scale in branch-
banking, but the current situation is better characterized by 
monopolistic competition: allowing new players to enter is 
only likely to increase the intensity of competition, not to 
reduce it. As far as entry barriers are concerned, all we seem 
to know from financial activities is that they are very hard 
to set up and even harder to protect as the fixed costs 
are quite limited (that is outside the business of branch-
banking). 
1.5. Foreign versus domestic financial centres 
Quite reasonably, some countries may worry about the redis-
tribution of cards among financial centres that would follow 
the shake-up that enhanced competition will trigger. More 
precisely, French financial agents and the French authorities 
may feel that Paris is not in a position to compete on an 
equal footing with, say, London. In order to evaluate this 
issue one must start by asking why is Paris unable to compete 
with London (or Frankfurt or Milan, etc.). Three reasons 
are immediately apparent: first, regulatory conditions differ 
across countries; second, tax systems also differ; third, com-
petitive advantage, or know-how, may exist. 
1 To take one obvious, and wcll-knuwn example, the Credit Agricole is 
given a monopoly for certain types of banking activities in rural areas 
in return for reduced-cost loans to farmers. Other banks have lung 
complained about this element of unfair competitiveness. Successive 
French Governments have resisted requests to dismantle this system and 
replace it by explicit subsidies to farmers which would raise a host of 
issues ranging from domestic costs to compliance with EC agricultural 
policies. 
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Clearly, one reason why Paris has not emerged as a major 
financial centre is that it has long been subject to a consider-
able number of competition-reducing regulations. This has 
now been officially recognized and the authorities are mov-
ing forcefully to eliminate the most glaring rest,ictions, 
including those affecting foreign exchange transactions. 
Consequently, there is currently no contradiction between 
the EC plan and deregulatory activities in France; quite to 
the contrary they act as mutually reinforcing factors. Yet 
this leaves us with the fact that different countries may find 
different levels of regulation optimal, maybe because of 
inherited traditions, industrial and social structures, etc. 
Therefore, it may well be that competition will be unequal. 
The same issue arises with regard to taxation. We do not 
know how to 'design' an optimal tax system practically, so 
that, even if all countries were alike in some general sense, 
they might well end up with sharply different tax systems. 
This is why opening-up to trade invariably raises issues of 
tax harmonization. 
There are two answers to the problems of tax and regulatory 
harmonization. The first one is that, of course, preliminary 
harmonization is the 'first-best' solution. But one should be 
extremely cautious not to jump to the unimplied conclusion 
that harmonization is a precondition for liberalization. As 
the example of trade liberalization has shown, taxes and 
regulations can and do evolve over time. This actually brings 
about the second remark: national tax and regulations ought 
to be left to compete with each other so that, in time, 
harmonization will emerge as a by-product. Given current 
knowledge, it is impossible to assert that the emerging pat-
tern will be inferior to the one which could be agreed upon 
via preliminary negotiations. On the contrary, it is altogether 
likely that such preliminary negotiations may fail to reach 
an agreement. 
The third and last issue concerns relative competitive advan-
tages and the possibility that some financial centres which 
have long operated under less constrained conditions have 
accumulated a know-how which will enable them to increase 
their market shares as a result of the liberalization process. 
This is precisely the reason why international trade is wel-
fare-improving: it allows the most effective producers to 
deliver the best products at the lowest costs. It is therefore 
not unlikely that London will emerge as a yet more powerful 
financial centre, with smaller 'regional' centres in Paris, 
Frankfurt, Milan, Brussels, etc. catering to more specific 
needs of their local customers. The strong presumption is 
that such a process will be eventually welfare-improving. 
There remain two issues: while the final result of this com-
plex competition between financial agents, as well as between 
90 
national tax and regulatory systems, will be beneficial to the 
EC as a whole, some countries may feel worse off; second, 
a certain number of casualties are likely to occur during the 
transition period. As far as the first point is concerned, it is 
hard to see why a given country should not share in the 
total advantage: simple theorems of trade liberalization as-
sert that each country stands to gain, and there is no a priori 
reason to believe that such a result does not apply in the 
present case. 
The issue of transitory costs is a more serious one. Indeed, 
it is hard to believe that a major increase in competition will 
not drive out a certain number of financial intermediaries, 
some of them of very significant size. In fact, this is part 
and parcel of the benefits from the programme that the least 
effective agents be either eliminated or forced to streamline 
their activities. Given the particular dangers associated with 
bank or financial intermediary failures, the matter ought to 
be taken very seriously. But there is not much more to be 
said about it except that national and community authorities 
should be prepared to exert their function of lenders of last 
resort when prohlems arise. They should do that swiftly and 
resist the temptation to bail out failing agents since this 
would actually negate the whole purpose of the liberalization 
programme. 
In addition, there is a fear that such a process of streamlining 
will result in dismissals, worsening an already bleak unem-
ployment situation. This is also likely to happen, but one 
must recognize, again, that unemployment is not being ad-
equately fought through measures which actually make some 
industries inefficient: there are real costs to such efforts at 
protecting jobs, and concealing them is an expediency which 
has no economic justification. On the contrary, the presump-
tion is that reducing inefficiencies will eventually result in 
job creations, unless the labour market is badly distorted: 
then the distortions must be treated directly. 
2. Monetary and fiscal policies' independence 
under the EMS 
2.1. The simple Mundell-Fleming model 
In this section, I briefly recall the standard results under the 
assumption that the EMS is best approximated as a fixed 
exchange rate system. In the next section, I will depart from 
this assumption. 
First it may be argued that EMS countries actually operate 
in a flexible exchange rate system as their currencies, al-
though fixed to one another, fluctuate vis-a-vis the world 
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major currencies such as the US dollar, the yen, and the 
pound sterling. It would be grossly misleading to conclude 
that the EMS countries thus escape the implications of a 
fixed exchange rate system. Indeed, the crucial constraint of 
a fixed exchange rate system is that the monetary authorities 
are forced to intervene any time their exchange rate falls out 
of line relative to the currencies to which they wish to 
maintain a peg. This constraint does exist within the EMS. 1 
The power of the constraint is not related to the additional 
fact that EMS countries are very strongly tied to each other 
via trade and financial flows while relatively closed vis-a-vis 
the rest of the world. Even if an EMS country was mainly 
trading with, say, the US, the smallest deviation from its 
declared parity would force its authorities to intervene and, 
in the presence of sufficient capital mobility, the pressure of 
a misalignment would be as overwhelming as for any other 
EMS member country. 
Under this condition, the standard result is that, if capital 
is freely mobile, monetary policy independence is lost. The 
well-known mechanism is as follows: any change in monet-
ary policy exerts pressure on the exchange rate which, in 
turn, triggers capital movements. Monetary authorities will 
have to reverse themselves unless they are able and willing 
to spend ( or absorb) a sufficient amount of reserves, while 
at the same time sterilizing in order to maintain their policy 
stand. But it is clear that each intervention provides the 
exchange markets with more ammunition to continue exert-
ing pressure, so that there is no doubt that in the end the 
choice is between abandoning the initial policy change or 
accepting the necessary exchange rate correction, i.e., aban-
doning the existing parity or float. 
Fiscal policy, on the contrary, is quite powerful. Consider, 
for example, an increase in government spending without 
monetary financing, a so-called 'pure' fiscal expansion. As 
it puts an upward pressure on the interest rate, capital flows 
in, which both keeps the interest rate constant and provides 
an indirect financing of the budget deficit, i.e., it avoids 
the offsetting crowding-out effect. Furthermore, the capital 
inflows compensate for the associated current account deficit 
and help maintain the exchange rate parity. 
These results are summarized here as originally stated by 
Mundell and Fleming. Recent extensions, incorporating dy-
namic elements such as cumulated fiscal and current account 
imbalances or (rational) expectations leave the main quali-
tative conclusions unchanged. 2 
1 This constraint is relaxed only when all EMS currencies are identically 
affected by a given disturbance. In practice, this occurs when a major 
currency (e.g. the US dollar) undergoes a fluctuation of its own and 
leaves the intra-EMS parities unaffected, a rather infrequent occurrence. 
For such extensions sec, for example, Sachs and Wyplosz (1984). 
2.2. Reformulation for the EMS 
The EMS differs from the simple textbook version sketched 
above in at least two important respects. First, it explicitly 
allows for realignments; second, it allows for margins of 
fluctuation. As it turns out, these two characteristics do not 
strongly modify the standard conclusions. 
It might appear that these two characteristics would allow 
a country at least some degree of monetary independence 
as the domestic interest rate may depart from rates in other 
EMS countries. But this is mostly an illusion as the interest 
rate completely incorporates the expected rate of fluctuation 
within the band and the eventual rate of change at the time 
of realignment. Consider a country which wishes to run a 
more expansionary monetary policy than its partners. I 
assume that money is neutral in the long run, so that the 
ultimate effect of this shift will simply be a higher steady-
state inflation rate. But I also assume that in the shorter 
run, money may have real effects via reduced nominal long-
term interest rates (and also real rates as expected inflation 
is presumed not to adjust instantaneously) and increased 
level of Tobin's q. Exchange markets will, however, recog-
nize the eventual need to realign because of the long-run 
increase in the inflation rate so that the long-term nominal 
interest rate must rise by the full amount of the expected 
rate of depreciation, which in turn should equal the higher 
rate of inflation (assuming that purchasing power parity 
holds). The upshot is that the real long-term interest rate 
remains unchanged and that monetary policy has no effect, 
except inasmuch as the associated outflow of money in-
creases the total stock of money. and reduces the real rate 
of interest, in the EMS as a whole, which is a function of 
the relative size of the country which has attempted to 
expand. 
The existence of a band of fluctuation does allow some room 
for manoeuvre, but only for those minute changes which do 
not imply that the exchange rate moves out of the allowed 
margins. Furthermore, this can only be exploited in the very 
short run as any attempt to maintain permanently a lower 
rate of interest requires a continuously increased rate of 
money growth, the case discussed in the previous paragraph. 
A last issue is whether less than perfect asset substitutability 
offers any scope for policy independence. This is the stan-
dard presumption in textbook versions of the M undcll-
Fleming model. For countries like those in the EMS, imper-
fect asset substitutability may only arise in two cases: first, 
when significant, recurrent exchange rate changes create 
sufficient exchange risk; second, when capital restrictions, 
or the threat of them. result in a significant political risk as 
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described by Aliber ( 1973). 1 The second channel is the one 
that is to be erased precisely by the proposal under review. 
As for the first one, empirical work 2 on the major developed 
countries has shown that the exchange risk, if it exists, is 
small, highly volatile, not explained by policy actions, and 
therefore not exploitable to achieve monetary indepen-
dence.' 
The conclusion, then, is that the EMS provides policy inde-
pendence in two limited respects: in the very short run for 
infra-band interventions designed to cope with temporary 
disturbances of small magnitude; in the long run to accom-
modate different rates of steady-state inflation. Most impor-
tantly, over the medium run, the horizon relevant for policy-
making, the EMS effectively prevents member countries 
from conducting independent monetary policies. 
However, the value of the long-run monetary independence 
should not be belittled. What it means is that the EMS 
allows member countries to opt for different steady-state 
inflation rates. Such a flexibility is quite important in several 
respects. First, because the costs of reducing intlation have 
proven to be high. Second, because we know little of what 
is the optimum inflation rate so that divergences of objectives 
are likely to remain, particularly as they relate to differences 
in economic structures and historical experiences. Third, 
because it is not clear how these differences can be rec-
onciled, so that it is quite crucial to maintain a system which 
accommodates such divergences, as compared to a system 
which either eliminates them or breaks down. Finally, be-
cause we ought not to be overly influenced by the recent 
past: in the future, real and nominal disturbances will occur, 
and it is clearly illusory to pretend that we can build contin-
gent rules to cope with them which will always be optimal. 
2.3. Fiscal policy : a guarded assessment 
The independence of fiscal policy within the EMS is likely 
to be considerably less than suggested by the simple theory 
sketched above. First, a fiscal policy expansion is only ef-
ficient if it does not leak massively abroad. For very open 
economies, its effectiveness is likely to be so limited that the 
1 Capital restrictions. in addition, prevent full capital mobility. This is 
different from asset substitutability. Capital mobility restrictions do offer 
some degree of independence, a point discussed at length in Section 3. 
See for example Frankel ( 1982) and Hodrick and Srivastava ( 1984). 
J Technically, earlier models relied on a portfolio balance model represen-
tation of imperfect substitutability. Modern finance theory has shown 
this formalization to be misleading. See Frankel ( 1979) and Adler and 
Dumas ( 1983 ). 
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costs (in terms of servicing the public debt as well as the 
external debt created by current account deficits) may well 
be too large relative to the benefits.4 This is certainly the 
case for the smaller European countries such as Belgium or 
the Netherlands, less so for the larger ones. 
There is, however, another important consideration, illus-
trated by the French experiment over 1981-83. 5 If a fiscal 
expansion is to be entirely financed by public borrowings, 
it exerts an upward pressure on interest rates which, in turn, 
triggers a capital inflow. This capital surplus amounts to a 
financing of the budget deficit and offsets the current ac-
count deficit. If the budget deficit is to be financed by 
monetary creation, however, this is tantamount to an at-
tempted accompanying monetary expansion, which has been 
shown to be incompatible with a given EMS parity. Actually, 
given that exchange markets are forward-looking, what mat-
ters is less the government's true intentions about the finan-
cing of its fiscal expansion than the markets' expectations. 
This is the much talked-about credibility issue: if the authori-
ties are not credible, i.e., if the markets expect an eventual 
monetary financing, the fiscal expansion is immediately in-
compatible with the existing EMS parity. There follow capi-
tal outflows, not inflows, which on top of the normal current 
deficit results in an exchange crisis which only stops when 
the fiscal stance is reversed. The conclusion, then, is that 
any fiscal move which puts a member country out of line 
quickly faces the credibility wall. Credibility, in turn, de-
pends on the perceived commitment of the monetary auth-
orities to the existing parity, itself a function of the track 
record of the authorities and of the cost of a realignment. 6 
2.4. Credibility and time consistency 
The notions of credibility and time consistency have received 
considerable attention recently in academic literature. It is 
too early to draw definitive conclusions, and empirical work 
remains to be done to pass judgment on the relevance of 
4 One should mention at this stage the well-known neutrality proposition 
of Barro (I 974), according to which fiscal policy does not have real 
effects because the private sector, foreseeing the future tax implications, 
exactly offsets the government action. This proposition is currently quite 
influential in the United States despite the lack of any empirical support. 
5 This experiment is studied in Fonteneau and Muet (1983) and in Sachs 
and Wyplosz (1986). 
6 Giavazzi and Pagano (I 986) argue that the EMS has so far forced 
realignments which imply a real exchange appreciation as the nominal 
devaluation typically docs not fully compensate for the cumulated in-
flation differential. If true, this mechanism raises the cost of a realignment 
and strengthens devaluation-prone countries' credibilities. Unfortu-
nately, it makes the EMS unsustainable in the longer run, short of a 
complete convergence of inflation rates. 
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these issues. Yet a brief review may be warranted as it proves 
to be an argument in favour of the EMS and of freely 
functioning capital markets. 
These concepts concern policy rules, i.e., a number of guid-
ing principles which stipulate what the authorities are to do 
in given situations. Essentially, a policy rule attempts to 
limit policy actions to a feed-back function, where a limited 
number of variables (e.g. inflation, unemployment, the ex-
change rate, etc.) are enough to fully determine the policy 
instrument setting. A crucial aspect is that once a policy rule 
is defined, it is meant to remain unchanged: in the future, 
the same circumstances will provoke the same policy actions 
as today. Examples of policy rules abound: fixed money 
growth, balanced budgets, cyclically balanced budgets. More 
complex rules can, in principle, be designed. In practice, 
when we estimate the reaction functions of given authorities, 
we implicitly assume that the authorities have been following 
a rule of the type being estimated. 
While rules are rarely observed in practice, they have been 
advocated with increasing intensity over the recent years. 
One reason for this renewed popularity is the disappoint-
ment with the fine tuning of discretionary policies. Another 
reason is related to the rational expectations hypothesis. As 
is now well-known. an implication of rational expectations is 
that 'only surprises matter', so that conducting discretionary 
policies boils down to engineering unexpected, therefore 
fundamentally stochastic, policy actions. This is not the 
place to review one of the liveliest debates of the last decade: 
what matters here is that policy rules have been described 
as a way to forego policies which may be ineffective, yet a 
source of uncertainty. 
As is often the case, things are more difficult than they 
appear. Much recent work has shown that even policy rules 
are troublesome. At a given moment a well-meaning govern-
ment may design an optimal policy rule. This rule is optimal 
in the sense that, if carried forever thereafter, it will deliver 
the highest possible welfare in a present value sense. 1 The 
difficulty arises when we wonder what will the optimal policy 
look like some time further in the future. If the policy 
rule has been wisely chosen, surely the situation will have 
improved by then. In general it will not be the case that the 
'old' policy rule is still the best. When this happens, the 
policy rule is said to be 'time-inconsistent' 
1 Put another way, the government acts like a firm which optimizes its 
present value. The firm has a clear objective: its profitability. The 
government is supposed to have identified its own objectives, for example 
a weighted average of inflation and unemployment targets, with increas-
ing costs as the outcomes deviate further from the targets. 
An example may prove useful. Consider a central bank 
which cares about both inflation and unemployment, but 
starts from a situation of unacceptably high inflation. It will 
want to announce a low rate of money growth. The public 
understands that a low rate of money growth implies a 
correspondingly low rate of inflation, but is not certain that 
the central bank will stick to its guns. It is therefore optimal 
for the public to assume a non-zero probability of slippage, 
and to raise prices faster than implied by the announced 
policy rule. Knowing that, the central bank will want to let 
money grow even more slowly: it adopts an over-contrac-
tionary policy, and this policy is optimal both for the auth-
orities and the public. Later on, when inflation has abated, 
such an over-contractionary stance does not make sense 
anymore. Both the central bank and the private sector will 
have an interest in shifting to an easier monetary policy. 
What was once optimal is not so any more: the rule is time-
inconsistent. 
Are all policy rules necessarily time-inconsistent? In general, 
it is possible to design time-consistent policies, i.e., rules 
which once set by the government, will be adhered to, not 
merely because the government has promised to do so, but 
because it is, and will be, in its best interest. This can be 
done simply by ruling out time-inconsistent policies, i.e., by 
restricting the authorities to choosing the next best policy 
rule which will always be optimal. 
The main result here is that an optimal time-inconsistent 
policy is often superior, after proper discounting, to an 
optimal time-consistent one. The reason is quite intuitive: a 
time-consistent policy is chosen by imposing the restriction 
of not choosing a time-inconsistent one. In the previous 
example, the central bank may adopt a less restrictive policy, 
which will bring inflation down more slowly: overall, the 
economy is less well-off over time, and this is the cost of 
adopting the time-consistent rule. 
In general, therefore, both the authorities and the public 
would prefer to see time-inconsistent policies adopted. How-
ever, this is normally impossible without further arrange-
ments. Indeed, if the policy is known to be time-inconsistent, 
the public will anticipate its eventual abandonment and act 
accordingly: the policy ceases to be optimal. In our example, 
sensing that monetary policy will be relaxed, the public will 
not settle for the same sharp deflation that it would accept 
if it believed in the permanence of the over-contractionary 
stance: the economy gets more inflation and more unem-
ployment. 
The question then is to devise arrangements which will 
guarantee that the optimal, time-inconsistent policy will be 
adhered to in the future, even if at some point it will be 
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prolitahle to abandon it. The best possible solution is for 
the government to credibly precommit itself never to change 
the policy in the future, even if it would be in its best interest 
to do so some time later. This is what lies behind proposals 
to limit the range of options open to any government (such 
as a constitutionally fixed money growth rule). Short of 
institutional changes, the desirability of precommitments 
takes practically the form of credihility. An authority is 
credible when the public believes that it will stick to its 
announced policy rule, even if the rule is time-inconsistent. 
Thus credibility is seen as an important asset worth investing 
Ill. 
The applicability of these concepts is wide. It has received 
attention in the areas of budgetary and monetary policies. 
A natural application is exchange rate policy. When the 
monetary authorities care about exchange rate stability, it 
would he useful for them to be credible in the exchange 
market. that an announced precommitment to maintain a 
given parity be unquestioned. One way of attempting to do 
that. of course, is to enter into a fixed exchange rate system 
or, even better, to join a monetary union. It the authorities 
further pursue a disinflationary policy there is a potential 
added advantage of such arrangements. This will occur when 
the system, or the union. is dominated by a country, or a 
set of countries, whose government has achieved credibility 
as an inflation-lighter. In that case, the exchange rate pre-
commitment is also a commitment to follow monetary poli-
cies consistent with those pursued by the credible authority. 
In particular, it is often asserted that France, and other 
countries also, mainly benefit from the EMS because they 
'buy' the undisputed credibility of the Bundesbank. 
Can one look at the EMS as a precommitment? Clearly not 
as long as realignments occur frequently and easily. In the 
next section. however, I shall argue that capital controls 
make realignments easy to operate and actually are necessary 
for the survival of a system of fixed but periodically adjusted 
exchanges rates. This view suggests that the complete re-
moval of capital controls would make realignments hard 
to organize. This. in turn. leads some to believe that full 
liberalization of capital movements will transform the EMS 
in a precommitment and thus allow superior time-inconsist-
ent policies to be credible. 
There is a problem with this line of argument though: it 
practically relies on one country (the Federal Republic of 
Germany) to be wise enough to provide the fundamental 
policy rule which ties everybody's hands. It remains to 
be proved. however. that such a rule, even if optimal for 
Germany. also serves the best interest of the other EMS 
countries. Yet it is entirely conceivable that the other 
countries. while interested in 'buying' Germany's credibility, 
would like Germany to adopt a different rule: there is a 
94 
genuine trade-off between the gains from borrowed credi-
bility and the constraint imposed by so tying one's hands. 
Of course, the same eventually occurs at each country's level 
and this is but a reflection of the time-inconsistency problem. 
What is not explained is why the external constraint is better 
suited to bring credibility than domestic ones (presumably, 
here we shift to considerations of political economy). Also, 
the trade-off raises an interesting, but so far unsolved, coor-
dination issue: as countries negotiate over what credible rule 
Germany should adopt, is the coordinated outcome with 
credible time-inconsistent policies preferable for them to the 
uncoordinated outcome with time-consistent policies? In my 
view, there is no presumption that this is always the case. 
In plain language, it remains to be proved that France, and 
other EMS member countries always benefit from accepting 
Germany's leadership and borrowing the Bundesbank's 
credibility, rather than adopting their own (time-consistent, 
hence inferior) policies. It is unclear also whether Germany 
benefits from exerting such a leadership. 
Summarizing the arguments, this section has suggested that 
one benefit of capital flows liberalization is to strengthen 
the discipline aspect of the EMS by making realignments 
impractical. The evidence from the experience so far suggests 
that Germany's leadership would be reinforced, the other 
member countries accepting it as the price for buying the 
Bundesbank's credibility. This view is one interesting possi-
bility, but only a possibility. Its theoretical foundations have 
not been fully worked out and its empirical basis is, so 
far. inexistent. Going for a full-scale, real-life test is not 
innocuous because of the risks that would be imposed on 
the EMS and which are discussed explicitly in the following 
section. 
3. The central dilemma: EMS or liberalization? 
3.1. The role of capital controls 
Efficient controls allow domestic interest rates to differ from 
those in the other EMS countries; this is the procedure 
referred to in France as deconnexion. If they were perfectly 
tight, such restrictions would restore full freedom to monet-
ary policy even in a system like the EMS. For example, 
should a country decide to expand its rate of money growth 
and reduce its interest rate, capital controls would prevent 
the otherwise normal response of financial markets: an 
outflow of capital seeking better yields abroad, which results 
in loss of exchange reserves and an eventual offset of the 
monetary expansion. In reality, for convertible currencies. 
controls can never be tight enough to deliver such a strong 
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effect. It is interesting to briefly summarize the French 
experience, as capital movement restrictions have been the 
rule for most of the postwar period. 1 Indeed, over the 
years, the French monetary authorities have built up an 
increasingly efficient administration to enforce capital con-
trols. 
For a long period of time, and with few exceptions, France 
has been a devaluation-prone country with a keen interest in 
limiting exchange rate fluctuations. It has been devaluation-
prone because monetary policy has been mainly concerned 
with growth objectives via low real interest rates. However, 
the simultaneous concern with exchange rate stability would 
have required relatively high nominal interest rates so as to 
compensate for the expected rate of depreciation. Caught in 
this dilemma, it seemed only natural, then, to resort to 
capital controls to reconcile both objectives locking in na-
tional savings. Consequently, the restrictions have been de-
signed to limit capital outflows. 
The restrictions have been in place for most of the post-war 
period. They weie lifted first between January 1967 and late 
May 1968. This period had been dominated by the weakness 
of sterling and the US dollar, so that the French franc was 
seen as a relatively strong currency and could sustain low 
interest rates. The political events of May 1968 instan-
taneously reversed the situation and led to a reinstatement 
of severe controls. When the pressure eased in September of 
the same year, controls were lifted again. By then, however, 
inflation was on the upswing following the accords de 
Grenelle (large wage concessions), so that a devaluation was 
perceived as unavoidable. A tide of speculative attacks rose 
in November. Capital controls were quickly put back in 
place, yet were only able to push back the eventual devalu-
ation until August 1969. The situation changed progressively 
thereafter. The US dollar gradually emerged as the weakest 
currency. Consequently, French capital controls were gradu-
ally dismantled for the third time, and actual briefly shifted 
towards the prevention of inflows. It was during this period 
that France experimented with a two-tier market, from 21 
August 1971 (in the aftermath of the decision by President 
Nixon to free the US from their obligation to convert offi-
cially-held dollars into gold) to 24 March 1974. By then the 
first oil shock had struck and moved the franc to its more 
usual status of weak currency and, after it was forced to 
leave the snake arrangement in January of that year, capital 
controls designed to repeal ouflows were restored. With 
varying degrees of severity (see next sedion), they remained 
in force until a gradual lifting started in 1985. 
1 For detailed studies of the French experience, sec Mathis ( 1981 ), Claassen 
and Wyplosz (1982), Neme (1986) and Loubcrgc and Van Tie! (1986). 
The fact that controls have been occasionally lifted should 
be surprising for two reasons. First, there have been in-
stances where the French franc was not under stress: this 
happened because other currencies were then in the front 
line (the dollar, sterling, and often the Italian lira too). 2 
Second, and quite importantly, even when the franc assumes 
a weak currency status, speculative pressures need not apply 
permanently. Indeed, the record shows that, most of the 
time, capital controls are not 'biting': domestic interest 
rates are larger than abroad (in a proper average sense), 
incorporating the expectation of a depreciation. As the ex-
pected time of the devaluation is remote, however, the differ-
ence is small. When the probability that a depreciation will 
occur in the near future rises, so do the expected gains of 
moving out of francs: a speculative attack gains momentum 
and would, in the absence of controls, require a correspond-
ing increase in interest rates, which is what the monetary 
authorities want to avoid. This is when controls bite. 
A speculative attack works along two main lines: first, direct 
capital outflows, as residents wish to sell domestic assets 
and acquire foreign ones, and non-residents wish to acquire 
franc-denominated liabilities; second, leads and lags, as 
French exporters delay the repatriation of foreign earnings 
and foreign importers similarly delay payments of franc-
denominated invoices. This is why the crucial components 
of capital controls prevent: (i) acquisition of foreign assets 
by French residents; (ii) borrowings (acquisition of franc 
liabilities) by non-residents; (iii) leads and lags. 
The speculative attack is highly visible on off-shore markets: 
Euro-franc interest rates rise and become disconnected from 
internal rates.3 Arbitrage between these markets is prevented 
from operating efficiently. In normal periods, i.e., in the 
absence of an impending depreciation, there are enough 
loopholes to generate a sufficient flow of funds to ensure 
approximate equality between Euro and domestic rates. In 
a crisis period, these loopholes are not wide enough to allow 
full arbitraging; capital controls 'bite', not because they are 
tight, but because they put an upper boundary on the volume 
of capital movements per unit of time. If the crisis lasts, the 
capital movements gradually fill in the gap, and put an 
increasing pressure on domestic rates as can be seen in 
Graph I. 
It must be noted that when speculation against other currencies tended 
to push the franc upward. as in 1970-73, controls were brought back in 
force, but of course were put to work in the opposite direction. 
l The ability to shield domestic rates from Euro-rates is a function of the 
effectiveness of capital controls and of the length of time during which 
the pressure is on. The authorities can. to some limited extent. choose 
to react to an attack by a combination of controls and increases in the 
domestic rates. 
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GRAPH I: Domestic and Euro-market interest rates (1-
montb inter-bank rates on French francs -
Weekly data) 
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The conclusion is that capital controls are only useful during 
crisis periods, and only if these periods do not last too long. 
(As can be seen in Figure 1, during much of 1981 and 1982 
French authorities have had to partly give in, allowing 
domestic rates to rise towards the Euro-rates) . During tran-
quil periods, all that is left is the political risk component, 
admittedly small and generating some degree of imperfect 
substitutability. Yet, as noted in Section 2, this is not a 
factor which can be exploited systematically to regain much 
policy independence. At the same time, it is a source of 
inferior allocation of resources. 
3.2. Main proposition 
It would be highly unjustified to conclude from the preceding 
section that capital controls are generally useless and actu-
ally harmful. What is suggested by these considerations is 
that the role of capital controls can only be understood in 
the context of exchange rate crises. The theory of crises 
of the balance of payments has been developed recently 
following the seminal work of Krugman (1979).1 For the 
1 Some references useful for this discussion are Obstfeld ( 1984), Flood and 
Garber (1984) and Wyplosz (1986). 
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present purposes, the main result which emerges from this 
literature is that a fixed exchange regime is bound to collapse 
in a crisis if the underlying monetary policy is incompatible 
with the existing parity. This is a very strong statement, 
especially worrisome as far as the EMS is concerned since 
it states that the EMS can only survive if monetary policies 
are fully coordinated, to the point where inflation rates are 
identical in all member countries. 
The reasoning behind this result is as follows. A lasting 
inflation differential between two countries linked by a fixed 
exchange rate is gradually eroding the competitiveness of 
the country with the higher inflation rate. So, sooner or later 
its current account is turning into a deficit which, for a given 
capital account, implies an eventual overall deficit for the 
balance of payments. As the monetary authorities intervene 
to defend the existing parity, exchange reserves are being 
depleted. This process mut continue until complete exhaus-
tion of reserves unless monetary policy is altered in such a 
way that the external price competitiveness is restored. With 
efficient markets, operators cannot fail to understand that 
when reserves will have been exhausted (and reserves may 
well include credit facilities obtainable from other countries 
as is the case within the EMS) the monetary authorities will 
not be able to peg their exchange rate any more, so that an 
eventual depreciation is a certainty. Under these conditions, 
before exchange reserves are exhausted, a crisis will occur: 
operators will sell short the domestic currency in order to 
benefit from the depreciation, which on impact yields an 
infinite rate of return, and the depreciation will occur instan-
taneously as reserves will be fully lost as a consequence of 
the crisis. Thus, attacking the currency is a sure bet, so that 
the volume of speculative capital is virtually unbounded and 
the monetary authorities have no way out. The essential 
pont is that reserves will have been entirely exhausted at the 
time of the attack, and can only be rebuilt gradually through 
cumulated current account surpluses. Consequently, for 
some time after the attack, the exchange rate will have to 
float as the monetary authorities will not have any reserves 
to back up a declared parity. 
How then is it possible to reconcile this strong result and 
the fact that the EMS has already survived numerous bouts 
of speculative attacks? Two explanations have been offered. 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1985) show that if domestic interest 
rates are allowed to rise sufficiently to make up for the 
eventual capital loss associated with a depreciation, and 
provided there is some uncertainty about the exact timing 
of the parity change, the crisis may be thwarted. This is so 
because the interest parity condition, inclusive of the ex-
pected rate of depreciation, is maintained so that no capital 
outflow need take place. Consequently, all that the monetary 
authorities need to do is to raise the interest rate and choose 
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the time of the devaluation some time before exchange 
reserves will have been depleted through the current account 
deficit. The problem with this strategy is that in the prede-
valuation period monetary independence is lost and, more 
importantly, the required increase in the interest rate may 
be considerable. Indeed, in order to maintain the interest 
parity condition, what must be taken into account is the 
expected rate of depreciation adjusted for the time horizon: 
for example, a 10 % depreciation expected to occur one 
week ahead requires an interest rate increase of 520 percent-
age points (per annum). While this is technically feasible, it 
is quite unlikely that monetary authorities would accept 
such movements in their short-term interest rates, if only 
because they worry about the implications for stock prices, 
with attendant risks of massive capital losses. One way of 
making this strategy more acceptable is to increase the level 
of uncertainty, both about the timing of the devaluation and 
the exact level of exchange reserves: the more diffuse the 
market's expectations, the lower the required rate of interest 
can be at any moment in time. Indeed, we know that monet-
ary authorities do attempt to introduce a high degree of 
uncertainty during crisis periods. 
The other explanation, presented in Wyplosz (1986), relies 
on the existence of capital controls in virtually all devaluing 
countries of the EMS. The discussion in Section 3.1 of how 
capital controls operate has already shown that they only 
matter in times of crisis, and that they work by limiting the 
amount of speculative capital which can be put to work 
during a given period. If this upper boundary is less than 
the exchange reserves available to the monetary authorities, 
it is immediately clear that reserves will not be entirely 
exhausted by the attack, thus providing the authorities with 
some degree of freedom to choose the timing of the devalu-
ation, as well as leaving them with sufficient ammunition to 
back the post-devaluation parity. 
Summarizing so far, it appears that a fixed exchange rate 
system with less than full coordination of monetary policies 
can only survive if one of the two following conditions are 
satisfied: either the monetary authorities are prepared to 
raise the interest rate so as to maintain the parity condition, 
or else they must resort to capital controls. Currently we do 
not have formal evidence as to which of the two explanations 
has been operative in allowing the EMS to survive. More 
casual evidence, as in Figure I for example, points to the 
assessment by Rogoff (1984) and others that capital controls 
have been playing the key role. If this true, then it is possible 
to state the following proposition: 
Of the three following conditions, two, and at most two, are 
compatible with each other: 
(i) a fixed exchange rate sytem (such as the EMS); 
(ii) full capital mobility, i.e., no capital controls; 
(iii) long-run monetary independence, i.e., different steady-
state inflation rates. 
For our purposes, the implication of this proposition is that 
the elimination of all restrictions to capital movements will 
lead to a breakdown of the EMS if monetary policies do not 
fully converge. Alternatively, one could say that a natural 
consequence of the proposed liberalization is a complete 
coordination of monetary policies within the EMS, to the 
point of being indistinguishable from a full monetary union. 
Given the foreseeable difficulties of establishing a monetary 
union, we must therefore weigh the costs and benefits of the 
two alternatives, and this is the object of the next two 
subsections. 
3.3. The case for the EMS 
If it is true that the proposed liberalization requires such an 
extreme form of loss of monetary independence that even 
the steady-state inflation rates must be equalized so as to 
rule out any realignment, 1 one must make the case that the 
EMS is highly desirable. It is generally agreed that one of 
the main advantages of the EMS has been the stabilization 
of relative prices. This comes against the background of 
numerous empirical studies which have failed to detect any 
significant adverse effect on the volume of international 
trade of exchange rate fluctuations. 
It must be then that the main benefit of exchange rate 
stability stems from the possibility that relative price fluctu-
ations trigger costly reallocation of resources, for example 
between the traded and the non-traded goods sectors. In-
deed, the recent experience in the United States, illustrated 
by the rise of the protectionist tide, indicates that this may 
be a real problem. Similarly, there is now mounting evidence 
that a similar process of resource reallocation may be under 
way in Japan. What makes this process costly is that factors 
of production are industry-specific, in fact often firm-spec-
ific. Consequently, capital which is being scrapped some-
where is lost, and is unlikely to be put back into operation 
when the relative price change is reversed. Similarly, human 
capital may also be dissipated as workers go through retrain-
ing, particularly if they move in search of new job oppor-
tunities. 
I This leaves out other reasons why a realignment might be necessary since 
the implicit argument is that PPP is the normal equilibrium situation. 
Permanent deviations from PPP are needed if the EMS countries undergo 
real asymmetric disturbances. Within a monetary union, such adjust-
ments may be dealt with with fiscal policy actions such as labour taxes 
(if the disturbance is an increase in labour costs), corporate taxes (if the 
disturbance affects firms· profitability). or particular subsidies. 
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It may well be then that, given the large degree of openness 
between EMS countries, the EMS fulfils an important func-
tion, one which is desirable enough to warrant sacrifices 
elsewhere. The proposition of Section 3.2 means that either 
monetary independence ought to be given up or else that 
some restriction to capital movements should be maintained. 
Indeed these two alternatives are discussed in the concluding 
section. 
3.4. The case for liberalization of capital movements 
As amply discussed in Section I above, it is quite hard to 
find valid arguments against the liberalization proposition. 
With due account to the fact that such a process should 
imply non-negligible transitory costs, it remains that its 
permanent effects cannot fail to be positive. What is not 
known, and impossible to measure ex ante (and also prob-
ably ex post), is the magnitude of these beneficial effects. 
We simply do not know enough about the distortionary 
effects of capital controls. 1 
The only, and quite casual, observation that I could venture 
at this stage is the following. France is a country which, 
during most of the post-war period, has lived not only 
under capital controls but also under an amazing variety of 
regulations that, most economists would agree, are quite 
detrimental to an effective allocation of resources: credit 
controls and, more generally, a very regulated banking and 
financial system; price controls; subsidies to corporations 
and individuals etc. These inefficiencies notwithstanding, 
France is one of the European countries which has experi-
enced the fastest growth rate. The best contrast is with its 
neighbour. Switzerland, a country known for its commit-
ment not to regulate markets unless absolutely necessary, 
particularly as far as financial markets are considered. 2 
Table I compares the growth rates of France and Switzer-
land since I 950. Whether measured in absolute terms (real 
GDP), or on a per capita basis, there is no doubt that France 
has outperformed Switzerland by a wide margin: between 
1950 and 1985, GDP per capita has been multiplied more 
than three times in France and only by a factor slightly 
above two in Switzerland. 
1 For an attempt to measure them indirectly, see Claassen and Wyplosz 
(1982). 
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It is true that Switzerland has not been so shy in tampering with goods 
markets, in particular various protections from free trade. But apart 
from this, Switzerland has only briefly resorted to capital controls, does 
not have price controls, and the Bank of Switzerland is known to be one 
of the most free-market oriented. An excellent overview of the Swiss 
economy can be found in Dan thine and Lambelet ( 1987). 
Table 1 
Growth performance between 1950 and 1985 
France 
Real GDP (level of 1985/level of 1950) 4,27 
Real GDP per capita (level of 1985/ 
level of 1950) 3,23 
Real GDP (level of 1985/level of 1970) 1.51 
Real GDP per capita (level of 1985/ 
level of 1970) 1,40 
Source: lnternurionul Fm,.mciai Statistics Yt'arhook, 1986. 
Switzerland 
3,00 
2,19 
1,20 
1,15 
Obviously. comparisons of this sort require considerable 
caution, and initial conditions do matter. In particular, the 
reconstruction effort in France immediately after World 
War II required an altogether different growth rate. This is 
why I also present data for the period 1970-85. If indeed the 
main reason lying behind the superior French performance 
is the post-war catch-up effect, it must be that this effect, as 
still operating some 40 years after the end of the war, is 
larger than the efficiency costs of restrictions on market 
forces. What this admittedly crude evidence indicates is 
that the benefits from financial liberalization may well be 
overestimated at this juncture. It may be, however, that the 
benefits mostly lay elsewhere, namely in the pressure for 
coordination. 
4. Conclusion : three options 
The central proposition asserted in Section 3.2 claims that we 
cannot simultaneously have a system of fixed and adjustable 
exchange rates like the EMS, long-run monetary indepen-
dence allowing for different steady-state inflation rates, and 
completely free trade in assets. The implication is that we 
have to choose which of these three desirable properties has 
to be abandoned in order to retain the other two. A reason-
able position is that the EMS performs a useful role in 
stabilizing relative prices throughout Europe and that the 
benefits it thus delivers in terms of allocation of resources 
are not trivial; that the liberalization of capital movements 
must be welfare-improving, in the long run at least, but 
that the benefits are likely to be limited; and that a total 
convergence of monetary policies is not necessarily superior 
(in the sense of Pareto) to some degree of long-run indepen-
dence, given both the costs of deflation and the difficulties 
of reaching a fully coordinated agreement. Consequently, 
this concluding section takes the view that the EMS ought 
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to be preserved. The remaining choice is between long-run 
monetary independence with some limits to capital move-
ments and liberalization of trade in assets accompanied by 
a modification of the current EMS arrangements. 
4.1. Option number one: coordinated safeguards 
This option considers that the benefits from the EMS are 
paramount and that the EMS should not be jeopardized by 
an overly ambitious liberalization programme. It explicitly 
assumes that full convergence of inflation rates among mem-
ber countries, to the point where realignments would be 
unnecessary, while external imbalances created by real dis-
turbances would be taken care of by fiscal policy measures, 
is either undesirable or unattainable for political reasons. 
Under these conditions, we remain in the present system, 
with occasional realignments required to return to PPP. The 
theory of crises of the balance of payments suggests that 
some restrictions to capital movements ought to be main-
tained. But the experience with capital controls shows that 
such restrictions are only useful, and needed, in times of 
crises. The implication is that the liberalization programme 
ought to be considered seriously but should explicitly include 
safeguard clauses to be put into effect when widely expected 
realignments trigger speculative crises. The rest of this sub-
section considers the principles which could guide the design 
of such safeguard clauses. 
4.1.1. Temporary restrictions 
Because capital controls are only needed sporadically to cope 
with short-term capital movements while their continued 
existence is detrimental to the allocation of long-term capi-
tal, it is logical to consider restrictions which may be put in 
place quickly, and lifted once the situation has been cleared 
up. 
During crisis periods, what is needed is the ability to limit 
the volume of speculative capital below the level of reserves 
available to each EMS country, including the automatic 
borrowings currently part of the system. I When such a crisis 
erupts, a country expected to devalue is under considerably 
higher pressure than a country expected to revalue so that 
controls are more crucial to the first country. Yet, should 
controls be applied at both ends, they would need to be less 
severe in the devaluing country, another illustration of the 
1 This means that increasing the volume of these available borrowings 
reduces the severity of the needed capital controls. This observation is 
at the root of proposition number four below. 
general proposition that coordination is welfare-improving. 
Safeguard clauses should be therefore symmetric, and trig-
gered simultaneously by all EMS member countries. 2 
The desired limit to speculative capital movements is to be 
understood per unit of time. The longer the crisis lasts, the 
more controls must be tightened up, and the more it becomes 
worthwhile to circumvent them, whiie their administrative 
and allocative costs rise. Consequently, it is in everyone's 
best interest to agree quickly to a credible realignment, i.e., 
a realignment of sufficient magnitude to restore the system's 
stability.3 This can be encouraged by limiting the duration 
of allowed capital controls, especially if they are indeed 
symmetric as suggested in the previous paragraph, so that 
the pressure to realign will bear upon all EMS member 
countries. 
The time dimension also has implications on which trans-
actions should be concerned by the safeguard clauses. Typi-
cally, speculation proceeds along two main channels: leads 
and lags on commercial transactions, and outright capital 
movements including position-taking in the forward market. 
Leads and lags are necessarily bound by the volume of trade, 
so that with proper reserves and a prompt realignment, they 
need not be subject to restrictions. This is quite desirable 
given the importance of shielding the real sector, hence 
international trade, from financial disruptions. 
A related implication is that long-term capital, the one 
crucial for allocation of resources and unlikely to move 
forcefully because of a crisis, should also be, as much as 
possible, outside the scope of restrictions. This leaves us 
with the need to restrict temporarily short-term capital 
movements and the problem of how to do it. The general 
principle is that acting through prices is bs distortionary 
than quantitative limitations, so that temporary taxes. if 
feasible, represent the best course of action. An example is 
to tax short-term capital flows out of devaluing countries as 
well as into revaluing countries. This can be done by taxing 
all outflows with a clause guaranteeing reimbursement of 
the tax, inclusive of an interest service, if the capital is not 
repatriated within a given period (say, at least a year). 
Similarly, inflows could be taxed if put in liquid assets. 
As part of the capital leaving the devaluing country goes to non-EMS 
countries, unlikely to agree to a symmetric scheme. it remains likely that 
a devaluing country will face more pressure than a revaluing country. 
3 The conditions for a realignment to be credible arc formally stated in 
Wyplosz ( 1986). 
99 
Creation of a European financial area 
4.1.2. T1rn-ticr exchanf;c market 
A two-tier exchange market, which treats separately com-
mercial transactions, at a pegged rate, and financial trans-
actions, at a freely floating rate, is quite appealing. It ach-
ieves three desirable objectives: first, it completely shields 
international trade, and this can be done efficiently if the 
crisis is of limited duration for the reasons presented above 
in Subsection 4.1. l; second, it relics on non-quantitative 
restrictions: third, if adopted by all EMS member countries 
simultaneously, it offers nice symmetry properties. 
The main problem is that it typically requires some adminis-
trative investment. Consequently it is not well suited to be 
used in an on-off fashion. On the other side, if it is a 
permanent feature, incentives to circumvent it by investing 
in adequate schemes grow, so that it may require supplemen-
tary quantitative measures, as found in the Belgian case. 1 
A cost-benefit analysis of such a system is beyond the scope 
of this report. A priori it appears as an interesting system 
which ought to be considered seriously. In particular, it 
could be a permanent one, 'biting' only in crisis periods. It 
is hoped that past experiences with two-tier exchange mar-
kets will offer a better view of their advantages and limi-
tations. 
4.2. Option number two: a monetary union 
A monetary union is a natural implication of the proposed 
liberalization of capital movements within the EMS. As 
already explained, realignments with full capital mobility 
constitute a major risk for the EMS. In order to remove the 
likelihood of realignments, EMS countries would have to 
quickly reach identical inflation rates, which requires full 
coordination of monetary policies. 
With independent monetary authorities, such a coordination 
is hard to put in place. Indeed, within a fixed exchange rate 
zone consisting of n countries, there exists only n-1 degrees 
of freedom as money growth in each country will be the 
weighted average of money growths in all member countries. 
The well-known Bretton-Woods response to this difficulty 
was to put one country formally in a central position. This 
is, of course, possible in the case of the EMS, but obvious 
political considerations (as well as the issue of seigniorage, 
a real issue, although of limited quantitative importance) 
are likely to make it a non-starter. 
1 The French experience has not been much studied. As noted above in 
Section 3.1, it was used for a relatively brief period, at a time when the 
franc was 'strong', and simultaneously with quantitative restrictions. 
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In the absence of a nth country solution, the cooperation 
game resembles the familiar 'battle of the sexes' example of 
game theory." Each country has a preference for a given 
money growth rate, yet in the end (in the absence of realign-
ments) it will achieve the average growth rate of the zone. 
Hence a tendency to 'overdo it', in a futile attempt to move 
the average towards one's preferred direction, and a non-
negligible risk of total breakdown if realignments become 
unavoidable. As a consequence, such a system is likely to 
be very unstable. 
On the other hand, once It IS recognized that monetary 
independence is lost, even in the long-run sense developed 
in Section 2.2 above. why not go all the way to a monetary 
union, with a single central bank internalizing all the exter-
nalities which make the cooperative solution so hard to 
achieve? This solution raises delicate political difficulties 
which might make it appear beyond reach. Yet the following 
considerations, necessarily superficial, are offered to prompt 
further discussion of a too easily dismissed solution. 
The traditional economic argument against a monetary 
union is that it forces member countries to absorb real, 
asymmetric disturbances through adjustments which may be 
costlier than a realignment. In particular, such disturbances 
often require a reallocation of factors of production, possibly 
across borders. When it comes to labour, it is immediately 
obvious that in a multinational system, with severe differ-
ences in terms of languages, social and cultural habits, the 
fixed costs are overwhelming. This is why a monetary union 
requires an elaborate system of regional policies, for which 
the common agricultural policies offer a very unappealing 
blueprint. 
Further thinking of what can be done with national fiscal 
policies suggests that the system has much to recommend it. 
Indeed, it may be asserted that there is hardly anything 
which is achieved through exchange rate changes that cannot 
be done through fiscal policy measures. 3 For example, an 
asymmetric increase in labour costs can be dealt with by a 
reduction in labour taxes. Or a loss of competitiveness be-
cause of lagging investment in more advanced technologies 
can be taken care of by adequate subsidies. The list of 
examples is limitless but the main idea should be clear: 
exchange rate changes work by modifying relative prices, 
which can be achieved instead by modifying relative costs 
of production. The main problem with such a scheme is the 
2 This issue is discussed by Hamada ( 1985). 
3 Arguments along these lines are presented in Cohen, Melitz and Oudiz 
(1987). 
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danger of developing a fiscal system which in time becomes 
overly complex and also subject to too many pressures from 
interest groups. The easy answer is that fiscal systems will 
end up competing with each other (as long as no attempt is 
made to coordinate them, as with the CAP), so that the 
most distorted ones will either be readjusted or bring about 
disaster. 
4.3. Option number three: a softer EMS 
Repeatedly in this report, the argument has been made that 
perfect capital mobility may deliver a fatal blow to the EMS 
at the time of a realignment. This argument, rooted in the 
theory of balance of payments crises, is entirely based on 
the idea that a discrete jump in the exchange rate cannot be 
anticipated by free, well-functioning, exchange markets: the 
markets will anticipate it and beat it in a speculative attack. 
The main proposition presented in Section 3.2 drew the 
implications of this analysis by ruling out either free capital 
mobility, or realignments, or the EMS. There remains two 
attractive possihilities which are presented in this section 
and the following one. 
The first possibility is to guarantee that realignments do not 
involve discrete jumps. This can be achieved under one 
condition, namely that the change in the central parity of 
any currency be smaller than the width of its allowed margin 
of fluctuation. Under such conditions, the exchange rate 
would move within the band and will not jump at the time 
of the realignment, it will simply keep moving within the 
new band. The reason is that markets will expect that the 
realignment does not require a jump. Accordingly, when 
they expect a realignment to occur, they will position the 
exchange rate at the expected post-realignment rate, which 
by construction, will be within the pre-realignment band. 
Practically, this requires either or both of two alterations to 
the current working of the EMS. One alteration is to increase 
the size of the band. The other alteration is to formally agree 
that realignments cannot exceed the width of the band, 
which means that they occur more frequently, ceteris paribus. 
Both changes may be made simultaneously, the frequency 
of realignments being inversely proportional to the size of 
the band. 
Of course, such a modification weakens the EMS which, on 
the surface of it, draws some praise from its ability to reduce 
the frequency of realignments. As discussed earlier, there is 
no empirical evidence that the EMS has reduced the varia-
bility of exchange rates: the benefits come in the form of 
more predictable rates (De Grauwe et Verfaille ( 1987), Ro-
goff ( 1984)), a feature likely to survive the alteration under 
discussion. More importantly, as noted above, the EMS has 
so far avoided significant intra-European misalignments. 
That feature, too, would be preserved.' 
4.4. Option number four: a stronger EMS 
The conclusion that a fixed exchange rate regime collapses 
at the time of a speculative attack is predicated upon the 
argument that the exchange reserves of the country whose 
currency is under attack will be exhausted. It must be noted, 
however, that the maximum amount of speculative capital 
which can be used to exhaust reserves is bounded by the 
size of the country's money base. Indeed, speculators must 
first acquire the domestic currency before unloading it on 
the exchange markets. What can effectively be mobilized, 
then, is the money base, leaving of course the possibility 
that the commercial banks face a run as their reserve ratios 
get dangerously close to zero. As will be argued, though, 
this should not happen. 
The difference between the money base and the official 
exchange reserves is, of course, the domestic credit com-
ponent of the base. Option number four is to set up a system 
of automatic loans among monetary authorities which would 
guarantee to each central bank automatic and immediate 
access to other countries' currencies in excess of the domestic 
credit component of the money base. Under such an arrange-
ment, it is known to all would-be speculators that the monet-
ary authorities have access to a volume of foreign reserves 
larger than their domestic currency liabilities: an attack is 
bound to be defeated and becomes pointless. And because 
it is a one-way bet that the speculators are sure to lose, the 
attack will not occur. Nor will there be any associated run 
on banks. 
Similar automatic credit lines are already a part of the EMS 
arrangement. The crucial point, however, is that they fall 
considerably short of the amounts required to thwart specu-
lative attacks. What is envisioned here is not, therefore, a 
formal transformation of the EMS as it now stands. Of 
course, it implies credit lines of huge amounts by current 
standards, and the conditions of such arrangements (term, 
rates, currencies, etc.) need to be carefully thought out. But 
for those who are not enthusiastic about the three other 
alternatives, and still wish to go ahead with the liberalization 
programme without putting the EMS in jeopardy, this op-
tion deserves careful appraisal. 
1 An appealing aspect of this proposal is that it would go some way 
towards meeting the British requests for joining the EMS (see Artis and 
Miller ( 1986)). 
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4.5. A pragmatic synthesis 
The four options outlined above are not mutually exclusive. 
While each of them is able to meet the requirements implied 
by the main proposition of Section 3.2, they can be put to 
work to reinforce each other. A pragmatic approach would 
be to use all of them in various degrees over time. A moderate 
widening of the allowed margins of fluctuation, coupled 
with more frequent realignments such that discrete jumps 
of the exchange rates are ruled out, would help dissuade the 
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markets from testing the effectiveness of the credit line 
arrangements. Conversely, the credit line arrangements will 
make the pledge not to allow discrete realignments more 
credible. In a period of transition, safeguard clauses may be 
maintained as a last resort threat, which should be progress-
ively recognized as useless and can eventually be eliminated 
without anyone really noticing it. Then the increased compe-
tition among financial systems will gradually evolve towards 
a private 'financial market union' which will make it obvious 
that a monetary union implies the abandonment of a monet-
ary independence which will have become only formal. 
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Introduction 
The Commission's plans to advance the financial integration 
of the EEC countries by fostering further liberalization of 
capital movements raises a whole set of issues of both 
technical and political significance. However, the scope of 
this report is voluntarily limited. Thus, in accordance with 
the indications set forth by the Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, no attempt is made here 
to deal with the general issues of financial liberalization, its 
effects on resource allocation, welfare and the like, as well 
as the theoretical aspects of its relationship with the stability 
of exchange rates within the EMS. I would rather concen-
trate on issues of macroeconomic policy and monetary con-
trol and the effects of the liberalization of capital movements 
on the structure and performance of the financial system, 
and that only in relation to the particular position of a 
country like Spain, which does not yet belong to the EMS 
but has already embarked on an extensive process of liberal-
ization of capital movements according to the provisions 
established in the Accession Treaty. 
To sum up, the report considers the implications and possi-
bilities of a full liberalization of capital movements in re-
lation to the external accounts of the Spanish economy and 
the structure and functioning of its financial system, and 
faces as well the thorny question of the compatibility and 
timing of the somewhat contradictory processes of financial 
liberalization and participation in the EMS. 
The report is structured in three parts. The first focuses on 
restrictions posed by the Spanish foreign accounts in the 
way of further liberalization of capital movements. The 
second deals with the structure of the Spanish financial 
system and its possibilities of meeting with success the new 
competitive situation. Finally, the third and last part con-
siders the compatibility and timing of the two processes 
involved in the advance of Spain towards full integration in 
the Community: liberalization of capital movements and 
integration in the EMS. 
I. Implications of Spain's foreign accounts for 
the liberalization of capital movements 
It seems suitable to begin the discussion with a brief overview 
of the recent evolution of Spain's balance of payments and 
the process of external indebtedness. 
As Table I makes clear, the first important trait of the 
balance of payments is the recurrent deficit in the trade 
balance. Indeed, to the chronic weakness of the export flows 
have been added, since the accession to the Community, the 
implications of the progressive dismantling of the protection-
ist system built up over the years, to configurate a situation 
of greater dependence of the relative competitive position 
of the country and the evolution of the import flows of its 
main trading partners. 
In the recent past the trade balance deficit has been more 
often than not compensated by the surplus in the services 
and transfers accounts, to render a current account balance 
that presents important surpluses in the last few years. These, 
in conjunction with strong inflows in the capital account 
(see Table 1) have led to a substantial accumulation of 
reserves which, however, is not a historical trait of Spain's 
foreign accounts. It could be argued, though, that the situ-
ation just depicted is going to persist, due both to the 
extensive process of reduction of internal disequilibria going 
on in the country and to the new position that it has obtained 
in the international arena, due in its turn to the success of 
the economic policy pursued in the last years and the ac-
cession to the EEC. 
In any case, be those the structural traits of Spain's external 
position or not, it is certain that they have led to difficulties 
in two areas that concern us here: 
(i) They have generated appreciation pressures on the cur-
rency that the Bank of Spain has been forced to absorb, 
in the context of the dirty flotation of the peseta. to 
prevent further deterioration of the export flows. 
(ii) They have generated undesirable base money growth, 
required sterilization measures and put in jeopardy the 
management of monetary policy. 
Facing those constraints and difficulties, Spain's policy has 
been directed in several related ways: 
(i) A strong anti-inflationary stance, to maintain com-
petitiveness in the wake of strong appreciation tenden-
cies of the currency. 
(ii) Renewed impulse to the structural change of the Span-
ish economy, reducing rigidities, restructuring obsolete 
sectors and promoting export-oriented industries fre-
quently linked to foreign capital. 
(iii) Accelerated pace of repayment of the external debt, so 
as to reduce the pressure on the currency and to facili-
tate the conduct of monetary policy. 
(iv) Increased liberalization of capital movements, over and 
above the requirements of the Accession Treaty, so as 
to promote the possibilities of investment abroad by 
residents. 
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Table 1 
Balance of payments (selected items) 
(million USO) 
1983 1984 1985 1 1986' 
Trade balance - 7 672.5 -3 990,0 -4 379,0 -6 267,0 
Invisibles balance 
Current-account balance 
Short-term capital 
Long-term capital 
Central reserves 
4 993,9 6 344,0 7 032,0 10 523,0 
- 2 678,6 2 354,0 2 653,0 4 256,0 
94,7 -97,6 -120,2 -178,3 
3 104,6 3 331,0 - I 540,8 -1 414,8 
I Provision,tl 
1 Advance. 
So11rc1· Bank of Spam 
However, these policies have not always been fully compat-
ible. The presence of a very important fiscal deficit (see 
Table 2), not always financed by recourse to the market, 
has meant a continuous upward pressure on real interest 
rates and, at times, has cornered the Bank of Spain into an 
impossible situation, endangering the continuity of the tight 
monetary policy it was pursuing and damaging its credibility. 
On the other hand, in a country in which growth infallibly 
leads to strong import increases, the Bank of Spain has had 
to raise interest rates in an effort to curb the growth of 
internal pressures that risked excessive deterioration of the 
current account, thus aggravating the problem of the capital 
inflows. 
Nevertheless, the relative flexibility that the Spanish monet-
ary policy has enjoyed so far has been possible in good 
measure because the country does not yet belong to the 
EMS, thus enabling the Bank of Spain to pursue a combi-
nation of monetary and exchange rate policies that would 
have been impossible otherwise. Now, recent declarations 
Table 2 
Deficit of the public sector (excluding public firms) 
/% GDP! 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 
1,8 2,0 5,6 5,5 5,7 
Sourn• Bank or Spain 
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325,7 -4 486,8 1 912,1 - 2 700,4 
of the Governor of the Bank of Spain and other authorities 
seem to imply that one of the medium-range objectives of 
Spain's policy is the full integration in the EMS structure, 
be it with an expanded fluctuation band for the peseta like 
Italy or with the general fluctuation band of the other 
currencies. This development, if implemented, would cer-
tainly pose new problems of the kind already discussed at 
length by other consultants and to which we shall refer 
briefly in the third part of this report. 
Irrespective of the potential participation of Spain in the 
EMS, are there special problems posed by the foreign ac-
counts in the way of the liberalization of capital movements? 
Probably not with respect to long-term flows linked to 
investments and portfolio decisions, as long as Spain con-
tinues to enjoy a degree of exports and an influx of foreign 
investment sufficient to prevent any undue growth of foreign 
indebtedness. The situation regarding short-term capital 
movements entails more complexities. 
During the transitional period prior to full integration in 
the EEC, Spain has to dismantle progressively its system of 
tariffs and other restrictions to commercial flows. This pro-
cess could not fail to provoke important changes in relative 
prices at a time in which many other facets of Spain's 
economic structure are suffering extensive modification (lab-
our relations, industrial restructuring, etc.). Together, these 
developments are likely to pose recurrent difficulties to the 
current account and the exchange rate which, in presence 
of a full liberalization of short-term capital flows, could 
endanger the execution of a monetary policy geared towards 
the reduction of the inflation rate and the careful regulation 
of internal demand. 
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In this situation, the Bank of Spain will need every bit of 
flexibility it can muster and it seems that part of that flexi-
bility should come from a judicious curtailment of those 
capital movements likely to be used as vehicles of speculative 
attacks against the currency. 
In summary: 
(i) Spain's balance of payments presents a difficult equilib-
rium whose soundness depends in good measure on the 
maintenance of a degree of support to the exchange 
rate. 
(ii) The exchange rate policy collides frequently with the 
anti-inflationary stance of the monetary policy, which 
must on occasion reduce the growth of internal demand. 
(iii) Over all the previous difficulties, the public sector finds 
it difficult to manage and to reduce the level of its 
deficit which sets a permanent upward pressure on 
real interest rates and poses additional problems to 
monetary policy. 
(iv) The Spanish economy will suffer a continuous stream 
of real shocks during the transitional period of inte-
gration in the EEC due both to the dismantling of the 
system of taxes, tariffs and other protectionist measures 
of its foreign transactions and to the inescapable 
changes in its economic structure that shall have to be 
implemented to face with success the new competitive 
situation. 
(v) Within this framework it seems difficult to take strong 
steps in the way of full liberalization of short-term 
capital movements. Not so, however, for the further 
liberalization of long-term capital transactions pertain-
ing to investment flows and portfolio decisions by fore-
igners and residents alike. 
2. The Spanish financial system in the new com-
petitive situation 
The main point considered in this part is whether the Spanish 
financial system is prepared, by the institutions that make 
it up and their way of operation, to face the competitive 
situation that will follow the foreign aperture imposed by 
the Accession Treaty, whose main transitory period will 
linger until 1992, and other additional liberalization meas-
ures the Commission could propose. To consider this point, 
I will present a brief overview of the main financial insti-
tutions and markets already in place and the transformations 
to which they are subjected nowadays, including important 
ones in the conduct of monetary policy. As will become 
clear, it is my opinion that the Spanish financial system is 
reasonably well prepared to face the added competence 
consequent to its foreign aperture and that its weak points 
could well be removed by certain changes in the regulatory 
framework, aimed at establishing the domestic financial 
institutions on a similar footing to their competitors. 
Since 1978, when they were first allowed to do so, some 38 
foreign banks have been established in Spain. They are 
subjected to a special norm, already in the process of being 
phased out, prohibiting them from opening more than three 
offices, from obtaining in the internal market resources 
exceeding 40 % of the value of their internal credit invest-
ment, except in the interbank market, and forbidding them 
to have in their portfolios securities other than bonds, public 
and private. This set of restrictions forced the foreign banks 
in Spain to gear their activity towards the wholesale market 
and excited their ingenuity in devising new products and 
activities that could allow them to circumvent their operative 
limitations. 1 
Thus, the foreign banks have accomplished a very important 
role in the innovation and development of the Spanish 
financial system. They promoted a new deepness in the 
interbank market, started the syndicated loan market in 
pesetas, participated actively in the development of the com-
mercial paper market and, in general, were always at the 
forefront of the innovation process followed by the Spanish 
financial system in the last few years. This way, they were 
able to raise its participation in the assets of the whole 
banking system, excluding thrifts, to I 0,68 % in 1983 and 
11,78 % in 1986. 
The main institutions in the Spanish financial system are the 
private banks and the saving banks (thrifts) whose shares in 
the banking system as a whole are approximately 48 % 
and 40 %, respectively. By different roads, both sets of 
institutions have converged to the general pattern of univer-
sal banking, although the bigger banks are busy setting up 
and training subsidiaries devoted to investment and mer-
chant banking activities. 
During the last few years the domestic banking system (both 
banks and saving banks), albeit with very different intensity 
and dedication, has participated in the introduction and 
development of new lines of activity, under the push of the 
foreign banks but also on its own initiative. This has meant 
a continuous pressure to reduce transformation costs and 
to make a better use of the base of cheap resources provided 
hy the very extensive network of offices at their disposal. 
I On foreign banks and their operations, see Gonzalo Gil ( l 985, l 986) and 
Francisco J. Abad Hernando ( l 987). 
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Until 1987 the interest rates of a whole range of short-term 
deposits were fixed by the regulators which made those a 
very cheap source of funds and provided one of the main 
competitive advantages of the domestic institutions. How-
ever, at the present time all interest rates are free in Spain 
and this is forcing a strategical reorientation of the insti-
tutions away from growth by itself and to be more concerned 
with profitability and return on assets. 
Other than the competitive advantages enjoyed by the dom-
estic banks is their very low level of foreign risk, a result of 
the stringent set of regulations that prevented them from 
participating in the growth of international lending at the 
beginning of this decade. Nowadays the banks have a rela-
tively reduced but growing foreign activity that amounts to 
USO 23 814 million in assets and USO 25 409 million in 
liabilities, both at the end of 1986, which represent only a 
share of 0,80 % and 0,86 % in the total foreign assets 
and liabilities exposure of the international banking system, 
respectively. 1 On the other hand, the savings banks have a 
negligible foreign activity. 
Next to those competitive advantages of Spanish banks, 
there are also distinct competitive disadvantages with respect 
to their foreign competitors. Probably the most important 
is the small dimension and low capitalization of Spanish 
institutions. Only 13 institutions appear among the 500 
institutions recorded by Euromoney in its last survey, 10 
banks and 3 savings banks, and the first one only in the 
58th position. 
On the other hand, Spanish institutions are still burdened 
by an extensive set of coefficients - 19 % required reserves 
ratio and 11 % special investments ratio, 10 % of which in 
Treasury bills - linked in the main to the financing of the 
public deficit, that reduces their operating possibilities and 
their return on assets.2 
In relation to existing financial markets in Spain it is best 
to divide their treatment according to the money and capital 
markets classification. I have already referred to the fully-
fledged and developed interbank market, trading in 1986 a 
daily average of USO 5 200 million. Next to this is the short-
term Treasury market, very active in both term and 'repo' 
operations and which is one of the main channels of monet-
ary policy's influence. Also, since 1983 a thriving commercial 
1 On the foreign activity of Spanish banks and its likely increase following 
the lifting of restrictions in 1987, see Antonio Sanchez-Pedretio and 
Gonzalo Gil ( 1987). 
2 On regulations pertaining to banks and other financial institutions, see 
Gonzalo Gil (!986). 
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paper market has been gaining ground, whose outstanding 
issues of about USO 4 200 billion in 1986 places it third in 
the world ranking: there is now the project of setting up a 
self-regulatory association of dealers in this market as well 
as a clearing system serving it, both of which measures shall 
result in an increased volume with a better protection of 
investors. 
The situation is not nearly as rosy with respect to capital 
markets, traditionally less developed in Spain than monetary 
markets. The combination of the coefficients imposed on 
the savings banks, forcing into their portfolios certain kinds 
of private bonds, and the fiscal credit due to private investors 
that kept in their portfolios during three years the bonds 
acquired, was a permanent restraint to the growth of a 
strong secondary bond market in the last years. Thus, there 
is not in Spain a real long-term market for private issuers, 
although it is to be hoped that the phasing-out of the two 
said regulations in 1986 will mean a progressive change. 
In this respect the experience of the Euromarket and the 
new possibility, already a fact, of creating a Euro-peseta 
market, should mean a great deal for the corresponding 
domestic efforts; also, the development of the new public 
debt market, to which I will refer shortly, is going to be 
relevant. 
For its part, the stock market is taking bolder steps in the 
way of its rehauling. Thus, a new law is already under 
discussion, that, if approved in line with the project, will 
result in the creation of a unified national stock exchange 
and the implementation of new operating structures based 
on the Anglo-Saxon model of brokers and dealers. On the 
other hand, the government has already announced its will-
ingness to allow quotation of foreign firms in the existing 
exchanges, without exhausting the transitional periods pro-
vided for in the Council Directives. 
However, the market that is already more advanced in its 
restructuring process is the public debt market. In June of 
this year the Treasury finally set up a book-entry register 
for all its issues that will be managed by the Bank of Spain. 
This is only the most apparent sign of a deeper process that 
is going to change completely the structure of the Treasury 
market and that could very well be called Spain's 'mini Big-
Bang'. In addition to the book-entry system, this will include 
a new discipline for the Treasury issues, the establishment 
of market-makers and inter-dealer brokers and, in time, a 
complete restructuring of the conduct of monetary policy. 
To the Treasury, the new public debt market will offer a 
deepness that permits a diversified covering of its financing 
needs, lengthening maturities; it shall also allow a reinforced 
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reliance in the market conditions for its issues and should 
even permit a reduction of costs. To the Bank of Spain, the 
new market offers a swift instrument through which to 
implement its open market operations acting on a fuller 
range of maturities. 
The last important topic that is left in relation to the Spanish 
financial system and its opening to foreign competition is 
related to the implementation of the monetary policy. 
As early as 1974 the Bank of Spain decided to structure its 
monetary control activity on the two-level principle. Thus, 
at the first level it sought to control a monetary aggregate 
linked to nominal demand and at the second level pursued 
the control of that aggregate by means of the monetary base. 
With minor modifications this is the system still in use and 
it should be said that is has fulfilled its promise rather well, 
providing an instrument of monetary regulation reasonably 
flexible although somewhat lagged in response and needing 
at times an intensive handling of interest rates. 1 
However, from the beginning, the method suffered some 
structural imperfections; for instance, the mechanism of 
liquidity injection through competitive action was always 
effective, but when the situation called for a drainage of base 
money, the Bank of Spain frequently found itself lacking 
adequate instruments. To these technical difficulties there 
have been added others of a more basic nature, linked in 
the main to the recent process of financial innovation that 
increases the liquidity of some assets and blurs the frontiers 
of the monetary control aggregate. On the other hand, at 
times of strong shifts in the demand of different financial 
assets, included or not in the monetary aggregate, the Bank 
of Spain has had to revert to a more direct control of interest 
rates, abandoning temporarily its quantitative objectives for 
the sake of a better control of internal expenditure. 
Nowadays, both the developments just discussed and the 
added availability of intervention instruments linked to the 
new public debt market, seem to promote a new reliance on 
two-way open market interventions as a means of regulating 
liquidity and interest rates. Indeed, we are just attending to 
the first movements in that direction with a general balance 
of success. 
Still, it must be said, and emphasized, that like so many 
other aspects of the economy, the Spanish monetary policy 
lives under the pressure of the continuing budget deficit and 
the vagaries of the Treasury in its financing. The Bank of 
Spain is forced by law to extend free credit to the Treasury 
1 On the working of Spanish monetary policy, see Carlos Cuervo-Arango 
and Jose Trujillo (1984). On its recent history, see Beatriz Sanz (1987). 
up to a certain amount and, in practice, this has been a 
continuous cause of worry to the conduct of monetary 
policy.2 
As previously, I will finish this section stating some con-
clusions: 
(i) Spain's financial system is reasonably well prepared, or 
it will be shortly, in terms of markets and institutions 
to adapt itself without excessive turmoil to the new 
competitive situation that will arise with the lifting 
of controls of establishment and operations and the 
liberalization of capital movements that shall take place 
on or before 1992. 
(ii) However. a smooth transition would require some regu-
latory changes during the transitional period, mainly 
the phasing out of the investment coefficients that bur-
den most domestic financial institutions, and a stricter 
limit to the credit rights of the Treasury against the 
Bank of Spain. Both regulatory changes are linked to 
a reduction of the public deficit. 
(iii) The inexistence of a long-term bond market in Spain 
appears as the main drawback that could make compe-
tition difficult for domestic institutions in some mar-
kets. 
(iv) Anyway, a process of mergers and takeovers should be 
expected both among domestic firms and by their for-
eign competitors, all the more likely because of the low 
capitalization of Spanish institutions. 
3. Two legs of integration: Stability of ex-
change rates and freedom of capital move-
ments - The case of Spain 
The question here is that of compatibility between freedom 
of capital movements and the structure of fixed exchange 
rates that constitutes the EMS, taking into account the 
particular position of a country like Spain which does not 
yet belong to the EMS but is already embarked on a rather 
broad process of liberalization of its capital flows. 
In general terms, it seems well established that the EMS and 
full liberalization of capital movements are only compatible 
within a framework of integration of the monetary policies 
of the member countries. This is the well known result of the 
Mundell-Fleming model that states that under free capital 
movements a country that participates in a fixed exchange 
rate system, like the EMS, loses its monetary independence. 
2 On the relation between fiscal and monetary policy in Spain, see Carlos 
Cuervo-Arango and Jose Trujillo ( 1987). 
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It is true that the EMS allows a fluctuation band for each 
currency and that this feature lends some flexibility to na-
tional monetary policies, but inasmuch as domestic interest 
rates incorporate the market expectation about the course 
of inflation and the fluctuation of the currency within the 
band, the room for manoeuvre is greatly reduced and strictly 
confined to short-term reversible movements. 
Is it likely that the EMS countries would take bold steps in 
the way of integration of their monetary policies? Possibly 
it is, since what is required is advancing from the actual 
coordination of general policies to a more detailed agree-
ment about domestic objectives of policy, for instance about 
the growth of monetary aggregates. Certainly this line of 
action would be much more positive that alternatives like 
increasing the flexibility of operation of the EMS by widen-
ing the fluctuation bands. for instance. 
In any case, without relying on advances in the way of 
fuller coordination of policies, at least in the short run, the 
alternatives for Spain should consider the relative merits of 
the two legs of integration we are considering: commitment 
to the process of liberalization of capital movements and 
integration in the EMS. 
I have already referred to the advantages that would stem 
from liberalization of the capital movements for a country 
like Spain: modernization of the financial system; growth 
in the investment funds available and better terms for them; 
new impulse to needed structural changes in labour relations 
and some industrial sectors; better management, by necess-
ity, of the public debt, etc. Thus, it is clearly my opinion that, 
in general, terms, the advantages of liberalization greatly 
outweigh its dangers and that consequently this is a train 
not to be missed, allowing of course for all the gradualism 
and safeguard measures that could be needed. 
Now, the question is whether the train of liberalization of 
capital movements could collide with the stability of ex-
change rates that brings participation in the EMS. Should 
Spain renounce such participation? Certainly not, for many 
reasons, some of which I discuss in what follows. 
It is clear from the start that by reducing short-term move-
ments in exchange rates and, at the same time, allowing 
accommodation of long-term structural changes through the 
realignment of parities, the EMS constitutes one of the main 
building blocks in the execution of a great internal market 
at Community level. If only for this reason, Spain could not 
envisage a policy of permanent renouncement to join the 
EMS. 
But joining the EMS presents other clear advantages for 
Spain. For one thing, it would reinforce the domestic anti-
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inflationary policy by linking more directly the internal and 
external rates of inflation, in practice by forcing the country 
to maintain its parity with the mark. On the other hand, 
participation in the EMS should give an added credibility 
to internal policy by making it clear to all agents the losses 
of competitivity which the country would incur should it 
renounce the anti-inflationary stance, be it because of ex-
cessive labour demands or lack of care with the dangers of 
continuous fiscal deficits. In other words, I would go as far as 
saying that, in a sense, losing some monetary independence is 
not necessarily a bad thing in a country as structurally 
inflation-prone as Spain and as long as the discipline of the 
EMS is geared towards maintaining a low rate of inflation. 
It is in this sense that I argue that participation in the EMS 
would give new credibility to domestic monetary policy and 
more arguments to its executors facing pressures from other 
social agents and instances of policy. 
Thus, since it is clear to this consultant that Spain should 
join the EMS, the question is then the timing of its joining. 
As I have already discussed in the first part of this report, 
during the transitional period previous to its full integration, 
Spain will suffer a programmed, continuous string of real 
shocks due to the elimination of quantitative restrictions to 
trade and to the dismantling of its protectionist tariffs sys-
tem. The real resource reallocation this process is bound to 
generate constitutes a powerful argument for retaining dur-
ing that period the flexibility of nominal exchange rates that 
allows the present flotation of the peseta. 1 On the other 
hand, Spain is embarked right now on a long-range trans-
formation process of whole parts of its industrial network. 
All these factors and the relative price changes they are 
going to produce call. for a reasonable waiting period until 
it should become dear what is a sensible parity for the peseta 
within the EMS system. It could be supposed, though, that 
such a waiting period should not extend beyond 1993, the 
year in which Spain's tariff system would converge with that 
of the Community. 
During the period until integration in the EMS, Spain must 
resolve its disequilibria, in particular those concerning the 
trade balance, the level of its public deficit and the rigidity 
of the real wages, and should adjust its inflation rate to that 
prevailing in the Community. This is in fact a precondition 
to integration in the EMS in the same way as a failure in 
the reduction of the public deficit could very well jeopardize 
the whole process. 
1 On the convenience of a certain flexibility in nominal rates of exchange 
as a buffer to real changes in parity, see Jose Vinals (1987). 
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The aforesaid factors, though, show only just a fraction of 
the wealth and income redistribution processes that will 
accompany the linkage of the Spanish economy with the 
internal market at Community level. Progress in the liberal-
ization of capital movements could only exacerbate them 
during the transitional period until integration in the EMS. 
Redistributive policies within the Community are thus of 
great relevance, implying in particular the strengthening of 
the structural funds available and their careful allocation to 
the more fragile and less developed economies. 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that liberalization of 
capital movements is already an ongoing process in Spain. 
If it is true that some of the arguments that call for retarding 
full participation in the EMS also apply for the regulation 
of short-term capital movements, in particular those related 
to speculative attacks against the currency, it is also true, as 
I have mentioned in the first part of this report, that there 
is no reason for not advancing in the liberalization of the 
capital movements linked to real and portfolio investment. 
From this point of view, there is a sense in which not 
participating in the EMS should be construed as an advan-
tage for Spain in the way of liberalization of capital move-
ments, since it would permit a relative freedom of the ten-
sions between stability of exchange rates and liberalization 
of capital movements that the countries already linked by 
the fixed exchange rates system will probably encounter. 
In summary, as to the relation between participation in the 
EMS and liberalization of capital movements we could state 
some conclusions: 
(i) Spain should participate in the EMS and should liberal-
ize its capital movements. Inasmuch as there is a certain 
incompatibility between those objectives, it should be 
resolved through tighter coordination of policies and 
the establishment of safeguards to some monetary oper-
ations. In particular, neither a dual exchange market 
nor the widening of the fluctuation bands seem suitable 
solutions, at least for Spain. 
(ii) Spain should not enter the EMS until completion of 
the reduction of tariffs and lifting of quantitative restric-
tions processes. Only then, and once the relative price 
changes involved are considered, could the sustainable 
rate of exchange of the peseta become clear. In this 
respect is would be better, in my opinion, to enter later 
but with the regular fluctuation band than sooner with 
a wider one. 
(iii) During the transitional period previous to the full inte-
gration in the EMS, Spain could proceed to dismantle 
most present restrictions to capital movements, except 
those strictly linked to very short-term movements that 
could be used as instruments of speculative attacks 
against the peseta. In other words, Spain could join the 
general process of liberalization of capital movements at 
Community level, perhaps with some special safeguards 
related to its transitional position. 
(iv) The reduction of the important disequilibria that mar 
the Spanish economic structure is imperative and a 
prerequisite to integration in the EMS. In particular, 
reduction of the inflation rate and the public deficit 
should be the main order of business as well as correc-
tion of the rigidities in real wages and labour relations. 
These objectives should be accomplished by the end of 
the transitional period around 1993. 
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Introduction 
The Commission of the European Communities has already 
set the pace for a complete liberalization of markets for 
goods and services by 1992. Integration of financial markets 
has always been seen as a necessary complementary measure 
to reduce transaction costs and facilitate creation of an 
integrated European market for goods. 
However, in the past integration of financial markets has 
proven extraordinarily difficult because finance is not only 
a useful service for trade, but underlies and influences closely 
the business cycle, price stability, growth and income distri-
bution. This paper attempts to identify the likely effects of 
financial integration on these major variables. 
According to the communication from the Commission to 
the Council of 23 May 1986, financial integration is expected 
to proceed in two phases: 
(i) the first phase aims at liberalizing those transactions 
linked to the proper functioning of the common market 
(free circulation of goods, services and persons as well as 
free establishment) and to the creation of an integrated 
Community capital market (operations in securities); 
(ii) the second phase aims at creating by 1992 a unified 
financial system in the Community through the removal 
of all the remaining restrictions and controls. The inten-
tion is to liberalize erga omnes. 
This step-wise integration could raise certain difficulties. 
They will, however, not be discussed because they do not 
affect in a major way the three countries of this paper's 
specific concern. This paper focuses therefore on final inte-
gration and neglects transitory effects or problems. This 
seems well justified by the advanced degree of liberalization 
already achieved by the three small northern countries. 
The liberalization objective of the Commission recognizes 
that the difficulties and final gains of liberalization are likely 
to be dissimilar for each country, depending on country size, 
the initial macroeconomic configuration, sophistication of 
its financial sector and on the degree and extent of regu-
lations to be dismantled. 
This paper does not attempt a complete treatment of these 
issues. Being focused on the three small, northern countries 
of the Community this paper limits the analysis of liberaliza-
tion to the context pertinent to these countries. This context 
can be summarized as follows. All three countries are highly 
developed small countries and very dependent on foreign 
trade. Germany is the main trading partner for each of these 
three countries and hence the evolution of domestic prices 
relative to German prices is of particular importance. At 
present all three countries are forming a OM-zone, whilst 
at the same time trying to maintain or even improve a liberal 
system of international financial flows: the Netherlands are 
very close to an unrestricted system of foreign transactions; 
Denmark has significantly liberalized in recent years and 
Belgium does not impose any restrictions other than operat-
ing a two-tier exchange market. 
This paper is organized in two parts. The first part deals 
with general issues of financial liberalization. The second 
part is more empirical and investigates the experience of 
Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. In Section I of the 
first part the effects of liberalization on resource allocation 
and income distribution are investigated. It is usually con-
sidered that the major potential advantage of liberalization 
lies in the domain of more efficient resource allocation. 
However, we shall argue that the most sizeable potential 
gain is a dynamic one: the effects of liberalization on savings 
and investment. 
In Section 2 of the first part we turn to issues of macro-
economic policy and control. This is the area where liberal-
ization is feared to cause problems, or welfare losses, such 
as the loss over domestic monetary policy control. Within 
the European Monetary System (EMS) it is sometimes 
feared that free capital movements and a fixed exchange 
rate allow foreign countries to dictate domestic interest rates, 
the domestic inflation rate and therefore the Phillips-curve 
trade-off. While largely true, the full truth is both more 
complex and more interesting. 1 
In this section we also examine, in passing, the issue of 
safeguard clauses for foreign exchange crises and how best 
to cope with such crisis situations. 
The second part comprises four sections: one for each of the 
three countries studied and one for a comparison of the 
empirical lessons. Finally the conclusions of this study are 
summarized. 
1 Our discussion will be limited to the issues faced by small countries. 
Those of large countries and those of the EMS as a whole arc discussed 
in the reports on France. Italy. the United Kingdom and the EMS. 
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General issues of financial liberalization 
1. The effects of liberalization on resource allo-
cation and income distribution 
1.1. Liberalization of what? 
In the communication cited in the introduction, a priority 
is already established among different international financial 
transactions: first, trade finance and second, capital market 
transactions. 
Free movement of goods in the Community is realized when 
costs in any location differ only by unavoidable transport 
costs. Costs of trade finance could distort competition be-
tween exporters and local producers in either direction. 
Full commodity market integration requires therefore the 
elimination of implicit taxes or subsidies contained in trade 
financing. However, trade finance covers only one aspect. 
Capital costs in protected national markets can be signifi-
cantly above those in world markets. When this is recog-
nized, authorities tend to subsidize capital costs of particular 
producers distorting thereby not only resource allocation 
internationally but also domestically. 1 
Creation of an integrated financial market in the Community 
very much expands the dimension of liberalization. While 
trade finance is largely complementary, i.e. a necessary input 
for trade, capital market integration is both complementary 
to and a substitute for trade. Foreign direct investment is a 
generator of mainly intra-industry trade and thus comp-
lementary,2 but it also can be a substitute when production 
abroad replaces exports. Frequently trade barriers (trans-
port costs, tariffs, etc.), generate such substitution. The 
absence of significant trade barriers in the EEC suggests that 
foreign direct investment is predominantly trade-creating. 
Market integration which should contribute to factor-in-
come equalization according to the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson theory, is undoubtedly assisted by capital market 
integration. Indeed, factor-income equalization can either 
be achieved through free trade or, alternatively, through free 
capital movements (the Mundell theory). Hence, free trade 
and free capital movements reinforce each other in bringing 
about factor-income equalization. As we shall see, the impli-
1 Compared to other distortions in the EEC, differentials in trade finance 
are likely to be of second-order importance, although this is not the case 
for capital costs in general. Real rates of interest do significantly differ 
among countries of the EEC. 
2 See Helpman and Krugman ( 1985). 
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cations are not to be applauded by every economic agent, 
but the welfare of the Community is bound to increase. It 
is thus necessary to evaluate the allocation and distribution 
effects. 
In the absence of exchange risks, free capital movements 
will generate convergent lending rates for identical maturities 
and risk classes. Similarly, deposit rates will tend to be 
equalized and hence spreads of borrowing-lending rates will 
tend to be equalized. Thus, throughout the Community, 
savers are confronted with identical conditions, and so are 
investors. Hence a major factor of market disintegration 
would tend to disappear, namely the fact that differentiated 
capital costs distort the competition for savings. 
However, one sector which might suffer in some countries 
from capital market integration is the financial sector. Fi-
nancial integration provides new opportunities and the most 
dynamic firms will be able to benefit. But integration will 
also mean increased competition and lower margins. In 
many cases this is to be welcomed because in highly pro-
tected financial markets returns are much more a reflection 
of monopolistic privileges awarded by governmental regu-
lations than a reflection of innovation, risk-taking and rents 
for scarce entrepreneurial talent. 
Whilst it is timely to shave the golden glitter of protected 
financial sectors, identical spreads do not imply identical 
costs and hence profit conditions, given the fiscal and regu-
latory differences among member countries. The market 
has been facing such difficulties for some time: increasing 
securitization easily allows borrowings and savings to be 
placed abroad, although banks participating in the inter-
national market are not subjected in their home countries 
to a uniform fiscal and regulatory environment. 
In consideration of the extreme difficulty of uniformizing 
regulation, some discrimination has to be accepted; the same 
is true for industrial firms. A workable compromise has 
been supported by LECE: 3 harmonization should be pushed 
as far as possible but in areas where harmonization is not 
feasible each country would accept that foreign subsidiaries 
obey regulation in their home country. The monetary auth-
orities of the country where headquarters are implanted 
would be responsible for Community-wide operations. 
Whenever financial techniques are imported which are ruled 
out by domestic regulations, thus putting domestic banks at 
a competitive disadvantage, authorities would be obliged to 
relax regulations. Such a treatment would be reserved for 
3 Ligue europeenne de cooperation economique (LECE): Vers un espace 
financier europeen, Brussels, 11 and 12 December 1986. 
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financial firms with their headquarters in Europe, for purely 
practical reasons. This would at the same time give European 
firms on the European market an advantage comparable in 
spirit, but not dimension, to the customs union privilege. 
Over time, the Commission should, of course, endeavour to 
progress with regulatory harmonization. 
The fiscal treatment of international capital flows is of 
particular importance, comparable to the question whether 
VAT on internationally traded goods should be collected at 
the point of origin or at the point of destination. To the 
extent that taxes on capital income (interest and capital 
gains) are retained at source, problems arise. Whilst tax 
collection would be relatively easy, interest rates would 
not be equalized (rates net of income tax will however 
be equalized) and hence banks would compete on unfair 
grounds. Moreover, taxes would be collected where savings 
are invested and not where income is earned. 
Alternatively, capital income of non-residents could be tax 
exempt in the country where funds are invested and taxed 
at home. Interest rates would be equalized, savings would 
be taxed where income is earned, but tax evasion would be 
made easier (the Belgium-Luxembourg syndrome). 
The most sensible solution would be a uniform tax for 
the Community, rendering capital flows for tax reasons 
uninteresting. Even better would be to set the uniform rate 
at zero to eliminate the traditional double taxation of savings 
(through taxation of income earned and subsequent taxation 
of income earned on income saved). Europe's present growth 
record is dismal by historical trends and could benefit from 
an additional boost to savings and a corresponding decline 
in investment costs which would result from the elimination 
of capital income taxes. 
It can also be expected that the development of European 
financial markets would greatly benefit from such a measure 
for three reasons. First, non-taxation of capital income 
would eliminate existing distortions (as would uniform tax-
ation). Second, non-taxation would improve the relative 
price of future goods in terms of present goods and this 
would stimulate savings and thereby the net size of the 
financial market. Third, Euromarkets have always benefited 
from their offshore character and thus from tax evasion. 
Whilst Euromarkets have other advantages as well, the re-
moval of the tax advantage over domestic markets would 
render domestic markets more competitive. It seems there-
fore advisable to study the fiscal dimension of capital market 
liberalization in more detail as this question obviously tran-
scends the scope of this paper. 
The approach of the Commission to support liberalization 
without prior fiscal and regulatory harmonization has con-
siderable pragmatic merit. Indeed, it can be hoped that 
once liberalization increases competition in national markets 
harmonization will be a forced result. As long as some 
countries maintain regulations and a tax structure putting 
its financial industry at a competitive disavantage they will 
lose business - unless regulations are relaxed. Empirically 
there is however no strong support for this conclusion: in 
some countries deregulation followed liberalization as in the 
United Kingdom; 1 in other countries, such as Germany, free 
capital movements have resulted in only a very timid and 
slow process of deregulation. 
Will a European financial market with complete liberaliza-
tion and regulatory harmonization be characterized by an 
even regional distribution? At least three arguments suggest 
that this is unlikely to be the case and much more likely is an 
evolution toward one (London) or a small number (London, 
Frankfurt, Paris, etc.) of monetary centres. First, economies 
of scale characterize financial products and the financial 
industry. With technological advance in communications the 
scale argument tends to become stronger rather than weaker 
in the future. Second, the industry is strongly conditioned 
by hystereses, that is trust is an essential input which can 
only be developed over time. Existing centres therefore have 
a competitive advantage over potential centres. Third, the 
quality and size of a national currency market provides 
support to the development of a national financial centre. 
According to the first two arguments London might well 
emerge as the monetary centre of Europe. One could even 
imagine that transactions in French francs or Deutschmarks 
are carried out more efficiently in London than in Paris or 
Frankfurt.2 But the fact that retail and wholesale banking 
cannot be totally separated, that central banks' supervisory 
and lender- of last-resort role is restricted to the national 
market, and that bourses will retain a largely national basis, 
suggests that attractive and large-sized currencies will pro-
vide an offsetting advantage to their national monetary 
centres. 
1.2. The ~atic effects of perfect capital mobility on re-
source allocation 
In a world with no externalities (such as market failures or 
differences in available technologies amongst countries), no 
distortions (such as inopportune government interferences), 
complete hedging facilities and costless financial trans-
See M.J. Artis, 'Exchange controls and the EMS' (this volume). 
This phenomenon is already observable for a variety of financial trans-
actions in bonds, shares, swaps, option trading, etc. 
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ac ti o ns, capita l Oows a re determined by the differences be-
twee n the domest ic and foreign private marginal returns 
on capita l, by differences in national time preferences a nd 
liquid ity preferences. According to th is theo retical bench-
mark, perfect capita l mobility across nat ions equalizes pri-
vate a nd socia l ret urns on capital abroad a nd at home, and 
maximizes the world global welfare. 
Financia l resources now from countri es where capita l is 
ab unda nt and marginal returns relatively low to countries 
where capita l is sca rce . In the net lending country , capital 
ho lders obtain higher revenue from their foreign investment 
while tota l wage income is reduced because of the production 
decline. But the wage bill contraction is less than the ri se in 
reven ue from lending abroad such that the country as a 
who le has increased its rea l gross nati onal revenue. 
In the net borrow ing countries, the inOow of funds triggers 
an increase in the nationa l rea l capita l stock. For a given 
Ja bour force th is reduces the income from investment ob-
tai ned by domestic cc1pital holders to the benefit of foreign 
in vestors a nd , for the major part of it , to the benefit of wage 
ea rners. A t eq uilibrium, marginal returns on capital are 
eq ua li zed worldwide and the world globa l production has 
increased accordingly. 
Figure I illust rates this sta tic resource allocation effect in a 
simplified two-country case . The horizonta l axis represents 
the glo bal capital stock. Capita l endowments are respectively 
OF fo r country A and FQ for country B. Before capital 
Oows are libera lized both countries operate in isolation with 
country A's return on capita l equal to G higher than country 
B's return equal to H . Country A's production is measured 
by the a rea QAIF while QBJF represents B's production . 
La bour's share in coun try A is the tria ngle AIG while GIFO 
is the re turn on capita l. In country B the labour bill is 
measured by BHJ and capita l income by HQFJ. 
With capi ta l market integra tion the system moves to point 
E where the marginal productivity lines intersect. Country 
A's production rises to OAEK with a la bour income of 
AER and a capita l income of REKO, of which CEKF is 
tra nsferred to capita l owners in country B. Similarly, country 
B's production is reduced to QBEK, divided between labour 
income (BER) a nd domestic capital income (REKQ). The 
production of the whole system has increased by the triangle 
IEJ of which !EC is a net production gain accruing to 
country A end J EC is a net revenue im;rease for country B. 
It sho uld be noted tha t the net global production gain as 
well as its di stribution amongst countries is highly dependent 
upon the slope of each country 's marginal product curve 
and thus, a t least td a certain ex tent, upon each country's 
technology. 
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In the second part of this paper it is shown that during the 
last 10 years Derima rk and Belgium were able to sustain 
sizeable current account deficits . The effects can therefore 
be compared with those of country A: GNP in Belgium and 
Denmark was higher than otherwise, labour benefited and 
domestic capital obtained lower returns. 
1.3. Some intertemporal considerations 
In Figure I , capital mobility is welfare-improving for both 
countries because marginal returns on capital are different 
in the absence of capital movements . The welfare gain is 
obtained from increased efficiency of static resource allo-
cation. But even if returns were identical in the absence 
of capital mobility there could exist unexploited trading 
opportunities. One such case arises if countries have different 
aggregate time preferences. A country with a lower prefer-
ence for the presen t could shift its consumption into the 
future through current account surpluses, while countries 
with less patience could shift their consumption patterns 
towards the present through debt accumulation . As in the 
static case, both countries gain . ' 
I See Kouri ( 1982). 
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In Figure 1, the value of the marginal product value of 
capital (mpc) schedule changes, of course, over time. Tech-
nological progress, improved terms of trade, lower wages, 
and growth of the labour force all shift the mpc-schedule 
upwards. Thus, if A's schedule shifts more than B's, then 
country A will attract an increasing share of B's capital. 
Which countries can be expected to be net capital importers 
in long-run equilibrium? With similar savings propensities 
those countries generating the highest returns through their 
efficiency and innovation. The competitive pressure gener-
ated by capital market integration will however be such that 
past performance is of little help in forecasting the future. 
1.4. Liquidity preferences 
In the 1960s, Deprez, Kindleberger and Salant (1966) at-
tracted considerable attention with their argument that a 
large share of European portfolio investment in the United 
States found its way back to Europe in the form of US 
direct investments. According to these authors, European 
investors preferred liquid, low-risk assets whereas US inves-
tors, using more sophisticated management techniques, 
preferred higher-yielding assets with less liquidity and more 
risk. Whilst these conclusions have been criticized, this argu-
ment is an illustration of mutually beneficial trade requiring 
no net capital movements. Thus, independently of current 
account imbalances, capital flows may be welfare-improving 
for both partners. 
Recent financial innovations serve mostly to reduce risk, 
increase liquidity, and to approach as much as possible 
specific demands by important subgroups of market partici-
pants. They serve therefore much more gross than net flows, 
as also documented by statistics on gross and net capital 
flows. 
Similarly, better satisfaction of varied and complex liquidity 
preferences thanks to financial integration is welfare-enhanc-
ing. However, the present argument does not directly affect 
resource allocation or intertemporal transfers of consump-
tion, and does not therefore affect directly countries' net 
wealth. Only their liquidity structure is affected because only 
gross capital flows are concerned. But the indirect effects on 
growth can be positive: if, say, Italian savers have a prefer-
ence for liquid and safe assets, whilst Dutch savers ( or their 
institutions) prefer longer and riskier maturities, then Italy 
will lend short-term to the Netherlands which will invest 
long-term abroad, possibly in Italy. Maturity transform-
ation, combined with different risk attitudes and investment 
capacities, is likely to stimulate growth. 
1.5. Market distortions 
A major distortion in countries with capital controls is of 
course the existence of these controls. But second-best theory 
should make us cautious to recommend elimination of these 
distortions in a world where many market imperfections 
exist. 
In terms of the analysis represented by Figure I it is clear 
that both countries will gain from free capital movements 
as long as full employment is maintained, i.e., as long as 
labour markets work well and flexibly enough. For example, 
when B invests in A, the marginal product of labour in B 
falls and so must real wages. If they are rigid, country B 
could suffer a welfare loss: the higher capital return may be 
insufficient to compensate for the reduction in production 
caused by unemployment. In the long run it is unlikely that 
market rigidities pose an insurmountable difficulty but the 
short run is characterized by a plethora of rigidities and 
therefore by frequent divergences of social from private 
costs. The short run distribution of gains is hard to assess 
and would require a case by base analysis. 
Another imperfection in the form of an externality is the 
following. Additional investment at home augments the mar-
ginal product of labour. A capital-exporting country obtains 
higher capital returns than one that locks in domestic sa-
vings, but does not obtain the associated Jabour income 
generated abroad. Hence, from a national viewpoint the 
social return on foreign investment is lower than the private 
return. By restricting capital exports through a tax and 
creating thereby pressure on foreign returns to increase the 
country can augment its social returns. Thus, sufficiently 
large countries with the power to influence world market 
interest rates may gain through restricting capital outflows. 
This argument is similar to the optimum tariff argument 
and shares the shortcomings of the latter. Implementation 
of such an optimal tax is extremely problematic because it 
only maximizes national welfare and hurts trading partners. 
When they retaliate chances are that both will wind up worse 
off than in the initial situation. 
No European country has the required size to have an 
influence on world market interest rates, but an integrated 
European market might have the required size. Small 
countries with respect to the rest of the world but large 
within the EEC may become price-makers in European 
financial markets while the EEC itself has a sufficiently large 
financing capacity to affect worl<l interest rates. Financial 
integration would then give a relative advantage to the 
financially largest and most sophisticated member countries 
by promoting them from price-taker to price-maker through 
the support of all member countries. Power provides one 
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advantage: to command respect and to enable the Com-
munity to react or threaten to react to policies enacted by 
other powerful nations. Of course, such policies or threats 
require not only an integrated market but also appropriate 
monetary policies in the EEC. 1 
A major international externality is being produced by ex-
change rate misalignments (Dornbusch, 1976). If the mis-
alignment persists over a significantly long period of time, it 
will induce a redistribution of productive capital (Steinherr, 
1986). In practical terms, when the exchange rate of a capital-
abundant country appreciates in real terms above its equilib-
rium level, its capital marginal product curve shifts up in-
ducing thereby a reduction - or even a reversal - of its 
capital exports and an increase in equilibrium interest rates. 
Since the European Monetary System minimizes misalign-
ments between participating currencies, externalities of this 
kind should not cause major concern inside the Community. 
But the experience with the dollar over the last I O years 
suggests that global capital liberalization might lead to mass-
ive and quite volatile capital misallocations between the 
EEC and the USA. It might therefore prove useful to investi-
gate the possibility of taxes imposed on Community external 
capital transactions either on a permanent basis (like the 
external tariffs for goods) or on a safeguard basis. 2 
In the main the discussion so far assumed price-clearing in 
capital markets. In recent years a substantial literature has 
developed rationalizing observed imperfections such as cre-
dit rationing. For a comprehensive survey of the literature 
see Stiglitz (1987). The main reason for credit rationing is 
imperfect information of lenders about the quality of the 
borrowers. In the face of excess demand for loans an increase 
in interest rates may eliminate credit demands by safe bor-
rowers and increase demand by riskier borrowers (adverse 
selection) leading to a decline in bank profits. This problem 
can be illustrated with the following example. Suppose there 
are two types of borrowers; each has a project cost of x, 
entirely loan-financed. Revenues are Ri with probality Pi 
and zero with probability (I - P). If there is a collateral 
c < 1 + r per ECU loaned (otherwise the bank faces no risk) 
expected returns Vi to firm i are 
If both firms borrow at the rate r because the bank lacks 
the information to identify low and high-risk borrowers but 
P1 > P2 then even if P1R 1 = P2R2 we have V1 < V2• That 
1 For a discussion of the game-theoretic aspects of coordinated European 
monetary policies in an integrated European financial market, see Stein-
herr ( 1984). 
Along these lines see Basevi ( 1985). 
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is, even if the two projects have the same expected revenues, 
the riskier project yields a higher return because the prob-
ability of repaying the loan is smaller and c < 1 + r insures 
that this advantage is not fully compensated by the higher 
probability of losing the collateral. 
The low-risk firm will not apply for a loan anymore when r 
exceeds the value r* at which V 1 = 0. Thus, for r ~ r* both 
firms apply whilst for r > r* only the high-risk firm applies. 
For r slightly above r* the jump in risk is not compensated 
by the increase in interest rates and therefore banks would 
do better not to increase r above r* even in face of excess 
demand. 
A number of useful insights can be derived from this ex-
ample: 
(i) Profit-maximization by banks may not generate Pareto-
optimal equilibria. Hence, institutional changes leading 
to a reduction in credit rationing can improve aggregate 
social welfare. 
(ii) Imperfect information can be reduced by investing in 
long-term bank-client relationships. This explains why 
market newcomers find it more difficult to obtain credit 
than established firms. This reinforces barriers to entry 
and protects vested interests. A new entrant to the 
market of country A may therefore find it costly or 
impossible to obtain desired credit amounts because he 
is unknown to local banks whereas banks in his home 
country find it difficult to assess risks in a foreign 
market. If home country banks were allowed to set up 
branches abroad, the combination of knowledge of the 
client and knowledge of market A would reduce the 
financial disadvantage of the newcomer to country A. 
(iii) Access to capital markets in different countries offers 
opportunities to reduce costs and credit rationing. Any 
individual borrower faces rationing in any one market. 
Access to several markets reduces overall rationing. 
Furthermore, real interests are not equal in all markets. 
If in country A the real interest rate is set at r < r* 
both type of firms in our example are rationed; if 
r > r• low risk firms will drop their project. Hence, if 
in another Community country B a lower value of r· 
prevails the low-risk firm can obtain funds there and 
invest profitably. On the other hand, high-risk pro-
moters of country B will seek funds in country A. 
(iv) Essentially the same arguments also apply to equity 
markets. For both equity and loans foreign market 
access offers additional advantages in a world of incom-
plete markets and imperfect information. One advan-
tage for firms engaged in foreign trade is risk hedging. 
This argument is therefore particularly relevant for 
firms in the EEC with high trade intensities. A quotation 
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on a foreign stock exchange improves the image of 
the firm, provides useful information to investors and 
lenders in that country (thereby reducing the lack of 
information), provides additional flexibility (at an ad-
ditional cost), and hedges net worth. Suppose a firm in 
country A sells part of its productions to country B. If 
the currency of country B depreciates with respect to 
currency A whilst prices cannot be increased by the rate 
of depreciation, profits expressed in currency A fall 
whilst profits expressed in currency B fall by less or 
may even rise. Hence net worth is at least partially 
protected by a foreign quotation. 
(v) Suppose that the money supply is reduced in country 
A. The impact on interest rates could be negligible if 
banks ration loans and all the impact will be felt by a 
credit squeeze. Access to credit markets of other 
countries not pursuing tighter monetary policies would 
help in avoiding a full repercussion on economic activity 
in country A. 
1.6. Effects on income distribution 
The effects on income distribution can be regrouped under 
three headings: functional income distribution (wage v. capi-
tal income); sectoral income distribution, and intertemporal 
income distribution (consumption v. savings). 
Figure I depicts the effects on functional income distri-
bution. Capital returns fall in the receiving country (country 
A) and rise in the capital-exporting country (country B). 
Inversely, labour income increases in the receiving country 
and falls in the capital-exporting country. It is therefore 
easily understood why labour unions usually welcome for-
eign investments, but not domestic investments abroad al-
though aggregate welfare is increased. In this example, the 
distribution of savings has no importance: they will be 
invested in both countries such as to maintain equal marginal 
returns. 
The case depicted in Figure 1 makes abstraction of financial 
intermediation and of other market imperfections. Financial 
intermediation only is useful in a world beset by friction, 
lack of information, transaction costs, etc. Even worse, 
the financial industry itself is protected by regulations and 
then::fore rarely competitive. Free capital mobility is provid-
ing new opportunities but is likely to diminish spreads be-
tween borrowing and lending rates. This is empirically illus-
trated in the second part of this paper. Hence - apart from 
financial institutions able to take advantage of increased 
opportunities, able to cut off the fat represented by unnecess-
ary demonstration expenditures and excessive retail facili-
ties, or willing to be absorbed to benefit from increasing 
returns to scale - the banking industry in highly protected 
countries is bound to suffer. 
In contrast, all other activities will gain from a wider choice 
of financial products (product diversification), of more com-
petitive pricing and of more sophisticated financial services. 
Among borrowers the advantages are of course not uni-
formly distributed. In general, capital-intensive activities will 
benefit more that others; foreign trade will benefit more 
than domestic trade; companies too small to borrow on 
Euromarkets, therefore constrained to the domestic market, 
will benefit more than multinationals. Big domestic projects 
will find finance more easily; market niches will be more 
likely serviced, and so on. 
In controlled markets government borrowing enjoys a sig-
nificant advantage in terms of volume, risk and customer-
banker relationship. This privilege is likely to be drastically 
diminished in a liberalized environment where investors find 
substitutes more easily. 
More competition implies reduced spreads between lending 
and borrowing rates. In other words, borrowers will pay 
less, savers will receive more and the intermediary will lose 
his monopoly rent. This will have a major potential effect 
on the static income distribution and, over time, on growth 
of incomes. 
Movements in real interest rates with a constant spread 
either benefit savers or investors, but not both. Reduction 
of the spread benefits both and the expected effects are 
increased savings and increased investments. Empirical esti-
mates suggest that the interest elasticity of investment is 
stronger than the interest elasticity of savings. Therefore 
the effect of liberalization on the current account of the 
Community would tend to be negative. 
These arguments, complementary to the adverse selection 
problem discussed before, are graphically illustrated in Fig-
ure 2(a), with the help of traditional investment and savings 
functions. Investment is an inverse function of the borrowing 
rate (re), while savings is a positive function of the lending 
rate (rL). The spread (re - rL) - obtained in an oligopolistic 
national market protected from foreign competition through 
capital controls - establishes equilibrium below the levels of 
savings (S*) and investment (I*) obtained when competition 
eliminates spreads. The rate re = rL is assumed equal to 
world market rates: this assumption is dropped in case (c). 
As a result of liberalization GNP increases by areas 2 + 4 
+ 5; the social gain is represented by areas 2 + 4; investors 
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gain 1 + 2; savers gain 3 + 4; and banks lose their monopoly 
rent 1 + 3. 
In Figure 2(b) a special case is represented, the case where 
savings are completely interest-inelastic. In this case compe-
tition would not lead to higher savings and investments. I 
GNP would remain unchanged and the social gain would 
be limited to distribution effects: savers would gain area 1 
from bankers. A similar conclusion is obtained for the case 
where investment is considered completely interest-inelastic. 
A third case of interest arises, if capital outflows are permit-
ted but capital inflows are controlled so that domestic bank-
ing can enjoy monopoly spreads. The loss in Figure 2(a) 
would be reduced, as depicted in Figure 2(c). The equilib-
rium 10 = S0 is obtained in the absence of capital flows. If 
outflows are allowed, savings will increase to the level S1, 
determined by the world interest rate (rw) and the quantity 
S1 - S0 is invested abroad. Domestic savers increase their 
income by the area 1 + 2 + 6 and their welfare by the 
surplus equal to area 1 + 6; banks' monopoly rent would 
fall to r8 - rw. 
With total liberalization of capital transactions, domestic 
investment jumps to 11, and the country becomes a net 
importer of capital equal to the current account deficit 
11 -S 1. This is precisely what is often feared by policy-
makers: liberalization will create current account deficits. 
But, in fact, this is the best that could happen to this country. 
GNP will now increase by the area 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5, of 
which area 5 represents interest payments on the foreign 
debt. 
Figure 2(d) depicts the case where capital inflows are liberal-
ized but not capital outflows: this corresponds to the legal 
distortion in some Community countries. For the restriction 
on capital outflows to make sense it needs to be assumed 
that domestic lending rates are below external lending rates. 
Because rw > rL foreigners will not invest in this country's 
fixed interest securities. Investment is therefore constrained 
to level 10 by available domestic savings S0 and savings will 
be rationed at borrowing rate r 8 . If foreigners can freely 
acquire equity or invest directly then investment will increase 
to 12 and foreigners will own the distance 10 - 12. With free 
competition in capital markets savings would increase to 
S1 and foreigners would only own S1 - 12. This example 
illustrates the possibility that domestic investment is either 
constrained by savings if direct foreign investment is con-
trolled, or if not partial controls give rise to excessive foreign 
indebtedness. 
In the second part of this paper it is shown that spreads in 
countries with capital controls are a multiple of spreads in 
countries with liberal capital transactions. Just to gain orders 
1 But investment would increase after liberalization if world market interest 
rates are lower than r8 . 
of magnitude the following example may be useful. With 
Cobb-Douglas technology, the elasticity of the desired capi-
tal stock with respect to cost of capital is above unity. 2 
Hence, the impact of lower spreads on investment can be 
quite sizeable, even more so in periods of high unemploy-
ment. 
In this discussion, we have neglected the economic use of 
bank profits. At one extreme, if bank profits are reinvested 
in banking then liberalization would tend to slow investment 
in banking and stimulate investment in other sectors. But, 
in addition to this redistribution effect, there is an overall 
gain because higher savings increase the aggregate amount 
of funds for investment. 
In controlled markets, all savers may obtain lower than 
world market returns. But, generally, small savers are penal-
ized most and they can expect to gain most from liberaliza-
tion. 
2.1. Macroeconomic policy in small EMS 
countries and free capital movements 
2.1. The small country context 
The advanced small EMS countries are highly dependent on 
foreign trade and therefore on stable and foreseeable price 
relationships. This constrains their domestic policies already 
very sternly: if they allow domestic prices to increase faster 
than those of their major EMS partners then domestic 
products will be replaced by foreign products both at home 
and abroad; a current account deficit develops and if no 
clear signals are given about the correction of the competitive 
loss, the market will expect a realignment. No financial 
support will be able to avoid a devaluation; the only solution 
consists in either domestic means to curb prices or in a 
devaluation. 
With the Cobb-Douglas production function Y 
conditions are 
K" LI-a marginal 
(l)w = (1-a)Y/Landr = aY/K 
where w and r arc real wages and real capital costs respectively. In full 
employment or in a situation where any productivity gains are reclaimed 
by higher real wages, employment is constant. From 
(2JY = (1-aJL + baK 
where- denotes growth rates. it is seen that Y = aK and from (I): 
a 
(3)Y = -- r. 1-a 
If the rea~ cost of capital falls from 5 % to 4 %, f = - 20 % and, with 
a = 0,2, Y = 5 %, K = 25 %. 
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Therefore any policy, fiscal or monetary, which affects prices 
is bound to fail in a small country aiming at maintaining 
EMS exchange rates, and this verdict is independent of the 
degree of capital controls. 
A second feature of small countries is that whatever they do 
matters less than the same actions carried out by a large 
country. In the EMS the determination of individual monet-
ary growth targets need to be resolved in one way or another. 
Either a large country acts as a leader and all others follow; 
or all countries take decisions jointly; or they combine joint 
decision-making with automatic rules; e.g. the McKinnon 
proposal (1984). The important point here is that as far as 
small countries are concerned it does not matter. Individu-
ally, these countries are not affecting much the overall 
outcome and therefore what they do is of no great import-
ance for the EMS as a group. A major problem among 
large countries, namely how to coordinate through rules or 
through a decision-making process is not an issue for small 
members (Steinherr, 1984). 
Because of their high foreign-trade dependency, small 
countries would find it difficult and costly to maintain exten-
sive capital controls. Finance is often a by-product of trade, 
as argued before. But this is not the only constraint. In a 
very open economy as compared to a nearly closed economy, 
equilibrium is more often and more dramatically disturbed 
by foreign shocks. To smooth domestic production and 
consumption over time, these shocks require financing. 
Otherwise the real economy of a small country would be-
come extremely unstable. Financing shocks in the current 
account does not necessarily require private capital flows, 
as monetary authorities can use exchange reserves and 
government can borrow on external markets to protect 
exchange reserves. In order to allow private agents to achieve 
a level of welfare close to the one attainable with free capital 
movements, government is, in fact, constrained to mimicking 
the private market. Therefore capital controls, implying 
costs discussed before, are justified only if government can 
avoid or correct strong market externalities. 
In practice, the authorities find it very difficult to monitor 
current account finance timely and through appropriate 
actions. Government would have to accept risks which are 
usually borne by the market, and the international market 
will be more reluctant to absorb exclusively government 
debt, represented by a limited menu of financial products, 
rather than a more diversified portfolio of public and private 
papers. 
We observe therefore that all advanced small EMS countries 
have liberalized foreign capital transactions. Moreover, they 
tend to follow a hard-currency monetary policy by pegging 
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their currencies to the Deutschmark. The weight of Germany 
in international trade can be seen as the major reason for 
this choice. 
2.2. Fiscal and monetary policies 
In principle, for small countries all has been said by Mundell 
(1963) and Fleming (1962). Even the shortcomings of the 
Mundell-Fleming models (fixed prices, absence of expec-
tations, no stock constraints on government debt) are not 
of great consequence for the issues here. 
Any country operating with free capital movements experi-
ences constraints on its conduct of fiscal and monetary 
policies. For a large country these constraints are however 
Jess severe. Whilst its prices and interest rates cannot diverge 
from parity conditions in equilibrium, it can influence equi-
librium prices. For example, if money supply in the United 
States doubles, the world money supply increases signifi-
cantly and therefore US interest rates and world interest 
rates decline. 
As to fiscal policy, small countries tend to satisfy a larger 
share of domestic demand through imports and aggregate 
demand management operates therefore with a smaller mul-
tiplier. This is partly compensated by the fact that fiscal 
expansion in a large country tends to increase interest rates, 
leading to crowding-out. This effect is absent in a small 
country with free capital movements. Therefore, the worst 
case for the efficiency of fiscal policy in a small country 
arises with capital controls: a large import leakage is then 
combined with crowding-out through a rise in interest rates. 
Free capital flows affect fiscal policy still in another way. 
Recently, economists have focused on the issue of debt-
neutrality, i.e., the question whether it matters to finance a 
deficit with higher taxes or with government bonds. If it 
doesn't then debt is called Ricardo neutral, and the impli-
cation of interest here is that a bond-financed increase in 
government expenditure has the same effect on real variables 
as a tax-financed increase. In both cases the balanced-
budget-multiplier is obtained. This is particularly important 
for small open economies where the balanced-budget-multi-
plier is s/(s + m), that is, significantly smaller than unity. 
Now, debt neutrality requires absence of tax illusion and 
perfect capital markets allowing the private sector to undo 
the government's action. For example, if government in-
creases taxes to repay its debt, and a perfect substitute for 
government debt exists, then private agents can replace 
government bonds with the perfect substitute. Moreover, 
the tax to be paid is equal to the present value of future tax 
liabilities which would have been required for services and 
repayment of the government debt. Thus, if interest rates 
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are unchanged - as would be the case for a small country 
and free capital movements - tax liabilities and wealth 
composition are unchanged and the shift from debt to taxes 
would have no real effect. Thus, liberalization has potentially 
the effect to create Ricardo neutrality and hence to reduce 
the value of the expenditure multiplier. 
Thus, with capital controls the small, open economy oper-
ates with a small multiplier because there is crowding-out 
via interest rates; with free capital flows the multiplier seems 
to be very large because interest rates remain unaffected but 
this Mundellian argument neglects the Ricardian neutrality 
effect. 
Monetary policy in small countries with fixed exchange rates 
within the EMS and free capital mobility is seriously limited 
as demonstrated by the Mundellian analysis. Whilst monet-
ary policy is ineffective as a demand policy tool it remains 
a useful tool for managing foreign exchange reserves of the 
central bank. This may be of little social utility compared 
to the cost of maintaining central bank operations and 
compared to ambitions of central bank governors - but 
these are the facts of life. I 
In summary, the loss of monetary control in small, open 
economies is reinforced by free capital mobility but not 
caused by capital mobility. Arbitrage in goods markets is 
already sufficient to destroy the monetary independence of 
these countries. However, not all is lost, as fiscal policy, 
whilst not very powerful for demand-tuning in a very open 
economy due to import leakages, gains in efficiency from 
capital mobility. Indeed, foreigners assist in financing defi-
cits, thereby stabilizing interest rates and minimizing crowd-
ing-out. 
2.3. Safeguard clauses 
The arguments in favour of free capital movements are 
generally accepted in advanced, small, open economies. 
However, it is sometimes felt that in exceptional circum-
stances, such as exchange market crises, it would be ben-
eficial to equip monetary authorities with tools to limit 
speculative capital flows. 
The foundations of this argument are debatable. In a flexible 
exchange rate context, overshooting phenomena may well 
warrant some means of intervention. But in the EMS any 
1 A minor argument in favour of temporary capital controls was advanced 
by Johnson ( 1967). This argument is also mentioned in Claassen and 
Wyplosz ( 1985). 
balance of payments crisis is generated by fundamentals 
which then need to be addressed. Recent experience in Den-
mark, discussed in the second part of this paper, is of interest 
here. Capital transactions have been liberalized since 1982 
when the country had a major current account deficit. 
Through a reduction in the fiscal deficit and moderation 
in monetary growth targets, the authorities succeeded in 
reversing expectations, in stabilizing the effective exchange 
rate and in reducing the current account deficit. Liberaliza-
tion of capital transactions made these corrections easier 
rather than more difficult. 
One could, of course, imagine situations where the market 
acts 'irrationally' from the point of view of the authorities, 
for example, as a result of political elections; or, if authorities 
have privileged information (as they often claim and rarely 
have) so that the market's and the authorities' interpret-
ations of the sustainability of the exchange rate diverge. 
Whilst probably exaggerated, it might reassure monetary 
authorities to keep safeguard clauses i\1 reserve and, indeed, 
a more pressing need could arise for large EMS countries. 
If small countries insist on safeguards, the most efficient 
solution might be a generalized two-tier exchange market. 
Taxation is at any rate superior to administrative restric-
tions. A uniform tax rate renders all transactions below a 
certain level of profitability uninteresting whereas quantitat-
ive restrictions may allow low-profit operations and prohibit 
high-profit operations. 
A two-tier exchange market is like a variable uniform tax 
on capital imports combined with a subsidy of the same rate 
on capital exports, if the financial rate depreciates with 
respect to the commercial rate. If the financial rate appreci-
ates with respect to the commercial rate, then capital imports 
are taxed and capital exports are subsidized. See Fleming 
(1974), Decaluwe and Steinherr (1974). 
The Belgian experience suggests that the two-tier system 
works quite well, in spite of the imperfect separation of the 
two market segments. It should be remembered here that all 
capjtal controls are imperfect much as a compliment to the 
human innovatory capacity. The advantages of the two-tier 
market can be summarized as follows. First, automaticity: 
no administrative decision is needed to take any actions. In 
the absence of tension, the premium of the financial rate 
will be close to zero and the market behaves like an inte-
grated market. If tensions develop, the financial rate reacts 
immediately and variably according to the extent of tension. 
Second, low administrative costs and no discrimination 
other than between capital and trade transactions. Third, 
speculative attacks cannot upset trade. Fourth, the brunt 
of market expectations would be borne by the exchange rate 
(for capital transactions) and by interest rates. Without the 
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movement in the exchange rate, the whole weight would fall 
on interest rates. This advantage is clearly demonstrated by 
the Belgian experience discussed in the second part of this 
paper. 
Although a two-tier exchange market might be the least 
inefficient form of capital control, it would not be efficient 
to maintain a two-tier market if safeguards are needed 
infrequently: the administrative cost is to be borne whether 
there are spreads between the two markets or not. In ad-
dition, once a two-tier market exists the Commission or 
any other body responsible for coordination, such as the 
Monetary Committee, would have little or no control over 
the use of capital controls. Individual countries may then 
rely on the two-tier market in setting their policies. By 
contrast, with ad hoe controls approval would be required 
and the extent and durability of these controls would be 
subject to coordinated decision-making. 
For these reasons it would seem preferable to use on an ad 
hoe basis quantitative controls or better taxes on exchange 
operations. 
Exchange controls would, of course, be erga omnes. How-
ever, this would pose a problem for the treatment of the 
ECU. After all, national currency is part of the ECU and 
the ECU is a European currency which is expected to become 
a parallel currency. But the ECU could only be considered 
as a parallel currency if there are no differential treatments 
of national currency and of the ECU. It would therefore be 
natural to except the ECU from temporary capital controls. 
Liberalization with occasional use of safeguard clauses 
would then also gain a little specific European dimension. 
To fix ideas, consider the case where exchange of national 
currency (currency A) into foreign currency without an 
underlying trade transaction is prohibited (or taxed) to pro-
tect exchange reserves. If the ECU is excepted currency 
shifts and capital outflows would then still be possible, 
but no other EMS member's currency would be directly 
concerned by this flight into the ECU. 
This increase in demand for ECU deposits in country A is 
not being matched by an increased demand for ECU loans 
in country A. Therefore there is a net capital outflow in 
ECU which requires central bank financing either directly 
in ECU or other reserve currencies, with a concomitant fall 
in the national money supply. In exchange for excepting the 
ECU from safeguard controls country A should be able to 
receive financial support in ECU. This would be similar to 
the present situation but with some attractive features added. 
First, support is to be provided by a common pool (the 
Fecom) and not on a bilateral basis because there would be 
no specific bilateral problem. Second, country A needs ECU 
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and therefore ECU support is better justified than under 
present circumstances. Third, the usability problem of the 
ECU would disappear. If Fecom provides ECU loans of very 
short run and short-run maturities, an additional advantage 
would be gained: autonomous official ECU creation. The 
justification for this step is quite solid: it would only follow 
the increase in private demand. Of course, if it were desirable 
to reduce the money supply in country A, ECU assistance 
would have to be sterilized. 
The advantages of such a scheme would be multiple: 
(i) The ECU would be considered a liquid currency never 
constrained by safeguard clauses. Thus, also in tranquil 
periods the ECU would enjoy an advantage over other 
currencies: 
(ii) any exchange crisis of a particular currency would be 
confined to that currency and would increase ECU 
assets: 
(iii) the exception of the ECU from safeguard exchange 
controls would introduce a European element into an 
otherwise perfectly cosmopolitan approach; 
(iv) once a resident of country A acquires an ECU he is of 
course free to exchange it into any other currency be-
cause the ECU is freely convertible. Nevertheless it can 
be expected that a large share of conversions of currency 
A remain in ECU to avoid twofold transaction costs 
and because the ECU is a priori as attractive as any 
other Community currency. In the past, weakness of 
currency A produced flows into currency B (the 
Deutschmark) and expectations of a devaluation of 
currency A and a revaluation of currency B. The 
Deutschmark has been the obvious candidate because 
several other _EMS countries operated exchange con-
trols. After liberalization speculative outflows are likely 
not to be concentrated on the Deutschmark anymore 
and thereby the ECU would gain in attractiveness; 
(v) the loss of foreign exchange caused by ECU acquisitions 
could be offset by Fecom assistance - and not as 
currently is the case - by bilateral assistance. 
Capital market integration in Belgium, Denmark 
and the Netherlands 
A traditional counter-argument to international financial 
integration is that it deprives countries, and more specifically 
small countries, from any autonomous monetary policy con-
trol. Financial conditions and their stability are feared to be 
influenced more by foreign monetary authorities and private 
agents than by domestic authorities. The following sections 
analyse the experience of Belgium, Denmark and the Nether-
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lands, and try to determine how, considering their respective 
evolution since the emergence of the EMS in 1979, these 
countries have managed their internal and external equilib-
num. 
The three countries present some strong structural similarit-
ies. They are all highly dependent on foreign trade as their 
imports represent more than 60 % of their GDP and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the member country of the 
EMS with the strongest currency, is the largest trading 
partner for each of them. 
This dependency on the Federal Republic of Germany has 
been differently managed by these three countries. Belgium 
found it difficult to peg its currency to the Deutschmark, 
sometimes at a high cost in terms of competitiveness and 
financial pressure. 
The Netherlands has kept its currency close to the Deutsch-
mark for a long time, even before the EMS. The financial 
cost of this policy choice has been quite limited, somewhat 
helped by natural gas which allowed the Dutch economy to 
maintain a positive current account balance during most of 
the I 970s and the I 980s, and to stay comfortably rated by 
the world financial market. Of course, natural gas is not the 
main explanatory factor. Much more important has been 
the readiness of Dutch authorities to accept the implications 
of their foreign exchange policy in setting their fiscal and 
monetary policies. 
Denmark has only recently changed its overall external 
policy. With the hope to preserve domestic policy autonomy, 
Danish authorities controlled quite rigorously outgoing and 
ingoing capital flows for decades. Despite strict financial 
barriers, the continuous current account deficit and the 
increasing difficulty to control across-the-border financial 
transactions without hurting the highly trade-dependent 
economy resulted in a slow but uninterrupted depreciation 
of the krone. In I 983, Danish authorities swiftly reversed 
their stance adopting a strong currency option and liberaliz-
ing international capital flows. 
1. Belgium 
1.1. The dual exchange rate system of the Belgian franc 
The BLEU dual exchange rate system exists since 1955. 
By maintaining a fixed exchange rate for current account 
transactions and a floating rate for capital account trans-
actions, monetary authorities rendered possible the com-
pliance with the general return to full convertibility while 
taking advantage of both fixed and flexible exchange rate 
systems. 
Exchange market regulations are based on the distinction 
between current and capital account transactions. All cur-
rent account transactions, apart from some invisibles (like 
tourism) and private transfers, are channelled through the 
official market where the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) 
intervenes. Regarding capital transactions a distinction is 
made between inflows and outflows. The acquisition of 
foreign financial assets by BLEU residents has always been 
assigned to the financial exchange market where the NBB 
does not - at least officially - intervene. Capital inflows, 
on the other hand, have been allowed to transit through the 
official market before May 1971 and after May 1983. 
Since the dual exchange rate system is generally considered 
as a substitute for capital controls, 1 much attention has been 
devoted to ensuring isolation of both markets. Apart from 
illegal transfers, the existence of official and financial mar-
kets has always left room for arbitrage operations.2 Without 
changing the legislation, the Belgian monetary authorities 
loosen or tighten regulations according to the pressure put 
on the franc in the financial market. For example, during the 
second half of 1981 - when anticipations of a devaluation of 
the franc provoked a record divergence between financial 
and official rates (see Graph I) - the NBB set a number of 
punctual rules to strengthen the separation of both markets. 
Measures included the limitation of banks' balances in for-
eign currencies, and the reduction of the authorized time lag 
between current account transactions and repatriation of 
the proceeds. By contrast the NBB took an opposite stance 
after 1984, at a time when the divergence between the two 
exchange rates had declined to less than half a percentage 
point: a larger variety of payments has been allowed to 
transit through either of the two markets at the transactor's 
will. 
1.2. The performance of the BLEU dual exchange market 
Reding (1985) evaluated the performance of the BLEU 
exchange market by comparing the fit of the covered interest 
rate parity using the financial exchange rate on the one 
hand, and the official exchange rate on the other hand: 
should the interest rate parity condition perform as well on 
the official market as on the financial market, it could be 
concluded that the dual market did not in any way provide 
1 Fleming (1974). Decaluwe and Steinherr (1976). 
Decaluwe and Steinherr ( 1974) provide empirical evidence. 
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GRAPH I : Belgium: The financial exchange rate discount on 
the official exchange rate 
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insula tion from foreign disturbances or enhance control over 
domestic interest rates' .1 
Using various estimation procedures, Reding concludes that 
the covered interest rate parity relation holds across curren-
cies (notably the US dollar and the Deutschmark) but not 
across markets ( official and financial). Whilst the financial 
exchange and interest rates adjusted fairly well in order to 
maintain the parity with the foreign interest rates, the two-
tier exchange system has allowed the NBB to maintain 
during the turbulent period of 1981-82 the domestic interest 
rate far below what it would have been in an environment 
with fi xed exchange rates and a unique exchange market. 
This is illustrated in Graph 2 which traces two interest 
ra te differentials. One is the differential between domestic 
Belgian and German 3-month deposit rates; the other is 
the differential between convertible Belgian and German 3-
month deposit rates .2 The gap between these two differen-
Reding (1 985), p. 12. 
Convertible Belgian fra nc deposits a re deposits by non-residents convert-
ible at the offici al rate. Interest rates refl ect therefore that part o f the 
deva luation risk already incorpo rated in the di scount of the financia l 
ra te. 
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GRAPH 2: Interest rate differential: Belgium - Germany 
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tials is a measure of the required additional increase in 
domestic interest rates in the absence of a dual exchange 
market. In December 1980, the interest rate differential with 
respect to Germany would have jumped to more than 11 % , 
instead of the 5 % actually realized. During calm periods 
(from mid-1983 onwards) convertible and financial interest 
rates are virtually identical, as are official and financial 
exchange rates . Thus, one practical advantage of the dual 
exchange system is that during turbulent periods, domestic 
interest rates rise less than otherwise, because the spot finan-
cial exchange rate adapts sufficiently to equate covered 
returns without a major rise in interest rates. 
It thus appears that the two-tier market fulfills quite well its 
advocated insulation role during exchange market unrest -
i.e. when parity changes are anticipated. During these per-
iods, market separation has been sufficiently efficient to 
prevent complete arbitrage between them and to allow the 
NBB to keep some control on both the official exchange 
and domestic interest rates . Symmetrically, during tranquil 
periods, the N 88 loosens the regulation scheme thus permit-
ting a better osmosis between the two compartments of the 
exchange market. 
One should however not consider the evidence presented 
above as absolute reference. A careful analysis of the BLEU 
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balance of payments during the crisis period of 1981-82 
shows that the NBB interventions in the official foreign 
exchange market have been supported by the Belgian 
Government's massive recourse to borrowing in foreign 
currencies. 
Whether the two-tier exchange rate system shielded, at least 
partially, the domestic economy from disturbances in the 
foreign exchange market seems little questionable. Another 
concern is whether the legal freedom of across-the-border 
capital transactions has led to an effective capital integration 
of the BLEU with the rest of the world. 
1.3. Capital integration and banking activity 
The international role of Belgian banks is much more impor-
tant than what could be expected according to domestic 
market size. Graph 3 shows the share of foreign liabilities 
and domestic liabilities in foreign currencies in the consoli-
dated balance sheet of the Belgian banking system compared 
with the German and British banking systems. Considering 
the historical background of London as a financial centre, 
the international dimension of the Belgian banking system 
is quite remarkable and certainly not unrelated to the ab-
sence of direct capital controls. In recent years, a little more 
than half of banking activity in Belgium has been developed 
with non-residents. Taking into account the liabilities in 
foreign currencies with respect to residents, over 60 % of 
the liabilities of Belgian banks are related to foreign trans-
actions. 
Belgian financial institutions are obviously keen to develop 
their role as intermediaries. This raises some awkward policy 
questions as a systematically large net position would suggest 
that banks offer an efficient channel for net capital outflows 
and inversely in the case where liabilities to non-residents 
outweigh foreign assets. 
During turbulent periods the NBB severely constrains bank 
positions in foreign currencies - generally with respect to 
non-residents - and it is clear that banks try to match, over 
the long run, their foreign assets and liabilities. It is therefore 
not easy to determine whether and to what extent financial 
institutions' foreign activities are significantly isolated from 
domestic intermediation. Nevertheless, recent experience 
based on the evolution of bank positions with respect to their 
foreign correspondents suggests that, without considering 
short-run adjustments during turbulent periods, the Belgian 
private banking system has systematically provided the dom-
estic economy with foreign funds. Table I indicates the net 
external investment position of Belgian commercial banks 
since 1970. From a relatively modest net debtor position 
during the early 1970s, banks have massively borrowed 
funds abroad to reach a net negative foreign pos1t1on of 
more than BFR 1 100 OOO million in 1986 (comprising both 
domestic and foreign currencies). 
1.4. Real capital flows 
The integration of commercial banks in the international 
financial market is not sufficient to guarantee the integration 
of the whole economy. As argued before, perfect capital 
mobility goes well beyond strictly defined financial inte-
gration and allows savings and investment decisions to be 
completely dichotomized. In an environment with complete 
capital mobility domestic investment is not constrained by 
domestic savings as capital flows to countries where it ob-
tains the highest reward. 
Graph 4 shows Belgian savings and investment as a percent-
age of GDP. Whilst during 1975-84 savings and investment 
tended to be collinear in Belgium, the level of domestic 
investment exceeded domestic savings for an eight-year per-
iod, in some years by as much as 4 % of GDP. Domestic 
savings appear therefore, at least over the medium term, not 
to constrain investment in Belgium. During 1976-85 financial 
inflows allowed Belgium to maintain a higher level of dom-
estic investment than would have been possible without 
capital mobility. 
1.5. Capital mobility and the balance of payments 
According to the study by Reding, the two-tier exchange 
system has succeeded in its role of insulating current account 
transactions from disturbances in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. Parallelly, a reinforced implementation of regulations 
on the part of the NB8 during the turbulent period (1981/ 
11-82/IV), has prevented much of the potential arbitrage 
between the official and the financial markets. Taking Table 
2 as a reference, it appears, on the one hand, that the N 88 
had sometimes ( 1982/IV) been forced to reduce its foreign 
assets holding by more than the current account deficit, and, 
on the other hand, that the massive recourse of public 
authorities to foreign borrowing has been an appreciated 
alternative to official reserve losses. 
During 1979-80, current account deficits and the net acqui-
sition of foreign assets by private non-banks have been 
largely financed by net direct investment inflows and the 
increase in commercial bank liabilities to non-residents. Di-
rect public foreign borrowing and official intervention have 
played a rather marginal role. Even if this division is not 
necessarily identical to the distinction between autonomous 
and accommodating capital flows, the absence of direct 
capital controls did not produce unsolvable balance of pay-
131 
C rea ti o n of a European fin a ncia l a rea 
GRAPH 3: Foreign liabilities and domestic liabilities in foreign currencies as a percentage of the banking system's balance sheet in 
Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom 
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ments problems during the period preceding the 1981-82 
cns1s. 
Whilst the current account deficit jumped to a cumulated 
record high of BFR 315 OOO million in 1981 and 1982, 
its financing has changed in an essential way as Belgian 
authorities faced the financial market's lack of trust in the 
franc. After channelling funds from abroad during the pre-
ceding period, banks augmented massively their net foreign 
assets since the beginning of 1981 (see Table 2b ). 
This dramatic reversal may certainly be explained by the 
fact that private non-banks augmented dramatically their 
assets in foreign currencies deposited with banks, which led 
Table 1 
Belgium: Net external investment position of commercial banks 
Foreign assets 
of which in BFR 
Foreign liabilities 
of which in BFR 
Net investment position 
Source: Bulletin of the NBB. 
Table 2a 
Belgium: Balance of payments 1981-82 
Current account 
Fgn. direct invest. (net) 
Public foreign borrow. 
NFA non-banks 1 
NFA corn. banks 1 
NFA NBB2 
Com. credit 
1 ( - ) = increase. 
2 ( + ) = increase. 
Soun(·· NBB. monthly and annual reports. 
1970 1975 
246 703 
33,4 67 
287 796 
50 162 
-41 -93 
-36 
II 
32 
20 
-34 
-47 
-12 
II 
the latter to raise their holdings of foreign assets above the 
level they would have reached autonomously. The relatively 
limited change in non-banks' foreign assets during the specu-
lative months of 1981 is thus seen as the consequence of 
anticipations. 
The necessity to support the franc led Belgian public authori-
ties to increase their direct recourse to foreign capital. Start-
ing from early 1981, they borrowed in one single semester 
more than during the two previous years. Ex post, capital 
inflows through public operations financed more than half 
of the current account deficit in 1981, and overfinanced it 
in 1982, preserving thereby official reserves from an unsus-
tainable contraction. 
( In hillion BFR: at t'lld <f paiod) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986'\ 
I 913 2 690 3 085 3 684 4 517 4 665 4 488 
118 135 158 184 221 239 253 
2 300 3 196 3 677 4 462 5 449 5 687 5 604 
354 349 361 368 459 531 570 
-387 -506 -592 -778 -932 -1022 - I 116 
fquurtaly, in hi/lion BFR) 
1981 1982 
Ill IV II Ill IV 
-60 -49 -54 -51 -54 3 -15 
34 -4 10 2 35 5 29 
27 16 33 43 40 32 2 
16 -9 -8 -19 -40 -10 -6 
-12 6 5 14 -2 30 -78 
4 -40 -13 - II -20 60 -67 
-22 -5 -27 21 2 -13 10 
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Table 2b 
Belgium: Balance of payments (1978/1 - 86/1) 
1978 1979 
I. Current account -23 -92 
2. Fgn. direct invest. (net) 29 -3 
3. Public foreign borrow. 13 4,3 
4. NFA non-banksl -50 -31 
5. NF A corn. banks3 22 87 
6. NFA NBB2 -16 32 
%(1) + (3) -(6) 6 -56 
I ( - ) = increase. . . 
( +) = increase. This entry docs not comprise discounted commerc1al credits. 
Errors and omissions have been included in banks' capital Oows. 
The 1982 financing scheme is similar. The devaluation in 
February did not stop the speculative position against the 
franc with stayed under pressure until the June realignment 
amongst EMS currencies. Massive direct investment inflows 
and foreign public borrowing associated with an improve-
ment of the private non-banks financing capacity, allowed 
the latter to reduce their foreign borrowing and, simul-
taneously, to raise their holdings of liquid foreign assets. 
Again, banks channelled - during the fourth quarter -
flows abroad to cover domestic deposits in foreign currencies 
and autonomous spot positions despite the renewed public 
borrowing in foreign currencies. 
The proceeds of the public authorities' borrowing in foreign 
currencies are exchanged with the NBB which utilizes them 
to intervene in the foreign exchange market, realizing 
thereby a sterilized intervention. The excess of public net 
foreign borrowing plus the net use of the NBB's international 
liquidity in relation to the current account deficit indicates 
that exchange market segmentation has never been complete 
and that several capital operations - such as leads and lags 
and financial transactions by non-residents in convertible 
francs - have been channelled through the official market. 
But, considering its amplitude, it also suggests that the NBB 
intervened non-marginally in the free financial exchange 
market. 
It remains, nevertheless, that by assigning most of the private 
capital flows to the financial market, the two-tier exchange 
market appears, ex post, to have helped Belgian authorities 
to circumvent the tensions at a manageable level. 
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1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986/1 
-164 -198 -116 -39 -1,5 13 16 
41 49 67 47 4,5 43 -2 
26 107 129 29 83 18 40 
25 -17 -82 -75 -107 -105 -40 
85 -11 -35 15 70 28 -20 
27 -96 -38 -22 67 -8 1 
-111 5 51 12 14 39 55 
1.6. Conclusion 
The BLEU has ceased to impose direct capital controls since 
the general return to convertibility in Europe in 1958. 1 
Instead, monetary authorities set up a two-tier foreign ex-
change market whose advocated purpose was - and still is 
- to shield real flows from disruptive financial disequilibria. 
The separation between the official and financial markets is 
rather loose during quiet periods but is strengthened when 
the franc comes under heavy pressure. 
Although both the domestic and the Euro-franc markets are 
modest in size, the absence of stringent capital barriers has 
permitted banks in Belgium and Luxembourg to massively 
develop their foreign currency and across-the-border oper-
ations which now represent the major part of their activity. 
This intermediary role of the banks benefited the domestic 
economy as financial institutions have continuously, over 
the last 15 years, channelled funds from abroad. 
Statistics cannot offer a definite answer as to whether the 
immersion of Belgian banks into the world financial market 
suppressed all fund shortages in the domestic economy. 
I One of the last marginal restrictions to capital flows has been recently 
lifted (in May 1987), which suppresses any discrimination ·en matiere 
d'emission publique ou de demande de cotation a une bourse beige de 
titres crees par des personnes, societes ou institutions relevant d'un autre 
Etat membre de la CEE'. 
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Investment does not seem however to be constrained by the 
availability of domestic savings, which may indicate that 
most of the profitable investment opportunities are financed 
either domestically or internationally. Profitability remains, 
of course, constrained by world market interest rates. 
Belgian monetary policy has been driven over the last I O or 
more years by the external constraint, that is by the attempt 
to maintain the franc parity with the Deutschmark. How-
ever, the policy objective of pegging the Belgian franc to the 
Deutschmark has been incompatible with the increase in 
wage costs relative to Germany. Until wage-indexation was 
scaled down to support the devaluation in 1982, growth of 
labour costs in Belgium diminished competitivity of 
Belgium's trading sector and led to several exchange market 
crises. The last episode is the 1981-82 period sanctioned by 
a devaluation of about 10 %. During this turbulent period 
the NBB reinforced the separation of the dual exchange 
system and prevented most of the potential arbitrage be-
tween the two markets. Parallelly, public authorities mass-
ively tapped foreign banks and supplied the NBB with ad-
ditional foreign exchange. Considering the volume of the 
funds leaving the BLEU during these two years and the 
implicit but delayed cost attached to the public borrowing 
in foreign currencies, the dual exchange system appears, ex 
post, to have helped in preventing a more expensive crisis. 
2. Denmark 
2.1. The removal of capital controls 
After 1961, Denmark adopted the liberalization codes set 
by the OECD concerning payments associated with current 
account and certain capital account transactions. On the 
occasion of its accession to the EEC in 1973, Denmark 
became subject to the EEC's capital directives to which she 
complied partially according to the Executive Order on the 
Foreign Exchange Regulations of March 1981. Beyond these 
measures, Denmark maintained until recently extensive con-
trols over foreign capital transactions. 
Along with the growing recognition within the EEC that 
capital controls may have become largely inefficient and 
probably counter-productive in today's integrated world 
financial market, Danish authorities engaged in a broad 
liberalization process. The Foreign Exchange Regulation 
Order has been amended in 1982 and 1985, in order to free 
most of the privalt: capital movements from quantitative 
barriers. I 
1 Public capital operations are, for their part, managed discretionarily by 
the Danish public authorities. 
In this section, 2 the main aspects of the liberalization process 
are reviewed according to the EEC classification code re-
garding categories of capital transactions. 
List A: 
Direct investment, loans and credits related to current ac-
count transactions: 
This category has been basically liberalized already before 
the accession to the EEC. The amount of inward direct 
investment below which no formal permission from the 
Ministry of Industry is needed was increased from DKR I 
million to DKR 2 million per calendar year in 1982, and 
again to 10 million in 1985. On the other hand, the payment 
threshold for direct investment which residents can make 
abroad without specific permission - from the National-
bank this time - has been raised from DKR 200 OOO to 
DKR 500 OOO in 1982, to DKR 2 million in 1983 and further 
increased to DKR 10 million in 1985. Direct investments 
requiring permission are normally approved in accordance 
with Denmark's obligations as a member of the EEC and 
of the OECD. Outgoing investment in purely financial insti-
tutions is however still subject to tight control. 
List B: 
Portfolio transactions (quoted securities): 
A gradual liberalization of non-residents' purchase of ex-
change-listed kroner bonds was initiated in 1971 while sales 
of exchange-listed shares to non-residents were deregulated 
overnight on Denmark's entry into the EEC. A temporary 
ban on purchases of Danish government bonds was lifted 
in 1983. The only essential restriction still in application 
covers non-residents' purchase of Danish treasury bills 
which are regarded as money-market securities. 
Following the transitional period, Danish residents were 
permitted, from the beginning of 1978, to buy exchange-
listed bonds issued by international organizations of which 
Denmark was a member. On I May 1983 the rules were 
liberalized further, general access being granted to purchase 
foreign exchange-listed bonds with an original maturity ex-
ceeding two years. Since the beginning of 1984 Danish resi-
dents arc allowed to buy foreign exchange-listed shares, as 
well as Danish bonds denominated in a foreign currency. 
The exposition of the liberalization measures has benefited from J. Ovi 
( 1985). In the meantime. Lists A and B were merged according to the 
Directive of 17 November 1986. Sec the Of.ficial Journal of rhe European 
Co1111111111i1ies of 26 November 1986. 
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List C: 
Port fo lio tra nsactions (unquoted securiti es): 
Since 1983, non-residents have free access to all types of 
Dani sh sha res while previously they could on ly buy ex-
change- li sted securities. 
After recommending banks to avoid involvement in financial 
constructions, aimed a t tax evasion , the Danmarks National-
bank has, since June 1985, accommodated specific appli-
ca ti ons from residents to acquire unlisted foreign securities 
including sha res and certificates in foreign investment associ-
a ti ons. 
The issuing and placing of securities : 
Since I January 1984 residents are a llowed to issue Danish 
securities fo r subscription or sa le abroad and have free 
access to Danish bonds denominated in a foreign currency. 
Financia l loans: 
While companies ' were previously granted only limited ac-
cess to borrowing abroad - foreign loans , with a minimum 
maturity of five years , were restricted to finance fixed invest-
ment - the link to investments was dropped in May 1983, 
and the required minimum period was in 1985 reduced to 
one yea r. 
Residents a re still , as a general rule, not allowed to grant 
loans to borrowers abroad - except commercial credits. 
The Danmarks Nationalbank noticed however that this rule 
has had no particular effect , as interest rates have been 
higher in Denmark than abroad.2 
More generally , the threshold for transactions for which 
permission is not required or which do not have to be 
reported for statistical purposes was increased from 
DKR 10 OOO to DKR 25 OOO in 1983 and again to 
DKR 40 OOO in 1985. Parallelly, rules governing forward 
exchange transactions were largely liberalized in I 984. 
1 Acti vities o f banks, stockbrokers and mortgage cred it institutions a re 
still severely controlled . In principle, banks are prohibited to maintain 
net indebtedness abroad and their net credit balance cannot exceed 15 % 
of equit y subject to a maximum of DKR 2 million. 
2 The Danmarks Nationalbank , annual report , 1983, p. 54. 
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2.2. The financial environment of the liberalization 
The recent Danish experience of financial liberalization of-
fers an opportunity for testing some of the arguments raised 
against liberalization of across-the-border capital trans-
actions. We shall restrain the fo llowing section to the balance 
of payments and exchange rate situation of Denmark at the 
time of liberalization, namely the period 1980-82. 
In the first half of the 1970s the krone's nominal effective 
exchange rate appreciated steadily with respect to its indus-
trialized partners but from the beginning of 1979 until Sep-
tember 1982, after a period of relative stability, it lost about 
22 % of its value (Graph 5). 
Even if this development owes much to the appreciation of 
the US dollar over this period, the krone's recurrent weak-
ness during that period is also observable with respect to 
the Deutschmark, which is frequently used by Danish com-
panies as borrowing currency. From January 1979 until the 
second half of 1982, the krone depreciated by 24 % with 
respect to the currency of Denmark 's largest trading partner 
(Graph 6) . Three readjustments of the krone's exchange rate 
GRAPH 5: The Danish krone's effective exchange rate 
1975 = 100 
1979/1-86/11 
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against the other EMS currencies occurred during the same 
period. 1 
Even with relatively constraining capital controls, the inter-
est rate differential with respect to the FR of Germany 
adjusted for expected depreciation, stayed largely positive, 
illustrating the low efficiency of existing controls for shelter-
ing the domestic economy (Table 3). Adjusting for the mar-
ket's expectations of the krone's depreciation against the 
Deutschmark,2 the Danish domestic rate of interest pre-
sented constantly throughout the period a positive differen-
tial of 4 to 5 percentage points. In the light of several 
effective devaluations and the fear of future realignment, 
foreign lenders were apparently unwilling to increase their 
net assets in kroner while domestic companies were reluctant 
to finance the repayment of their old foreign debts by new 
foreign borrowing. 
In connection with the government's policy of demand 
stimulation since the autumn of 1975, the current account 
deteriorated substantially and continuously over the period 
under review. The external balance deficit has been a recur-
rent problem for the Danish economy and it reveals a 
structural disequilibrium between domestic absorption and 
domestic supply rather than a competitivity problem. As 
appears in Graph 7, the situation owes much to the structur-
ally high investment rate compared with domestic saving. 
More than the current account deficit itself. its financing 
has significantly changed over the period 1980-82 compared 
with the previous years. Foreign borrowing by domestic 
companies - which includes intra-group loans - financed 
over 30 % of the current deficit in l 978-79 while non-
residents' acquisition of domestic securities (mainly govern-
ment bonds) provided ingoing financial flows. The massive 
recourse by the Danish Government to direct foreign bor-
rowing overfinanced the deficit and allowed the Danmarks 
Nationalbank to increase its net foreign reserves. 
The swift increase in the balance of payments deficit in I 980 
was exclusively due to private financial transactions. After 
the two devaluations in 1979, business was not disposed 
- in spite of favourable interest differentials - to raise 
additional funds abroad. Accordingly, net incoming finan-
cial loans almost dried up in 1980 and completely reversed 
1 The kru11e was devalued 011 24 September 1979. JO November 1979 and 
22 February 1982. It was also devalued indirectly against the Deutsch-
mark when the latter was revalued on 5 October 1981 and 14 June 1982. 
This adjustment is considered as a measure of the market's expectations 
of the depreciation of the krone against the Deutschmark. Expectations 
are assumed to depend on the difference between the in nation differential 
and the actual depreciation of the krone. 
in I 98 I and 1982. Parallelly, in February 1979, the Danish 
Government put a ban on the purchase by non-residents of 
government bonds that produced its maximal effect in the 
1980-82 period. The circulation of government bonds abroad 
declined both through sales and redemptions, while foreign 
investors' interest in Danish bonds decreased. Residents, on 
the other hand, who had shown no special desire to purchase 
foreign bonds before, increased their net detention by DKR 
I 200 million during the September-October l 982 crisis. 
Cumulated over the three-year time span, portfolio oper-
ations added to the external deficit. Consequently, and in 
order to prevent a major loss of international reserves, public 
foreign borrowing jumped dramatically - from DKR 5 705 
million in 1979 to DKR 25 618 million in 1982 - although 
not sufficiently to preserve official foreign exchange reserves. 
To sum up, the external financial position of the Danish 
economy was relatively negative at the time the decision 
to liberalize capital movements was taken. The traditional 
argument according to which, in a fixed exchange rate en-
vironment, only favourably positioned economies can lib-
eralize across-the-border capital transactions without suffer-
ing an unsustainable loss of foreign official reserves. was far 
from being verified. The following section thus focuses on 
the balance of payments implications of liberalization. 
2.3. The balance of payments reactions to the removal of 
capital controls 
Towards the end of l 982, the Danish monetary authorities 
opted for a non-accommodating exchange rate policy which 
was supported by a tightening of fiscal and revenue policies. 
In connection with the deceleration of inflation, the current 
account deficit noticeably declined in absolute terms (Table 
4) and even more in relative terms from 4 % of GDP in 
I 982 to 2, l % in I 983. This improvement was, however, 
shortlived and the current account deficit in relation to GDP 
reached 4,4 % in 1985, the year of the second liberalization 
phase. Preliminary data for 1986 indicate a further worsen-
ing as the current account deficit reaches DKR 34 600 
million. equivalent to approximately 5 % of GDP. 
Whilst the removal of capital controls had almost no effect 
by itself on current account transactions,3 it had far-reaching 
consequences for their financing. The ban on foreign sales 
of government bonds was lifted in May 1983 as non-residents 
gained free access to all types of Danish securities. The 
hard-currency stance adopted by monetary authorities in 
1 This need not necessarily be the case if domestic investment is constrained 
by the availability of domestic funds. 
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GRAPH 6 : Index of the Deutschmark's value in Danish 
kroner 
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Table 3 
GRAPH 7: Savings and investment in Denmark 
1975-84 
24.----.,.-.,-------------------, 
23 
22 
ii : 
20 
19 
18 
17 
16 
15 
14 - S/GDP 
13 - - - - I/GDP 
' 
, ____ _ 
' 
' 
' 
' \ , 
' 
' ' 
' ' 
' ' \ ' 
,_ ---
',, ,. ,.,.,. 
12 .___.___ ,___ ,__ _ _._ _ _.__.J.c=...L..--'--..J 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
The Danish krone's depreciation, bond yields and inflation differential (Denmark-Germany)l 
In te rest lnnation Depreciation Interes t diffe ren tia l adjusted fo r 
differentia l differential 
lnnation Depreciation Average 
differential 
1979 8,85 7,70 4,57 1,15 4,29 2,72 
1980 10,04 6,63 8,0 1 3,41 2,03 2,72 
1981 8,27 5,35 1,63 2,92 6,64 4,78 
1982 10,43 4,61 8,96 5,83 1,47 3,65 
1983 6,93 3,49 4,28 3,44 2,66 3,05 
1984 6,44 3,80 1,62 2,64 4,82 3,73 
1985 4,87 2,47 - 1,05 2,40 5,92 4, 16 
1986/11 4,43 6,93 2,36 -2,50 2,07 - 0,2 1 
I This table is const ructed from C. F. Jensen and J. Hald (1986). 
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Table 4 
Denmark: Balance of payments (1978/1-86/1) 
1978 1979 1980 
Current account balance -8 345 - 16 065 -13 400 
Fgn. direct invest. (net) 129 173 -145 
Public foreign borrowing 7 885 5 705 10 025 
Portfolio inv. l 1 999 3 015 -457 
Loans and other cap. flows2 3 820 7 671 I 952 
Official reserves4 5 488 499 -2 025 
Com. credit3 -236 -2 351 -1 042 
I ( - ) = outnows. 
2 ( + ) = increase. 
J ( - ) = net from abroad. 
' 
Ind. discrepancies. 
Source: Nationalbank Review. 
combination with continued high positive interest rate differ-
ential certainly gave a strong incentive to non-residents 
to take advantage of capital liberalization. Effectively, the 
portfolio balance moved rapidly into a surplus amounting 
to about DKR 24 OOO million during 1983-85. Similarly, the 
successive easing of companies' financial borrowing abroad 
resulted in a complete reversal of capital movements from 
net outflows to increasing net inflows, amounting in 1985 
to a flow of DKR 34 237 million into the domestic economy. 
Because the reversal of private capital flows tended to fi. 
nance a greater part of the current account deficit and 
despite increasing direct investment abroad, government had 
the opportunity to start redemptions of previous expensive 
borrowings, producing a net public financial outflow in 
1984. Meanwhile, Danmarks Nationalbank more than re-
stored its net foreign assets holdings after three years of 
continuous strain. 
As to foreign loans and securities transactions, it appears 
that despite a negative starting situation, the easing of the 
former in connection with a firm exchange rate policy re-
sulted in massive inward capital flows while the liberalization 
of the latter has not given rise to sizeable capital movements, 
except for the acquisition by non-residents of krone bonds. 
Figures for 1986 are still partial. However, they suggest 
that, partly due to concern about the krone's exchange rate 
stability, sales and purchases of Danish government bonds 
by foreign investors have been almost equally balanced and 
that Danish companies have been paying back old foreign 
rin hil!ion DKR1 
1981 1982 198) 1984 1985 1986/1 
-12 270 -19 230 - 12 775 - 17 720 -27 960 NA 
-312 616 3 -2 354 -1 384 -782 
8 880 25 618 17 417 -5 686 4 297 318 
511 -1 213 2 876 7 365 13 751 -11 111 
-2 200 -8 253 -332 14 931 24 938 NA 
-5 391 -2 462 7 189 -3 464 13 642 NA 
-201 123 -3 225 -13 923 3 740 I 246 
debts while raising new funds in domestic currency. Similarly 
to the 1980-81 period, with the private sector not filling the 
current account gap, the government had to import capital 
directly from abroad at an accelerated pace. 
2.4. Interest rates and financial liberalization 
The most spectacular change occurred in I 983 in the inter-
bank money market where interest rates fell by approxi-
mately 8 percentage points during the second quarter. when 
the first liberalization measures came into force (Graph 8 ). 
Even if a slight increase occurred in the subsequent period, 
the declining trend resumed in early 1985, at the time of 
the second step towards financial liberalization. and money 
market rates reached a level as low as 8,66 % in February 
1986. 
Interest rates followed closely the reduction in inflation 
rates. The consumer price index decelerated from more than 
12 % in 1980 to less than 4 % over the June 1985 to June 
I 986 period. This reduction outdid the pace of Germany's 
disinflation, which brought the inflation differential from 
7, 7 % in 1979 to 2,5 % in I 985. Since the krone has only 
slightly depreciated with respect to the Deutschmark over 
the last three years, the interest rate differential adjusted for 
inflation-depreciation has been maintained at a relatively 
high level. This explains, at least partly, that the capital 
liberalization measures have drained funds from abroad. 
Symmetrically, the widening of the inflation gap since the 
beginning of 1986, associated with the firm-currency stance 
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developed by the Danish moneta ry authorities, has reduced 
the adjusted interes t different ia l which, during the first sem-
ester, has become nega tive. Accordingly, and a lso fo r fo reign 
exchange uncertain ties, domestic compan ies have not been 
induced to refinance their borrowi ngs abroad . 
The evolution o f bond ra tes is simila r. Although they did 
not decli ne sharply over any limi ted period of time, the long-
run trend has been conti nuously nega ti ve fo r the las t five 
yea rs, and the gap between 1982 - when bond ra tes peaked 
at more than 20 % - and the low 9,88 % recorded in March 
1986 is qui te impressive. T he prospects fo r 1986 suggest tha t 
in teres t rates have adj usted upwards as the Danish current 
acco unt sharply worsened and private capital new out of 
the country. 
G ra ph 9 shows tha t after erra tic movements of the spread 
between domestic and Euro-rates fo llowing libera lization, 
spreads became negligible after liberaliza tion. 
2.5. Conclusion 
Although it is certainly not possible to attribute the evolution 
of fina ncial markets and of the balance of payments to 
the sole remova l of across-the-border capital contro ls, it is 
important to note tha t, while fi nancial liberali zation has 
been endeavoured in a non-favo ura ble enviro nment, it did 
not prod uce unsustai nable capita l outOows. On the contrary, 
moneta ry authorities di smantled exchange controls, adopted 
a ' ha rd -currency' sta nce, managed to curb the krone's de-
preciation rate wi th respect to the Deutschmark , and suc-
ceeded in redi recting private capital Oows from a net outOow 
to a net inOow, and in reconstituting its fo reign reserves. 
The situa tion in 1986 may prove less idyllic but it presents 
many structural similarities wi th the pre-libera liza tion per-
iod : a deepening of the current account deficit and widening 
of the inOation diffe rentia l. T here is however no reason to 
believe that the fi nancial libera liza tion has produced these 
difficul ties or is even aggravating them. Indeed, the terms 
Denmark has been able to obta in fo r her recent borrowings 
in the Euromarket co rrobora te the view tha t the removal of 
capita l barriers has not produced a negative impact on the 
financia l market's perception of the Danish credi t quality 
and the underlying economic fundamenta ls. 1 
1 As an example, in ea rly August Morgan Guaran ty led a USO 
I OOO million Ooating rate notes issue fo r Denmark which paid I /8 below 
six-month Libid . 
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GRAPH 8 : Money market interest rates and bond yields in 
Denmark and Germany 
1979/1-86/11 
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The Danish experience supports, however, a fact which 
became also apparent from the Belgian experience: if funda-
mentals (demand policies or wage pressure) generate current 
account deficits, the market expects realignments of the 
exchange rate. Either domestic interest rates reflect these 
expectations or when monetary authorities attempt to pre-
vent a rise in domestic interest rates, private capital flows 
will be insufficient for financing the current account deficit. 
Governments are then induced to borrow directly abroad, 
instead of borrowing in the domestic market. In the process 
the money supply is being increased and the upward move-
ment of interest rates is further delayed. 
These experiences demonstrate the obvious: it is impossible 
to peg the exchange rate, peg the interest rate and to pursue 
autonomous demand and wage policies at the same time. 
3. The Netherlands 
3.1. The external monetary policy 
Natural gas has brought the Netherlands to a special pos-
ition in the Community not only for matters concerning 
energy but also for international adjustment problems. The 
direct impact of natural gas production on Dutch exports 
associated with the impact of the substitution process on 
imports has contributed, since the beginning of the 1970s, 
to maintain the current account balance in surplus except 
for the years 1978 through 1980. 
The main target of the Dutch authorities has been to gear 
monetary policy towards the external constraint. Imports 
represent approximately 60 % of GDP and more than 20 % 
comes from Germany, the Netherland's largest trading part-
ner. Since the beginning of the snake in 1972, monetary 
authorities have tried to maintain a stable exchange rate vis-
c1-vis the Deutschmark. This policy target has forced the 
Nederlandsche Bank (NB) to undertake unsterilized inter-
ventions in case of strong pressure on the guilder's exchange 
rate. 
The guilder has always kept a strong position in the EMS. 
Apart from the weeks surrounding the 2 % realignment vis-
a-vis the Deutschmark in September 1979 and March 1983, 
it showed only two periods of relative weakness - in the 
first half of 1981 and the beginning of 1982 (see Graph I 0). 
Parallelly, the guilder's effective exchange rate has uninter-
ruptedly appreciated and gained more than 15 % between 
1979 and 1986. 
Capital has been nearly free to flow inwards and outwards 
and the Dutch authorities have steadily reduced remaining 
barriers. Accordingly, rules concerning commercial banks' 
external position was eased in 1980 and the rules governing 
permission for capital imports by the private sector were 
significantly relaxed after July 1981. 1 
In the absence of strict capital controls, the NB has continu-
ously maintained its control over interest rates in the money 
market either by acting on the official discount rate or 
by modifying the liquidity of the banking system through 
unsterilized interventions, reserve quotas and foreign ex-
change swaps with private commercial banks. Taking into 
account the exchange rate target, Dutch monetary policy 
has consisted in keeping domestic interest rates close to 
German interest rates. Graph 11 shows that the interest rate 
differential between the Netherlands and Germany has been 
modest from 1979-86 except during turbulent periods such 
as the months following the September 1979 devaluation 
when the differential jumped to more than 5 %. The other 
periods of exchange rate unrest are marked by a negative 
differential rapidly followed by a rise of the Dutch interest 
rate. 
3.2. The Dutch balance of payments structure 
The Dutch current account balance has been largely positive 
during 1978-86/1, except for the three first years. Accord-
ingly, monetary authorities have been much more concerned 
about controlling capital inflows which were a potential 
source of domestic liquidity increase, of inflation and 
thereby a potential threat for the guilder's exchange rate 
stability. 
Table 5 shows the structure of current account financing. 
Partly due to the decline in capital productivity, direct invest-
ment abroad has represented an important share of outgoing 
funds, not matched by foreign direct investment in the 
Netherlands. 
Contrary to what happened in Belgium and Denmark at 
times of widening current account deficits, foreign public 
borrowing has never been an instrument devoted to shielding 
official reserves. A very restrictive course of monetary policy 
during 1977-81 led private banks and non-banks to increase 
their foreign borrowing, taking advantage of relaxed con-
trols and of the interest rate differential. 
1 As an illustration, the latter relaxation entails that the NB is prepared 
to grant permission on application for raising funds abroad by the private 
sector with a maturity of at least two years (previously 7 to 10 years) 
provided that the rate of interest has been fixed for those two years. The 
restrictions imposed on private foreign borrowing constituted one of the 
measures taken by the Dutch monetary authorities to control domestic 
liquidity over the period 1977-81. 
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Table 5 
Netherlands: Balance of payments 1978/1-86/1 
1978 1979 1980 
Current account -2 686 -3 867 -4 900 
Fgn. direct invest. (net) -2 082 -1 756 -2 981 
Public foreign borrowing -59 -521 -180 
NF A non-banks 274 I 390 I 569 
NFA corn. banks 2 588 3 898 9 049 
NFA NB** -1 975 -916 2 607 
( - ) indicates outnows except for •• 
Source: De Ncdcrlandsche Bank, quarterly statistic~. 
After the current account reversal in 1981, triggered by a 
sharp decline in the Dutch investment rate (see Graph 12), 
private domestic investors increased massively their foreign 
asset holdings through portfolio and direct investment oper-
ations forcing, at times of exchange rate unrest, the NB to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market. 
3.3. Conclusion 
Across-the-border capital flows are not directly constrained 
in the Netherlands. The Dutch authorities follow a strong 
currency policy by pegging their currency exchange rate to 
the Deutschmark. Their domestic monetary policy is geared 
towards this external constraint and the Nederlandsche 
Bank does not attempt to set interest rates at levels divergent 
from German rates. 
The absence of capital controls combined with financial 
market efficiency should result in interest rate parity as well 
as in the complete dichotomy between saving and investment 
decisions. Graphs 12 and 13 are impressive illustrations. 
The former represents Dutch savings and investment as 
percentages of GDP. The absence of correlation between 
the two is striking and suggests that domestic investment 
has not been constrained by the availability of domestic 
funds - especially during the 1978-80 period - and that 
domestic savings have developed independently of domestic 
investment needs. 
( in hiJ/ion H FL) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986/1 
7 764 11 638 12 007 16 611 18 814 3 375 
-4 859 -4 610 -3 801 -6 586 -9 120 -831 
-480 240 -189 -580 19 -461 
-1 481 -5 716 -3 551 -7 869 -5 768 -2 489 
-2 808 8 200 -5 080 -1 641 - I 864 989 
-1 814 4 752 -514 -65 2 086 588 
Graph 13 illustrates the interest rate parity between domestic 
and Euro-guilder rates. In the presence of capital barriers, 
full arbitrage cannot take place, and transaction costs as 
well as risk premiums for further potential controls maintain 
a differential which can be quite noticeable in crisis periods. 
This interest rate differential has been negligible for the 
guilder from 1979/1 to 1986/1, except during the last quarter 
of 1979 when it reached 80 basis points, indicating the 
market's fear of additional restrictions on private borrow-
ings abroad. 
4. The three countries compared 
It is possible to isolate four theoretical implications of inter-
national capital mobility which are empirically identifiable 
in the three economies reviewed: 
(i) Perfect capital mobility renders domestic investment 
totally independent from domestic savings. With no 
barriers to flow of funds and efficient capital markets, 
savings are invested where they obtain the best rewards, 
independently of the residence of the ultimate lenders 
and borrowers. Accordingly, domestic investment, 
whether private or public, should not be constrained 
by the availability of domestic funds. Graphs 4. 7 and 
12 illustrate the specific correlation of domestic saving 
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and investment in each country. During the period 
under review, Denmark exerted strict controls on capi-
tal nows which bound investment to domestic saving. 
(ii) In the absence of capital barriers, domestic interest rates 
should not differ significantly from Euro-rates. Since 
Belgium operates a dual exchange market, domestic 
money market rates and financial Euro-BFR rates are 
identical. On the other hand, interest rates on convert-
ible deposits differ noticeably from financial Euro-BFR 
rates during crisis periods, indicating the amplitude of 
the protection offered by the two-tier exchange system 
(see Graph 2). The Dutch situation corresponds closely 
to a situation of no capital controls (Graph 13). In 
Denmark, after erratic changes in 1983, the differential 
between Euro-krone and domestic rates has been dra-
matically reduced in 1984 and almost disappeared in 
late 1985 and 1986, after the second wave of liberaliza-
tion (Graph 9). 
(iii) By opening financial frontiers, capital integration offers 
the possibility for banking institutions to increase their 
potential markets. Taking into account comparative 
advantages, a small economy effectively open to inter-
national financial transactions can be expected to de-
velop its external banking activities. Graph 14 shows 
the structure of the balance sheet of the banking system 
in five different countries. Banks in the United Kingdom 
hold more than 60 % of their assets on non-residents, 
whilst German banking activity is largely domestic. 
Both countries have nevertheless totally liberalized capi-
tal nows. Belgian banks have massively increased their 
external activities in the absence of legal barriers. The 
most important progression has been recorded by Dan-
ish banks whose foreign activities almost doubled from 
approximately 14 % in 1978 to more than 26 % in June 
1986, most of the increase taking place after 1983. 
(iv) Finally, due to the increased competition from foreign 
banks, financial integration should lead to a reduction 
in the spread between lending and deposit rates. It is 
again convenient to compare the situation in our three 
small countries with other economies. After financial 
deregulation in the USA, it is generally considered 
that US financial markets have attained an exceptional 
degree of competitiveness. On the other extreme, 
French financial institutions were until recently sub-
stantially protected from both internal and external 
competition. Graph 15 shows the spread between lend-
ing and deposit rates in five countries. Even if lending 
rates may not be totally comparable, theoretical expec-
tations are confirmed by the data. The countries with 
free capital movements have the lowest spreads. 
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Indeed, spreads for Belgium and the Netherlands are 
close to US spreads and internal regulations, such as 
for example collective fixing of deposit rates, are likely 
to explain the excess over US spreads. The effects of 
liberalization on spreads are demonstrated by the Dan-
ish experience: from June 1982 to June 1986, the spread 
fell by 2 percentage points, attaining a level comparable 
to the Dutch spread. By contrast, spreads in France 
are much higher and certainly not compatible with 
competitive conditions. 
The experience of Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands 
certainly confirms the expected theoretical implications of 
free capital mobility. The three countries have nevertheless 
their own specificities which prevent any easy generalization. 
Natural gas has certainly given the Netherlands a financial 
advantage; it is doubtless that the two-tier exchange market 
shielded the Belgian domestic economy from financial dis-
turbances; Denmark, on the other hand, has liberalized 
financial transactions in a crisis situation, both in terms of 
current account transactions and market expectations. It did 
not suffer, at least in the short run, from important capital 
outnows and financial instability; Denmark has been able 
to reduce its interest rate differentials with respect to Ger-
many and to reconstitute its stock of foreign official reserves. 
However, what made liberalization possible, in spite of a 
difficult starting point, was the macroeconomic stabilization 
programme implemented simultaneously. 
Conclusions 
The review of the experience of three small EMS countries 
and theoretical considerations suggest several useful guide-
lines. · 
First, small EMS countries experience severe external con-
straints for domestic policy options. Liberalization of foreign 
capital transactions may marginally reinforce these con-
straints but do not bring about dramatic changes. 
Second, whether capital transactions are stabilizing or de-
stabilizing depends solely on underlying fundamentals. Small 
countries cannot deviate from EMS average performance 
or, if pegged to the Deutschmark, from Germany's price 
performance. This constrains domestic fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
Third, whilst monetary policy loses much of its effectiveness, 
fiscal policy may even gain in efficiency from free capital 
mobility. Hence, an instrument for demand management 
remains available. By contrast, monetary policy is largely 
dictated by the remaining EMS countries or Germany. 
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GRAPH 14: Foreign assets as a percentage of commercial banks' balance sheets 
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Fourth, the efficiency gains associated with liberalization 
can be quite substantial. Economies of scale, greater avail-
ability of specialized financial services, more stable rates and 
a greater opportunity set: all represent definite advantages. 
To this is to be added greater rationality in resource allo-
cation. 
Fifth, perhaps the greatest welfare gain will be generated by 
a reduction in spreads between lending and borrowing rates. 
In protected markets these spreads are a multiple of those 
in open markets. Savers and investors will both gain and 
income growth will accelerate. 
Sixth, the distribution effects are generally favourable as the 
cake to be distributed grows in size. However, in particular 
cases either labour or capital owners lose but could always 
be compensated for that loss. Increased competition is also 
likely to have the socially desirable result of reducing mon-
opoly rents of banks. 
GRAPH 15: Spread of lending over deposit rates 
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Seventh, the success of liberalization depends to a large 
extent on fiscal and regulatory uniformiza tion . Recent regu-
latory agreements between the United States and the United 
Kingdom may help to inspire other member countries. From 
the fiscal side, national financial markets would reduce their 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis Euromarkets if capital 
Source: IFS, lines 60 p and 60 i; for Belgium, Generale de Banque (credits de caisse 
and large deposits, 3 monthJ). 
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income was uniformly taxed or, even better, taxed at a zero 
rate. 
Eighth, although the experience of Belgium suggests that a 
dual exchange market may be the least inefficient form of 
capital control, dual exchange markets would not be an 
146 
appropriate institution for sporadic capital control under 
Community supervision. Any quantitative controls or 
foreign exchange taxes used for safeguard purposes may 
except the ECU, thereby avoiding that problems of a par-
ticular currency develop into bilateral strains and effectively 
contributing to development of the ECU into a parallel 
currency. 
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Introduction 
This paper gathers some perspectives on financial liberaliza-
tion in the three newly integrating countries of the European 
Community (EC). These are Greece, which joined in 1981, 
and Portugal and Spain, which followed in 1986. 
While Spain is considerably larger and more industrialized 
than the other two countries, the three new members were 
seen as part of the 'newly industrializing countries' identified 
by the OECD in the early 1970s so that they are frequen~ly 
referred to as European or Mediterranean NICs, along with 
Israel, Turkey, Yugoslavia, etc. 
The three new EC member countries restored democratic 
institutions shortly after the oil crisis, after dictatorships of 
varying length and intensity. Now they are just embark(ng 
on a process of economic integration with the other nme 
member countries (EC 9) as well as among themselves. 
As a conse4uence, it may be sai<l that the three countries 
are also NI Cs in the sense of representing 'newly integrating 
countries' relative to a well-defined and substantially larger 
entity, the EC 9. 
Grouping the three NICs together may be convenient for 
some purposes, but it should never be taken for granted, be 
it in describing their economic structure, in discussing the 
policy-making process or in attempting to characterize vot-
ing patterns on Community matters. 
Greece and Portugal have a history of involvement with 
steps towards European free trade in manufactures in the 
I 950s and I 960s. Nevertheless the domestic effects of lower 
tariffs on industrial imports were rather limited in the face 
of both quantitative restrictions and domestic controls. With 
respect to Spain, even the lowering of tariffs was in its 
infancy when the political constraints on integration disap-
peared. A systematic comparison of the timing and sequen-
cing of trade liberalization policies in these three countries, 
as well as in several other semi-industrialized economies in 
Latin America and Asia can be found in Michaely et al. 
(1986). 
Conversely, the degree of financial development is highest 
in Spain. The financial underdevelopment of Greece is visible 
in the use of profits retention as the discretionary source 
of investment finance for firms, as argued by Dutta and 
Polemarchakis ( I 988). In Portugal, financial underdevelop-
ment was exacerbated by the nationalization of banks in 
Portugal in I 975 which froze competition among financial 
intermediaries until private banks were allowed in 1985, as 
shown in Macedo ( 1987). 
Aside from the effect of each country's calendar toward full 
integration with the EC 9, which ranges from I 99 I. for 
Greece to 1996 for Portugal, the central objective of a umfied 
market in 1992 is to be taken into account. But even taking 
the target for the internal market to be common. the question 
remains of the best transition path for each one of the three 
N!Cs. 
With respect to exchange rate arrangements, in particular, 
the absence of the United Kingdom from the exchange rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System (EMS) seems 
to suggest the advantage for the NICs to explore new forms 
of association to the EMS, which will enhance the credibility 
of domestic macroeconomic management without excessive 
reliance on the policies of the Bundesbank. 
Indeed, at present, the EMS is often seen as a Deutschmark 
area, and this identification would certainly be more mislead-
ing if the United Kingdom were to join the exchange rate 
agreement of the EMS. The same might be true if Spain 
were to join - even with an Italian-style wider band. 
To experiment with some form of wider band or_ dual ex-
change rates, would certainly facilitate early Spamsh mem-
bership in the system. This might not be enough to further 
dilute the identification of the EMS with the Deutschmark, 
but it would certainly enhance Spain's role within the NICs, 
perhaps including Italy. The experience of Italy from 1975 
to I 985 is relevant because the opening was gradual and 
sustained, even though the inability in controlling the public 
sector borrowing requirement continues to make the perfect 
openness of the Italian capital market less credible than in 
other EMS member countries. 
Preventing a sudden transition toward financial openness is 
certainly consistent with recent awareness of the drawbacks 
of excessive financial liberalization. as well as with the prefer-
ence for a sequencing of financial liberalization after real 
liberalization. Nevertheless, this desirable caution could 
never be used as a defence of the existing financial structure 
in the NICs, especially the small ones. 
This last observation underscores the importance of the 
structure of the financial markets at hand, but it should be 
emphasized that the description of such a structure is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
Instead of taking an institutional approach. the paper offers 
an analytical perspective on financial liberalization in the 
three NICs and then draws tentative policy implications. 
The analysis is divided into two sections. Section I deals 
with some conceptual issues along the lines of Padoa-
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Schioppa ( 1987) and Section 2 discusses the degree of capital 
mobility using real return differentials as computed by 
Frankel and MacArthur ( 1987). 
Following the analysis, it is suggested in Section 3 that 
desirable financial liberalization and exchange rate unifi-
cation among the 'old' EC 9 should not wait for the three 
N !Cs, as long as they are open to the new countries so that 
there is no durable exception to the objective of a cohesive 
Community. Such arrangements are sometimes called 'mini-
laterar to emphasize that they tend to be easier to achieve 
that the more ambitious multilateral negotiations. 
The point here is that other minilateral solutions besides the 
one behind membership in the exchange rate mechanism of 
the EMS should be envisaged. Specific arrangements be-
tween the three N !Cs, or between Spain and Portugal, about 
ways to attain financial integration may thus be desirable. 
I. The EC enlargement and capital market inte-
gration 
I. I. Welfare effects of international capital mobility 
There is now widespread agreement among economists and 
policy-makers that some form of financial development is 
the key to economic and social development. 
The realization that financial repression maintains financial 
underdevelopment and hinders economic progress does not 
imply, however, that immediate financial liberalization 1s 
necessarily the most appropriate policy response. 
Even the most enthusiastic defender of financial liberaliza-
tion has become, in his own words, 'a little gun-shy' after 
the resounding failure of various experiments of all-out 
financial liberalization in the southern cone of Latin 
America. 1 
Particularly in light of these experiences, but also due to 
analytical results about the order of liberalization, financial 
liberalization without prior dismantling of trade barriers 
may not be advisable. Aside from the intuitive appeal of 
the message that relative prices must be transparent before 
worrying about their rate of change, the precedence of real 
over financial liberalization has been established analytically 
for different types of models. 2 
I McKinnon ( 1986), which is an assessment of the influential McKinnon 
( 1973) book, where linancial liberalization was more enthusiastically 
endorsed. Sec also M accdo ( 1986 ). 
Sec Edwards and Van Wijnbcrgcn ( 1986), Rodrik ( 1984), Edwards ( 1984) 
and Macedo ( 1985). The relevance of the southern cone experiences for 
southern Europe is discussed by Calvo (1985). See also Branson (1984) 
on Greece, (1985) on Greece and Turkey and (1986) on Portugal. 
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The idea of the early literature, which draws on the so-called 
transfer problem, is that, paradoxically, a capital inflow can 
hurt rather than help. If trade is distorted and foreign 
funds are used to buy imported capital-intensive goods for 
investment, the effect of a capital inflow will be negative on 
the economic welfare of the representative consumer in so 
far as the distortion will be amplified. 
More generally, according to the basic theoretical equival-
ence between goods and factors in general equilibrium mo-
dels, the classical assumption that factors are mobile across 
regions and sectors within each country but immobile be-
tween countries may seem peculiar. However, it has long 
been recognized that international trade in goods is just 
indirect trade in internationally immobile factors. 
Then, if capital is internationally mobile, welfare would only 
increase unambiguously in the small open economy if all 
taxes were uniformly lowered, including both tariffs on 
goods and taxes on capital movements. Since international 
capital mobility raises the price-output response in the econ-
omy, if imports are capital-intensive, this greater response 
is bad: it raises the cost of tariff protection. 3 
The conclusion of this subsection, then, is that a feature of 
the transition towards an integrated European capital mar-
ket is not only a lowering of taxes on the international 
movement of capital but also a substantial lowering of trade 
barriers by the NI Cs and also by the Community as a whole. 
1.2. Macroeconomic effects of international capital mo-
bility 
The results summarized above are important for the micro-
economics of financial liberalization but the current caution 
may have been rather the result of greater awareness about 
the macroeconomic preconditions for financial liberaliza-
tion, especially after the 19 October 1987 stock market crash. 
The importance of a stable macroeconomic environment 
was of course easy to underestimate during the prosperous 
1960s, at least during the earlier part of the decade. After 
the turbulent I 970s and I 980s, though, some form of macro-
l These very recent results are due to Neary (1987a and b), where several 
forms of trade restriction are compared with and without capital mobility. 
The welfare effects of tariffs are opposite to those of quotas when capital 
mobility is allowed for. The welfare cost of a quota is lowered rather 
than raised, because of the absence of the price effect. Similarly, the cost 
of a voluntary export restriction is lowered with capital mobility because 
the smaller price rise reduces the rents accruing to foreigners. 
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economic stabilization seems required for financial develop-
ment to occur without generating bubbles and crashes. 
Shortly after a stock market crash such a lesson can be 
overtaught, just like it is undertaught before a banking crisis 
- the so-called 'disaster myopia' of financial markets. 1 
In turn, macroeconomic stabilization requires some form of 
control over the government budget deficit, a problem that 
has been pervasive in some of the member countries, includ-
ing not only the three NICs but also Italy. Without control-
ling the primary deficit, even the gains on the rate of price 
inflation will be short-lived, and this lessens the credibility 
of macroeconomic stabilization. 
The same can be said about the failure to solve the persistent 
unemployment which has been plaguing the EC 9, Spain 
and to a lesser extent Greece and Portugal. Without reforms 
at the microeconomic level, there is little hope of a sustained 
improvement in employment. Thus, macroeconomic success 
becomes tied to the ability to control the primary deficit and 
to hring a hout economic efficiency at the firm level, along the 
lines of the lowering of taxes on international transactions -
or at least intra-EC transactions discussed in the previous 
subsection. 
The conventional answer about the macroeconomic effects 
of greater capital mobility shows that monetary indepen-
dence requires flexible exchange rates. Contrasting an en-
tirely insulated domestic capital market with a fully inte-
grated one, it is easy to see that, in the latter, monetary 
expansion will not be able to reduce interest rates and can 
only expand output if the exchange rate depreciates. If the 
exchange rate is fixed, on the contrary, an expansion of 
domestic credit leads to offsetting capital outflows: monet-
ary policy is powerless. 
This assumes that domestic and foreign assets are perfect 
substitutes, so that either imperfect substitutability or imper-
fect mobility may allow some control of the national central 
bank upon its monetary base, at least in the short run. There 
are several studies which estimated these offset coefficients, 
both in reduced form and in structural form. The earlier 
estimates for Germany, referring to the 1960s, were close 
to one, meaning that there was hardly any scope for an 
independent monetary policy by the Bundesbank. 
Correcting the simultaneity bias lowered those estimates 
considerably. Nevertheless the interest-sensitivity of capital 
movements was measured to be quite high in Germany, 
implying that offset coefficients would indeed have been 
1 See Diaz ( 1986) for a classic analysis of the Chilean banking crisis and 
Macedo ( 1987) for an application to Portugal. 
close to one if the Bundesbank had not pursued a systematic 
sterilization of reserve flows, as noted in the early empirical 
applications of the Mundell-Fleming model. 2 
Despite the appeal of this conventional result of the 
Mundell-Fleming model, recent directions in open-economy 
macroeconomics provide qualifications to the strong policy 
implication of loss of monetary independence. Simple 
examples have been provided of how price setting by firms, 
irreversible investments and expectations modify the 
analysis. 3 
Thus considerations of industrial organization and market 
structure, especially large entry costs and small national 
markets, may lessen the price discipline induced by opening 
the economy. 
Similarly, viewing labour as an irreversible investment may 
induce waiting in the face of small improvements in business 
conditions induced, say, by favourable real exchange rate 
developments. If the insight is applied to the return of capital 
flight, then, the immediate payoff must overshadow the 
prospect of subsequent deterioration, thus requiring some 
frontloading which - because it involves higher fiscal incen-
tives - may run counter to fiscal stabilization. 
Finally, the role of expectations may be to extrapolate 
changes in monetary policy in ways that have a strong 
impact on asset prices. A small increase in money growth, 
extrapolated into cumulative increases, would lead to a 
strong immediate depreciation, to be then undone by a 
gradual appreciation. 
Even without incorporating these new insights, whose policy 
relevance is quite clear, the conventional result must in 
any event be qualified when capital mobility is not perfect, 
exchange rates are not fully flexible and there exists some 
form of monetary cooperation. 
This may well have been the situation in the EC area since 
the implementation of the European Monetary System, even 
though the trend toward dismantling capital controls accel-
erated in 1986. 
The long-run success of this sterilization policy is highly questionable. 
according to Obstfeld's ( 1982) assessment of the evidence. the most 
relevant work in this connection may instead be the estimate of the offset 
coefficient of the Bank of Mexico by Cumby and Obstfeld ( 1983) and of 
the Bank of France by Claassen and Wyplosz ( 1982). both of which 
seem to suggest a higher degree of autonomy. because of imperfect 
substitutability as well as of imperfect mobility, due in the second instance 
to the existence of capital controls. The results are in Herring and 
Marston ( 1977). 
! See Dornbusch ( 1987) for a description of the three examples discussed 
below in the text. 
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The degree or capital mobility is now higher among the 
major countries, especially with respect to Italy and France. 
with immediate implications for the NI Cs. Should they lower 
harriers as well, join the EMS exchange rate mechanism. 
cooperate more effectively, or some combination of these 
alternatives? 
As mentioned, the policy implications drawn below point to 
·minilateral' solutions among the NICs and some of the 
other member countries. In particular, the possible move 
toward the EMS would have to take into account the absence 
or the United Kingdom and hold views about the expected 
duration of Bundesbank leadership among the countries 
taking part in the exchange rate mechanism. 
1.3. Long-run resource transfer versus capital market ef-
ficiency 
The difference between the microeconomic and macro-
economic aspects of financial liberalization is further illus-
trated by the distinction between capital movements based 
on differences in endowments which lead to long run re-
source transfers and capital movements based on arbitrage 
opportunities which enforce capital market efficiency. 
As emphasized by Krugman ( 1987), this distinction mirrors 
the distinction between inter- and intra-industry trade. This 
is important because the source of the gains from trade is 
different and the distributive consequences are also different. 
Inter-type capital movements tend to lower the rate of return 
to capital in less capital-intensive countries such as the NI Cs, 
whereas intra-type capital movements would enforce the 
equality of returns on comparable financial assets. 
While the N!Cs are candidates for inter-type intlows, their 
situation in connection with intra-type movements is less 
clear. Indeed. Spain may even be less subject to capital 
controls than France or Italy. This hypothesis is confirmed 
by tests of interest rate parity which do not work for the 
French franc or the Italian lira but work for the Spanish 
peseta, largely due to one-way arbitrage. 1 
The importance of interest-rate sensitive remittances into 
Greece and Portugal may also lessen the ability of both 
governments to depart from interest-rate parity. It is there-
fore important to identify for each one of the three countries 
which way the exchange restrictions were binding. 
1 This point is emphasized in Bliss and Macedo ( 1986). See also Yinals 
( 1986). 
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Independently of these tests, it is known that the conduct 
of monetary policy in the three new EC members is much 
more passive than in the members of the EMS. The implied 
institutional changes should thus be included in the assess-
ment of the costs and benefits from coordination within the 
EMS framework. 
Simply put, for the central banks of Greece, Portugal or 
Spain to follow the Bundesbank rather than the Greek, 
Portuguese or Spanish Treasuries let alone their trade 
unions, may be an important change indeed. 
Coming back to long-run resource !low, the consequences 
of the enlargement for the unification of the members capital 
markets can also be seen as part of the broader question 
of the !low of international capital into the Community, 
sometimes referred to as ·new international corporate ar-
rangements'. For example, a Japanese company wishing to 
manufacture motor vehicles for the EC market needs to 
locate inside the EC to avoid the external tariff. An enlarged 
EC gives it more choice, and the cheap labour country may 
be the most attractive.2 
2. Capital mobility and real interest-rate differ-
entials in Greece, Spain and Portugal 
2.1. Measures of capital mobility 
The question of measuring capital mobility arises naturally 
from the strong policy implications of the degree of capital 
mobility. Under fixed exchange rates, once again, if capital 
is immobile, monetary policy works whereas, if capital is 
perfectly mobile, monetary policy is ineffective. Several at-
tempts at measuring capital mobility under fixed exchange 
rates by focusing on the 'offset coefficients' from domestic 
credit expansion into capital outtlows have been already 
mentioned. 
Independently of the exchange rate regime, however, perfect 
capital mobility equalizes real rates of return among identical 
assets denominated in different currencies, and should be 
directly testable by looking at real interest differentials be-
tween countries. Given the world rate of interest, then, 
there should be no correlation between national savings and 
investment. 
This effect takes the external tariff as given. See Bliss ( 1988) for a 
relaxation of this assumption in an enlargement context. 
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This is the macroeconomic implication of perfect capital 
mobility emphasized by Feldstein and Horioka ( 1980) and 
Feldstein (1983). If private saving falls, there should be no 
crowding out of private investment because the country can 
borrow abroad at the going interest rate. The same is true 
for the government saving through a budget surplus. Since 
the data suggest a high correlation between savings rates 
and investment rates, the paradoxical conclusion reached by 
these authors is that capital mobility is not in fact all that 
high between industrialized countries. 
There are, again, econometric problems with the original 
results but, even when the endogeneity of national saving is 
corrected, the correlation remains and, in Obstfeld (1987), 
actually rises in the 1970s, suggesting that capital mobility 
declined. He also develops other measures of capital mo-
bility, with equally poor results. 
Along the same lines, several studies find higher correlations 
in the OECD area than in developing countries. contrary to 
the standard presumption, even though not the contention, 
of Harberger (1983) that capital mobility, both official and 
unofficial (i.e. capital flight) may in fact be higher between 
countries with different levels of financial development. 
Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson ( 1986) test the Feldstein-
Horioka proposition using data for 49 countries from 1960 
to 1984 and correcting for the endogeneity of national sa-
vings. This is done with instrumental variables for the private 
and public savings rates in order to allow for a policy 
reaction of governments in the face of incipient current 
account imbalances, such that these will be reduced. Despite 
all of these refinements, they reach results that contradict 
the presumption that capital mobility is high. Indeed. as 
mentioned by Frankel and MacArthur ( 1987), the results 
also contradict the associated presumptions that capital mo-
bility is higher for industrialized countries and that it has 
been rising since the 1950s and especially after 1973. 
A rationalization of these findings, due to Dooley and lsard 
(1986), comes from the idea that governments are more 
tempted to renege on their debt to foreigners, the higher 
such debt is, so that there cannot be too high a level of 
capital mobility in a world of sovereign nations. While 
standard when applied to LDC debtors, this emphasis on 
the country or 'political' factors is not generally used for 
industrialized countries. It was certainly relevant for the 
three NICs some years ago, and may not be entirely out of 
place even now. 
Tests of real interest parity are also in conflict with the 
standard presumption because they suggest that real interest 
rates are far from perfectly correlated among countries. This 
conclusion comes from the rejection of the unbiased nature 
of the forward rate as a predictor of the future spot rate. 
From the failure of uncovered interest parity follow differ-
ences in expected rates of return. The outcome is thus 
contrary to the standard presumption. Indeed. recent studies 
report that major industrialized countries move in the 1980s 
away from real interest parity relative to the experience 
of the 1970s. These results are also cited in Frankel and 
MacArthur (1987). 
Taking due account of the difficulties associated with all 
of these tests, Frankel and MacArthur ( 1987) attempt to 
decompose the real interest differential into 'political' and 
'currency· components, so as to assess where the failure of 
real interest parity comes from. If it comes from political 
factors, the notion that there are obstacles to the free move-
ment of capital across nations is confirmed, whereas. if the 
failure comes from 'currency· factors. there will be other 
explanations for a fall in national savings to crowd out 
domestic investment via a rise in the real rate of interest. In 
particular, these authors point to the imperfect integration 
of goods markets. 
Real return differentials can thus be attributed to 'political' 
or country factors, leading to departures from covered 
interest parity, as well as to currency factors. leading to a 
forward premium or discount over the inflation differential. 
We write then the real interest differential as the sum of the 
nominal interest differential and the real forward discount: 1 
r - r* = (i - i* - fd) + (fd - p - p*) 
where r (r*) = real interest rate at home (abroad), 
i (i*) = nominal interest rate at home (abroad), 
p (p*) = price inflation at home (abroad). 
fd = forward discount. 
The real forward discount can in turn be expressed as the 
sum of the exchange risk premium and expected real de-
preciation: 
fd - p - p* = (fd - e) + (e + p* - p) 
where e = expected change in the nominal exchange rate. 
By substituting this expression into the definition above. we 
see that the difference between the real interest differen-
tial and the real exchange rate depreciation encompasses 
both lhe political an<l the exchange risk premiums. Due to 
the lack of forward exchange rate data for Portugal. it 
1 This is related to the real forward premium described in Kouri and 
Macedo ( 1978), especially if the dcnators are indexes of the purchasing 
powers of the two currencies. 
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is not possible to disentangle these two sources of risk. 
Nevertheless, the effect of trade barriers is presumably re-
flected in the real exchange rate, so that some of the micro-
economic considerations mentioned in the first section can 
he addressed. 
Given the widespread movements in real exchange rates 
that have characterized the current international monetary 
system, purchasing power parity cannot be said to be ex-
pected even when we are dealing with several years. A major 
reason for the failure of real interest parity may thus be the 
failure of goods market integration, as shown by expected 
movements in real exchange rates, rather than the political 
premium. 
This is indeed one of the conclusions reached by Frankel and 
MacArthur ( 1987) in a study of three-month real-interest 
differentials in 24 countries from September 1982 to October 
1986. The local interbank rate is measured relative to the 
Eurodollar interest rate and they are deflated by realized 
consumer price inflation during the ex-post three-month 
period. 
The sample is divided into five categories of descending 
financial openness, of which the most open, the least open 
and the middle category - which we will call the semi-open 
- involve EC member countries. For our purposes, the 
classification confirms that there is a substantial difference 
between the two NICs included in the sample, Greece being 
the only 'closed' EC member country. 
Thus, in the EC, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK 
are open, and Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy 
and Spain, are semi-open. Of the EC member countries, 
moreover, only Portugal is missing, the presumption being 
that it is closed, like Greece. In a way the Frankel and 
MacArthur (1987) groupings match financial development, 
with the effect of London as a world financial centre being 
reflected in the UK real interest differential and, on the 
other side, the two major hard currencies in the EMS. 
Using the same methodology for the case of Portugal, Table 
I shows the mean and the coefficient of variation of the 3-
month real interest differential between the Eurodollar rate 
and a standard rate in each one of the EC member countries, 
together with the three group averages involving the EC 
156 
member countries in the sample. 1 Open countries tend to 
have a small and stable covered nominal interest differential 
and exchange risk premium but not necessarily a small and 
stable real interest differential or real exchange rate change 
against the US dollar. 
The EMS countries show lower real interest rates than in 
the USA by about 2% and a real appreciation against the 
dollar of about 5%. offset by a 3% political and exchange 
rate risk premium. 
Among the three NICs, Spain shows somewhat lower nega-
tive values, and a smaller positive difference, whereas Greece 
has a large negative differential with no real appreciation 
and Portugal a 4% negative differential and a 3% real 
appreciation. with a negative difference of I%. 
This seems to confirm that Spain is indeed the most inte-
grated of the three NI Cs, whereas both Greece and Portugal 
seem to be in two different positions. Greece has a large 
differential but a lower coefficient of variation, whereas 
Portugal has a lower mean in absolute value but a much 
higher variance. 
The comparison of the real interest differential with the 
various group averages suggests that the mean is indeed 
closest to the industrialized economies for Spain, where it is 
around - 1,5% p.a. for the Atlantic group, - 1,8% for all 
countries, and Spain is at its group mean of - I, I%. 
We also see that real depreciation was closest between the 
two Iberian countries, at about - 3% p.a., whereas in Greece 
the value was 0,6% (relative to a group average of 3%). The 
average for all countries in the sample (excluding therefore 
Portugal) is - 2%, whereas the open group reaches - 3%, 
as mentioned. 
1 See Macedo (1983) on the available data on Portuguese forward rates 
and Bo/etim Trimestra/, 1980 for an article by J.J. Toscano where the 
rate of crawl was used to compute a covered interest differential. In 
1987, the Bank of Portugal began to report an ex-post covered interest 
differential between the escudo and major currencies, as well as their 
trade-weighted average: see Bo/etim Trimestral and Boletim Mensa/ de 
Conj1111111ra. 1987. However the calculations are explained in a forth-
coming publication, so that it is difficult to compare the measure used 
here and the one presented by the central bank. One major difference 
stems from the fact that we use the 3-month interbank rate, which is 
free, rather than the (post-tax) deposit rate, which is administratively set. 
Another difference might be that we use changes in the escudo/dollar 
rate during the following three months. Using the common sample 
period, 1984/1 to 1987 /IV, we see that the mean of our measure is I0,8% 
whereas the mean of the Bank of Portugal's measure is 7,3%, both with 
standard deviations of about 20%. The coefficient of correlation between 
the two measures is only 46%. Note that the mean real differential using 
the same denators changes sign from 2,2% to -1,3% and the correlation 
drops below 30%. 
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Here however, Greece shows a substantially greater vola-
tility. with a coefficient of variation of 46, relative to 7 (in 
absolute value) for Portugal, Spain and the semi-open group 
and relative to 9 (in absolute value) for the open group. 
2.2. Real forward discounts in Greece and Spain 
Even though the unavailability of a forward exchange rate 
for the Portuguese currency prevents comparisons with 
Portugal, we can nevertheless compare the political and cur-
rency factors in explaining the real differentials against the 
dollar in Greece and Spain. The relevant results for the two 
NICs and the group averages are taken from Frankel and 
MacArthur ( 1987). 
The covered interest differential was - 3.1 % p.a. in Spain 
(standard deviation is 3,6) and - 9,7% p.a. in Greece (stan-
dard deviation is 6,3), whereas the Atlantic group average 
is 0,2% (standard deviation is 0,2) and the 'other European' 
group - 1.3% (standard deviation is 2.8). The size of the 
political premium is much larger in Greece than in Spain, 
but the two NICs do show a substantial difference relative 
to the two DC group averages. In particular, the value for 
France is - 2, I% (standard deviation is 2,9) and for Italy it 
is 2, I% (standard deviation is 3,6). 
The real forward premium is 1,7% (standard deviation is 3) 
in the Atlantic group and zero (standard deviation is 4) in 
the 'other European' group but negative and more variable 
in both NI Cs. For Greece we have - 0,3 and a standard 
deviation of9,6 and for Spain - 2, I and a standard deviation 
of 5,5. Again, the value for France is 0,9% (standard devi-
ation is 2,6) and for Italy it is -1,3% (standard deviation 
is 3,6). 
The exchange risk premium is very similar in Spain and in 
the 'other European' group, namely a mean of 6% and a 
standard deviation of 23. In Greece it is a mean of I% and 
a standard deviation of 27, whereas in the open Atlantic 
group it is 2% with a standard deviation of 25. Again. the 
value for France is 7% (standard deviation is 25) and for 
Italy it is 6% (standard deviation is 22). 
These results confirm that currency factors are more relevant 
in Spain than in Greece, whereas political factors are 
stronger obstacles to capital mobility in Greece than in 
Spain. 
While a more detailed analysis is certainly called for. these 
numbers are consistent with our prior remarks that Spain is 
becoming part of the European and international capital 
market in a way that has so far not been observed in Greece. 
Explanations might range from the different degree of indus-
trialization to the nature of bank regulation in both 
countries. 1 
3. 'A minilateral' policy of financial liberaliz-
ation for the NI Cs of the EC 
Independently of the tests for capital mobility discussed in 
Section 2, it is important to note that the conduct of monet-
ary policy in the three new EC members is much more 
passive than in the current members of the EMS or in the 
UK. 
The implied institutional changes should thus be included 
in the assessment of the costs and benefits from coordination 
within the EMS framework. Simply put, for the central 
banks of Greece, Portugal or Spain to follow the Bundes-
bank rather than the Greek, Portuguese or Spanish 
Treasuries let alone their trade unions, may be an important 
change indeed. 
The policy implication is that specific financial and exchange 
rate arrangements among the three NICs may be desirable, 
as long as they are open to other member countries along 
the lines of so-called 'minilateral' negotiations. 
Aside from the effect of each country's calendar toward full 
integration with the EC 9, which ranges from 1991 for 
Greece to 1996 for Portugal, the objective of a unified 
market in 1992 is to be taken into account. 
With respect to exchange rate arrangements, in particular, 
the absence of the United Kingdom from the exchange rate 
mechanism of the EMS seems to suggest the advantage for 
the NI Cs to explore forms of association which will enhance 
the credibility of domestic macroeconomic management 
without excessive reliance on the policies of the Bundesbank. 
The idea is to experiment with some form of wider band as 
in Italy or dual exchange rates as in Belgium, so as to 
facilitate early membership in the system while preventing a 
greater financial openness than desirable, given the degree 
of real liberalization and financial development of the three 
NICs. 
1 Note the unfortunate consequence of a financial libcraliLalion that leads 
to higher interest rates. Firms in the preferred sector find themselves in 
difficulty because they have lo compete with firms from the curb market 
at higher rates. They may go bankrupt and will certainly try to lay ofT 
workers. Firms from the curb market are now facing lower rates and 
they increase borrowing for investment. which also allows them to shed 
labour. This phenomenon was also observed in Korea. Branson ( 1985), 
stresses the importance of the curb loan market in Greece. 
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This message is consistent with recent awareness of the 
drawbacks of excessive financial liberalization even by its 
most ardent defenders, such as in Mc Kinnon ( 1986) as 
well as with the preference for a sequencing of financial 
liberalization after real liberalization, such as in Edwards 
( 1985). 
An illustration of the peculiar nature of capital mobility in 
the NICs is the strong effect on the three stock markets of 
the Wall Street crash of 19 October 1987 which was much 
higher than expected. This is precisely the effect of 'disaster 
myopia', and serves to remind us that the estimates of the 
degree of capital mobility reported above must be inter-
preted for calm rather than for turbulent periods. 
This observation confirms the importance of the structure of 
the financial markets at hand. In the case study of Portugal, a 
story can be told about how the nationalization of banks 
and insurance companies in 1975 delayed financial decontrol 
and was responsible for an accumulation of bad debts among 
the 'old' banks. 1 
The relationship between capital mobility and the liberaliz-
ation of financial services is characteristic of the new direc-
tions in open economy macroeconomics mentioned above, 
yet not always fully taken into account. The effect of greater 
capital mobility on the availability of financial services to 
residents of the NICs, or indeed of the lesser financially 
developed EC members, is again worthy of great attention 
but there does not seem to be any presumption that a 
national hank would do a better job that a foreign one. 
Insurance, banking and the marketing of securities are 
around 7% of GDP in the Community and growing strongly, 
according to the Padoa-Schioppa report. Despite the mo-
bility of capital across national borders, steps toward inter-
national harmonization in banking services or insurance are 
necessary not so much at the EC but rather at the world 
level. 
Yet, even within the EC, the question of how the regulatory 
and executive powers should be organized in an integrated 
market remains unaddressed. This is another reason to en-
courage some 'minilateral' initiatives, especially with 
countries that are relatively underdeveloped financially. 
Despite the harder credibility of an exchange arrangement 
that would not tie the central bank's hands, some experimen-
tation with an informal peg to the ECU, perhaps with a 
wider band and a separate financial rate, may be appropriate 
I Macedo ( 1987). 
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for the countries where inflation is still substantially higher 
than the Community average or where the overhang of bad 
debts seems most serious for financial liberalization. 
It should be noted that, even though it is outside the EMS, 
the pound sterling has not remained too far from the other 
major European currencies. This may be an indication that 
an 'as-if joining of the EMS - sometimes called a shadow-
EMS - on the part of Portugal and Greece may be appro-
priate, especially if the expectation that Spain is to join 
relatively soon becomes widespread. 
4. Conclusion 
It was argued in this paper that specific financial and ex-
change rate arrangements among the three NICs may be 
desirable, as long as they are open to other member countries 
along the lines of so-called 'minilateral' negotiations. 
Once the relationship between capital mobility and the liber-
alization of financial services. characteristic of the new direc-
tions in open economy macroeconomics, is taken into ac-
count, the need for considerable innovation in Community 
practices with respect to harmonization, mutual recognition 
and coordinated supervision becomes apparent. 
Otherwise, the effect of each country's calendar toward full 
integration with the EC 9, which ranges from 1991 for 
Greece to I 996 for Portugal, may be to delay the central 
objective of a unified market beyond I 992, at least for the 
N!Cs. 
With respect to exchange rate arrangements, in particular, 
the absence of the United Kingdom from the exchange rate 
mechanism of the EMS seems to suggest the advantage for 
the N!Cs of exploring fonns of association which will en-
hance the credibility of domestic macroeconomic manage-
ment without excessive reliance on the policies of the Bun-
desbank. 
These experiments might involve some form of wider band 
as in Italy or dual exchange rates as in Belgium, so as to 
facilitate early membership in the system while preventing a 
greater financial openness than desirable, given the degree 
of real liberalization and financial development of the three 
NICs. 
In closing, it should be stressed that the implications of 
financial liberalization in the N!Cs for policy coordination 
in the enlarged EC are a major part of the research project 
described in Bliss and Macedo ( I 986), and, whilst of decisive 
policy relevance, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Table 1 
Measures of capital mobility 
Real interest 
differential 
mean variation coefficient 
EC 12 
B -0,2 17,3 
DK -4,1 1,0 
D (*) -1,8 1,6 
GR(+) -9,5 0,9 
E -1,1 4,8 
F -1,3 2,1 
lRL 0,3 10,7 
I 0,5 7,5 
NL(*) -1,8 1,8 
p 
-3,6 3,2 
UK(*) -0,3 12,9 
Group averages 
Open(*) -1,5 2,0 
Closed ( +) -5,8 1,6 
Semi -1,1 3,3 
All -1,8 3,0 
NB: Variation coefficient is standard deviation divided by absolute value of mean. 
Source: Adapted from Frankel and MacArthur ( 1987) except for Portugal (also excluded from averages). 
Portugal data from Bank of Portugal (see footnote on p. 156). 
Open:(•) as well as Canada, Switzerland. 
Closed: ( +) as well as Bahrain, Mexico and South Aflica. 
Semi: other EC 12 as well as Austria. Norway. Sweden. 
All: above as well as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore. Australia, Japan and New Zealand. 
mean 
-6,9 
-6,6 
-5,2 
0,6 
- 3,4 
-5,7 
-3,3 
-6,3 
-3,9 
-2,7 
1,2 
-2,6 
3,1 
-5,1 
- 1,9 
Real 
exchange rate 
(%p.a.) 
variation coefficient 
3,4 
3,6 
4,9 
46,0 
6,8 
4,4 
7,5 
3,7 
6,5 
9,0 
23,3 
9,2 
12,3 
4,5 
14,3 
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Introduction 
This paper falls into two parts. The first is a comment on 
the general issues arising in connection with capital exchange 
controls and the proposals for their liberalization within 
the existing and potential membership of the European 
Monetary System. The second focuses on the specific experi-
ence of the United Kingdom which, in I 979, abolished 
completely a system of quite comprehensive exchange con-
trols. 
General issues 
I. Rationales for exchange control 
A number of different arguments for the deployment of 
exchange controls over capital movements can be found; we 
may distinguish, for example, at least the following possible 
rationales: 1 
(i) general 'second-best' arguments suggest that (unavoid-
able) rigidities in goods and labour markets are best 
matched by some institutionally created rigidities in 
foreign exchange markets; 
(ii) the presence of controls confers monetary autonomy 
on the Central Bank of the country deploying them; 
(iii) controls can act as a counter-speculative device to sup-
port the viability of adjustable peg exchange rate sys-
tems; 
(iv) controls can be used to influence the distribution of 
ownership of domestic (and foreign) productive assets; 
(v) controls may raise investment in the domestic economy 
and hence real growth. 
These various arguments are spelt out further below and 
confronted with the arguments for the market solution; 
invariably it will be found that the latter either poses alterna-
tive means as superior to administrative exchange control 
for attaining the same objectives or makes a virtue out of 
denying that the objectives posed are good ones. 
2. Creation and ownership of productive assets 
Exchange controls have been seen as helping to correct 
distortions which arise as the calculus of private rates of 
return yields systematically biased solutions compared to 
1 See also Cairncross ( 1973). 
the calculus of social rates of return. The classic example 
here turns on the fact that private investors will rationally 
arbitrage after-tax rates of return; from the point of view of 
the capital exporting country, however, the fact that the 
foreign government will absorb tax revenues arising from 
the returns to investment in its economy implies that the 
social rate of return on foreign investment falls below that 
on domestic investment. A developing country might also 
argue that exchange controls will help correct the distortion 
that would otherwise arise as the exceptional external econ-
omies of investment in a developing economy will not be 
reflected in ex ante private returns. Moreover, relatively 
primitive capital markets may not offer investors instru-
ments which are as attractive as those available in developed 
country capital markets, and the added liquidity cost of 
domestic investment will tip the balance in favour of invest-
ment overseas even if the social rate of return on domestic 
investment is higher. Arguments like these may lend some 
support to exchange controls; but administrative (direct) 
controls do not often seem the best way of securing the 
objectives in question, where fiscal arrangements and tax-
and-subsidy policies appear to provide superior solutions. 
It is certainly questionable how far exchange controls will 
succeed in raising total investment in the protected economy 
for, if they are successful in creating a captive market, 
domestic private rates of return will be reduced and as a 
consequence inward capital flow will be diminished. A simi-
lar point is made in Hemmings ( 1981 ), in relation to portfolio 
investment and in Beenstock (1977) in relation to direct 
investment. In this event the controls might have to be 
appraised on the different grounds that they create a redistri-
bution of asset ownership: a larger fraction of domestic 
assets will be owned by domestic residents and a smaller 
fraction of overseas assets will be owned by domestic resi-
dents than would otherwise be the case. 
3. A counter-speculative role 
Arguments of the kind spelt out above apply most obviously 
to the control of portfolio and direct investment; in the 
context of the EMS, however, most attention has under-
standably been directed at the effects of what might be 
described, for want of a better term, as 'monetary exchange 
controls': by this we mean to refer to the controls over the 
holding by residents of foreign-currency-denominated bank 
deposits and other short-term assets and controls over the 
lending by domestic residents and banks of domestic cur-
rency to foreign residents. These provisions are the key to 
the counter-speculative role of exchange control for they 
limit the amount of domestic currency which can be quickly 
sold in anticipation of devaluation. 
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GRAPH I : Italy: the off-shore/on-shore differential 
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GRAPH 2 : France: the off-shore/on-shore differential 
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Papers by Melitz ( 1985), Giavazzi and Pagano (1985), Gia-
vazzi and Giovannini ( 1986), Claassen and Wyplosz ( 1982), 
and Wyplosz (1986), among others have illuminated the way 
in which such controls can be expected to work and actually 
function in practice in the EMS. In particular, the evidence 
on the behaviour of off-shore/on-shore interest rate differen-
tials seems to show that the controls are highly effective, as 
these differentials rise sharply ahead of realignments when 
expectations of devaluation are widely held: Graphs I and 
2 illustrate the Italian and French cases. 1 Given the history 
of the demise of the Bretton Woods system, in which a large 
role is generally attributed to the influence of speculative 
capital movements (see Artis and Ostry ( 1986)), it would 
indeed be surprising if exchange controls were not accorded 
a role in the success of the EMS. This role for exchange 
controls is given added emphasis by reason of the nature of 
the policy episode in which the EMS has been situated. By 
offering an option for 'under-indexed' crawling peg realign-
ments, the EMS has afforded a compromise between rigid 
nominal exchange rate targets and inflation-accommodating 
real exchange rate targets. By choice, a counter-inflationary 
policy which is effective but not too rigorous can be exerted 
through niggardly and under-indexed realignment consist-
ently with avoidance of the severe real exchange rate appreci-
ations experienced by the UK and the US. It may be argued 
that avoidance of such misalignments is vital to the survival 
of an exchange rate arrangement within a customs union, on 
pain of undermining the customs union's trade liberalization 
achievements. If this is a correct description of the way in 
which the system can be used, speculation is an obvious 
problem. On the one hand, the policy-makers promise not 
to let (real rate) misalignments occur; on the other hand, 
they want to threaten wage and price setters with the defence 
of nominal parities. It is only too easy to see that speculation 
is invited by this posture and that, if allowed to occur, it 
can fatally undermine the policy-makers' ability to deliver 
the 'crawling peg - nominal rigidity compromise' which is 
the policy rationale of the EMS.2 Ifso, there is a premium on 
considering whether speculation can be avoided by altering 
some other aspect of the EMS's present mode of functioning. 
A timely EMS realignment effects a change of central rates 
within the existing bands so that market rates do not undergo 
a discrete change. At the same time the realignment renews 
the option (say) for a particular currency to (be expected 
1 See Giavazzi and Pagano ( 1985) for further discussion of the behaviour 
of these differentials. 
2 It might be objected that this description yields a view of the role of 
exchange controls which is altogether too benign and it must certainly 
be admitted that the discretion afforded by exchange control to pursue 
wise policies can be abused and thus lend support to unwise policies. 
to) depreciate against another. Timely realignments of this 
kind avoid presenting speculators with the prospect of 'one-
way bets': they necessarily involve an amount of realignment 
which is small, relative to the band width, and the prospect 
that realignments will be of this timely type can thus be 
improved by increasing the band width and reducing the 
allowable amount of realignment. A combination of these 
two elements could therefore be envisaged as a modification 
of the present mode of functioning of the system in the event 
of the abolition of exchange controls. 3 It should not be 
forgotten, of course, that a coordination of policies will be 
helpful in reducing the need for realignments in the first 
place, but it would be quite fanciful to suppose that this 
can be relied upon to eliminate the need for realignments 
completely - especially as there is reason to think that 
the counter-inflation policy priority which commanded the 
agreement of EMS members in the system's formative years 
may be challenged by other concerns in the future. 
4. The protection of monetary autonomy 
Exchange controls confer monetary autonomy on those 
countries which deploy them, in two distinct ways. First, in 
an adjustable peg system, interest rates would otherwise be 
determined by those prevailing in the other countries in the 
system, or in the leading country, plus or minus the expected 
depreciation or appreciation permitted by the band width 
and the position of the currency within the band. With a 
very narrow band, interest rates are thus in effect determined 
directly by the leading country. The presence of effective 
controls breaks this interest parity link and permits some 
discretion for domestic interest rates to depart from the 
levels otherwise dictated by it. Second, in the absence of 
exchange controls, the type of control exercised by the 
Central Bank over its commercial banks is firmly disciplined 
by the presence, or potential presence, of off-shore banks. 
Any control which is onerous relative to the added cost of 
transacting off shore will result in a migration of business 
to the off-shore banks and make the control itself cosmetic 
in effect. Exchange controls break this link and provide 
greater room for discretion in the design and implementation 
of monetary controls and regulations. 
Monetary autonomy of the first type may be recovered by 
widening the band: although the interest parity condition 
will still prevail with the wider band, im:reasing the band 
width will allow more of the effect of a change in interest 
The United Kingdom does not at present adhere to the exchange rate 
mechanism of the EMS. Some inOuential support for its participation 
advocates that this should occur on the basis of wider bands. Sec the 
Croham Report ( 1986). 
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rates in the leading country to be accepted in a change in 
the exchange rate and so require less of a parallel change in 
interest rates in the other country. The appearance of a 
slavish dependence can be so avoided. 1 Autonomy of the 
second type cannot be secured by increasing the width of 
the exchange rate band, but it is questionable how far such 
autonomy is desirable. At any rate, if deregulation and 
liberalization of domestic monetary systems is desired, no 
more powerful ally than the liberalization of exchange con-
trols can be imagined. 
5. An argument from 'second-best' 
A general argument against the market solution and in 
favour of restriction of some kind may be said to flow from 
the 'second-best' principle of welfare economics. Specifically, 
if distortions remain in some set of markets, it does not 
follow that liberalizing others will lead to an overall improve-
ment. The application of this principle to the regulation of 
trade and capital movements might be said to have governed 
the wisdom of the founders of Bretton Woods, for whom 
the creation of a stable system of exchange rates and freedom 
from controls on current account was coupled directly with 
the perceived gains from liberalization of trade and the 
continued restriction of capital movements. The erosion of 
controls over capital movements in the post world war 
period occurred in spite of, not because of, the acceptance 
of the principles of Bretton Woods. More recently, the 
analysis of exchange rate overshooting (e.g. Dornbusch, 
I 976) has provided a forceful analytical example, and the 
experience of first sterling and then the dollar has provided 
practical evidence that unregulated markets may produce 
untoward exchange rate behaviour. These examples are less 
than conclusive evidence in favour of exchange controls, 
however. In particular, some observers have drawn the con-
clusion that exchange rate behaviour can be rendered more 
stable without the need for exchange control, by writing 
rules for the conduct of policy in a world of exchange rate 
target zones (e.g. Williamson (1985); Edison, Miller and 
Williamson ( I 987)). 
It must be said, moreover, that the case for the market 
solution is now understood to involve much more than 
welfare 'triangles' and to extend to considerations of x-
efficiency and innovation in the operations of markets, here 
involving the entire capital an<l credit markets of Europe. As 
such, the potential gains from the generalized liberalization 
1 The liberation, it is fair to point out, may be purchased at the cost of 
somewhat higher average interest rates if the use of wider bands leads 
to more volatile exchange rate behaviour for which investors require a 
compensation. 
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could be large, leading to a significantly improved allocation 
of resources and, through time, a higher rate of innovation 
and efficiency increase. It is impossible to comment in detail 
on the likely distribution of benefits from such a process, 
though it is probable that there will remain significant econ-
omies of scale in the provision of financial services. But 
whilst this would suggest that the provision of (though not 
the benefit derived from) such services might tend to be 
concentrated in a few centres, the persistence of distinctive 
national currencies provides an offsetting force :2 
The most important positive propositions to emerge from 
this discussion are. perhaps, these: 
I. Liberalization of exchange controls will compel liberaliza-
tion of banking and monetary regulations. 
2. It will also require a modification in the present function-
ing of the EMS. in order to avoid the speculative wreckage 
of the system and in order to avoid an intolerable loss of 
monetary autonomy. 
3. One such modification would involve a temporary widen-
ing of the bands of exchange rate fluctuations until such 
time as the degree of policy convergence and coordination 
has developed to a point at which the bands can again be 
narrowed. Such a widening might be accompanied by a 
smaller permitted amount of central rate realignment. 
The abolition of exchange control in the UK 
I. Introduction 
The United Kingdom has a long history of the use of 
exchange controls, starting with the 1914-18 war and resum-
ing after a post-war interval of liberalization in I 924 since 
when exchange controls of some kind were continuously 
enforced until October 1979 when they were wholly re-
moved. The removal of the controls at this time, prompted 
by a desire to reduce the appreciation of sterling and to 
provide a means of translating North Sea oil wealth into 
overseas earnings assets, can also be seen as part of a broad 
policy of widening the scope for the market solution. 
The logic of the market solution may in the long run, however. lead to the 
displacement of national currencies even for the conduct of substantial 
amounts of domestic business·· - a further erosion of monetary autonomy 
and sovereignty. Thus exchange control may be seen as a form of 
protection both for banking and for the national currency of denomi-
nation. 
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It might be hoped that the abolition of exchange controls 
in the United Kingdom would provide some clear lessons 
for the effects to be expected of abolition elsewhere; yet 
considering the magnitude of the step involved, there has 
been extraordinarily little analysis of the consequences of 
the abolition of the controls. There is in fact a major obstacle 
to the precise identification of the contribution of the abol-
ition of the controls to the exchange rate, interest rates or 
to the development of balance of payments flows; this is 
represented by the coincidence in timing of the abolition of 
the controls with two other major shocks to the British 
economy - the second OPEC shock (itself accompanied by 
the transition of the UK from oil importing to oil exporting 
status) and the advent of the Thatcher government and a 
new regime of economic policy. But whilst the violation of 
the ceteris paribus conditions seems to rule out recourse to 
sophisticated modelling and readily explains the lack ofwell-
quantified estimates, some effects are none the less clear 
enough. Above all, it seems clear that the removal of ex-
change control, in removing protection for domestic banking 
activity, forced the reform of monetary regulation to take 
place on a very liberal basis; whilst a move in this direction 
might have taken place in any event, the abolition of ex-
change controls provided a ruthless logic for it. It is also 
now possible to see that a development of currency substi-
tution has taken place that would have been impossible in the 
continued presence of these controls and that the controls 
on outward portfolio investment and on the currency of 
financing of both portfolio and direct investment were sub-
stantially effective. 
In what follows, the next section sets out the nature of the 
controls that were abolished in 1979. Following sections go 
on to discuss the evidence that abolition has supplied on the 
effects of these controls. 
2. The controls in outline 
The principal controls abolished in 1979 pertained, separ-
ately, to direct and portfolio investment, to the holding by 
residents of foreign currency deposits and to sterling lending, 
by UK residents and banks to non-residents. 
In regard to direct investment, the controls provided for the 
restriction of all sterling-financed foreign investment (i.e. 
investment paid for with foreign exchange bought at the 
official rate) except where it could be shown to have advan-
tages to the balance of payments; but direct investment 
financed by foreign borrowing or by foreign exchange 
bought from the investment currency market (see below) 
was freely allowed (at least, during the 1970s). In order to 
prevent leakage through the use of unremitted profits, the 
controls also normally required that at least two-thirds of 
after-tax profits should be repatriated. 
In regard to portfolio investment, the controls provided that 
purchase by residents of foreign exchange for the purpose 
of investment overseas should only be made from the sale 
of existing foreign securities or from foreign currency bor-
rowing. This created an investment currency market in which 
there was an implied premium over the official exchange 
rate (since non-residents were free to purchase securities at 
the official exchange rate, there would never be a discount). 
In addition, for a period up to the end of 1977, sales of 
securities were subject to a 'surrender' penalty, in that 25 % 
of the proceeds of sale had to be exchanged at the official 
rate. 
Finally, the controls required that the holding by residents 
of foreign currency deposits should be limited to working 
balances, whilst sterling lending by banks and others over-
seas was similarly restricted to trade-related purposes. 1 
With the adoption by the United Kingdom of a floating 
exchange rate regime from 1972 onward, the original de-
clared unifying rationale for the controls (to conserve foreign 
exchange) was lost and there is a dearth of official expla-
nations for their continuation. Cairncross ( 1973) has remar-
ked that the continuation of the controls may have been 
due, as much as anything else, to a perception that they 
might again be needed, for the old reasons, in the future 
and that to abolish them would effectively prevent their 
future use. This suggestion is given credence by the evident 
belief, at the inception of the new regime, that floating was 
a temporary expedient. 
However this may be, the controls were finally removed in 
three stages in 1979. On 12 June it was announced, effective 
from the following day, that interest charges on foreign 
currency borrowing for portfolio investment could be finan-
ced at the official rate and the requirement of 115 % cover 
for such borrowing was removed; then, on 18 July it was 
announced that henceforth repayment of foreign currency 
borrowing outstanding for a year or more could be made 
with currency purchased at the official rate, whilst purchase 
of EEC securities was exempted from all the restrictions. 
At the same time, all the remaining restrictions on direct 
investment and the repayment of foreign currency borrowing 
incurred to finance it were removed. The rest of the restric-
tions (with the exception of some which were involved in 
the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, themselves re-
moved in December) were lifted as from 24 October. 
1 All of the controls are described in detail in the Bank of England's ( 1977) 
manual. 
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With the removal or the restrictions and the reporting system 
associated with them, some of the information useful in 
assessing their effectiveness (in particular, that pertaining to 
the currency of finance of investment flows) was lost, a 
further hindrance to effective estimation of the impact of 
abolition. 
Two attempts to quantify the effects of abolition are readily 
available: these are those by the Bank of England ( 1981) 
and by Chrystal ( 1985); their assessment is combined with 
later evidence in what follows. 
3. Direct investment 
The general opinion, before the abolition of the controls on 
direct investment, was that the regulatory regime of the 
1970s was not intended to, and did not in fact, impinge 
significantly on the direct investment flows themselves (see, 
for example, Cairncross (1973); Tew ( 1978)), but upon the 
financing of these flows. Foreign currency borrowing to 
finance direct investment abroad had been freely allowed, 
and the effect of the control was described for this reason 
in the Bank of England's Quarterly Bulletin for December 
1979 (p. 37 I) as primarily one of deferred access to official 
exchange (in the sense, presumably, that the profits on the 
investment, which would otherwise be repatriated at the 
official rate, could be used to repay the foreign currency 
loan incurred to finance it). 
Certainly, it had always seemed doubtful to what extent 
the two-thirds rule for repatriation of foreign earnings was 
effective for the companies covered by the balance of pay-
ments statistics, where the figures showed that the pro-
portion repatriated (though variable) was often closer to 
40% than to 662/3rds (see, for example, Tew (1978), p. 333); 
among other differences, the exchange control provisions 
extended only to companies where the voting control lay 
within the UK, whereas the balance of payments statistics 
embraces the earnings of companies in which the UK interest 
is in a minority. This explanation, whilst consistent with 
the nominal effectiveness of exchange control over direct 
investment suggests that the penetration of foreign invest-
ment activities by multinational companies will significantly 
dilute the overall impact of such restrictions. 
As the outstanding foreign currency borrowing associated 
with portfolio investment was comparatively small, most of 
the refinancing which appeared to occur during the third and 
final quarters of I 979 could be attributed to the relaxation of 
the controls over direct investment: a comparison of net 
borrowing for overseas investment in these quarters with its 
average in the previous two years prompted the Bank of 
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England to suggest an effect to the order of UKL I OOO 
million in each quarter (Quarterly Bulletin, December 1979, 
p. 372; March 1980, pp. 13-14). This assessment, though, is 
somewhat bigger than the figures adduced in the Bank's 
subsequent analysis of the effects of abolition (Bank of 
England, I 981 ), would readily support. These figures (see 
Table I) give the amount of direct investment and its finan-
cing in the period before the relaxation of controls in June 
and July, and in the third and fourth quarters of 1979, after 
which the foreign currency financing data are no longer 
available. These figures suggest a turn-round in identified 
foreign currency borrowing from UKL 260 million to a 
repayment of UKL 378 million, a total effect of UKL 638 
million a quarter, total direct investment itself remaining 
more or less the same. 
The direct investment data for subsequent and earlier years, 
together with their (end-of-year) stock counterparts are 
shown in Table 2. These reveal some important implied 
revisions to the earlier data used in Table I; for example, 
the revised outflow figures corresponding to the quarterly 
averages shown in Table I and with the addition of the last 
period shown are, in UKL million: I 978Q I- I 979Q2: I 047; 
I 979Q3- I 979Q4: I 563; I 980Q 1-1981 Q2: I 305; 1981 Q3-
l 986Q2: I 412. But it is not clear that these revisions signifi-
cantly alter the provisional verdict of the earlier studies that 
the controls did little to affect outward direct investment in 
total. 
Table 2 indicates an increase in inward as well as in outward 
direct investment after abolition, consistent with some effect 
of the controls in reducing domestic rates of return; and 
whilst the net outward flow has risen over the period it is 
clearly an erratic series, much influenced in the last two 
years shown by disinvestment by overseas oil companies. 
Tentatively removing the oil-related component flattens the 
upward trend in net investment almost completely. 1 Table 
2 also reports stock data for direct investment held abroad 
by UK residents and those held by foreign residents in the 
UK. 
The net asset position has clearly improved, but trends here 
are additionally complicated by valuation changes, including 
those due to exchange rate changes, and cannot be said to 
cast any light on the effect of removing exchange controls. 
1 The data only allow this lo be <lone up to 1983 after which oil companies' 
investment, which was previously located in the category 'other UK 
residents' (which it might be assumed to dominate) can no longer be 
even approximately identified. Assuming that the investment shown for 
'other UK residents', excluding oil companies after 1984, is representative 
of earlier figures, the net balance of direct investment, approximately 
excluding that of oil companies, beginning in 1975, emerges as, in 
UKL 1 OOO million: 0,7; 1,5; 0,8; 1,6; 1,5; 1,3; 3,9; 1,4 and in 1983, 1,5. 
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What seems to emerge, then, is this: whereas the controls 
were not (in their latter years) intended to reduce overseas 
direct investment significantly, they were aimed at the finan-
cing of this investment. There is evidence that the controls 
had some effect in this sense, though their abolition also 
removed the data source needed to track this over a reason-
aple period of time. General considerations suggest that 
Table 1 
Direct investment and refinancing 
Outward direct investment 
Financed by: retained earnings 
Identified foreign currency borrowing 
Unidentified finance 
.. = not available. 
Source: Bank of England ( 1981 ), p. 371. 
Table 2 
Direct investment 1975-85 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Flows 
Outward Inward 
1,3 1,5 
2,4 1,7 
2,4 2,5 
3,5 2,0 
5,9 3,0 
4,9 4,4 
6,1 2,9 
4,3 3,0 
5,3 3,4 
6,0 0,4 
7,3 3,4 
By convention these figures are shown with sign reversed in the balance of payments tables. 
Source: CSO, Balance of Purmenl.I Pink Book, /986. 
where there was an effect on outward investment it may 
have been purchased at the expense of some reduction in 
the incentive for inward investment to occur and this would 
further reduce the impact of the controls on the net flow 
and the net foreign exchange position. There is no strong 
evidence in the relevant figures for any net effect. 
( million U KL; quarterly averages) 
l 978Q l -l 979Q2 l 979Q3-l 979Q4 1980Ql-1981Q2 
707 643 724 
325 473 341 
260 -378 
122 548 383 
(UKL/OOOmillionJ 
Stocks 
Net outward External UK liabilities Net, UK 
assets to overseas 
of UK residents 
0,2 18,6 12,1 6,5 
0,7 23,5 13,7 9,8 
-0,1 24,4 15,7 8,7 
1,5 28,1 17,9 10,2 
2,9 31,4 22,0 9,4 
0,5 33,3 26,4 7,9 
3,2 45,2 30,0 15,2 
1,3 53,3 31,8 21,5 
1,9 60,3 36,3 14,0 
5,6 81,5 38,0 43,5 
4,0 76,7 40,5 36,2 
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4. Portfolio investment 
The effectiveness of the controls over portfolio investment 
was a lways evident in the height of the investment currency 
premium created by them. As Graph 3 shows, th is premium 
was not infrequently in the range 30-50%, and on some 
occasions was even higher than this. Variations in the pre-
mium were frequently discussed in the pages of the Bank of 
England's Quarterly Bulletin and attributed to speculation 
on the exchange rate or on the stock markets in New York 
or London. The decline in the premi um before abolition 
owed much to the circulation of rumours about the impend-
ing abolition of the controls. 
Recourse to foreign currency borrowing to support port fo lio 
investment was less significant than for direct investment : 
the Bank ( 1981) quoted an estimate of UKL I 600 million 
to I 700 million outstanding associated foreig n currency 
borrowing at the end of 1978. Accordingly, refinancing of 
the existing stock of such borrowing was less significant 
(and in any case indist inguishable from the refinancing of 
GRAPH 3 : UK: the investment currency premium 
PREMIUM RATE 
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borrowing connected with direct investment) ; but the re-
moval of the controls clearly allowed outward investment 
to increase (see Table 3) and raised the net outflow sharply, 
despite some concurrent increase in inward investment. 
Strict enforcement of the controls would have implied no 
outward portfolio investment net of foreign currency bor-
rowing, and in 1975-78, the average gross outward flow was 
very small. Assuming that this is what would have been 
enforced by the continued presence of the controls , virtually 
the whole outward flow from 1980 on might be put down 
as the effect of abolishing the control - an amount in excess 
of UKL 45 OOO million; granting that the controls deterred 
some inward investment , cumulating the increase in net 
outflow over the period might seem more appropriate -
something to the order of UKL 30 OOO million. A somewhat 
similar order of magnitude is suggested by crude calculations 
based on the increase in the share of overseas assets in 
financia l institutions' portfolios, as portrayed in Table 4. 
Comparing the share in 1985 with either the average for 
1975-78 or for 1978 alo ne suggests an increase to the order 
of 6-9 basis points, worth UKL 30 OOO million to 40 OOO 
million on l 985's total portfolio . 
o .._---:~----=~--~~-~~-~~--~:-----''----.._-...L.._._.J 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
YEAR 
EFFECTIVE DOLLAR PREMIUM RATE 
Exchange controls abolished October 1979 
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Table 3 
Portfolio investment 1975-85 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
19867 
1 End of year. 
2 First half-year . 
. . not available. 
Flows 
Outward Inward 
0,1 0,2 
-0,1 1,0 
1,9 
1,1 -1,0 
0,9 1,5 
3,2 1,5 
4,3 0,3 
6,7 0,2 
6,5 1,9 
9,6 1,4 
18,2 7,1 
12,0 2,3 
By convention these figures are shown with sign reversed in the balance of payments tables. 
Sourcl': CSO. Balance of Payments Pink Book, /986. 
Table 4 
Net outward 
-0,1 
-1,1 
-1,9 
2,1 
-0,6 
1,7 
4,0 
6,5 
4,6 
8,1 
11,2 
9,7 
Financial assets and liabilities of other financial (non-bank) institutions: overseas components 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
S011rc('. CSO Financial Statistics. November 1986. 
Overseas 
assets 
7,0 
9,0 
8,6 
10,4 
11,0 
16,2 
22,5 
38,2 
54,9 
75,7 
77,3 
Overseas 
liabilities 
1,4 
1,6 
1,8 
1,5 
2,2 
2,0 
2,3 
5,3 
7,6 
9,0 
9,9 
Net 
overseas 
5,6 
7,4 
6,8 
8,9 
8,9 
14,2 
20,2 
32,9 
47,3 
66,7 
67,5 
External 
assets 
of UK 
6,9 
8,7 
8,7 
10,3 
12,3 
18,7 
25,4 
40,3 
60,0 
84,3 
100,6 
Gross financial 
wealth 
(total assets) 
77,3 
88,4 
117, I 
132,8 
150,1 
185,5 
210,3 
263,3 
326,7 
401,2 
472,9 
!UKL I OOO million) 
Stocks 1 
UK liabilities Net. UK 
to overseas 
residents 
6,1 0,8 
7,8 0,9 
10,6 -1,9 
9,7 0,6 
10,4 1,9 
12,1 6,6 
12,7 12,7 
15,7 24,6 
19,3 40,7 
23,5 60,8 
32,1 68,5 
I UKL I OOO million and%) 
% 
Portfolio shares 
Net Gross 
overseas overseas 
7,3 9,1 
8,3 10,2 
5,8 7,3 
6,7 7,8 
5,9 7,3 
7,7 8,7 
9,6 10,7 
12,5 14,5 
14,5 17,7 
16,6 18,9 
14,3 16,4 
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GRAPH 4 : Foreign currency deposit holdings and exchange control abolition 
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GRAPH 5: Foreign currency deposits, trade and tbe removal of exchange controls 
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All such calculations are exceptionally crude and can only 
be treated as broadly indicative of what has been agreed in 
previous analyses (Bank of England, 1981; Chrystal, 1985), 
namely that there was a large effect on portfolio investment 
from the removal of the controls. 
5. The monetary controls 
The lifting of the monetary restrictions on bank lending in 
sterling to overseas residents and on the holding by residents 
of foreign-currency-denominated deposits has had some 
clear and sizeable effects. In addition, a particularly striking 
impact is noticeable from the removal of controls on the on-
shore/off-shore differential and consequently on departures 
from covered interest parity. These in turn have implied 
significant changes in the scope and form of monetary policy. 
The restriction of sterling lending overseas was an important 
component in the system of exchange control; such lending 
had broadly to be associated with UK trade. The statistics 
collected on bank lending give a straightforward picture of 
the consequences of removing this control: Table 5 shows 
bank lending in three categories - for identified long-term 
export credit, for other identified export credit and for 
'other' purposes. Lending in the last category increases sig-
nificantly after 1979, a good part of it going to the offices 
of unrelated banks abroad (which banks have also in this 
period increased their holdings of sterling deposits with UK 
banks as part of the growth in Eurocurrency business). 
The lifting of the restriction on the holding of foreign cur-
rency bank deposits has been followed by a large increase 
in such deposits. M3, the broad monetary magnitude which 
includes foreign currency deposits, has grown faster than 
sterling M3 which excludes them. The ratio of sterling M3 
to M3 has consequently fallen, as illustrated in Graph 4, 
from pre-abolition levels in the late 1970s of the order of 
91% to 85-87% in the mid-1980s. This would not have 
been possible without the removal of the controls; Graph 5 
illustrates the relationship of the difference M3-sterling M3 
to trade (exports) before 1979, and the shift in this relation-
ship in the post-abolition period. 
The removal of the controls has had a dramatic effect on 
the on-shore/off-shore interest differential. In the presence 
of the controls, full arbitrage is inhibited and in consequence 
the on-shore/off-shore differential can exhibit significant 
departures from zero and significant variability. A predicted 
effect of removing the controls is that these distortions will 
be removed. 1 The calculations reported in Table 6 and the 
displays in Graphs 6A and 6B provide strong confirmation 
of this effect. Graph 6A shows the 3-month Euro-sterling 
rate and the 3-month local authority temporary loan rate 
and the differential between them, whilst Graph 6B displays 
the Euro-sterling rate against interbank rate. In Table 6 
information is given on the mean, variance and range of 
each of these differentials before and after October I 979. 
It is known that interest rates in Euro-markets closely repro-
duce covered interest parity (Johnston, 1979); the interest 
rate on Euro-X deposits may actually be set directly by 
adjusting the corresponding dollar rate for the cost of for-
ward cover in the dollar/X market. This being so, deviations 
from covered interest parity between on-shore rates will 
primarily reflect the wedge between on-shore and Euro-rates 
and will tend to vanish as the wedge is removed. Since we 
have already found the abolition of exchange controls to be 
effective in this respect, it must be expected that deviations 
from covered interest parity between on-shore rates will tend 
to zero after abolition of exchange control. Once again, the 
graphical evidence (Graphs 7A and 7B) strongly confirms 
this. It will be seen that both the on-shore/off-shore differen-
tial and the covered interest differentials after abolition have 
non-zero means, however much reduced they are from pre-
abolition levels. Inter alia, these are likely to be explicable 
in terms of observation error and systematic differences in 
perceived risk and transaction costs. In their study of this 
question, Frenkel and Levich ( I 977) argued that the presence 
of transaction costs meant that there was a band within 
which deviations from interest parity could fall consistently 
with perfect arbitrage and they argued that a large pro-
portion of observed deviations from covered parity between 
US and UK interest rates actually fell within this band. 
McCormick ( I 979) subsequently showed, however, that 
Frenkel and Levich had estimated too wide a band and 
calculated that the proportion of observed deviations from 
parity of on-shore rates which fell within the band was less 
than 30%, not 96% as implied by Frenkel and Levich. (For 
off-shore rates, the recalculation sustained the contention 
that virtually all deviations fell within the neutral band.) 
These observations serve to strengthen the suggestion here 
that exchange controls did inhibit full arbitrage and that the 
1 Phylaktis and Wood ( !986) have noted such findings in Johnston (1979) 
for Germany and in Otani and Tiwari ( ! 98 l) for Japan in similar 
instances. The narrowing of the on-shore/off-shore differentials for 
France and Italy (as in Graphs I and 2 above) in times of'calm' suggests 
that it is reasonable to think of their controls as akin to a variable tax. 
biting most vigorously when a realignment is expected. effecting little 
distortion at other times. 
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Table 5 
Bank lending (in sterling) abroad 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 198 1 
Identified long-term export credit 0,2 0,2 0,5 0,6 0,1 0,2 0,2 
Other identified export credit 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 -0, 1 
Other sterling lending -0,1 0,4 0,1 0,1 -0,2 2,5 3,0 
- = less than UKL 50 million; by convention these figures arc shown with sign reversed in the balance of payments tables . 
Source : CSO Balance of Payments Pink Book , 1986. Ta ble 8.4. 
Table 6 
On-shore/off-shore interest differentials per cent per annum 
Mean 
Variance 
Range 
Mean 
Variance 
Range 
176 
Euro-sterling 
minus local authority 
rate 
1,476 
1,731 
- 0,250 to 5,940 
0,075 
0,069 
- 1,280 to 0,940 
Jan. 1973-Sept. 1979 
Oct. 1979-0ct. 1986 
1982 1983 
1,0 0,9 
-0,2 
3,3 1,3 
Euro-sterling 
minus interbank rate 
1,510 
1,735 
- 0, 160 to 6,000 
0,040 
0,045 
- 1,220 to 0,690 
( UKL I OOO million) 
1984 1985 
0,3 
- 0,1 -0,1 
4,7 1,7 
( end of month data ) 
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GRAPH 6A: UK: the off-shore/on-shore differential 
(local authority loans) 
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GRAPH 7 A : UK: departures from covered interest parity 
(3-month rates: (local autority loan rate/Euromarket rate) 
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decline in observed deviations from parity ensuing upon 
their abolition does indicate a real change in this respect. 1 
6. Implications for monetary policy 
The abolition of the monetary exchange controls in principle 
poses several problems for monetary control and in practice 
has disciplined the system of monetary regulation and con-
trol employed in the United Kingdom. 
Three aspects of this may be singled out for discussion: the 
scope for intervention in the foreign exchange markets: the 
nature of monetary regulation; and, finally, the conse-
quences of currency substitution. 
Considered as part of a trend towards greater integration, 
and more efficient financial markets, abolition of exchange 
control can be considered to reduce the scope for sterilized 
intervention and for manoeuvres in the forward markets. 
As an example of the latter, a Bank of England tactic to 
exploit the forward markets to exert a bear squeeze on 
speculators may be mentioned. This tactic consisted of sell-
ing sterling forward, thus raising Euro-sterling but not on-
shore rates of interest, discouraging spot sales and reducing 
the profit from selling sterling short. This manoeuvre cannot 
take place in the absence of exchange control, because the 
possibility of raising off-shore rates without also raising 
on-shore rates no longer exists. 2 Kearney and Macdonald 
(1986), more generally, have found some evidence that steril-
ized intervention was an effective instrument of policy in the 
1970s for the UK, in contrast to Obstfeld's (1984) findings 
for Germany. Since the finding for the UK implies that 
capital mobility was less than perfect, they tentatively sug-
gest that exchange control may have been responsible. 
That the liberalization of exchange controls has had impli-
cations for the nature of monetary control and regulation 
is not in doubt. In a liberal regime, quantitative credit 
restrictions, or similar instruments, are subject to added 
leakage as frustrated business moves off-shore: this was 
forcefully illustrated in the British case (as noted in Artis 
and Lewis, 1981) when the Governor of the Bank of England 
requested the domestic banks in 1979 not to participate in 
1 Some recent work by Chrystal (1986), however, might provide a possible 
qualification. Using daily data on Euro-sterling and interbank .rates. 
Chrystal finds evidence of a move to integration before the aboht1on of 
the controls, specifically in the period September 1978 ~ February 1979. 
What is unknown of course is whether this movement would have proved 
irreversible in the absence of a lifting of the controls or would. on the 
contrary, have been shown to be a temporary and accidental phase. On 
our view of the matter, the latter is the more likely. 
This is discussed in Llewellyn ( 1980). 
or encourage the use of off-shore facilities to frustrate the 
impact of the then existing Special Supplementary Deposit 
Scheme (popularly known as the 'corset'). The corset control 
specified a steeply rising rate of call to zero-interest account 
at the Bank of England on interest-bearing deposits received 
by banks in excess of pre-specified allowable rates of growth. 
The banks reacted to this by rationing borrowers for credit 
and reducing their competition for deposits. In the presence 
of freely available off-shore banking facilities, frustrated 
borrowers could tap off-shore banking facilities, whilst len-
ders would find it profitable to divert deposits from on-
shore to off-shore banks. The lifting of the exchange restric-
tions thus rendered the use of this control otiose and it 
was subsequently dropped in June 1980. Aside from its 
implications for the use of quantitative controls, or controls 
with a rationing effect, the lifting of exchange restrictions 
also implies that monetary regulations of the classical bal-
ance sheet ratio type may be redundant too. The ready 
availability of off-shore banking services, undertaken on the 
basis of complete freedom from imposed balance sheet ra-
tios, implies that the scope for imposing such ratios on 
competing on-shore banks must be strictly limited. Ratios 
which are onerous will result in a migration of banking 
services to off-shore locations. In this light, the reform of 
the regulations governing the British banking system in 1981, 
which placed the system on a very liberal and essentially 
ratio-free basis was inevitable: though there would probably 
have been a movement in this direction in any case, the 
absence of exchange control was compelling. 
In the long haul, these trends inevitably raise questions 
about the extent to which currency substitution will grow. 
The market solution draws its legitimacy from the efficiency 
gains of locating production in the lowest cost location; 
since banking services are highly mobile there is no guarantee 
that these services will not in future be purchased more 
efficiently from off-shore locations, perhaps involving non-
sterling currencies as transactions media. Alternatively, as 
there are economies of scale in production, a UK location 
may prove efficient for global services performed for other 
economies. In either event, widespread currency substitution 
would have radical consequences for monetary policy, as has 
K . 3 been spelt out in a number of recent papers by Mc mnon. 
7. Consequences for asset prices 
It is particularly difficult to draw inferences from the re-
moval of exchange control for its consequences for the 
exchange rate and for interest rates. The coincidence of 
other major shocks at this time is especially awkward in this 
respect. 
.1 See, for example, McKinnon ( 1984). 
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The Hank or England's 1981 study cautiously concluded 
that the abolition or controls must have had some depreciat-
ing effect on the exchange rate, considered in itself, and may 
have had some effect in keeping interest rates down. The 
two effects are to some degree alternatives: if the controls 
succeeded in holding down the rate of return on British 
assets, investment in them would have been correspondingly 
less attractive for foreigners and the impact on the net 
demand for sterling and therefore the exchange rate conse-
quently diminished. 
It seems plausible in view of our discussion of the probable 
impact of abolition on balance of payments flows that the 
controls did contain the net demand for foreign currency: 
removing them should have depreciated the exchange rate. 
The evidence of the change in on-shore/off-shore interest 
differentials might be thought to indicate that domestic rates 
were reduced by the controls, since positive pre-abolition 
differentials in favour of off-shore rates fall or become 
negative after abolition. But the off-shore rate is in covered 
interest parity with the US domestic rate, and would only 
be itself unaffected by abolition, if abolition made no differ-
ence to the exchange rate and expectations of its future 
value. Raw data processing on a pre- and post-abolition 
basis has no chance of revealing effects on either the ex-
change rate or on interest rates: as is well known, the sterling 
exchange rate continued to appreciate strongly during 1980 
and 1981 whilst nominal interest rates also rose during 1980. 
Chrystal (1985) has also looked at real interest rates, but 
arrived at no firm conclusion that abolition had definite 
effects on either nominal or real interest rates. There were 
strong coincidental forces making for an effect in the direc-
tion opposite to that which might have been associated with 
abolition per se both on the exchange rate and on interest 
rates. 
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8. Conclusions 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the British experience 
in removing exchange controls. First, the removal of those 
controls does appear to have contributed towards eliminat-
ing deviations from covered interest parity and reveals their 
presence to have been more of a hindrance to financial 
integration than was perhaps fully realized at the time. The 
integration which abolition has accomplished has in turn 
posed a felt discipline on the type of monetary policy avail-
able; it creates a presumption of a strong decline in the 
effectiveness of sterilized intervention, a presumption against 
quantitative controls on credit ( or controls producing this 
effect) and a presumption in favour of a very liberal regime 
of monetary regulation such as the UK now enjoys. Further 
into the future, the potential for currency substitution has 
still to be revealed. Second, various effects on the balance 
of payments flows can be discerned; in particular, a marked 
outflow of portfolio investment is to be found, and the 
balance of payments flows (on both sides of the balance 
sheet) bear witness to a greater degree of financial inte-
gration. Third, whilst there is a presumption from the appar-
ent balance of payments effects that abolition produced a 
depreciation impact on the exchange rate and some pre-
sumption that interest rates may have been raised ceteris 
paribus, neither effect is evident from the data. At the time 
when the restrictions were lifted the UK balance of payments 
was also affected by other important shocks: the new monet-
ary regime of the Thatcher government, the second oil price 
shock and the move from oil deficit to self-sufficiency in 
production. These factors serve to obscure any effects abol-
ition may have had on asset prices and hinder quantitative 
assessment of the effects on balance of payments flows. They 
also qualify the value of the British experiment as a guide 
to the likely experience of other countries taking the same 
route; among the findings, those pertaining to the impetus 
to financial integration are perhaps the most robust to this 
qualification. 
Part Two - Reports of independent experts consulted by the Commission 
References 
Artis, M.J. and Lewis, M.K., Monetary Control in the United 
Kingdom (Philip Allan), I 981. 
Artis, M.J. and Ostry, S. (1986), 'International economic 
policy cooperation', Chatham House Papers, No 30, Royal 
Institute for International Affairs. 
Bank of England, A guide to United Kingdom exchange 
control, I 977. 
Bank of England, 'The effects of exchange control abolition 
on capital flows', Quarterly Bulletin of the Bank o( England, 
September 1981. 
Beenstock, M ., 'Policies towards international direct invest-
ment: a neoclassical reappraisal', Economic Journal, Sep-
tember 1977. 
Beenstock, M. and Bell, S., 'A quarterly econometric model 
of the capital account in the UK balance of payments', 
Manchester School, March 1979. 
Cairncross, Sir Alec, Control o( long-term international capi-
tal movements, Brookings, 1973. 
Chrystal, K.A., 'The abolition of exchange controls in the 
UK: are there any lessons for other countries?', Capital 
controls and foreign exchange legislation, Euromobiliare, 
Milan, June 1985. 
Chrystal, K.A., 'Financial integration and exchange con-
trols: the UK before and after I 979', mimeo. University of 
Sheffield, 1986. 
Claassen, E. and Wyplosz, C., 'Capital controls: some prin-
ciples and the French experience', Annales de /'Insee, Nos 
47 and 48, 1982. 
Croham Report, 'Exchange rate policy for sterling', Public 
Policy Centre, London, I 986. 
Dornbusch, R., 'Expectations and exchange rate dynamics'. 
Journal of Political Economy, December 1976. 
Edison, H., Miller, M.H. and Williamson, J., 'On evaluating 
and extending the target zone proposal', Journal o( Policy 
Modelling (forthcoming), 1987. 
Frenkel, J.A. and Levich, R.M. (1977), 'Transactions costs 
and interest arbitrage', Journal<~( Political Economy (2). 
Giavazzi, F. and Giovannini. A .. 'The EMS and the dollar', 
Economic Policy (2), April I 986. 
Giavazzi, F. and Pagano, M., 'Capital controls and the 
European Monetary System', Euromohiliare, Milan, June 
1985. 
Hemmings, D.B., 'Exchange controls. security prices and 
exchange rates'. Bulletin o( Economic Research. I 98 I. 
Johnston, R.B., 'Some aspects of the determination of Euro-
currency interest rates'. Quarterly Bulletin o( the Bank o( 
England, March I 979. 
Kearney. C. and MacDonald, R., 'Intervention and steriliza-
tion under floating exchange rates: the UK 1973-83'. Euro-
pean Economic Reviflr. No 30, 1986, pp. 245-364. 
Llewellyn, D.T., International Financial Integration (Macmil-
lan), 1980. 
McCormick, F., 'Covered interest arbitrage: unexploited 
profits?: comment'. Journal of' Political Economy. No 87 (2), 
1979, pp. 411-417. 
McKinnon, R.I., An international standard fen· monetary 
stahili::ation. Institute for International Economics, Wash-
ington. I 984. 
Melitz, J. and Michel, P., 'The dynamic stability of the 
European Monetary System·, CEPR discussion papers. 
1986. 
Obstfeld, M., 'Exchange rates. inflation and the sterilization 
problem: Germany 1975-8 I·. European Economic Rel'ic1r. 
No 21. 1983. pp. 161-89. 
Otani. I. and Tiwari. S., 'Capital controls and interest parity: 
the Japanese experience. I 978-8 I·. International Monetary 
Fund Staff" Papers, December I 98 I. 
Phylaktis, K. and Wood, G.E .. 'An analytic and taxonomic 
framework for the study of exchange controls', 1986 in (eds.) 
Black, J. and Dorrance. G.S.: Problems of' International 
Finance. Papers of the Seventh Annual Conference of the 
International Economics Study Group, 1984. 
Tew, J .H.B. (1978). 'Policies aimed at improving the balance 
of payments·. Chapter 7. in (ed.) Blackaby. f.T.: British 
l!Conomic policy 1960-74. (CUP). 
Williamson, J ., The exchange rate system. Institute for Inter-
national Economics, Washington. 1985. 
Wyplosz. C.. 'Capital controls and balance of payments 
crises·, Journal o( International Money and Finance. 1986. 
181 

Part Three - The proposals presented 
by the Commission to the Council for the creation 
of a European financial area 
In November 1987 the Commission presented to the Council 
a set of proposals for the implementation of the final phase 
of its programme for liberalizing capital movements pre-
sented in May 1986. 
They comprise: 
(i) a proposal for a Directive for the complete liberalization 
of capital movements; 
(ii) a proposal for a Directive amending the 1972 Directive 
on regulating international capital flows and neutraliz-
ing their undesirable effects on domestic liquidity; 
(iii) a proposal for a Regulation adjusting and combining 
the existing Community instruments for providing med-
ium-term financial support for Member States' balances 
of payments. 
The proposals were put forward in a Communication from 
the Commission to the Council indicating the main options 
adopted and drawing attention to three sets of complemen-
tary questions: harmonization of supervisory and prudential 
rules in the field of finance; tax aspects of the liberalization 
of capital movements; and the link with participation by all 
Community currencies in the EMS exchange-rate mech-
anism. 
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I - Communication from the Commission 
Creation of a European financial area 
Introduction 
In April 1983, the Commission sent the Council a communi-
cation on financial integration. 1 This gave new impetus to 
Community discussions and was followed in May 1986 by 
a programme for the liberalization of capital movements,2 
which is a vital element in the creation of an integrated 
financial area. The first stage of that programme was put 
into effect by the Council in November 1986 when it adopted 
a Directive which entered into force on I March 1987 extend-
ing the list of liberalized transactions. 
Several Member States have taken measures which go be-
yond their Community obligations; and the relaxation of 
exchange controls in France and Italy has made it possible 
to terminate the protective clauses under Article I 08 of the 
Treaty from which they previously benefited. 
The programme adopted in May 1986 stipulates that the 
Commission will study with the Monetary Committee and 
the Committee of Central Bank Governors the implications 
of financial integration for monetary cooperation and on 
the liberalization of financial services. It also stated that 
proposals for a Directive establishing the full liberalization 
of capital movements will be submitted to the Council in 
1987. 
A link was established between the strengthening of the 
EMS and the liberalization of capital movements during the 
discussions which followed the realignment of January 1987. 
At their informal meeting in Knokke in April 1987, the 
Ministers for Finance agreed that the measures under exam-
ination for strengthening the EMS should be adopted in 
September and that the Commission would present as soon 
as possible afterwards its proposals on the liberalization of 
capital movements. 
The informal meeting of Ministers in Nyborg in September 
approved a package on the strengthening of the EMS and 
welcomed the Commission's intention to send its proposals 
for the implementation of the final stage of the liberalization 
of capital movements to the Council meeting of November. 
The first part of this document outlines the main options 
on which those proposals are based. 
1 COM(83) 207 final. 
COM(86) 292 final. 
The second part considers the following three complemen-
tary questions, which have been posed during the Com-
mission's considerations on the implications of the full liber-
alization of capital movements and in the notes sent by the 
President of the Commission to the President of the Council 
for the informal meetings of the Finance Ministers: 
(i) How should the programme to liberalize capital move-
ments fit in with the programme to harmonize national 
supervisory structures, whose purpose is to facilitate 
the full freedom of financial services while ensuring 
the protection of savings and the conditions for fair 
competition between financial intermediaries? 
(ii) With no restrictions, capital movements will be deter-
mined to a greater extent by fiscal considerations. What 
measures may be necessary to ensure that there is no 
misallocation of capital and to combat a possible in-
crease in fiscal evasion? 
(iii) Maintaining stable exchange rates is necessary both 
for achieving and preserving the large internal market. 
What relationship is there between financial integration 
and participation in the exchange rate mechanism of 
the EMS? 
The Commission's view is that solutions to these questions 
must not be regarded as pre-conditions for the programme of 
liberalization of capital movements. An integrated financial 
market will not be achieved by simultaneously implementing 
all the necessary measures. On the contrary. it will be 
achieved by creating a dynamic movement towards inte-
gration and accepting some disequilibrium within an overall 
programme which is both coherent and binding. The liberal-
ization of capital movements will itself provide the momen-
tum for this process. 
Legislative proposals for the final state of the 
liberalization of capital movements 
The Commission's proposals are based on three texts: 
(i) A proposal for a Directive for the full liberalization of 
capital movements; 
(ii) A proposal for the amendment of the 1972 Directive 
on regulating international capital flows; 
(iii) A proposal for a Regulation amending and combining 
the existing two Community instruments which are 
available to provide medium-term balance of payments 
assistance. 
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1. The Directive to implement the full liberal-
ization of capital movements 
The purpose of this Directive, which will be based on Article 
69 of the Treaty, is to extend liberalization to all capital 
movements. This extension will cover mainly the following 
operations: 
(i) investments in short-term securities; 
(ii) current and deposit account operations; 
(iii) financial loans and credits. 
As the Directive will also stipulate that transfers made for 
the purposes of capital movements must be effected on the 
same exchange rate conditions as those for current pay-
ments, a dual exchange market could not be maintained or 
introduced except under a safeguard clause, provided for in 
the Treaty or in this Directive. 
The obligation to liberalize will be worded in a general way. 
This will remove any ambiguities over its scope, which may 
remain even after the decisions of the Court of Justice on 
this subject. The obligation must be interpreted to imply: 
(i) not only the elimination of restrictions on capital trans-
fers but also on the underlying transactions; 
(ii) the possibility for a resident in one Member State to 
have access to the financial system of another Member 
State and all the financial products that are available 
there; this resident therefore puts himself in the regulat-
ory framework of the market in which he deals; 
(iii) the elimination in domestic rules of discriminatory 
measures, for example fiscal discrimination, and restric-
tions imposed on certain types of investor, in so far as 
they are not strictly necessary for prudential reasons. 
The new Directive will contain a safeguard clause which 
would permit the reintroduction of controls on short-term 
capital movements if they were seriously endangering a 
Member State's monetary or exchange rate policy. 
Exercise of the safeguard clause would be subject to Com-
munity procedures. Either the Commission, after consulting 
the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Central 
Bank Governors, would authorize the implementation of 
protective measures; or in an emergency the Member State 
would do so itself, in which case it would inform the Com-
mission and the Member States. The Commission may then 
decide whether the measures taken should be amended or 
suspended. In all cases the measures would be limited in 
time to a maximum of six months and could only affect 
transactions newly liberalized by the Directive. 
186 
A safeguard clause in the Directive itself is necessary, despite 
the fact that the Treaty provides safeguard clauses through 
Articles 73, I 08 and I 09, for the following reasons: 
(i) Articles I 08 and I 09 require that the Member State 
has balance of payments difficulties, but there can be 
disruptive short-term capital movements without a bal-
ance of payments crisis. Article 73 refers to 'disturb-
ances in the functioning of the capital market'. There 
are risks in encouraging a wide interpretation of this to 
cover monetary and exchange rate difficulties connected 
with short-term transactions. 
(ii) As the measures would affect short-term and monetary 
transactions. the Committee of Central Bank Gover-
nors should be consulted; but the safeguard clauses of 
the Treaty do not provide for this. 
(iii) It is desirable to have a short fixed time-limit. 
Four Member States - Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland 
- are not in a position to proceed to the final stage of the 
liberalization of capital movements at the same pace for a 
variety of reasons such as: precarious balance of payments 
positions, high external indebtedness, less developed dom-
estic financial systems, etc. 
The new Directive will provide for a longer timetable over 
which these countries would remove controls on the trans-
actions covered. This would not affect the special provisions 
which already apply in these countries on other transactions 
covered by previous legislation. 
For Spain and Ireland it is proposed that the transitional 
period would terminate at the end of 1990; and for Portugal 
and Greece at the end of 1992. 
2. Amendment of the 1972 Directive on regulat-
ing international capital flows 
The purpose of amending this Directive is the following: 
(i) To include a declaration of intent that the degree of 
liberalization of capital movements to and from third 
countries should be equivalent to those within the Com-
munity. This solution is preferable to the introduction 
into Community law of an obligation to liberalize erga 
omnes. Although this would probably be done in prac-
tice, such a legal commitment, which would be more 
difficult to reverse than to make, could compromise the 
Community as a whole or individual Member States in 
negotiations with third countries. 
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(ii) To give operational content to the notion that there 
should be a Community dimension, which is contained 
in the preamble to the existing text but not in the 
Articles. The proposal is that Member States would 
keep the Commission informed of measures taken vis-
a-vis third countries, and that the Commission, after 
consulting with the Monetary Committee, would be 
able to make recommendations to the Member States. 
(iii) To extend the range of instruments covered by the 
Directive and to make them the same as the instruments 
which would be necessary for the implementation of 
the safeguard clause in the new Directive implementing 
Article 67 of the Treaty. 
It is desirable to include these aims in an amended version 
of the 1972 Directive rather than in the new Directive be-
cause they have to be based on different Articles of the 
Treaty. 
3. Mechanisms providing medium-term bal-
ance of payments assistance 
The purpose of the proposal, which takes the form of a 
regulation based on Articles I 08 and 235, is to: 
(i) establish a single instrument to provide medium-term 
financial support (MTFS) by combining the existing 
Community loan and medium-term financial assistance 
mechanisms; 
(ii) make the Community loan the primary instrument for 
medium-term assistance; 
(iii) extend the conditions under which medium-term assist-
ance can be granted to cover needs associated with the 
liberalization of capital movements as well as general 
balance of payments difficulties. 
It is desirable to fuse the two instruments for the following 
reasons: 
(i) it will unify the conditions under which they can be 
granted, while preserving their different financing 
methods; 
(ii) it reflects the current reality that the MTFS is not used. 
The granting of the loan, or the opening of a credit line, 
would be made by a Council decision taken by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission after the 
Monetary Committee had been consulted. The decision 
would cover: the amount of the loan, its length, procedures 
(e.g. single or phased payment) and the economic policy 
conditions to be attached. The nature of the conditionality 
would depend on whether the loan was activated for purely 
balance of payments reasons or whether it was granted to 
assist the process of liberalization of capital movements. 
The broadening of the mechanisms' scope and the order of 
precedence introduced between the two financing methods 
will mean that the upper limit on the outstanding amount 
of financing in the form of market borrowing should have 
to be raised to more than the present 8 OOO million ECU. 
Complementary questions 
1. The protection of savers and depositors: The 
harmonization of supervisory and prudential 
rules 
The liberalization of capital movements, combined with the 
full liberalization of financial services, will not only allow 
capital to move freely throughout the Community, but will 
also make it possible for banks, the many different categories 
of savings institutions and other financial intermediaries to 
offer and advertise their services to savers and depositors 
throughout the Community either through establishments 
in the Member States or across frontiers without establish-
ments. 
It is important that this liberalization should take place in 
a framework which ensures a satisfactory level of protection 
for savers and depositors, high standards of disclosure and 
information for investors and shareholders, equal conditions 
of competition in financial markets and the solvency and 
stability of banks and other financial institutions. 
The Commission's approach to the question of investor 
and depositor protection distinguishes between two different 
situations. The first case is where a resident in one Member 
State addresses himself on his own initiative to a supplier of 
financial services in another Member State. The second case 
is where a supplier from one Member State wishes to market 
his services and solicit business from the residents of another 
Member State, either from an establishment in that other 
Member State or across frontiers under the freedom of 
services provisions of the Treaty. 
In the first case the residents of any one Member State 
should be free to address themselves to the suppliers of 
financial services and products in any other Member State 
on the same terms and conditions as residents in that Mem-
ber State. In doing so, the client or purchaser of financial 
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services is deemed to place himself under the regulatory 
framework of the Member State of the supplier and accord-
ingly he cannot invoke the rules of his country of residence 
to protect himself. Banking and other savings institutions in 
all Member States of the Community are in general subject 
to strict regulation by the national authorities both as re-
gards their solvency and liquidity and as regards the protec-
tion of investors and depositors. 
To deal with the second case, the Commission has initiated a 
substantial programme of legislation to harmonize national 
rules for the prudential supervision of financial institutions 
and for the protection and information of investors. Many 
of these measures have already been adopted or are under 
discussion by the Council; the remaining proposals will be 
put forward by the Commission before the end of 1988. The 
objectives of the measures proposed are: 
(a) the removal of the remaining obstacles (i.e. other than 
exchange controls) to the freedom of establishment and 
freedom of services; 
(b) harmonizing prudential rules to ensure the solvency and 
financial stability of financial institutions; 
(c) ensuring equivalent standards of investor, depositor and 
consumer information and protection. 
The method of approach in the legislation as set out in the 
White Paper comprises three main elements: 
(i) the harmonization of the essential elements of pruden-
tial rules and standards; 
(ii) the mutual recognition of the way in which these stan-
dards are applied in the different Member States; 
(iii) based on (i) and (ii), the principle of 'home country 
control', i.e. the principle that all the activities of banks 
(and other financial institutions) throughout the Com-
munity, whether carried out through a branch or by 
cross-frontier provision of services, will be supervised 
by the authorities of the Member States of the head 
office. 
Although it is important that rapid progress should be 
made in the adoption of the harmonizing measures described 
above, their adoption should not be regarded as a precon-
dition for the final phase of liberalization of capital move-
ments. Many of the measures in question indeed relate to 
transactions which have already been liberalized. In the view 
of the Commission this programme provides a sufficient 
level of protection for savers and depositors; no further 
specific prudential measures are required for the completion 
of the liberalization of capital movements. 
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2. Taxation questions 
The liberalization of capital movements highlights the fol-
lowing four issues in the field of direct taxation: 
(i) harmonization of company taxation; 
(ii) tax evasion; 
(iii) discriminatory provisions in national tax systems that 
provide an incentive for private individuals to invest in 
national securities; 
(iv) restrictions on investments by pension funds in Member 
States. 
2.1. Harmonization of company taxation 
The full benefits of the liberalization of capital movements 
will not be obtained if investment decisions are distorted by 
significant differences in company taxation between Member 
States. Such decisions include not only decisions by com-
panies as to where to set up their head office and where to do 
business, but also decisions by shareholders and individual 
investors as to where to place their funds. 
The Commission takes the view that these distortions should 
be substantially reduced by a closer approximation of the 
systems, the taxable base and tax rates of company taxation 
in the different Member States. Its approach to this issue 
will be set out fully in a White Paper on the taxation of 
enterprises to be issued before the end of this year. The 
Commission will take as the starting point the Directive for 
the harmonization of company taxation systems which it 
put forward in August 1975. This proposal will be comp-
lemented by a proposal to harmonize the tax base and some 
aspects of the 1975 proposals will be amended. In particular, 
the bracket of tax rates then proposed (45-55 % ) is now too 
high in view of recent and prospective developments in 
Member States. 
2.2. Tax evasion 
The final stage of liberalization of capital movements carries 
with it a risk of increased tax evasion. This is because 
investors in all Member States will be able to have investment 
incomt: paid into bank accounts held by them outside their 
country of residence and this will heighten the risk that this 
income will not be declared in their country of residence. 
The Commission takes the view that an increase in tax 
evasion would be a matter of serious concern both because 
of the loss of budgetary revenue and because of the damage 
to fiscal equity, and that practical measures should be taken 
to minimize this risk. 
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This risk is less in the case of income arising from dividends 
than from interest from bonds or bank deposits. In the 
former case, in a large majority of Member States a substan-
tial part of the tax due from the shareholder is deducted at 
source (usually through a withholding tax) by the company. 
The proposals in the Commission's 1975 Directive for the 
harmonization of corporate taxation would ensure a com-
mon Community system for ensuring such a deduction. 
The risk is greater in the case of interest income, because 
most industrial countries either impose no withholding tax 
at all on such income or exempt non-residents from its 
application. 
Tax evasion already takes place. even where exchange con-
trols have not been removed, and the extent of any increase 
in evasion, when these controls are removed, must be uncer-
tain. If, as capital movements become completely liberalized 
throughout the Community, the threat of increased evasion 
proves substantial, two main types of remedy (which are not 
mutually exclusive) could be considered: 
(i) a generalized withholding tax applied either to all resi-
dents and non-residents alike or at least to all Com-
munity residents; 
(ii) an obligation on banks to disclose information about 
interest income, received by Community residents, to 
their tax authorities. 
Either of these solutions would ensure that any interest 
income paid into a bank account within the Community 
would be taxed. The withholding tax would be administra-
tively more simple. But it would probably have to be levied 
at a relatively low rate and the revenue would accrue to the 
country where the income arises. The obligation on banks 
to declare income would ensure that the taxpayers concerned 
paid the full tax due to their country of residence. But it 
could only be operated if banking secrecy requirements, 
applying in several Member States, were removed. 
The problem of fiscal evasion presents Member States with 
a dilemma. The more effective any measures taken within 
the Community to combat such evasion. the greater the risk 
of capital movements to third countries. A fully effective 
solution can therefore only be achieved through inter-
national agreements either for the more general extension 
of a withholding tax on interest or for stronger cooperation 
between fiscal administrations. So far as a generalized with-
holding tax is concerned, the prospects for such an agree-
ment seem remote at present. As regards stronger cooper-
ation between tax authorities, prospects seem somewhat 
brighter, since a convention has now been negotiated in the 
Council of Europe and the OECD and will soon be open 
l'or signature. 
Conclusions 
The final phase of liberalization of capital movements entails 
a risk of increased fiscal evasion. There is no watertight 
solution to this problem, but everything possible must be 
done to minimize the risks. 
Action to strengthen cooperation between fiscal adminis-
trations, e.g. in cases of suspected fraud, would be helpful 
and should in any case be set in hand. The other two 
main options are a withholding tax on all forms of interest 
payment to be paid at least by all Community residents and/ 
or a general obligation on all banks to declare interest 
income to Community fiscal authorities. 
The Council is invited to give its views on these solutions 
and on any other solutions which may be considered feasible. 
2.3. Discriminatory provisions in national tax systems that 
provide an incentive for private individuals to invest in 
national securities 
There has been an increasing tendency in Member States in 
recent years to introduce tax incentives for the purchase of 
domestic securities (shares and bonds). These measures 
could be regarded as discriminatory and might lead to distor-
tions in capital movements and to a misallocation of capital 
investment. Such measures may take the form of a deduction 
from taxable income of sums invested in such securities. 
generally up to a specific ceiling, and/or of an exemption, 
likewise normally subject to a specific ceiling, for income 
arising from such securities. They are normally limited over 
time. 
The Commission takes the view that such distortions should 
be eliminated. It is proposing to open discussions with the 
Member States concerned with the view to imposing a stand-
still and gradually removing any distortion or discrimi-
nation. In the latter case Member States would have the 
choice of discontinuing the tax concession or extending it to 
securities issued in other Member States. 
2.4. Restrictions on inwstments by pension funds in Mem-
ber States 
Some Member States do not allow pension funds to invest 
in foreign securities. or restrict their scope for doing so, 
thereby impeding the free movement of capital. 
The Commission is aware that some form of prudential 
supervision might be justified in the case of pension funds. 
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However, the restnct1ons are, in its view, excessive. It is 
planning to start discussions with the Member States con-
cerned with a view to their gradual removal. 
3. The relationship between liberalization of 
capital movements and the EMS 
Full participation in the exchange rate mechanism of the 
EMS and liberalization of capital movements are comp-
lementary. On the one hand, liberalization can be under-
taken because of the support given by the system to the 
stabilization of exchange rates. On the other hand, liberaliza-
tion increases the need to fully coordinate policies and hence 
requires a strengthened system. Those countries which do 
not fully participate and which have not liberalized capital 
movements should complete the two processes in parallel. 
Sterling presents a different case. The UK has fully liberal-
ized capital movements but does not participate in the ex-
change rate mechanism. This has a number of disadvantages 
190 
both for the UK, its closest partners, and for the Community 
as a whole: 
(i) For the UK it has been recognized that the exchange 
rate is a valuable policy target and the authorities main-
tain a degree of stability vis-11-vis the Community cur-
rencies. The credibility of this policy would, however, 
be enhanced if it were formalized. 
(ii) For its closest partners, Ireland especially, which has 
very close commercial and financial links with the UK, 
sterling's non-participation causes problems. The very 
large potential for capital nows between the two 
countries has made it more difficult for Ireland to move 
fully towards liberalization of capital movements. 
(iii) For the Community as a whole, the overall purpose is 
to complete a large internal market. This goes beyond 
the establishment of a free trade area and a zone of 
unimpeded capital mobility and requires exchange rate 
stability throughout the European financial area. The 
creation of an integrated financial area implies a degree 
of joint management through a reasonable homo-
geneous regulatory and supervisory framework and 
close and structured coordination between monetary 
authorities. 
II - Proposal for a Council Directive for the implementation of Article 67 
of the EEC Treaty 
Liberalization of capital movements 
(Presented by the Commission) 
The Council of the European Communities, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Article 69 thereof. 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission. which 
consulted the Monetary Committee for this purpose. 
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament, 
Whereas Article SA of the Treaty stipulates that the internal 
market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of capital is ensured: 
Whereas Member States should be able to take. within 
the framework of appropriate Community procedures, the 
requisite measures to regulate bank liquidity and, if necess-
ary. to restrict temporarily short-term capital movements 
which. even where there is no appreciable divergence in 
economic fundamentals. seriously disrupt the conduct of 
their monetary and exchange-rate policies: 
Whereas. in the interests of transparency. it is advisable to 
indicate the scope. in accordance with the Nomenclature 
laid down in this Directive. of the transitional measures 
adopted for the benefit of the Kingdom of Spain and the 
Portuguese Republic by the 1985 Act of Accession in the 
field of capital movements: 
Whereas the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic 
may. under the terms of Articles 61 to 66 and 222 to 232 
respectively, of the 1985 Act of Accession, postpone the 
liberalization of certain capital movements in derogation 
from the obligations of the Directive of 11 May 1960: 
whereas Council Directive 86;566/EEC of 17 November 
1986 also provides for transitional arrangements to be ap-
plied for the benefit of those two Member States in respect 
of their obligations to liberalize capital movements; whereas 
it is appropriate for those two Member States to be able to 
postpone the application of the new liberalization obli-
gations resulting from this Directive for the same periods 
and for the same economic reasons: 
Whereas the Hellenic Republic and Ireland are faced, albeit 
to differing degrees. with difficult balance-of-payments situ-
ations and high levels of external indebtedness; whereas the 
immediate and complete liberalization of capital movements 
by those two Member States would make it more difficult 
for them to continue to apply the measures they have taken 
to improve their external positions and to reinforce the 
capacity of their financial systems to adapt to the require-
ments of an integrated financial market in the Community: 
whereas it is appropriate, in accordance with Article 8C of 
the Treaty, to grant to those two Member States. in the light 
of their specific circumstances, further time in which to 
comply with the obligations arising from this Directive. 
Has adopted this Directive: 
Article 1 
I. Without prejudice to the following provisions. Member 
States shall abolish restrictions on the movement of capital 
taking place between persons resident in Memher States. 
The different categories of capital movement are set out in 
Annex I to this Directive. 
2. Transfers in respect of capital movements shall be made 
on the same exchange-rate conditions as those ruling for 
payments relating to current transactions. 
Article 2 
Member States shall notify the Commission. the Monetary 
Committee and the Committee of Governors of the Central 
Banks. by the date of their entry into force at the latest. of 
measures to regulate bank liquidity which have a specific 
impact on capital operations carried out by credit insti-
tutions with non-residents and which involve regulation of 
the net external positions of such institutions or of the setting 
of compulsory reserve ratios on their external assets or 
liabilities. 
Such measures shall be confined to what is necessary for the 
purposes of domestic monetary regulation. 
Artie/I.' 3 
I. Where short-term capital movements of exceptional mag-
nitude impose severe strains on foreign-exchange markets 
and lead to serious disturhances in the conduct of a Memher 
State's monetary and exchange-rate policies, being reflected 
in particular in substantial variations in domestic liquidity. 
the Commission may. after consulting the Monetary Com-
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mittee and the Committee of Governors of the Central 
Banks, authorize that Member State to take, in respect of 
the capital movements listed in Annex 11 to this Directive, 
protective measures, the conditions and details of which the 
Commission shall determine. 
2. The Member State concerned may itself take the protective 
measures referred to above, on grounds of urgency, should 
these measures be necessary. The Commission and the other 
Member States shall be informed of such measures by the 
date of their entry into force at the latest. The Commission 
may, after consulting the Monetary Committee and the 
Committee of Governors of Central Banks, decide that 
the Member State concerned shall amend or abolish the 
measures. 
3. The period of application of protective measures taken 
pursuant to this Article shall not exceed six months. 
Article 4 
The provisions of this Directive shall not prejudice the right 
of Member States to take all requisite measures to prevent 
infringements of their laws and regulations or to lay down 
procedures for the declaration of capital movements for 
purposes of administrative or statistical information. 
Application of those measures and procedures may not have 
the effect of impeding the capital movements in question. 
Anicle 5 
For the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, 
the scope, in accordance with the Nomenclature of capital 
movements contained in Annex I to this Directive, of the 
provisions of the 1985 Act of Accession in the field of capital 
movements shall be as indicated in Annex Ill. 
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Article 6 
I. The Member States shall take the measures necessary for 
them to comply with this Directive no later than ........... . 
They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. They 
shall also make known, by the date of their entry into force 
at the latest, any new measure or any amendment made to 
the provisions governing the capital movements listed in 
Annex I to this Directive. 
2. The Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, 
without prejudice for these two Member States to Articles 
61 to 66 and 222 to 232 of the 1985 Act of Accession, and 
the Hellenic Republic and Ireland may temporarily continue 
to apply restrictions on the capital movements listed in 
Annex IV to this Directive, subject to the conditions and 
time-limits laid down in that Annex. 
Article 7 
The Nomenclature of capital movements and the Explana-
tory Notes in Annex I, together with Annexes II, III and 
IV, form an integral part of this Directive. 
Article8 
The Council Directive of 11 May 1960, as last amended by 
Council Directive 86/566/EEC of I 7 November I 986, is 
hereby repealed. 
Article 9 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the Council 
The President 
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Annex I 
Nomenclature of the capital movements referred to in Article 1 of the Directive 
In this Nomenclature. capital movements are classified ac-
cording to the economic nature of the assets and liabilities 
they concern, denominated either in national currency or in 
foreign exchange. 
The capital movements listed in this Nomenclature are taken 
to cover: 
(i) all the operations necessary for the purposes of capital 
movements: conclusion and performance of the trans-
action and related transfers. The transaction is generally 
between residents of different Member States although 
some capital movements are carried out by a single 
person for his own account (e.g. transfers of assets 
belonging to emigrants); 
(ii) operations carried out by any natural or legal person. 1 
including operations in respect of the assets or liabilities 
of Member States or of other public administrations 
and agencies, subject to the provisions of Article 68 (3) 
of the Treaty; 
(iii) access for the economic operator to all the financial 
techniques available on the market approached for the 
purpose of carrying out the operation in question. For 
example, the concept of acquisition of securities and 
other financial instruments covers not only spot trans-
actions but also all the dealing techniques available: 
forward transactions, transactions carrying an option 
or warrant. swaps against other assets, etc. Similarly, 
the concept of operations in current and deposit ac-
counts with financial institutions includes not only the 
opening and placing of funds on accounts but also 
forward foreign-exchange transactions, irrespective of 
whether these are intended to cover an exchange risk 
or to take an open foreign-exchange position; 
(iv) operations to liquidate or assign assets built up, repatri-
ation of the proceeds of liquidation thereof1 or immedi-
ate use of such proceeds within the limits of Community 
obligations; 
(v) operations to repay credits or loans. 
I - Direct invcstments 1 
I. Establishment and extension of branches or new under-
takings belonging solely to the person providing the 
capital, and the acquisition in full of existing undertak-
mgs. 
1 Sec explanatory notes. 
2. Participation in new or existing undertakings with a view 
to establishing or maintaining lasting economic links. 
3. Long-term loans with a view to establishing or maintain-
ing lasting economic links. 
4. Reinvestment of profits with a view to maintaining last-
ing economic links. 
A - Direct investments on national territory by non-resi-
dents 1 
B - Direct investments abroad by residents 1 
II - Investments m real estate (not included 
under I) 1 
A - Investments in real estate on national territory by non-
residents 
B - Investments in real estate abroad by residents 
III - Operations in securities normally dealt in 
on the capital market (not included under 
I, IV and V) 
(a) Shares and other securities of a participating nature. 1 
(b) Bonds. 1 
A - Transactions in securities on the capital market 
I. Acquisition by non-residents of domesic securities dealt 
in on a stock exchange. 1 
, Acquisition by residents of foreign securities dealt in on 
a stock exchange. 
3. Acquisition by non-residents of domestic securities not 
dealt in on a stock exchange. 1 
4. Acquisition by residents of foreign securities not dealt in 
on a stock exchange. 
B - Admission of securities to the capital market 1 
(i) Introduction on a stock exchange. 1 
(ii) Issue and placing on a capital market. 1 
1 Sec explanatory notes. 
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I. Admission of domestic securities to a foreign capital 
market. 
2. Admission of foreign securities to the domestic capital 
market. 
IV - Operations in units of collective invest-
ment undertakings 1 
(a) Units of undertakings for collective investment in secu-
rities normally dealt in on the capital market (shares. 
other equities and bonds). 
(b) Units of undertakings for collective investment in secu-
rities or instruments normally dealt in on the money 
market. 
(c) Units of undertakings for collective investment in other 
assets. 
A - Transactions in units of collective investment under-
takings 
I. Acquisition by non-residents of units of national under-
takings dealt in on a stock exchange. 
2. Acquisition by residents of units of foreign undertakings 
dealt in on a stock exchange. 
3. Acquisition by non-residents of units of national under-
takings not dealt in on a stock exchange. 
4. Acquisition by residents of units of foreign undertakings 
not dealt in on a stock exchange. 
B - Admission of units of collective investment undertak-
ings to the capit2l market 
(i) Introduction on a stock exchange. 
(ii) Issue and placing on a capital market. 
1. Admission of units of national collective investment 
undertakings to a foreign capital market. 
2. Admission of units of foreign collective investment 
undertakings to the domestic capital market. 
1 See explanatory notes. 
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V - Operations in securities and other instru-
ments normally dealt in on the money 
market 1 
A - Transactions in securities and other instruments on 
the money market 
I. Acquisition by non-residents of domestic money market 
securities and instruments. 
2. Acquisition by residents of foreign money market securi-
ties and instruments. 
B - Admission of securities and other instruments to the 
money market 
(i) Introduction on a recognized money market. 1 
(ii) Issue and placing on a recognized money market. 
I. Admission of domestic securities and instruments to a 
foreign money market. 
2. Admission of foreign securities and instruments to the 
domestic money market. 
VI - Operations in current and deposit ac-
counts with financial institutions 1 
A - Operations carried out by non-residents with dom-
estic financial institutions 
B - Operations carried out by residents with foreign finan-
cial institutions 
VII - Credits related to commercial trans-
actions or to the provision of services in 
which a resident is participating1 
I. Short-term (less than one year). 
2. Medium-term (from one to five years). 
3. Long-ttrm (five years or more). 
A - Credits granted by non-residents to residents 
B - Credits granted by residents to non-residents 
1 See explanatory notes. 
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VIII - Financial loans and credits (not m-
cluded under I, VII and XI) 1 
I. Short-term (less than one year). 
2. Medium-term (from one to five years). 
3. Long-term (five years or more). 
A - Loans and credits granted by non-residents to resi-
dents 
B - Loans and credits granted by residents to non-resi-
dents 
IX - Sureties, other guarantees and rights of 
pledge 
A - Granted by non-residents to residents 
B - Granted by residents to non-residents 
X - Transfers m performance of msurance 
contracts 
A - Premiums and payments in respect of life assurance 
I. Contracts concluded between domestic life assurance 
companies and non-residents. 
2. Contracts concluded between foreign life assurance com-
panies and residents. 
B - Premiums and payments in respect of credit insurance 
I. Contracts concluded between domestic credit insurance 
companies and non-residents. 
2. Contracts concluded between foreign credit insurance 
companies and residents. 
C - Other transfers of capital in respect of insurance 
contracts 
1 Sec explanatory notes. 
XI - Personal capital movements 
A - Loans 
B - Gifts and endowments 
C-Dowries 
D - Inheritances and legacies 
E - Settlement of debts by immigrants in their previous 
country of residence 
F - Transfers of assets constituted by residents, in the 
event of emigration, at the time of their installation 
or during their period of stay abroad 
G - Transfers, during their period of stay, of immigrants' 
savings to their previous country of residence 
XII - Physical import and export of financial 
assets 
A - Securities 
B - Means of payment of every kind 
XIII - Other capital movements 
A - Death duties 
B - Damages (where these can be considered as capital) 
C - Refunds in the case of cancellation of contracts and 
refunds of uncalled-for payments (where these can be 
considered as capital) 
D - Authors' royalties: patents, designs, trade marks and 
inventions (assignments and transfers arising out of 
such assignments) 
E - Transfers of the moneys required for the provision of 
services (not included under VI) 
F - Miscellaneous 
195 
Creation of a European financial area 
Explanatory notes 
For the purposes of this Nomenclature, the following ex-
pressions have the meanings assigned to them respectively: 
Direct i111·estme11ts 
Investments of all kinds by natural persons or commercial, 
industrial or financial undertakings, and which serve to 
establish or to maintain lasting and direct links between the 
person providing the capital and the entrepreneur to whom 
or the undertaking to which the capital is made available in 
order to carry on an economic activity. This concept must 
therefore be understood in its widest sense. 
The undertakings mentioned under 1-1 of the Nomenclature 
include legally independent undertakings (wholly-owned 
subsidiaries) and branches. 
As regards those undertakings mentioned under 1-2 of the 
Nomenclature which have the status of companies limited 
by shares, there is participation in the nature of direct 
investment where the block of shares held by a natural 
person or another undertaking or any other holder enables 
the shareholder, either pursuant to the provisions of national 
laws relating to companies limited by shares or otherwise, 
to participate effectively in the management of the company 
or in its control. 
Long-term loans of a participating nature, mentioned under 
1-3 of the Nomenclature, means loans for a p~riod of more 
than five years which are made for the purpose of establish-
ing or maintaining lasting economic links. The main ex-
amples which may be cited are loans granted by a company 
to its subsidiaries or to companies in which it has a share, 
and loans linked with a profit-sharing arrangement. Loans 
granted by financial institutions with a view to establishing 
or maintaining lasting economic links arc also included 
under this heading. 
Investments in real estate 
Purchases of buildings and land and the construction of 
buildings by private persons for gain or personal use. This 
category also includes rights of usufruct, easements and 
building rights. 
Introduction on a stock exchange or on a recognized money 
market 
Access - in accordance with a specified procedure - for 
securities and other negotiable instruments to dealings, 
whether controlled officially or unofficially, on an officially 
recognized stock exchange or in an officially recognized 
segment of the money market. 
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Sernrities dealt in 011 a stock exchange ( quoted or un-
quoted) 
Securities the dealings in which are controlled by regulations, 
the prices for which are regularly published, either by official 
stock exchanges (quoted securities) or by other bodies at-
tached to a stock exchange, e.g. committees of banks (un-
quoted securities). 
Issue o(sernrities and other negotiah/e instruments 
Sale by way of an offer to the public. 
Placing o/'securities and other negotiahle instruments 
The direct sale of securities by the issuer or by the consortium 
which the issuer has instructed to sell them, with no offer 
being made to the public. 
Domestic or foreign securities and other instruments 
Securities according to the country in which the issuer has 
his principal place of business. Acquisition by residents of 
domestic securities and other instruments issued on a foreign 
market ranks as the acquisition of foreign securities. 
Shares and other securities of a participating nature 
Including rights to subscribe to new issues of shares. 
Bonds 
Negotiable securities with a maturity of two years or more 
from issue for which the interest rate and the terms for the 
repayment of the principal and the payment of interest are 
determined at the time of issue. 
Collective investment undertakings 
Undertakings: 
(i) the object of which is the collective investment in trans-
ferable securities or other assets of the capital they raise 
and which operate on the principle of risk-spreading, 
and 
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(ii) the units of which are, at the request of holders, under 
the legal, contractual or statutory conditions governing 
them, repurchased or redeemed, directly or indirectly, 
out of those undertakings' assets. Action taken by a 
collective investment undertaking to ensure that the 
stock-exchange value of its units does not significantly 
vary from their net asset value shall be regarded as 
equivalent to such repurchase or redemption. 
Such undertakings may be constituted according to law 
either under the law of contract (as common funds managed 
by management companies) or trust law (as unit trusts) or 
under statute (as investment companies). 
For the purposes of this Directive, 'common funds' shall 
also include unit trusts. 
Securities and other instruments normal!)' dealt in on the 
money market · 
Treasury bills and other negotiable bills, certificates of de-
posit, bankers' acceptances, commercial paper and other 
like instruments. 
Credits related to commercial transactions or to the pro-
vision of services 
Contractual trade credits (advances or payments by instal-
ment in respect of work in progress or on order and extended 
payment terms, whether or not involving subscription to a 
commercial bill) and their financing by credits provided 
by credit institutions. This category also includes factoring 
operations. 
Financial loans and credits 
Financing of every kind granted by financial institutions, 
including financing related to commercial transactions or to 
the provision of services in which no resident is participating. 
This category also includes mortgage loans, consumer credit 
and financial leasing, as well as back-up facilities and other 
note-issuance facilities. 
Residents or non-residents 
Natural and legal persons according to the definitions laid 
down in the exchange control regulations in force in each 
Member State. 
Proceeds of liquidation (of investments, securities. etc.) 
Proceeds of sale including any capital appreciation, amount 
of repayments, proceeds of execution of judgments, etc. 
Natural or legal persons 
As defined by the national rules. 
Financial institutions 
Banks, savings banks and institutions specializing in the 
provision of short-term, medium-term and long-term credit, 
and insurance companies, building societies, investment 
companies and other institutions of like character. 
Credit institutions 
Banks, savings banks and institutions specializing in the 
provision of short-term, medium-term and long-term credit. 
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Annex II 
List of operations referred to in Article 3 of the Directive 
Nature of operation 
Operations in securities and other instruments normally dealt in on the money market 
Operations in current and deposit accounts with financial institutions 
Operations in units of collective investment undertakings: undertakings for investment in securities or instruments 
normally dealt in on the money market 
Financial loans and credits: short-term 
Personal capital movements: loans 
Physical import and export of financial assets: 
securities normally dealt in on the money market 
means of payment 
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V 
VI 
Heading 
IV-A and B(c) 
VIII-A and B-1 
XI-A 
XII 
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Annex III 
Referred to in Article 5 of the Directive 
Scope of the provisions of the 1985 Act of Accession relating to capital movements, in accordance with the nomenclature 
of capital movements set out in Annex I to the Directive 
Articles 
of the Act 
of Accession 
(dates of expiry 
of transitional 
provisions) 
Art. 62 
(31.12.1990) 
Art. 63 
(31.12.1990) 
Art. 64 
(31.l2.1988) 
Art. 222 
(31.12.1989) 
Art. 224 
(3 l.l 2.1992) 
Art. 225 & 226 
(31.12.1990) 
Art. 227 
(31.12.1992) 
Art. 228 
(31.12.1990) 
Art. 229 
(31.12.1990) 
Nature of operation 
(a) Provisions concerning the Kingdom of Spain 
Direct investments abroad by residents 
Investments in real estate abroad by residents 
Operations in securities normally dealt in on the capital market: acquisition by residents 
of foreign securities dealt in on a stock exchange, excluding bonds issued on a foreign 
market and denominated in national currency 
Operations in units of collective investment undertakings: acquisition by residents of units 
of collective investment undertakings dealt in on a stock exchange, excluding units of 
undertakings taking the form of common funds 
(b) Provisions concerning the Portuguese Republic 
Direct investments on national territory by non-residents 
Direct investments abroad by resident5 
Investments in real estate on national territory by non-residents 
Investments in real estate abroad by residents 
Personal capital movements: 
(i) for the purpose of applying the higher amounts specified in Article 228 (2): 
Heading 
1-B 
11-B 
III-A-2 
IV-A-2 
I-A 
1-B 
II-A 
11-B 
- dowries XI-C 
inheritances and legacies Xl-D 
- transfers of assets built up by residents in case of emigration at the time of their 
installation or during their period of stay abroad XI-F 
(ii) for the purpose of applying the lower amounts specified in Article 228 (2): 
- gifts and endowments XI-B 
settlement of debts by immigrants in their previous country of residence XI-E 
- transfers of immigrants' savings to their previous country of residence during their 
periodofstay Xl-G 
Operations in securities normally dealt in on the capital market: acquisition by residents 
of foreign securities dealt in on a stock exchange, excluding bonds issued on a foreign 
market and denominated in national currency 
Operations in units of collective investment undertakings: acquisition by residents of units 
of foreign collective investment undertakings dealt in on a stock exchange, excluding units 
of undertakings taking the form of common funds 
lll-A-2 
IV-A-2 
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Annex IV 
Ref erred to in Article 6 (2) of the Directive 
I - The Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic may continue to apply or reintroduce, until 1 October 1989 
and 31 December 1990 respectively, restrictions existing on the date of entry into force of this Directive on capital 
movements given in List I below: 
List I 
Nature of operation 
Operations in units of collective investment undertakings: 
- Acquisition by residents of units of foreign collective investment undertakings dealt in on a stock exchange: 
undertakings subject to Directive 85/6 l l/EEC 1 and taking the form of common funds 
Acquisition by residents of units of foreign collective investment undertakings not dealt in on a stock 
exchange: undertakings subject to Directive 85/61 J/EEC 1 
Heading 
IV-A-2(a) 
JV-A-4(a) 
l Council Directive 85,,611,'EEC on the coordination of laws. regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakmgs for collective investment in transferable securities (Ucits) (OJ No 
L 375. 31.12.19851. 
II - The Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic may continue to apply or reintroduce, until 31 December 1990 
and 31 December 1992 respectively, restrictions existing on the date of entry into force of this Directive on capital 
movements given in List II below: 
List II 
Nature of operation 
Operations in securities normally dealt in on the capital market: 
- Acquisition by residents of foreign securities dealt in on a stock exchange: bonds issued on a foreign market 
and denominated in national currency 
- Acquisition by residents (non-residents) of foreign (domestic) securities not dealt in on a stock exchange 
- Admission of securities to the capital market where they are dealt in on, or in the process of introduction to, 
a stock exchange in a Member State 
Operations in units of collective investment undertakings: 
Acquisition by residents of units of foreign collective investment undertakings dealt in on a stock exchange: 
undertakings not subject to Directive 85/6l l/EEC 1 and taking the form of common funds 
Acquisition by residents (non-residents) of units of foreign (domestic) collective investment undertakings not 
dealt in on a stock exchange: undertakings not subject to Directive 85/611/EECI and the sole object of which 
is the acquisition of assets that have been liberalized 
- Admission to the capital market of units of collective investment undertakings: undertakings subject to 
Directive 85/61 l/EECI 
Credits related to commercial transactions or to the provision of services in which a resident is participating: 
long-term credits 
1 Sec footnote to List I. 
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Heading 
III-A-2(b) 
III-A-3 and 4 
III-8-1 and 2 
IV-A-2 
IV-A-3 and 4 
IV-8-1 and 2(a) 
VII-A and 8-3 
Part Three - Commission proposals for the creation of a European financial area 
III - The Kingdom of Spain and Ireland, until 31 December 1990, and the Hellenic Republic and the Portuguese 
Republic, until 31 December 1992, may continue to apply or reintroduce restrictions existing at the date of entry 
into force of this Directive on capital movements given in List III below: 
List III 
Nature of operation 
Operations in securities dealt in on the capital market: admission of securities to the capital market where they 
are not dealt in on, or in the process of introduction to, a stock exchange in a Member State 
Operations in units of collective investment undertakings: admission to the capital market of units of collective 
investment undertakings undertakings not subject to Directive 85/61 l/EEC 1 and the sole object of which is the 
acquisition of assets that have been liberalized 
Financial loans and credits: medium-term and long-term 
1 See footnote to List I. 
Heading 
Ill-8-1 and 2 
IV-8-1 and 2 
VIII-A, 8-2 and 3 
IV - The Kingdom of Spain and Ireland, until 31 December 1990, and the Hellenic Republic and the Portuguese 
Republic, until 31 December 1992, may defer liberalization of the capital movements given in List IV below: 
List IV 
Nature of operation 
Operations in securities and other instruments normally dealt in on the money market 
Operations in current and deposit accounts with financial institutions 
Operations in units of collective investment undertakings: undertakings for investment in securities or instruments 
normally dealt in on the money market 
Financial loans and credits: short-term 
Personal capital movements: loans 
Physical import and export of financial assets: 
- securities normally dealt in on the money market 
- means of payment 
V 
VI 
Heading 
IV-A and 8(c) 
VIII-A and 8-1 
XI-A 
XII 
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III - Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 72/156/EEC on 
regulating international capital flows and neutralizing their 
undesirable effects on domestic liquidity 
(Presented by the Commission) 
The Council of the European Communities, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity, and in particular Article 70(1) thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, which 
consulted the Monetary Committee for this purpose. 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament, 
Whereas by Directive ... /EEC for the implementation of 
Article 67 of the Treaty, the Council established the free 
movement of capital between the residents of the Member 
States: 
Whereas the Member States shall endeavour to attain the 
highest possible degree of liberalization in respect of move-
ment of capital between the residents of the Community and 
those of third countries: 
Whereas by Directive 72/156/EEC, 1 the Council established 
a set of instruments for regulating international capital flows 
and neutralizing their undesirable effects on domestic liquid-
ity: whereas in view of the fact that the free movement of 
capital within the Community has been established, these 
instruments may be put into operation in order to regulate 
short-term capital movements between residents of the 
Member States of the Community only on the conditions 
and according to the safeguard procedures laid down in ,he 
Treaty and in Directive ... /EEC: whereas Directive 72/156/ 
EEC must be amended accordingly: 
Whereas it must be possible for these instruments to be used 
on a recommendation from the Commission. in order to 
ensure coordinated action by the Member States, in the 
event of short-term capital flows to or from third countries 
leading to serious disturbances in their domestic monetary 
situation and in the stability of exchange rate relationships 
in the European Monetary System: 
Whereas for the sake of clarity, it is advisable to present in 
a single text all the exacting terms of Directive 72/ 156/EEC, 
as amended by this Directive, 
Has adopted this Directive: 
Article 1 
The exacting terms of Directive 72/ 156/EEC shall be re-
placed by the following: 
'Article I 
I. In the arrangements which they apply to the conclusion 
or performance of transactions and to transfers in respect 
of capital movements with third countries, the Member 
States shall endeavour to attain the same degree of liberal-
ization as in the case of operations taking place with resi-
dents of the other Member States of the Community. 
2. The Member States shall inform the Commission of the 
restrictions which they impose on movements of capital to 
or from third countries at the date of entry into force of this 
Directive, and of any subsequent change to these provisions. 
3. The Commission may make recommendations to Member 
States on this subject. 
Article 2 
The Member States shall take all necessary measures to 
ensure that the monetary authorities have available the 
following instruments and are able, where necessary, to put 
them into operation immediately without further enabling 
measures: 
(a) for effective regulation of international capital flows: 
(i) rules governing the constitution of short-term assets 
or liabilities placed with non-residents and payment 
of interest on the short-term holdings of non-resi-
dents; 
(ii) regulation of short-term financial loans and credits 
granted to or contracted with non-residents: 
(b) for the neutralization of those effects produced by inter-
national capital flows on domestic liquidity which are 
considered undesirable: 
(i) regulation of the net external position of credit insti-
1 OJ No L 91, 18.4.1972. p. 13. tutions: 
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(ii) fixing minimum reserve ratios, in particular for the 
holdings of non-residents. 
Article 3 
1. The Member States shall forthwith adopt the necessary 
measures to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith 
inform the Commission thereof. 
2. Each Member State shall, where necessary, and taking 
account of the interests of the other Member States, apply 
all or some of the instruments mentioned in Article 2. 
When these instruments apply to movements of capital oc-
curring between residents of the Member States of the Com-
munity, they may be put into operation only on the con-
ditions and according to the procedures laid down in the 
provisions of the Treaty relating to the use of a safeguard 
clause or in the provisions of Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 
... /EEC for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty. 
Without prejudice to these provisions, the Commission may 
recommend to the Member States that all or some of the 
instruments mentioned in Article 2 be put into operation, in 
the event of short-term capital flows to or from third 
countries leading to serious disturbances in the domestic 
monetary situation and in the stability of exchange rate 
relationships in the European Monetary System. 
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3. When the instruments mentioned in Article 2 are applied, 
the Commission shall ensure close coordination between the 
authorities of the Member States. 
Article 4 
In exercising the powers which are conferred upon it by this 
Directive, the Commission shall act in consultation with the 
Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors of 
the Central Banks. 
Article 5 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.' 
Article 2 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the Council, 
The President 
IV - Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a single facility 
providing medium-term financial support for Member States' 
balances of payments 
(Presented by the Commission) 
The Council of the European Communities, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Articles I 08 and 
235 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, which 
consulted the Monetary Committee for this purpose, 
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament, 
Whereas Article I 08 of the Treaty provides for the granting 
of mutual assistance, to be decided by the Council on a 
proposal from the Commission, to a Member State in diffi-
culties or seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its 
balance of payments; whereas the Resolution of the Euro-
pean Council of 5 December 1978 on the establishment of 
the European Monetary System (EMS) and related matters 
confirmed the need for a Community facility for medium-
term financial assistance of balances of payments; 
Whereas it should be possible for the operation of lending 
to a Member State to take place soon enough in order to 
encourage that Member State to adopt, in good time, meas-
ures likely to prevent the occurrence of an acute balance-of-
payments crisis; 
Whereas a financing facility, in the form of a credit line 
?r a loan commitment to a Member State undertaking to 
implement a capital liberalization programme despite a fra-
gile balance-of-payments situation, should provide back-up 
for such a programme in orderly exchange-rate conditions; 
Whereas each loan to a Member State must be linked to the 
adoption by that Member State of economic policy measures 
designed to re-establish or to ensure a sustainable balance-
of-payments situation and adapted to the gravity of the 
balance-of-payments situation in that State and to the way 
in which it develops; 
Whereas appropriate procedures and instruments should be 
provided for in advance to enable the Community and 
Member States to ensure that, if required, medium-term 
financial support is provided quickly, especially where cir-
cumstances call for immediate action; 
Whereas, in order to finance the support granted, the Com-
munity needs to be able to use its creditworthiness to borrow 
resources that will be placed at the disposal of the Member 
States concerned in the form of loans; whereas operations 
of this kind are necessary for the achievement of the objec-
tives of the Community as defined in the Treaty, especially 
the harmonious development of economic activities in the 
Community as a whole; whereas the Treaty makes no pro-
vision for the specific powers of action required for this 
purpose; 
Whereas by Decision 7 l / 143 /EEC, 1 as amended by Decision 
86/656/EEC,2 the Council set up machinery for providing 
medium-term financial assistance that was initially valid for 
a period of four years from I January 1972; whereas this 
machinery has since been renewed and extended, on the last 
occasion for two years until 31 December 1988 by Decision 
86/656/EEC; whereas this machinery provides for the Mem-
ber States to grant medium-term loans, within certain limits. 
to one or more Member States experiencing balance-of-
payments difficulties; 
Whereas by Regulation (EEC) No 682/81,3 as amended 
by Regulation (EEC) No 1131 /85,4 the Council set up a 
Community loan mechanism designed to support the bal-
ances of payments of the Member States; whereas this mech-
anism provides for the Community to contract loans. ac-
cording to needs and within the limits set on outstanding 
borrowing, in order to on-lend the proceeds to one or more 
Member States experiencing balance-of-payments diffi-
culties; 
Whereas the Community loan mechanism has demonstrated 
its effectiveness; whereas its general design and the arrange-
ments for implementing it still meet the needs of the Com-
munity; whereas, in view of the Community's borrowing 
capacity and of the conditions available to it for borrowing 
from financial institutions or on capital markets, the mech-
anism could constitute the main form of mutual assistance 
provided for under Article I 08 of the Treaty; whereas it 
could also constitute. under certain conditions and in an 
appropriate form. an instrument to provide back-up for a 
programme of capital liberalization; whereas the ceiling on 
amounts outstanding under the mechanism should be ad-
justed accordingly: 
Whereas, however. it is appropriate that the obligation on 
Member States to finance mutual assistance under the ma-
chinery for medium-term financial assistance stays in force 
until the final stage of the European Monetary System so 
as to ensure that system's cohesion and stability, irrespective 
of the conditions prevailing on international capital markets; 
whereas the present procedures for exempting a Member 
State from contributing or for mobilizing Member States' 
claims should, nevertheless, be simplified; 
1 OJL73.27.31971.p.15. 
OJ L 382. 31.12.1986. p. 28. 
1 OJ L 73. 19.3.1981. p. I 
4 OJ L 118. 1.5.1985. p. 59. 
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Whereas it is appropriate to merge medium-term financial 
assistance and the Community loan mechanism into a single 
facility !'or medium-term financial support, while retaining 
their srecilic methods of financing, 
Has adopted this Regulation: 
Article I 
1. In accordance with the decision adopted by the Council 
pursuant to Article 3 or 4 and after consulting the Monetary 
Committee, the Commission shall be empowered to contract 
loans on the capital markets on behalf of the European 
Economic Community, with the aim of lending the proceeds 
to one or more Member States which are experiencing or 
seriously threatened with balance-of-payments difficulties or 
which have undertaken to implement a programme of capital 
liberalization despite a fragile balance-of-payments situ-
ation. 
2. The outstanding amount of loans to be granted to Member 
States pursuant to paragraph I shall be limited to ... million 
ECU in principal. 
Article 2 
Where a Member State proposes to call upon sources of 
conditional financing outside the Community, it shall first 
consult the Commission and the other Member States in 
order to examine, among other things, the possibilities avail-
able under the Community facility for medium-term finan-
cial support. Such consultations shall be held within the 
Monetary Committee. 
Article 3 
1. On the initiative of the Commission acting pursuant to 
Article 108 of the Treaty or of the Member State experienc-
ing balance-of-payments difficulties and seeking a Com-
munity loan, the Council, after examining the situation in 
that Member State and the adjustment programme that it 
has undertaken to implement, shall decide, as a rule during 
the same meeting: 
(i) whether to grant the loan, and the amount of the loan; 
(ii) the average duration of. and the techniques for disburs-
ing the loan, which may be paid in one amount or in 
several instalments; 
(iii) the economic policy conditions attaching to the loan, 
with a view to re-establishing a sustainable balance-of-
payments situation. 
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2. If the amount available under the ceiling referred to in 
Article I (2) is insufficient, or if the conditions available on 
international capital markets are unsatisfactory, Community 
loans to Member States experiencing balance-of-payments 
difficulties shall be financed in full or in part by the other 
Member States, whose contributions in principal may not 
exceed the ceilings specified in the Annex. 
In such cases, the Council, in addition to taking the decisions 
referred to in paragraph 1, shall decide on the size of the 
Member States' contributions to the financing of the loan 
and on the financial conditions attaching to the credits they 
make available in that connection. The Council may exempt 
from contributing any Member State which maintains that 
difficulties exist or can be foreseen as regards its balance of 
payments. 
Article 4 
1. On the initiative of a Member State undertaking to im-
plement a capital liberalization programme despite a fragile 
balance-of-payments situation, the Council, after examining 
the situation in that Member State and the back-up pro-
gramme presented in support of its application, shall decide, 
as a rule during the same meeting: 
(i) whether to grant a financing facility, in the form of a 
credit line or an undertaking to grant a loan, which 
may be activated at the request of the beneficiary Mem-
ber State as and when the need arises and for a period 
that may not normally exceed one year; 
(ii) the overall amount of resources allocated; 
(iii) the back-up measures accompanying the liberalization 
of capital movements with a view to ensuring a sus-
tainable balance-of-payments situation. 
2. Loans drawn under the financing facility and granted 
pursuant to paragraph I shall, as a rule, have a term of one 
year renewable for a further one-year period. 
3. In cases where restrictions on capital movements are 
introduced or re-introduced during the term of the loan, the 
latter may be consolidated only within the framework of a 
longer-term loan granted as mutual assistance pursuant to 
Article 108 of the Treaty. 
Article 5 
The Commission shall take the necessary measures to verify 
at regular intervals, in collaboration with the Monetary 
Committee, that the economic policy of the Member State 
in receipt of a Community loan accords with the adjustment 
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or back-up programme and with any other conditions laid 
down by the Council pursuant to Article 3 or 4. To this end, 
the Member State shall place all the necessary information 
at the disposal of the Commission. On the basis of the 
findings of such verification, the Commission and, where 
appropriate, the Member States holding claims under the 
facility shall release further instalments. The Council shall 
decide on any adjustment to be made to the initial economic 
policy conditions. 
Article 6 
I. Loans granted as medium-term financial support shall 
have a term of one year or more. They may be granted as 
consolidation of short-term monetary support made avail-
able by the central banks of the Member States. 
2. At the request of the beneficiary Member State, such 
loans may carry the option of early repayment. 
3. Normally, no Member State may draw on this facility to 
the extent of more than 50 % of the ceiling referred to in 
Article 1 (2). 
Article 7 
1. The borrowing and lending operations referred to in 
Article 1 shall be carried out using the same value date and 
shall not involve the Community in the transformation of 
maturities or in any exchange or interest-rate risk. 
When the borrowings are expressed, payable or repayable 
in the currency of a Member State, they may be concluded 
only after consultation with the competent authorities of 
that Member State. 
Where a Member State receives a loan carrying an early 
repayment clause and decides to invoke this option, the 
Commission shall take the necessary steps after consulting 
the Monetary Committee. 
2. At the request of the debtor Member State and where 
circumstances permit an improvement in the interest rate 
on the loans, the Commission may, after consulting the 
Monetary Committee, refinance all or part of its initial 
borrowings or restructure the corresponding financial con-
ditions. 
Refinancing or restructuring shall not have the effect of 
extending the average duration of the borrowings concerned 
or increasing the amount, expressed at the current exchange 
rate, of capital outstanding at the date of the refinancing or 
restructuring. 
3. The costs incurred by the Community in concluding and 
carrying out each operation shall be borne by the beneficiary 
Member State. 
Article 8 
1. If one or more Member States that are creditors under 
this facility experience difficulties as regards their balance-
of-payments and/or a sudden decline in their foreign cur-
rency reserves, they may request mobilization of their claims. 
The Council, having due regard to the circumstances, shall 
decide to mobilize such claims, in particular in accordance 
with one of the following procedures, or a combination 
thereof: 
(i) by refinancing from Community borrowings from fi-
nancial institutions or on capital markets: 
(ii) by a transfer of the claim to other creditor Member 
States: 
(iii) by early repayment in full or in part by the debtor 
Member State or States. 
2. Where refinancing takes place in accordance with para-
graph 1, the debtor Member State shall agree that its debt, 
originally denominated in one currency, shall be replaced by 
a debt denominated in the currency used for the refinancing. 
Where applicable, the debtor Member State shall bear any 
additional cost resulting from an alteration in the interest 
rate and the costs incurred by the Community in concluding 
and carrying out the operation. 
3. Any creditor Member State may arrange with one or 
more other Member States for the partial or total transfer 
of its claims. The Member States concerned shall notify the 
Commission and the other Member States of the transfer. 
4. Any Member State that is a creditor in respect of a loan 
carrying an early repayment clause shall take the requisite 
steps where the debtor Member State decides to invoke 
this option. The Member States concerned shall notify the 
Commission and the other Member State~ of the operation. 
Article 9 
For the application of the ceilings referred to in Articles 
1 (2) and 3(2), the loan operations shall be recorded at the 
exchange rate of the day on which they arc concluded. The 
repayment operations shall be recorded at the exchange rate 
of the day on which the corresponding loan was concluded. 
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Article JO 
The Council shall adopt the decisions referred to in Articles 
3, 4, 5 and 8, acting by qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission, made after consulting the Monetary 
Committee on the matter. 
Article 11 
The European Monetary Cooperation Fund shall make the 
necessary arrangements for the administration of the loans. 
The funds shall be paid only to central banks and shall be 
used only for the purposes indicated in Article I. 
Article 12 
No later than five years after the adoption of this Regulation, 
the Council shall examine, on the basis of a report from the 
Commission, after delivery of an opinion by the Monetary 
Committee and following consultation with the European 
Parliament, whether the facility established still meets, in its 
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principle, its arrangements and its ceiling, the needs which 
led to its creation. 
Article 13 
I. Regulation (EEC) No 682/81 and Decision 71/143/EEC 
are hereby repealed. 
2. Amounts not yet repaid under outstanding Community 
loan operations concluded pursuant to Regulation (EEC) 
No 682/81 before the date of entry into force of this Regu-
lation shall count against the ceiling referred to in Article 
I (2) at their initial value in EC Us. 
3. References to the instruments repealed by virtue of para-
graph I shall be deemed to be references to this Regulation. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the Council, 
The President 
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Annex 
The ceilings for credits provided for in Article 3(2) shall be as follows: 
Member State Million %of 
ECU total 
Belgium 875 6,28 
Denmark 407 2,92 
Germany 2 715 19,50 
Greece 235 1,69 
Spain 1 132 8,13 
France 2 715 19,50 
Ireland 158 1,13 
Italy 1 810 13,00 
Luxembourg 31 0,22 
Netherlands 905 6,50 
Portugal 227 1,63 
United Kingdom 2 715 19,50 
Total 13 925 100,00 
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